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The term Occupy represents a belief in the transformation of the capitalist 
system through a new heterogenic world of protest and activism that cannot 
be conceived in terms of liberal democracy, parliamentary systems, class war 
or vanguard politics. These conceptualisations do not articulate where power 
is held, nor from where transformation may issue. This collection of essays by 
world-leading scholars of Deleuze and Guattari examines how capitalism can 
be understood as a global abstract machine whose effects pervade all of life and 
how Occupy can be framed as a response to this as a heterogenic movement 
based on new tactics, revitalised democratic processes and nomadic systems of 
organisation. Seeing the question as a political tactic aimed at delegitimizing 
their protest, Occupiers refused to answer the question ‘what do you want? 
Occupy: A People Yet to Come goes a considerable way towards providing the 
terms upon which this refusal can be understood within a changed landscape of 
political activism and the rewriting of the conventions of political protest.
With essays by Claire Colebrook, Giuseppina Mecchia, John Protevi, Rodrigo 
Nunes, Verena Andermatt Conley, Nicholas Thoburn, Ian Buchanan, David 
Burrows, Eugene Holland and Andrew Conio.
Series: Critical Climate Change
Philosophy/Political
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Senior Lecturer in Fine Art at the School of Music and Fine Art, Kent 
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Series Editors: Tom Cohen and Claire Colebrook
The era of climate change involves the mutation of sys-
tems beyond 20th century anthropomorphic models and 
has stood, until recently, outside representation or address. 
Understood in a broad and critical sense, climate change 
concerns material agencies that impact on biomass and 
energy, erased borders and microbial invention, geological 
and nanographic time, and extinction events. The possibil-
ity of extinction has always been a latent figure in textual 
production and archives; but the current sense of deple-
tion, decay, mutation and exhaustion calls for new modes 
of address, new styles of publishing and authoring, and new 
formats and speeds of distribution. As the pressures and re-
alignments of this re-arrangement occur, so must the critical 
languages and conceptual templates, political premises and 
definitions of ‘life.’ There is a particular need to publish in 
timely fashion experimental monographs that redefine the 
boundaries of disciplinary fields, rhetorical invasions, the in-
terface of conceptual and scientific languages, and geomor-
phic and geopolitical interventions. Critical Climate Change 
is oriented, in this general manner, toward the epistemo-
political mutations that correspond to the temporalities of 
terrestrial mutation.
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Preface
End the Occupation,  
Long Live Occupy!
Claire Colebrook
I
At the time of this book going to press, amidst all the diverging politi-
cal theories and commentaries regarding how the twenty-first century 
might cope with the intertwined complexities of climate change, collaps-
ing global finance, wars on terror that are also wars on freedom, potential 
viral pandemics and increasing disaster scenarios (with increased vulner-
ability to disaster for the less fortunate) one thing seems clear enough: 
end the occupation. The attacks by Israel on Gaza have not received 
unanimous condemnation; there are still those, especially in the United 
States, who – for all the disproportionate suffering inflicted on those 
trapped in Gaza – still see Israel as having some right to defend itself, and 
still maintain that conflict was instigated by Hamas and therefore not 
subject to any critique outside the right of Israel to ‘respond.’ Regardless 
of the competing histories, narratives, conflicting allegiances and com-
plexities, it nevertheless seems clear that ending the occupation would be 
the best and quickest way to end widespread and ongoing violence.
Why does ending occupation, amidst all this complexity, appear to 
be such a clear and just thing to do? There are two identities – the State 
of Israel and the Palestinians in Gaza – both of whom can lay claim to 
having suffered displacement and both of whom can seem to ask quite 
legitimately for a territory of their own. In the ongoing demands for a sta-
ble and peaceful future, perhaps one would support a two-state solution, 
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or perhaps there are other alternatives, but ending occupation seems an 
immediate imperative before anything else might be achieved, and occu-
pation seems to be a simple and unqualified evil: a people were residing 
in a territory, and that residence was taken over from without. Even if 
one regards Hamas’s reaction to occupation as terrorism (rather than a 
war between a funded military force and those who have to find other 
means) the overwhelming fact is that Gaza is occupied. It was ‘originally’ 
Palestinian territory by virtue of the presence of those who are now 
imprisoned in Gaza. Here we strike a small difficulty with the concept 
of original occupation, which perhaps needs to be thought of as ‘prior’ 
occupation. The state of Israel is not occupying land that is terra nullius. 
This might allow us to think of ‘minor’ occupation – whereby a people is 
formed by occupying a space, with the space becoming the place that it is 
by way of occupation. This would need to be contrasted with ‘molar’ or 
‘majoritarian’ occupation, whereby a world map is already laid out with 
established nations and agents who then lay claim (or not) to the right 
to occupy a space. Occupation is – initially – a form of territorialization, 
a becoming who one is, or becoming ‘a’ people by way of assembling in 
a spatial zone. Taking away a territory is not only taking away a people’s 
being – their right to exist and their existence – it is also the creation of a 
different register. Rather than an earth that is occupied by peoples there 
is a map of states, polities, geopolitics, markets, relations and nations that 
overcode and negotiate the distribution of peoples across the earth.
To follow Deleuze and Guattari on this question: occupying space is 
not something ‘a’ people does. Something like a people emerges through 
the occupation of a field, which in turn becomes a space. If this is so, then 
one can see history, geopolitics, capitalism and the war on terror as a 
problem of territorialization and deterritorialization. Most simply, capi-
talism deterritorializes in many different ways but one way is to gener-
ate a field of exchange, markets, finance, debts, and labor flows that pre-
clude any territory from being simply what it is. The occupation of any 
space becomes overcoded by another virtual space – the world of capital, 
and arms industries – and nowhere is this more evident than in the US 
response to Israel, where the simple moral demand to end occupation is 
neither fully enforced nor fully articulated because of that other register 
of ‘security,’ which will ensure that global trade, militarization and force 
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become a smooth operating system with no other imperative outside the 
system’s own ongoing function or operation. This is capitalism’s cynicism 
that allows for any belief whatever, and then allows for the market and 
exchange not only to operate regardless of belief but also to commodify 
belief by generating ‘green,’ ‘feminist,’ ‘queer’ and even ‘activist’ commod-
ities (such as Jay-Z’s marketing of ‘Occupy All Streets’ t-shirts).
Here is where – despite first appearances – Deleuze and Guattari’s 
philosophy allows for a nuanced political (or micro-political) account of 
occupation. At first glance their thought would seem to offer nothing but 
a violent relativism of force: there is no such thing as a people or a terri-
tory prior to occupation. Something becomes what it is by forming rela-
tions with what it is not, and those relations become relatively stable, but 
always and necessarily subject to deterritorialization. When a territory 
– Gaza – is represented by a single body – Hamas – one set of relations 
(bodies in space) has been overtaken by another set of relations (political 
identities and allegiances), and this other strata or register then becomes 
reterritorialized on a single system (capital) that quite like Deleuze and 
Guattari’s own philosophy acknowledges no essential territories or rela-
tions. But the difference resides in capital’s reference of all relations and 
territories back to a global system of maintaining a global system. So, yes, 
there is nothing in Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy that grants anyone 
any right to anything; all identities and territories begin with appropria-
tion and deterritorialization, becoming what and who one is in relations 
that are not one’s own. Any attempt to grant supreme importance to a 
single territory – the United Nations (UN), the World Bank, capitalism, 
democracy – is a form of violence that precludes the very dynamism that 
brings anything into being.
But there are two modes of occupation: minor and molar. Minor occu-
pation produces a territory through occupation so that a people or move-
ment comes into being by way of assembling and taking up space. We 
might say that all indigenous peoples, by definition, are forms of minor 
occupation insofar as their being has no existence outside the taking up 
of space. The sequences is not, ‘this is who I am and what I stand for, and 
therefore I have a right to occupy,’ but rather, ‘this is occupied space, and 
therefore this is who we have turned out to be.’ In the Occupy movement 
that inspired this volume the logic of minor occupation was at work. Yes, 
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Wall Street was the site for a people – finance, banking – and yes, this site 
was overtaken and occupied by protestors. The logic was not, ‘this is our 
space and we have a right to this space because of who we are what we 
represent and because we stand for humanity in general.’ On the contrary, 
the occupation began and then certain motifs of proportion or statistics 
were made quite explicit: to say ‘we are the 99%’ is less a claim of identity, 
property and right and more a claim of assembling. And if Wall Street 
was based on a deterritorialized system of owning space because some 
system other than occupation was at work (real estate, property, coloni-
zation of space), the Occupy movement was based on ‘higher deterrito-
rialization.’ Rather than right or ownership or taking back what was owed 
to ‘us,’ there was no ‘us’ or ‘we’ outside the event of occupation.
I would suggest that the same applies to Israel and Gaza: the Israeli 
defense force is adopting majoritarian or molar occupation, appealing to 
a narrative of nation, right, security, constituted peoples and property. 
Tragically, those abandoned in Gaza, cannot appeal to any straightfor-
ward conception of nation – but Gaza is where they are. All they have is 
their occupation of space, a space that has then been occupied by a force 
that does not simply counter-occupy but places the competing claims to 
space as some grand narrative of security, nation, legitimacy and right. It 
might seem quixotic, and violently so, to suggest that rather than respond 
with a counter-narrative of right and nation one imagines a world of 
occupation without right. Such a new earth would not set the occupa-
tion of a territory within a moral framework but would instead begin 
with occupation – the assembling across a space that generates ‘a’ people, 
and then enables certain narratives of rights to be formed ex post facto. 
Such a call for a radically immanent politics might be naïvely wishful, but 
here I would quote Isabelle Stengers and Philippe Pignarre who affirmed 
the possibility that was articulated at the Seattle protests (prior to the 
Occupy movements) that another world would be possible:
Becoming the child of an event: not being born again into 
innocence, but daring to inhabit the possible as such, with-
out the adult precautions that make threats of the type ‘what 
will people say?’, ‘who will they take us for?’ or ‘and you think 
that is enough?’ prevail. The event creates its own ‘now’ to 
which the question of a certain ‘acting as if ’, which is proper 
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to children when they make things (up), responds. (Stengers 
and Pignarre 2011: 4)
II
Deleuze and Guattari once declared that it was not easy being 
Heideggerian. By this I take them to mean not that Heidegger was a 
difficult thinker (for then they might have said the same about Kant or 
Leibniz), nor that it was unfashionable to be a Heideggerian phenome-
nologist in the late twentieth century (for then they might have said the 
same about any of their more obscure commitments to less canonical 
figures, such as Raymond Ruyer or less politically tolerable writers such 
as Henry Miller or Ezra Pound). Rather, there is something intrinsically 
risk-laden about the possibility of Heidegger’s philosophy that takes us 
to the heart of the relation between philosophy and politics, or the pol-
ity. Philosophy is possible by way of deterritorialization: the formation of 
the polity occurs when life’s relation to the earth shifts in register and one 
can create concepts that are not extensive (regarding what there is), but 
intensive (or what one might be able to think). It is in What is Philosophy? 
(1991) that Deleuze and Guattari theorize the geopolitical conditions of 
philosophy, tying philosophy to an agonistics that can only occur among 
friends who can be genuinely combative at a conceptual level because 
they are occupying a terrain of luxury that liberates them from immediate 
material production. (A similar notion of philosophical agonistics was 
articulated by Jacques Derrida in Politics of Friendship (1994), where he 
quoted William Blake’s ‘Do be My Enemy for Friendship’s Sake,’ (Derrida 
2005: 72)). If one is bound to another for reasons of state or diplomacy 
then relations are mediated by some external measure of justice or propri-
ety, but if there is nothing at stake other than the struggle itself then the 
genuine force (of concepts) can take hold. Deleuze and Guattari argue 
that certain geopolitical forces need to have played themselves out and 
constituted a specific territory for philosophical agonistics to emerge.
Their theorization of the philosophical plane of concept-creation has 
got them into quite a bit of trouble, given that they tied their observa-
tion to a specific limitation of democracy with regard to the ‘becoming 
of subjected peoples.’ Here, they argue that ‘Europeanization’ needs to be 
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distinguished from becoming, just as in A Thousand Plateaus (1980) they 
argue that there is no ‘becoming-man’:
Why are there so many becomings of man, but no becom-
ing-man? First because man is majoritarian par excellence, 
whereas becomings are minoritarian; all becoming is a 
becoming-minoritarian. When we say majority, we are refer-
ring not to a greater relative quantity but to the determination 
of a state or standard in relation to which larger quantities, 
as well as the smallest, can be said to be minoritarian: white-
man, adult-male, etc. Majority implies a state of domination, 
not the reverse. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 291)
In this sense the 99% remains as a minority (as do those ‘living’ in Gaza), 
not because they are fewer in number but because their identity has no 
basis outside the assembling in common. By contrast, the becoming 
of ‘man,’ has an internal end or telos towards which history is oriented. 
Both the figure of European reason and ‘man,’ go through time in order 
to realize their proper potential, in order to arrive at their own freedom, 
liberated from any specified form. Such a conception of democracy as 
a becoming that is nothing other than its own unfolding – as free self-
determination – needs to be differentiated from Deleuze and Guattari’s 
theorization of becoming as always ‘becoming-…’ (becoming-animal, 
becoming-woman, becoming-imperceptible), where becoming is not a 
self-unfolding but always in a relation with what is not one’s own. This 
is why philosophy and art, they argue, allow for a creativity that can only 
occur by way of ‘a people that are lacking’; one does not write because 
one is a member of a polity, for it is writing and creation that occur only 
in the absence of an autonomous or proper becoming:
The creation of concepts in itself calls for a future form, for a 
new earth and people that do not yet exist. Europeanization 
does not constitute a becoming but merely the history of cap-
italism, which prevents the becoming of subjected peoples. 
Art and philosophy converge at this point: the constitution 
of an earth and a people that are lacking as the correlate of 
creation. It is not populist writers but the most aristocratic 
who lay claim to this future. This people and earth will not be 
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found in our democracies. Democracies are majorities, but a 
becoming is by its nature that which always eludes the major-
ity. The position of many writers with respect to democracy 
is complex and ambiguous. The Heidegger affair has compli-
cated matters: a great philosopher actually had to be reterri-
torialized on Nazism for the strangest commentaries to meet 
up, sometimes calling his philosophy into question and some-
times absolving it through such complicated and convoluted 
arguments that we are still in the dark. It is not always easy 
to be Heideggerian. It would be easier to understand a great 
painter or musician falling into shame in this way (but, pre-
cisely, they did not). It had to be a philosopher, as if shame had 
to enter into philosophy itself. He wanted to rejoin the Greeks 
through the Germans, at the worst moment in their history: is 
there anything worse, said Nietzsche, than to find oneself fac-
ing a German when one was expecting a Greek? How could 
Heidegger’s concepts not be intrinsically sullied by an abject 
reterritorialization? (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 108–09)
How might we approach this argument regarding Heidegger, concepts, 
philosophy, shame, and a future ‘people and earth?’ For Heidegger, phi-
losophy had at one and the same time covered over the essentially non-
essentially nature of being, and the intrinsically inauthentic nature of 
authenticity. Because philosophy emerges in a leisured and aristocratic 
condition, freed from an economy of material production and occurs 
amongst friends who have the space to be antagonistic, it is capable of creat-
ing concepts. If you are genuinely my friend and we have the luxury of 
speaking in a manner of absolute war – because the conversation is in a 
different register from the day-to-day constituted demands of the body 
– then we can start to create concepts on a different plane: we might ask 
what justice really is only if the answer is not bound by immediate mate-
rial consequences and institutions. It is only in the absence of political 
and material diplomacy that genuine friendship opens genuine agonis-
tics. For Heidegger philosophers broke away from the everyday world 
of projects, concerns, meanings, and the ready-at-hand; and they could 
do so because that world of projects could be rendered inoperative by 
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asking the question not of what this thing is for me, but what this thing or 
being is as such.
It is in a moment of disorientation, or a certain loss of world, that 
one might start to think not of a world that is always already human but 
an earth (the forces from which the human world are composed). We 
might say that what Deleuze and Guattari refer to elsewhere as the ‘war 
machine,’ or an agonistics that has not been captured by opposing sides 
(such as political parties, nations, identified groups or communities), is 
only possible when there is no actual war: in a state of war one holds on 
to who one is, where one is, what one stands for and what one believes. 
Doing so reduces the intensity of the war machine to stabilized terms and 
oppositions; the war machine would be destructive of such a terrain. In 
this respect Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy, like Heidegger’s, is not at 
all easy because it abandons the negotiation of a field, abandons settle-
ment among terms and instead aims for a ‘higher deterritorialization’: in 
both cases one thinks the relation between ‘world’ (constituted mean-
ing) and ‘earth’ (the plane that renders such constitution possible but 
also fragile). Heidegger argued both that one can ask questions and begin 
to think only because one has a world (a horizon of meaning, concern, 
care, others, history and ‘ownness’) and that one becomes aware of the 
having of a world when the world breaks down. Authenticity is therefore 
not so much attachment to the projects and horizons that make us who 
we are, but a sense that while all we do and think emerges from the ‘life-
world,’ what is truly worth thinking about is that there is a world, and that 
it might not be. This does not mean that living authentically is liberation 
from any identity, history, project or tradition, but that having a world or 
tradition is something one takes on with a radical sense of decision. We 
can only take up a free and decisive relation to a world that was not of our 
own deciding, and nothing legitimates that world other than that world 
itself. And here, of course, is where things start to become ‘not at all easy’ 
as a Heideggerian. One might not only say that there are certain material 
and geopolitical conditions for adopting one’s world freely and decisively, 
and that for Heidegger these conditions were tied to a German National 
Socialism that aimed to eradicate anything that appeared as too inert 
or unthinking to embrace radical self-becoming. One might also point 
out, as Jacques Derrida has done, that a certain notion of contemporary 
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politics, democracy and modernity as a lazy consensus and acquiescence 
to passively received political forms was crucial to Nazi anti-Semitic 
rhetoric that relied on refusing democracy as a contamination of the 
truly decisive freedom of spirit. Democracy, parliamentary representa-
tion, communication and politics in its day-to-day combative forms were 
(for the Nazis and twentieth-century fascism) the hallmarks of a world 
dominated by money and an unquestioning acceptance of the consti-
tuted field. As Derrida pointed out in his reading of Benjamin, the dream 
of a ‘divine violence’ that would annihilate the ongoing order of received 
law was perilously close to the National Socialist rhetoric of renewal and 
redemption through a form of cultural rebirth (Derrida 1994).
One might then go on, as Deleuze and Guattari do, and tie the 
Heidegger affair to a problem of philosophy and its aristocratic temper. 
Philosophy is deterritorialization or the production of a register different 
and distant from the constituted terms of a polity; it is the refusal of the 
plane of functions, communication and certainly of ‘the people.’ Is it any 
wonder, then, that this notion of authentic and decisive thinking could so 
easily align itself with another territory – in Heidegger’s case the German 
Volk who were not one populace among others but the privileged people 
for thinking world-creation?
Bearing that in mind, we might say that today it is not easy being 
Deleuzo-Guattarian, and not just because their thought is abstruse, out 
of favor (in the new materialist turns) or irrelevant, but because their 
celebrated rhetoric of nomadism and deterritorialization is a luxury that 
displaced persons without a territory, or whose territory is occupied, 
cannot afford. Worse, as their criticism of communication and democ-
racy above seems to suggest, a certain privilege is attached to those who 
are not mired in literal and material antagonism but can occupy another 
plane, of pure conversation. One might suggest that their celebration of 
deterritorialized philosophy offers a glib dismissal of a certain mode of 
capitalist democracy – the democracy of free markets and imposed con-
ceptions of the consumer-oriented private individual – but reinstalls a 
hyper-democratic prejudice: some traditions, such as Western philoso-
phy, have at their heart the potential to distance themselves from any 
constituted tradition such that ‘democracy’ would not be a worldview or 
tradition so much as a critical mood or irony with regard to any tradition. 
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International interventions that impose, maintain or secure democracy 
are supposedly not undertaken for the sake of this or that constituted 
people, but for some abstract or virtual ideal of humanity in general.
Against such a reading of Deleuze and Guattari’s rhetoric of deterrito-
rialization and nomadism as yet one more way in which the West uses a 
concept of the universal to impose its own norms, presenting itself as the 
ideology that is no ideology, and – worse – of using concepts of nomad-
ism and deterritorialization in a world where real events of displace-
ment are life and death matters, I want to suggest that we think seriously 
about Deleuze and Guattari’s claim for a new people and a new earth as a 
genuinely futural endeavor. It is not easy being Deleuzo-Guattarian pre-
cisely because such talk of a people to come, deterritorialization, the war 
machine and nomadism appears at best uselessly naïve and at worst as 
violently appropriative. How dare one celebrate at a metaphorical level 
a placelessness that is traumatically painful for many who do not have 
the luxury of the philosophical view from nowhere? Isn’t such a strat-
egy stupid, risky and far too abstract to be of any use in urgent political 
struggles? What we need – it might be said – is not abstraction and deter-
ritorialization, but history, facts, distinction, and –more than anything – 
the affirmation of what is genuinely owed to a people who have had their 
land, their personhood and their conditions for living stolen.
At the time of this volume’s going into production the world was wit-
ness to such violent occupation and literal deterritorialization. Despite 
pressure from the international community, and despite widespread 
condemnation in much of the press and social media, the Israeli defense 
forces continued to assault and wage war on the occupied territories. 
Originally conceived in the wake of the radical and revolutionary Occupy 
movements across the globe, this collection of essays could (it seemed 
in 2012) quite easily contest capitalist and supposedly liberal ideologies 
of property by celebrating radical potentials for becoming, dissolution, 
non-identity and a notion of movement without place or clearly defined 
ends. Indeed, one might say that the neoliberal rhetoric of ends, out-
comes, success and even personhood had done much to precipitate the 
increasing reterritorialization of all political possibilities on market effi-
ciency and corporate personhood. To celebrate a certain destructiveness 
without clearly defined ends, a certain non-productivity and even social 
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dissension, dispersal and vagueness at the time of Occupy was both 
a timely response to those who accused Occupy of not being a clearly 
defined social movement, and provided a clear foil against the discourse 
of property and right that had allowed profoundly anti-democratic mea-
sures to be put in place lest the entire market and workforce be van-
quished by an even more catastrophic crisis of the financial sector. But, 
today, as a people who need to see themselves as a people with a territory 
and a history are subject to warfare, displacement, carnage and dehuman-
ization, what use would philosophical abstraction and anti-democratic 
distance serve? One might say – as Derrida’s critics did in his claim that 
South African apartheid required a sense of the entire Western tradi-
tion’s implication in national identity and apartness – that what is needed 
now is not a critique of territory, nations, identity, peoples and place, but 
an acute sense of facts, history, data, locatedness and immediate policy 
(McClintock and Nixon 1986).
But here we can say, with Deleuze and Guattari, that the immediate 
needs of molar politics – claims such as those of the women’s movement, 
or today demands for a Palestinian state and the right of a people to exist 
– do not preclude micro-political analysis and imagination. And here is 
where we go back to philosophy and risk: if we do not hold on to ideas of 
a people being entitled to the territory that is the milieu of their history 
and identity, do we not risk riding roughshod and violently over what – 
within the milieu of world politics and history – is a legitimate and fun-
damental right of the Palestinian people to autonomy, life and liberty? 
Yes, that is true: to question notions of territory, of peoples, of nations 
and of democracy is to risk falling into a managerial bio-politics that 
would undertake any means whatever to preserve life as such regardless 
of historical and political complexities. But it is also a way of enabling a 
post-territorial politics or a politics of higher deterritorialization. It is the 
same rhetoric of territory, right, history, what it is to be a people – and 
the rhetoric of holding on to historical complexities, and specific conflict 
histories – that not only is appropriated by the state of Israel to defend 
violent attacks that are anything but defensive, necessary or responsive; 
it also allows for certain styles of reporting (where both sides are repre-
sented fairly, when the ultimate issue should be the violence of sides), and
encourages ‘who started the conflict’ modes of reasoning. What stands 
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for democracy – or the debates and wars between and among identities 
that are constituted in a capitalist milieu of geopolitical borders produced 
by markets, trade agreements, and histories of appropriative nation states 
tied to warring territories constituted by trade competition – needs to be 
displaced by a mode of thinking in which no-one has a prima facie right, 
whatever the history, to occupy. What needs to be thought are less the 
molar categories of ‘the people,’ and ‘the nation,’ and instead the micro-
political potentials that might open a new people and a new earth.
Rather than think of molar politics and minor politics as an opposi-
tion, it might be best to think of oppositional narratives versus narratives 
devoid of scale. That is to say, one could start to approach the Israel–
Gaza conflict through the history of anti-Semitism, the horrors of the 
Holocaust and the desperate need for state security as a response to ter-
ror, or one could adopt a history of the Palestinian people and Hamas 
and the insecurity of Muslim culture in a Middle Eastern zone increas-
ingly tied towards alignment with the interests of the US, capital, energy 
markets and other affiliations that have little to do with the survival of 
the people who are supposedly represented by governments, parties and 
brotherhoods. Molar politics focuses upon ‘a’ history of nation and party 
formation, and geopolitical border disputes; such competing narrations 
enable debates over the proper nature of scale: should the Israel –Gaza 
conflict be framed by the specter of the Holocaust and anti-Semitism, or 
by the other history of displacement of the Palestinian people? Deleuze 
and Guattari’s micro-politics is not opposed to the molar, but pulverizes 
any such identity: any nation, party, people or brotherhood has as its con-
dition of emergence thousands of years of a taming of the earth (includ-
ing oil and other lines of capital), and no dispute over borders has a nat-
ural or proper scale. Rather than the banal claim that beneath religious, 
political, tribal or ethnic conflicts ‘we’ are all human – which of course is 
the violent imposition of a humanity of recognition and would demand 
that we all become liberal and distanced from the affiliations that mark 
out our territories – Deleuze and Guattari see difference as multiply-
ing rather than weakening in micro-political analysis. Neither the Israeli 
defense forces nor Hamas can contain the proliferation of differences 
and identities that both sides violently seek to ‘represent.’ So rather than 
a democratic politics that would negotiate one people versus another, 
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or that would reconcile the rights of people over territories, one might 
think beyond persons, beyond the demos, beyond the polity. One might 
start to consider how the earth – not the world – might generate a peo-
ple to come, a people without right, ownership or propriety. Such a call 
for a world in common without propriety, without identity and without 
nations and that would be beyond the world by thinking the forces of the 
earth would not be easy. It would risk, as so many people have objected 
with regard to Deleuze and Guattari’s work, a celebration of statelessness 
and impersonal life precisely when the world’s most fragile people are 
seeking a territory and state of their own. But we need to ask, today, both 
when climate change and environmental collapse have been ignored as 
viable political concerns because states are concerned with their own sur-
vival, and when – as the Occupy movement demonstrated, states repre-
sent corporations rather then people – whether the ideals of personhood 
and nation are not more risky. Do not concepts of right and nation risk 
generating higher degrees of catastrophe than a possible future where 
there are not territories and peoples, but a new people and a new earth, 
no longer bound by the macro-narratives of the world and polities.
The heightened Israeli violence against Gaza occurs just as the earth – 
not the world but the earth (or the geological strata from which philoso-
phy and various forms of humanity formed itself) – is poised at a singular 
point or threshold that would render all human life in its current mode 
untenable. Rather than extending capitalist democracy – a democracy 
that represents persons as private consumers with the right to self-deter-
mination – perhaps a better path would be to intensify the forces from 
which diverse peoples emerge, beyond states, markets, territories and 
right. The assaults on Gaza and the use of the figure of Hamas to destroy 
the lives of civilians is perhaps one of the more violent and flagrant events 
that have allowed the borders of states, markets, nations and molar iden-
tities to reduce the complex differences of people who do not have a state 
or a territory.
If it is not that easy being Heideggerian or Deleuzo-Guattarian, then 
one might insist that such difficulties are minor – very minor – when 
compared with the struggle to live in the occupied territories. Rather 
than see the means of violence – the state – as a right that should be 
extended, a minor politics would intensify forces that are irreducible to 
22 Claire Colebrook
the state, disentangling Judaism in all its forms from Israel, and differen-
tiating Islam from Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, and – in turn – 
disentangling life and the earth from the striated space of East and West.
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Introduction
Andrew Conio
I. A Political Ontology of Flow
Life flows. Societies, economies, and political systems channel flows to 
produce things, functional processes and systems. Processes congeal to 
make autopoietic and highly relational social structures. The language 
of painting or music can be used to describe social processes because 
society is a mobile composition of points, lines and rhythms. Out of 
flows, densities, contractions, planes and surfaces compositions emerge. 
Deleuze and Guattari call them assemblages, milieus or plateaus. Every 
society in history has operated on the basis of flows and distributions. 
Capitalism’s coding and decoding, de and reterritorialization, provide the 
most fluid and mobile compositional template of them all. ‘Capitalism 
… decodes and deterritorializes with all its might’; it is a non-territori-
ally based axiomatic of flows, but its distributions are dysfunctional as 
they channel wealth and power into the hands of the few (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2000: 369).
Deleuze’s politics cannot be thought outside of his aesthetics because 
he captures this struggle between flows that travel unimpeded to merge 
with other flows, or that diverge to create new tributaries, and those that 
are blocked or turned against themselves. Power is linked to the control 
of flows, and Deleuze’s anthropological1 intention is to capture the forces 
or systems that seek to control flows.
For Deleuze subjugation is not imposed from the top down – we 
are not simply repressed as we are conduits for or contractions of 
forces far in excess of the boundaries of the ‘self.’ Each form of capture, 
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be it phallogocentrism, colonialism, or sexism, controls the flow differ-
ently, hence there can be no crude economic determinism. As Conley2
observes, by:
advocating an ever-unfinished, non-dialectical, and non-
hierarchical model of constructive dissent, [Deleuze and 
Guattari] do away with the Marxian notion of class struc-
ture to consider social conflict in terms of mobile micro- and 
macro-cosms, ever shifting lines, rhythms and harmonics.
Under neoliberalism, as it reaches ever further into the fabric of life, 
capital determines far more than it ever did. The global economic and 
political elite is commandeering the human genome and the building 
blocks of life as well as the ontological and epistemological horizons of 
thought. The central paradox is that while capitalism seeks to command 
flows, capital itself is the strongest force of irrepressible desire to escape 
all limits. As neoliberalism tightens its grip, Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-
Oedipus (1972) takes on even greater prescience:
the prime function incumbent upon the socius has always 
been to codify the flows of desire, to inscribe them, to record 
them, to see that no flow exists that is not properly dammed 
up, channeled, regulated. (Deleuze and Guattari 2000: 33)
Such insights support Colebrook’s claim that Anti-Oedipus might be rec-
ognized ‘as one of the twentieth century’s most important works.’3
Release, capture, flow, systolic and diastolic rhythms, and the pro-
cesses necessary to control these pulsations are to be found in all things, 
in ‘flows of women and children, flows of herds and seed, sperm flows, 
flows of shit, menstrual flows’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2000: 112). The 
paths of flows are always machinic: mouth–breast, sun–photosynthesis, 
camera–lux–lumen, and the production of subjectivity itself is a machinic 
process. Production is primarily desiring production, far in excess of the 
economic system: ‘social life is machinic [and] may be conceived as a 
global system of desire and destiny that organizes the production of pro-
duction, the productions of recording, and productions of consumption’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2000: 142). There are, however, two valences to all 
things – block or flow, production or anti-production. Anti-production is 
not necessarily the opposite of ‘creative’ production. In anti-production 
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things slow, gain traction or assume a different meaning. Retraction, 
denial, and entropy are diverse dynamics to be found everywhere in all 
things, so diverse as to make it impossible to theorize an overarching 
code of ‘lack’ or negation. It’s pointless to imagine that anarchy as pure 
free flow is good, and the state, strata or assemblages are bad. Instead, 
block/flow, open/closed, anarchy/system have to be placed in a positive 
correlation in the formation of static or regular inscriptions that in turn 
facilitate the maximum degree of openness in all things – while capital-
ism creates false antinomies and dysfunctional syntheses.
This collection of essays presents Deleuze’s unique approach to poli-
tics, an approach that begins with a theory of life as flows, refrains and 
forces: ‘the notion of flow … constitutes the heart of an ontology that 
… conceptualizes all processes in terms of exchanges of energy’ (Garo 
2006: 58). This may sound abstract and tangential to the urgent problems 
faced by the world today: the destruction of the ecosystem, worldwide 
immiseration, the return of the despotic Urstaat or ‘empire’ in the capi-
talist socius (Thoburn 2003: 91), and the multiple layers of control and 
robbery. The Occupy movement, however, created a new environment in 
which discussions that might once have seemed impertinent have been 
gaining a new traction. ‘Occupy’ is a synecdoche for belief in the revolu-
tionary transformation of the capitalist system: a new heterogenic world 
of protest and activism that cannot be thought in terms of the state, lib-
eral democracy, parliamentary systems, or the hugely compromised non-
governmental organization (NGO) sector. Nor can Occupy be conceived 
in terms of class war or vanguard politics. These conceptualizations do 
not articulate fully where power is held, nor from where revolution may 
issue. A philosophical vocabulary that would materially inhabit the con-
ditions of our present global world order is needed because the differ-
ent registers of ontology (the movements of the earth), the social (the 
people yet to come), epistemology (concept formation), and aesthetics 
are nevertheless activated on the one single plane that is at considerable 
remove from the conventional terms of state or royal politics as they are 
understood today. This book seeks to contribute to this process of think-
ing a single plane of matter, knowledge, politics and art through analysis 
and illustration, but chiefly through the production of tools and methods 
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that Occupy and the political ontology of Deleuze and Guattari demand 
of each other.
The combination of precision and subtlety to be found in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s concepts accounts for the worldwide multi-discursive interest 
in their formulations. Recent politically-engaged Deleuzian scholarship,4
the financial crisis, and the emergence of widespread social conflict fol-
lowing the collapse of the self-certainties of the Blair–Bush era have made 
their work seemingly indispensible in the struggle to transform capital-
ism. Whilst Deleuze and Guattari have many mediators and interpret-
ers in political theory, most notably Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, 
readers are increasingly attracted by the force of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
own conceptual apparatus and the ways in which it reveals the ‘imma-
nent’ dynamics of capitalism in the ‘the pure flow of deterritorialization, 
of money and labor brought together in a conjunction of flows which is 
actualized in private property’ (Holland), and the axiomatics that hold 
this system in place. Also fundamental to their analysis is an understand-
ing of economic production as part of a much larger field of desiring pro-
duction that produces the subjectivities and social relations upon which 
the economic system ultimately depends. Deleuze and Guattari’s politi-
cal concepts have the capacity to resolve many of the contradictions left 
unaddressed by other accounts of the machinery of capitalism. For exam-
ple, their presentation of the immiserating, sadistic, world-destroying 
tendencies of capitalism is no barrier to their appreciation for capitalism’s 
dynamic potential and boundless creativity. Their formulation of capital-
ist axiomatics provides a way to understand how capitalist systems, sup-
ported by a war machine of stupendous proportions, have the appearance 
of inviolable natural laws, and yet are constantly modified by capitalism’s 
own inherent dynamism, the pressure of the multitude, and outright 
resistance. Deleuze and Guattari share with Marx the view that capital-
ism is the handmaiden of its own eventual demise. The construction of 
the contemporary subject is such that it is both the measure of capital-
ism’s capacity for freedom and its primary mode of capture. In sum: the 
brilliance of Deleuze and Guattari’s thought lies precisely in their ability 
to capture the multi-dimensional nature of social and life forces in such a 
way that (through the construction of a matrix of extremely sophisticated 
concepts) bifurcations, contradictions, and dialectics do not become 
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impediments to thought but rather opportunities to delve deeper into 
the underlying dynamics of existence and sociality.
The inconsistent reception of Deleuze and Guattari’s works may be 
due in part to the fact that their ideas stretch across so many discourses 
– from cinema to anthropology, philosophy to literature, and across the 
sciences; it is easy to get lost amongst the plethora of innovations that 
cannot be mapped easily onto the existing conceptual terrain. That their 
works first entered the English-speaking academic world through liter-
ary studies, film, aesthetics and architecture partly contributed to the 
sense that it would also be perfectly possible to engage with many of their 
idioms without attention to their political implications, which can be 
as evident as they are elusive. The scope of their works reflects the fact 
that politics itself is as multilayered as it is aesthetic, as ontological as it 
is linguistic, registering the fact that everything is political, or indeed, as 
Deleuze and Guattari themselves insist, that politics precedes being.
This volume presents a series of experiments with such Deleuzian 
concepts as the war machine, the pack, the event, the assemblage, becom-
ing-imperceptible, capitalist axiomatics and the minor and molecular, 
with three papers discussing a Deleuzo-Guattarian approach to econom-
ics. Theories from both the left and right ends of the political spectrum 
are subject to critique. Rodrigo Nunes, for instance, argues against the 
Marxist concept of the vanguard as a predetermined social form, arguing 
instead for a vanguard function and for multiple vanguards. In a typical 
Deleuzian thought experiment, he takes the concept of the anomalous, 
developed by Deleuze in relation to painting, out of its original context 
and deploys it to capture more fully the kind of social practices associated 
with the Marxist notion of the vanguard. The pack rather than the crowd, 
and the anomalous rather than the vanguard, are dynamic transversal 
expressions of social forces.
What makes Deleuze so perplexing and fascinating, and also of the 
greatest value, is that many of his novel concepts mark a radical break 
with established political ideas; they articulate something that cannot 
be said even in an hybridization of existing words. They do not engage 
with such notions as the rights of man, the social contract or constitu-
tional democracy, and in diverse ways this volume will show how and 
why such concepts cannot be afforded foundational status in the task of 
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articulating the concrete dynamics of the contemporary world. Deleuze 
and Guattari’s concepts have a deliberate indeterminacy and abstraction, 
which demands that the reader/writer/activist engage with them, putting 
them to work. The failure to grasp this crucial point has, as we shall see, 
led to a number of misplaced critical readings of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
political ontology.
II. Deleuze and his Critics
A series of critiques from Alain Badiou, Jacques Rancière and Peter 
Hallward has given considerable ballast to the idea common in left-wing 
circles that Deleuze and Guattari’s ideas are shallow exercises in rhizo-
matic absent-mindedness – ‘joyous thinker[s] of the world’s confusion’ 
(Badiou 2000; 10) lacking in substantive engagement with the urgent 
need for genuine revolutionary change. Giuseppina Mecchia, proposing 
the concept of ‘anthropolitics as method and analytical category,’ tackles 
each of these critiques in turn in, pursuing her argument that the anthro-
pos, ‘a dynamic, material figure of political subjectivity,’ has the potential 
to bring about the revolutionary transformation of society. For Mecchia, 
Badiou’s reliance on set theory and Lacanian discontinuities means that 
he has no account for the role of the kind of subjective encounters and 
commitments that led to and sustained the Occupy movement.
In her critique of Badiou’s notion of ‘truth’ based on his conception 
of the event as ‘rare’ and knowable ‘only retrospectively,’ Mecchia draws 
our attention to the psychological, affective, and bodily commitments 
of the Occupiers – factors that were a fundamental aspect of their com-
mitment to creating the event ‘Occupy.’ She points out that the emer-
gence of informed, affirmative activists sufficiently committed to stag-
ing worldwide the most important political protests of recent decades 
cannot be understood according to Badiou’s concept of the event as a 
truth that does not happen to things or to persons, but rather happens 
through them. For Badiou, events are politically and ethically of the high-
est significance. In response Ian Buchanan points out that whilst Badiou’s 
event may be universal and thus generalizable it still ‘requires our fidelity, 
we have to choose to believe in it and place it at the centre of our lives.’ 
He explains that, for Badiou, the event gives rise to truth (it is truth’s 
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condition), whereas for Deleuze it gives rise to sense (it is sense’s condi-
tion). Far from involving a multiplicitous dynamic interplay of cognitive, 
semantic and affective forces – of the type outlined by John Protevi in 
this volume – for Badiou the event ‘moves on’ and produces the subject 
who is also (again following Lacan) barred from her own subjective for-
mation by the event itself.
Events are such an important feature of Deleuze’s conceptual land-
scape because he is a philosopher of transformation. These transforma-
tions are changes in both matter and sense, both corporeal and incor-
poreal, so that when changes become infinitely extended and ongoing 
processes they also become events. Buchanan clarifies that ‘events’ are 
not necessarily matters of scale:
the event for Deleuze and Guattari is not measured by a 
change in the state of things – a large crowd gathering in a 
public square in Cairo or camping out in New York City is 
not intrinsically an event in Deleuze and Guattari’s thinking. 
It only becomes recognizable as an event if it brings about a 
transformation of thought itself, if it yields a new idea, a new 
way of acting.
For example, when the genocide of the American first peoples is prop-
erly understood, then America’s whole sense of itself is undone. Most 
importantly, for Deleuze, matter is evental; as Verena Conley puts it: 
‘changes can occur autopoietically, unbeknownst to the subject, before 
she or he even opens to the environing world.’ The inward rush of the 
sea has a sense, a ‘life-sense’ as Buchanan helpfully phrases it. We might 
talk of crowds contracting, expectations growing, balance sheets expand-
ing, blood levels rising, global digital signals pulsating across networks 
around a Champions League football match. Organic or urban, in rela-
tion to the moon, the molluscs, the pier and the bather (Williams 2008: 
8), sense is dispersed and flows in waves through and across bodies. The 
sea and the moon provide a picturesque example, but the application of 
the same concepts to the retreating, collapsing, rising, and dispersing of 
flows in the stock market helps us to understand that markets are only 
rational within the sublime irrationality of the capitalist economic sys-
tem, that they are affairs of animal spirits which are most often wolverine 
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as they hunt in packs. It is a Deleuzian commonplace that there is no dif-
ference in nature between the economic infrastructure and the libidinal 
economy: ‘desire belongs to the infrastructure, not to ideology, desire 
is in production as social production, just as production is in desire as 
desiring-production’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2000: 348).
Many of the features of Deleuze’s embodied/engaged (schizoana-
lytic) subject are marshalled in Mecchia’s third defence of Deleuze’s work 
(after her considerations of Badiou and Rancière) against the criticisms 
of Peter Hallward, whom she contends recasts and radicalizes Badiou’s 
critique of Deleuzian politics. Here Deleuze is again accused of aloofness, 
his vitalism is considered a major flaw, and his commitment to a par-
ticular theorization of the virtual is taken to have left his theory devoid 
of agency or of any sense of a determinant material force that might act 
upon the world. Stephven Shukaitis summarizes Hallward’s argument: 
‘this results in a politics that can only lead out of this world, because the 
potential of the actualized world is always compromised in compari-
son to the virtual’ (Shukaitis 2010). Ambrose phrases a pithy riposte to 
this contention:
It is never merely a question of attempting to ‘break out’ of 
the world that exists, but of creating the right conditions 
for the exposition of other possible worlds, the hetero-
cosmic – to ‘break in’ in order to introduce new variables 
into the world that exists, causing the quality of its reality/
actuality to undergo modification, change and becoming. 
(Ambrose 2006)
There are significant problems, in particular, with Hallward’s understand-
ing of the virtual. In The Logic of Sense (1969) Deleuze shows that the 
incorporeal is as real as the corporal. It is not the case that the virtual is 
some kind of unreality outside of the ‘real’; rather, the virtual is ‘real,’ just 
not actualized. As Buchanan says in his contribution to this volume: ‘the 
virtual is fully real, as real as an idea, an image, and an innovation, is real. 
It is real because its effects are real.’ Think of the infinite variety of forms 
the wheel has taken, from prayer wheel to clock to waterwheel and pro-
peller. Deleuze and Guattari suggest that there is an infinite multiplicity of 
potential in everything, only a minuscule portion of which is actualized 
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at any given time – a virtual multiplicity is always in reserve, still to come. 
Both Conley and Nunes detail the movement from pre-existing states of 
affairs (the domain of the possible, where what is possible is essentially a 
repetition of what already exists) to the domain of the actual where that 
which emerges is unconcealed, new. At some point something boils to 
the surface, a virtual something that neither Badiou nor Hallward can 
account for: ‘a threshold is crossed and without things being brought into 
the realm of possibility – should be this or should be that – the event has 
already happened,’ or as Conley puts it: ‘occupation always begins with 
an event, a rupture, a sudden surge of affect … that rises spontaneously, 
autopoietically. It begins with a preoccupation.’ Whilst for Nunes the 
event is a rupture, it is not a magical flash in the pan; it neither comes out 
of the blue nor is it a unique isolated new fact, but emerges out of a flux of 
interweaved virtual potentialities. As well as providing a succinct guide to 
the main points of disagreement between Badiou and Deleuze, Buchanan 
highlights their different treatments of the event: for Deleuze the event is 
an ‘irruption of immanence (the opening up of a smooth space in other 
words) [that] does not necessarily correlate with an idea of the truth.’ 
Buchanan also offers a more nuanced reading of Badiou than do many 
other commentators, noting that Spain’s indignados were possibly lacking 
the type of ‘affirmative idea’ that Badiou considers essential to political 
struggle – an ‘idea’ like truth able to ‘awaken the force of History itself.’ 
Buchanan, quoting Badiou, appreciates Badiou’s potential to contribute 
to our understanding of how an event like Occupy Wall Street works:
It ignites what he calls a ‘truth process’ – it makes apparent to 
all that ‘human animals are capable of bringing into being jus-
tice, equality, and universality (the practical presence of what 
the Idea can do). It is perfectly apparent that a high propor-
tion of political oppression consists in the unremitting nega-
tion of this capacity. (Badiou 2012: 87)
III. A Politics of Collective Affect
John Protevi describes how the occupiers were forced by the ban on 
bullhorns to invent the ‘human microphone,’ which created a shared 
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corporeal bond and affective identification between them. A profound 
sense of shared identity emerged as language was reclaimed and turned 
into both joyous affirmation and resistance to the command of order 
words. For example, when leading members of the Corporation of 
London braved the OccupyLSX General Assembly to explain that ‘the 
Corporation of London does many good things, [and] has a long history 
of civic engagement,’ the assembly fell about like cartoon characters in 
unrestrained laughter. This collective public ridicule of the guardians of 
the Corporation chimes with how Protevi talks of affect:
affect is “in the air,” something like the mood of a party, which 
is not the mere aggregate of the subjective states of the party-
goers. In this sense, affect is not emergent from pre-existing 
subjectivities; emotional subjectivities are crystallisations or 
residues of a collective affect.
Many occupiers felt that they had tasted a kind of utopia in the sense of 
release from the oppressive hegemony of Blair –Bush doctrine – a non-
coercive joyous experiment in creating the democracy yet to come. The 
life-changing impact of Occupy on its participants was often under-
stated, but what they did, as Holland notes, was to take ‘truly democratic 
social relations to the very “heart of the beast”.’ Things like the General 
Assemblies, direct action (Occupy operating as a kind of phalanx in the 
heart of the city from which further actions could be launched), work-
shops, mutual solidarity networks and the human microphone were 
indeed exemplary, as Protevi says of ‘direct democracy enacted but pro-
ducing an intermodal resonance among the semantic, pragmatic and 
affective dimensions of collective action.’ However, as Thoburn cautions, 
this kind of ‘communism in miniature’ must not be mistaken for the real 
thing: ‘From a minor political perspective, the risk with this formula-
tion is that Occupy turn inwards, valorizing its own cultural forms at the 
expense of self-problematization and an ever-outward engagement in 
social relations.’
Protevi also has a warning: corporeal affective collectivity is not neces-
sarily a good in itself; affect, after all, also surged through the Nuremberg 
rallies. Working through such valences is an essential feature of Deleuzian 
scholarship. When does becoming a body without organs lead to 
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impotence rather than genuine becoming? When is a rhizome a sign of 
idiocy and when is it a line of flight to a new creation? When is organi-
zation facilitative and when suppressive? One question Nunes seeks 
to answer is exactly the same as that which pre-occupied the Occupy 
encampments worldwide: how do you create open and porous demo-
cratic structures that avoid the leaderless, formless quagmire experienced 
at times by all occupiers? How might one enable structures that encour-
age a different type of democracy based on the principles of distributed 
leadership? For Nunes, distributed leadership is not only an accurate 
description of the actual processes in play at Occupy but also describes 
the process of avoiding the false binaries between organization and form-
lessness, unity and diversity, spontaneity or planning, in a manner that 
allows for the articulation of the greatest unity consiliant with the great-
est diversity. Indeed, the distinction between pack and crowd that Nunes 
draws upon is useful for thinking about how Occupy worked according 
to both the logic of direct democracy and the logic of the pack, whereby 
leaders emerged, led, provoked, instigated, and sometimes forced issues 
through. The logic of the pack allowed for divisions and stratifications 
and was arguably more democratic than modes of consensus. It was cer-
tainly a pre-requisite for getting anything done.
David Burrows also points to the pack-like movement and the effec-
tiveness of distributed leadership in his study of ‘negative space war 
machines’ operating alongside Occupy in London in 2011 and 2012. 
Nunes argues that far from solving the problem of representation the 
Marxist vanguard often vests itself with the imprimatur of ‘historical 
necessity,’ and in setting itself the task of expressing and organizing the 
revolutionary activity of the workers, can end up exasperating it.
The name ‘Occupy’ has become a synecdoche for a proliferation of 
new protest and political movements fighting a myriad of causes, from 
closing down tax havens to defending the rights of indigenous peoples, 
from resisting the decimation of the welfare state to critiques of big 
pharma. At its inception Occupy spilt into diverse working groups, led 
by experienced activists and charged with research, securing provisions, 
media relations, planning, education, and so forth. This created a profu-
sion of self-organized vanguards, each leading their own area. The dis-
tinction Nunes draws between the crowd and the pack is helpful here. 
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In the former, equal status is afforded to all and the crowd is organized; 
it moves as one, chants together, and there is a uniformity of function. 
Packs are not secondary groupings emerging from the crowd; they are 
the elemental ground of the mass and are formed out of alogical orders, 
consistencies and compatibilities. As was seen first-hand at Occupy, 
packs or multiplicities continually transform themselves into each other, 
and cross over into each other, through processes of alliance or conta-
gion. As Deleuze puts it: ‘Schools, bands, herds, and populations are not 
inferior social forms; they are affects and powers, involutions’ (Deleuze 
and Guattari 2000: 241).
In their different ways Nunes, Protevi, Conley and Mecchia each find 
solutions to the problems inherent to the tendency to objectification, or 
the ways in which historically sedimented practices impede becoming. 
Protevi captures the process as follows:
You don’t combat [the shame of unemployment] by trying to 
change individual people’s minds, one by one, with informa-
tion about unemployment trends; you combat it by showing 
your face, by embodying your lack of shame, by putting a face 
on unemployment or homelessness. You thus counteract the 
existing collective affect by creating a positive affect of, shall 
we say, joyful solidarity. Shame isolates (you hide your face); 
joyful solidarity comes from people coming together.
For Nunes, in the body of the collective one gains access to the complex 
process of becoming-imperceptible, which, far from being an act of self-
denial is a ‘becoming-more’ through allowing oneself to be exposed, to 
take a risk, and to trust that one can be formed by and, can help form, col-
lective assemblages. Nunes shares with Conley a concern to place becom-
ing-collective at the heart of the process of undoing subjectivation. He 
outlines how ‘becoming-imperceptible should be understood as becom-
ing more realistic about oneself and the real potentials and limitations to 
a process.’ It requires the shedding of selfhood (the vanguard, the revo-
lutionary), undermining pre-given divisions (self/other), finding differ-
ences that exist in potential, and the capacity to create new continuities. 
The sense that the novel and spontaneous is diffused in a web of practices 
and sensibilities that have been a long time in the making is shared by 
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Thoburn, who also places the evental quality of life at the imperceptible 
center of processes of social formation: ‘the ungraspable and often highly 
seductive character of a formation whose directions remain unmapped, 
indeterminable, full, as Deleuze has it, of virtuality.’
For Deleuze, only some of the virtual potentials existent in the world 
are actualized as we are moulded by macro and microscopic affects and 
sensations that pass through us and which can be cosmological in exten-
sion.5 We must think of contraction and dilation, release and flow, rup-
ture and slice, entropy and clamor, as pure intensities: the world floods 
through us in a cacophony of multiplicities and singularities fused in an 
indeterminable concoction of affects and percepts across multiple land-
scapes of psychic, social and physiological geographies in the backwards 
and forwards of time in multiple durations.
IV. Deconstruction and Occupy
In her contribution, Colebrook discusses the continued relevance of 
deconstruction, addressing a body of work that has considerable traction 
in contemporary political philosophy, and whose influence may be seen 
in the refusal by contemporary political activists to adopt an unassailable 
and inviolable stance of purported truth from which to declare the cor-
rectness of their position. Colebrook discusses the difficulties inherent in 
claiming either a pre-existing place of purity, innocence or natural justice, 
or a futural justice yet to come from which resistance to an invading or 
occupying force might be mounted. Implicit in the language of Occupy, 
explicit in its structure and modus operandi, and suffused throughout its 
culture, was the question, how do you criticize capitalism without set-
ting yourself up as the uniquely privileged defender of an imagined 
purity or innocence against some evil external power? More specifically, 
how do you defend a cause or mount a critique without repeating the 
same binary oppositions that sustain capitalism and which substitute 
underlying terms of exclusion and dominance for other equally deter-
minant terms? How do you create change without being either fascist 
or Leninist, or naïvely accepting capitalism’s claim that its leading terms 
such as freedom, equality, democracy and autonomy are somehow not 
complicit in the violence inherent in their constitution? These are the 
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reasons Occupy steadfastly refused to assert a claim to a single overarch-
ing ‘truth,’ knowing that one claim to truth is a potential violence against 
another. Diversity is a strategy, a methodology and an objective; any 
attempt to impose a master narrative is seen as a type of violence done 
to the myriad micro-struggles represented in the lived struggles of the 
movement’s members. The question often put to the occupiers, ‘What 
exactly do you want?’, is thus viewed as illegitimate, an attempt to del-
egitimize, belittle and close minds.
Colebrook explores the relevance of the works of Jacques Derrida and 
Paul de Man to these debates, and in so doing outlines the weaknesses in 
some interpretations of the deconstructive approach to politics (which 
saw deconstruction contributing to a politics of nihilism, relativism and 
cynicism), whilst highlighting some features that remain not just perti-
nent but necessary. First, in line with many of the arguments in this vol-
ume, and with its repeated theme of embodiment, Colebrook outlines 
how deconstruction arose out of both developments in the history of 
ideas and Derrida’s ‘tortured’ response to the Nazi occupation of France, 
where the occupation of language and citizenship led to a sense that the 
material occupation of a territory and the immaterial occupation of lan-
guage and subjectivity were violences of the same order.
For Colebrook, what began in material, historically specific circum-
stances provided the impetus for what became deconstruction’s quasi-
transcendental claim that neither the self-authoring presence of the 
citizen/subject nor language’s representational certainties, nor indeed 
any binary opposition between inside or outside, innocent or contami-
nated, can be cited as non-compromised or non-complicit sites of resis-
tance uncontaminated by the very logic of exclusion they were fighting 
against. Paul de Man, whom Colebrook says captures ‘deconstruction’s 
conception of politics at its most rigorous,’ shows how there is no place 
where language and the real can find a seamless relation. Each side of the 
binary, the beautiful soul and totalizing power, resists a transcendental 
structure of impossibility and undecidability. Both are party to an oppo-
sitional dialectic or binarism and are marked by the failure to accept the a 
priori ‘truth’ of the never assimilable, ungraspable ‘outside,’ which places 
all claims for truth under erasure. This is true of any type of Marxism 
that might seek to ground resistance in some kind of ‘system of techne’ 
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or authentic relation between the purity of labor and lived conditions 
that afford a ‘practical and transformative relation between humans and 
their world.’
For deconstruction, to mount a position of resistance based upon 
a Marxist logic of production, value and expropriation, or liberal ideas 
of the sanctity of the individual or the rights of man, repeats a failure 
to admit that we are constituted through resistance to the truth of the 
impossibility and undecidability inherent to any attempt to claim truth. 
The Nazi occupier and resistance fighter, the capitalist apologist and the 
protester who seeks the ‘pure’ ground for the perfect argument or the 
ideal society, all deny the abiding force of the indeterminable and dif-
férance: one is already complicit, determined within the domain of dif-
ference that enables one to think. The insecurity that this creates is the 
motivation behind all ‘presentness.’ The idea that we might create coher-
ent signs and narratives of this world, that we might resist the distance 
between signs and the world, that we might create a pure presence, center 
or ground, is ideology.
This stance, however, led in part to a widespread sense of decon-
struction’s political irrelevance: if truth cannot be theorized, and if truth 
claims are necessarily founded upon a denial of their own indeterminacy, 
then the ground upon which a critique of capitalism might be staged 
merely floats on a sea of differences; if difference leads to the impossibil-
ity of securing either a ground or a center, does this not amount to a form 
of compliance with capitalism’s own anti-foundationalism? Colebrook 
however reminds us that in the 1980s and 1990s deconstruction did offer 
an important and necessary critical response to the illusions of capitalism 
when notions of autonomy, freedom, and liberal self-determinism acted 
as ideological balustrades. For her, there was ‘nothing at all valid in the 
notion that post-structuralism’s critique of representation plays a role in 
nihilism, relativism and capitalist cynicism.’
However, deconstruction’s role in undermining both the illusions of 
self-consciousness, autonomy and integrity and the idea that these terms 
might provide the basis for a critique of capitalism has only limited cur-
rency in our age. Nine-eleven effectively marked the end of capitalism’s 
own now insubstantial rhetoric, as individual freedom was progres-
sively sacrificed to the demands of debt, surveillance and full spectrum 
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dominance. Such concerns have been overtaken by an era in which ‘mar-
ket, choice, opportunity, autonomy and equality in the market place are 
now caricatures unable to conceal a logic of market ruthlessness.’ We are 
now in the grip of a flagrant neo-feudalism that no longer even pays lip 
service to liberal ideology. We need to look elsewhere to explain how 
certain axioms have come to dominate and overtake the previous con-
figuration: ‘how did capital manage to escape difference and allow one 
axiom to overcode all others?’ (These questions are further attended to 
by Holland and myself).
For Colebrook, instead of attempting to find a putative place of oth-
erness we should think within system, techne and difference, critiquing 
capitalism from within. There is no outside to capitalism; becoming 
minor within a pre-existing language, economy and ontology is not only 
theoretically valid but can create a series of heterogenic economies and 
political systems, and a return to multiplicities of difference. In response 
to the question ‘what do you want?’ Occupy answers: ongoing reflection, 
an authentic relation not to life but to becoming minor and a revitalized 
commitment to difference.
V. Subjectivity and Aesthetics
Deleuze and Guattari oppose notions of an originating, proprietorial or 
intentional subjectivity. It is not unreasonable to say that their entire oeu-
vre amounts to a profound and relentless anti-humanism, where human-
ism is the conception that humanity somehow stands above or straddles 
‘life’ or nature. In fact, ‘life’ precedes, envelopes and supersedes all that 
human beings are – ‘the lived body is a paltry thing in comparison with 
a more profound and almost unlivable power of life’ (Deleuze 2003: 44). 
Deleuze and Guattari do not claim that their model of trans-monadic 
becoming supersedes or supplants the present system, but rather that it 
is already what we are. We are already packs; the body is impressed with 
bodies of knowledge, medical bodies, juridical bodies and a myriad of 
collective assemblages of enunciation. Perception is already cinematic 
and memory photographic.
Nunes brings these themes neatly together by highlighting the cor-
relation between event and subject taking place at Occupy. ‘[The] subject 
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is not an autonomous, sovereign agent, but the way in which the event 
expresses itself. It exists to the extent that it affirms the event, as much 
as the event exists only because it expresses itself in this subject.’ ‘[T]he 
event creates a new existence, it produces a new subjectivity’ (Deleuze 
and Guattari 2003: 216), but not as an external cause; it is in producing 
such transformations that the event ‘events.’ That the subject is ‘crafted 
by’ rather than master of events is also crucial to Conley’s argument. As 
Guattari asserts, changes can occur autopoietically, unbeknownst to the 
subject, before she or he even opens onto the environing world.
For Conley, Occupy presents an opportunity to revisit the promise of 
new forms of subjectivity outlined in A Thousand Plateaus, a work which, 
for her, marks a significant turning point in Deleuze’s political thought. 
After the exuberance, almost delirium, of Anti-Oedipus, and after the 
defeats of the left and capitalism’s resurgence, a more sombre and prag-
matic approach was needed. As Conley notes, A Thousand Plateaus is far 
from being the vague and indeterminate series of loose assemblages of 
ideas it is sometimes taken to be, but is rather a series of ‘territories held 
together by affective intensities made possible as a specific moment in 
history from which, in the “present” (for the authors in the aftermath 
of 1968) they think and write’. There is something so consistent about 
Deleuze’s approach that it almost amounts to a methodology: from the 
indeterminate ground, the flux and flow of change, consistencies emerge; 
depending on the context these are fashioned as territories, assemblages, 
milieus or plateaus. Conley attunes us to the subtlety of Deleuze’s use of 
plateaus to describe the creation of territories or planes of consistencies 
out of the profusion of complex multilayered social dynamics, semiolo-
gies and intensities. She writes of shifts in subjectivity, changes in rela-
tions and expectations, the dynamics of voyaging smoothly with aware-
ness, of crossing thresholds, of the making of rhizomatic connections 
that happen way beyond the egotistic and outside of the world reduced 
to systems of economic, juridical and scientific signs. She affirms that in 
voyaging one can invite change by shifting to a new subjectivity, perspec-
tive or language, or taking a line of flight, and she finds plenty of evidence 
of such ‘soft subversions’ effected by artists, educators, and cultural cre-
ators. Considering the slippery nature of desire, Buchanan (2011) notes 
‘that changing the composition of desire is itself revolutionary, and as 
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recent events have shown the transformation of desire on both an indi-
vidual and collective level … is not something that necessarily requires 
planning.’ Conley also asks, most positively of all, whether Occupy has 
not also put the dominant discourses of ‘state’, ‘democracy’, ‘space’ into 
variation: is Occupy another plateau?
In keeping with the spirit of this volume, Thoburn explores Deleuze’s 
concepts not in order to illustrate or represent the themes and issues of 
Occupy but to create a dialogue between the two with the aim of facili-
tating their further development: ‘It’s a recursive relation, for reflection 
upon Occupy’s themes or problems should also help extend Deleuzian 
concepts, lending them a contemporary vitality.’ For Thoburn, the 
minoritization of politics has found expression in the shift away from 
identitarian and representational politics as part of long-term changes 
in the structure of capitalist development and the concomitant produc-
tion of the multitude. The minor brings contestation, argument and 
problematization to the fore. This is exemplified by Occupy’s single most 
important statement: ‘Let these Facts be Known – the Declaration of the 
Occupation of New York City.’
Let’s acknowledge the reality: the future of the human race 
requires the cooperation of its members. Our increasingly 
interconnected world obscures the underlying truth that all of 
our grievances are connected.
Adding extra dimensions to this and echoing the autonomist Marxist tra-
dition, Thoburn draws our attention to how ‘willed poverty’ and a form 
of ‘boundary limitation’ are actively affirmed as a means of resistance 
by the multitude. He shows how the range of economic structures and 
plethora of social relationships thrown up by the push and pull between 
these co-determining dynamics offers no fixed route, system or structure. 
He also presents a warning that seeing the multitude in this way might 
mean avoiding perhaps the most urgent task of all: creating a strategically 
planned, coherently organized, well-prepared and organized body able to 
win a fearsome class war.
Thoburn also pursues a thought experiment by thinking of ‘democ-
racy’ as a grid – a series of lines, intersections and spaces, something 
like a diagram, imposed upon the virtual multiplicities of the socius. He 
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marshals Deleuze: ‘Elections are not a particular locale, nor a particu-
lar day in the calendar. They are more like a grid that affects the way we 
understand and perceive things. Everything is mapped back on this grid 
and gets warped as a result’ (Deleuze 2007: 143). For Thoburn, democ-
racy imposes a ‘status quo’ that inherently excludes the problems of 
inequality and exploitation. This state of affairs is normalized and treated 
as a natural condition that liberal democratic systems are best suited to 
resolve, rather than being imbricated in the very structures that bring 
these iniquities about. The grid ‘democracy’ is thus a matrix of principles, 
ideals, and structures into which people are expected to fit even when 
the inner logic of the system results in unelected technocrats taking con-
trol of the levers of power, as in Greece and Italy. Indeed, the idea that 
an unproblematized ‘majority’ might somehow stand for the ‘will of the 
people’ is itself a form of dictatorship. It’s not that Deleuze and Guattari 
are anti-democratic, far from it; rather, they seek a far more intensive 
democracy, a becoming democratic in everything everywhere.
To this end, Thoburn suggests that the grid ‘Occupy’ can be seen as 
a ‘means of multiplying points of antagonism.’ For example, the slogan ‘we 
are the 99%’ (asserting that the vast majority of humanity is suffering at 
the expense of the few), may have captured world-wide attention, but 
we should recall that Occupy London took down the talismanic banner 
‘Capitalism is Crisis’ because it accentuated a single theme. The fact that 
Occupy distinguishes itself relationally – the 99% versus the 1% – means, 
writes Colebrook, that it does not present itself as somehow positioned in 
a pure outside, occupying its own self-referential ground. It is a relation, 
‘it labels a mass not an identity.’ The 1% has no identity other than that 
of its situation within an already distributed terrain. In this way Occupy 
both reclaims capitalism’s claim of universality – a system of the greater 
good – and names a number and not an identity such as ‘the workers’ or a 
‘class,’ a ‘vanguard’ or a method of ‘socialism.’
For Deleuze a majority is like a dictatorship, or a weapon, a false 
abstraction imposed upon myriad forces, identities and singularities; 
indeed, ‘counting,’ for Buchanan, even a headcount of a million protes-
tors, is not the same as that which transforms history. A majority is false 
because it adheres to number and not the dynamic multiplicities evolv-
ing in the will of the people. For Badiou, the majority is an empty set, a 
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set that is determined by force, the terms of which majority might count 
having already been decided. The question, ‘Would you prefer a society 
in which all people share of the common wealth equally?’ is positioned 
as nonsense.
Contrariwise, historical transformation involves rather the irruption 
of immanence and a change in consciousness irrespective of number. 
Buchanan provides two examples to illustrate how such transformation 
can be both conceptual and historical. An idea whose time has come is 
a clear manifestation of the minor, it ‘isn’t concerned with results, with 
counting in the here and now, what it awakens is the force of history itself.’ 
A raggle taggle of disaffected anarcho-political activists who numbered 
no more than a few hundred placed into world-wide public conscious-
ness the idea that we might imagine the total transformation of society.
Buchanan also writes of the creation of smooth space and the mobility 
it affords being the key resource in battles for territory, technology, minds 
and ideas. However, elsewhere he is careful, in employing Deleuze’s exact 
phrasing, to caution against an uncritical valorization of the term:
it all depends on a careful systematic use … we’re trying to say 
you can never guarantee a good outcome (its not enough just 
to have a smooth space, for example, to overcome striations 
and coercion, or a body without organs to overcome organisa-
tions. (Deleuze 1995: 32)
Thoburn likewise observes that a kind of smooth space is necessary to 
undo the illusions of democracy, but he fills this with layers of antago-
nism. Hence, the grid Occupy seeks is to encourage a problematics 
of contestation and critique, and the development of divergent posi-
tions in an extension and intensification of the problematic in concrete 
circumstances.
As well as emphasizing the contested and conflictual modality of 
Occupy, Thoburn explores the aesthetic dimension of political struggle. 
He references Deleuze’s anthropological/ethological approach wherein 
animal, natural and human traits are interlaced in a social form that is 
indispensably aesthetic. We find in Occupy expressions of territorial-
ity that are not just markers and signifiers of boundary lines but have 
an expressive sensory quality. As in the numerous ethological examples 
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employed by Deleuze – the musicality of birds, the color of fish scales, 
the zigzag of the stickleback – such expressions are essential features of 
the territorializing function. As Thoburn carefully details, the occupa-
tions of Zuccotti Park and the St Paul’s Cathedral steps involved much 
more than a mere physical encampment, including songs, found objects, 
art brut, and countless slogans, banners and placards weaved together in 
a tapestry as affirmative as it was functional.
An aspect of pathos is crucial to this. The problem with representa-
tional and identitarian politics is that the few speak for the many; hierar-
chical structures are created and power becomes concentrated in oligar-
chies or elites. There is, by contrast, a humility to Occupy; its members 
are very circumspect about speaking for the movement or making claims 
on its behalf. Consensus is not just an aspiration but also a way of life, 
and the atmosphere is suffused with a sense of mutual aid and suffering. 
As Thoburn puts it, ‘this quality of life – fragile, impersonal, damaged 
– is central [to] … lifting “suffering” to a level of aesthetic expression 
without losing any of its “struggle”.’ This fragility is an important part of 
Occupy’s expression: the cardboard signs, the mocked-up soup kitch-
ens – OccupyLSX became a highly efficient kitchen feeding hundreds 
from day one, prompting the highly unethical response of the police who 
shepherded the homeless and the destitute to the park – and the provi-
sion of care for people suffering from mental health problems. Fragility 
became Occupy’s aesthetic, resulting in ‘mutually sustaining encounters’ 
between meaning and politics through sensory and expressive qualities, 
all coordinated and self-managed by a leaderless, grassroots movement.
VI. The War Machine and the Multitude
Each of the contributors in this collection takes a different approach to 
the conceptualization of those aspects of capitalism that they find most 
egregious. But they also address how capitalism’s creativity can be har-
nessed, and what is to be done in the face of ‘an appropriated and pre-
accomplished global war machine’ (Marzec 2001), the object of whose 
rule is social life in its entirety (Hardt and Negri 2000: xv). They ask 
which of Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts have the capacity not merely to 
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illustrate but to be applied along with Occupy’s practical tools and meth-
ods, not least in various approaches to the question of space.
Buchanan for instance observes how smooth space amounts to a 
commons. He argues that Occupy opened up a new way, a new space, for 
thinking and acting, creating a ‘radical break with the normal continu-
ity of things, interrupting and causing a counter flow to the usual flow 
of daily life’. Articulating the increasing interest in the ‘common,’ the 
commons movement and commoning at Occupy, he suggests that the 
common, conceived as ‘social relations,’ can be understood as a smooth 
space. We must bear in mind that neither Buchanan nor Thoburn equates 
smooth space with a flattening or an absence of conflict. Buchanan bor-
rows from David Harvey:
The common is not to be constructed, therefore, as a particu-
lar kind of thing, asset or even social process, but as an unsta-
ble and malleable social relation between a particular well-
defined social group and those aspects of its actually existing 
or yet-to-be-created social and/or physical environment 
deemed crucial to its life and livelihood. There is, in effect, a 
social practice of commoning. (Harvey 2012: 73)
For Hardt and Negri the common is the basis for the existence of the 
multitude; the two are indivisible since the common is: 
that which allows the multitude to “communicate and act 
together” … the common does not refer to traditional notions 
of either the community or the public … the common … is 
what configures the mobile and flexible substance of the mul-
titude’ and ‘social life depends on the common. (Hardt and 
Negri 2006: 9, 10, 212)
The common is a space that allows for the greatest degree of singularity, it 
is composed of ‘a set of singularities – and by singularity here we mean a 
social subject whose difference cannot be reduced to sameness.’ Beyond 
all else, the common is the virtual space of pre-individual singularities, 
where flows of affects and percepts, ideas and processes, and the ‘ground 
of all human life’ (Graeber 2012: 101) discussed by all the contributors 
to this volume, are to be found.
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Thoburn foregrounds contested and antagonistic spaces in which 
smooth space is by no means without conflict or fragmentation – the 
opposite in fact. Burrows’ chapter attends to Deleuze and Guattari’s con-
cept of the war machine specifically in relation to what he calls ‘nega-
tive space,’ and he joins Conley in stressing the importance of creating 
vacuoles of non-communication and of the more general ‘artistic’ strategies 
and tactics of the movement. Where Thoburn employs the notion of an 
ethno-aesthetic territoriality, for Burrows, Occupy is to be situated at 
the cutting edge of contemporary art practice. Like other contributors, 
he does not simply offer a Deleuzian reading of Occupy, but rather the 
production of a forced encounter between certain theoretical resources 
and the various material practices and events that took place across 2010 
and 2011. His essay also considers the ‘networked dividual,’ the role of 
art education, and the merit of various literary, philosophical and artistic 
strategies of non-relation to capitalism in the construction of a singular 
reading of the war machine.
The term ‘war machine’ may be one of Deleuze and Guattari’s most 
misleading, as it has nothing to do with war and what it designates might 
be better termed a ‘metamorphosis machine’ (Patton 2002: 110) or a 
‘mutation machine’ (Holland). Indeed the war machine and the multi-
tude should be seen as synonymous terms; as Tampio explains:
Hardt and Negri’s major contribution to Deleuzian politi-
cal theory is an attempt to name the social body capable of 
actualizing Deleuze’s vision. The concept of the multitude 
rephrases Deleuze’s intuition of a war machine combating the 
state apparatus, the composition of a joyful political body, 
and the full social body without organs (2009: 387).
With the concept of the war machine Deleuze and Guattari are describ-
ing a process of mutation and change. Now that a war is actually taking 
place over our bodies, minds, and increasingly the planet and life itself, ‘it 
is the state that has war as its object, and not the nomadic war machine’ 
(Marzec 2001). What Hardt and Negri once saw as an ‘acephelous supra-
national order’ is increasingly becoming a system of outright control, 
wherein power is vested in a specific identifiable group of financiers, poli-
ticians, institutions and corporations. There is then a tension emerging 
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between what we already know from French intellectual writing after May 
1968 – which broadly accepted the idea that ‘power is not simply a mat-
ter of coercion or repression … the product or the expression of a power-
ful ruling elite exercising influence over a powerless majority’ (Buchanan 
2008: 21) – and contemporary conditions on the ground suggesting the 
emergence of a transcendent neoliberal war machine of debt and perpet-
ual war against people, communities and life.
We should also be wary of investing in the notion of the sovereignty 
of an ‘empire’ or ‘despot’ as a terrifying behemoth, lest we both misun-
derstand it and create a monster that can only be challenged by matching 
its scale and its weapons, in turn affording it even greater power. Instead, 
we should think with Hardt and Negri:
Empire creates a greater potential for revolution than did the 
modern regimes of power because it presents us, alongside 
the machine of command, with an alternative: the set of all 
the exploited and the subjugated, a multitude that is directly 
opposed to Empire, with no mediation between them. (Hardt 
and Negri 2000: 393)
Capitalism is, in and of itself, decentered and deterritorialized; it is end-
lessly creative. It creates fluid networks, multiple hybrid identities, and 
demands new subjectivities. Its axiomatics create borders and inhibit 
flows, and yet it also cannot tolerate borders; indeed, we might argue that 
capitalist production cannot tolerate the unproductiveness of racism, 
sexism and homophobia, and certainly decoding and deterritorializa-
tion have immense emancipatory potential. According to Virno (2004) 
the capitalist mode of production in the transition from Fordism to post-
Fordism was driven by the multitude’s demands for new socialities, new 
working practices, and the development of new desires, relations, sexuali-
ties and attitudes to hierarchy that have subsequently been capitalized.
Given the inherent dynamism of capitalism, it is hardly surprising 
that the multitude takes on equally amorphous forms of expression. But 
the multitude is not simply a consequence of new forms of production; 
it emerges from the autopoietic drive of the resourcefulness of life – of 
difference – as the driving force behind new forms of capitalist produc-
tion. Its force also emerges from disjunctive and conjunctive accidents 
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and unexpected collisions, which foster new potentials and multiplicities 
that are to be found simultaneously in-between and beyond.
The new phenomenology of the multitude reveals labor as the fun-
damental creative cooperative activity that goes beyond any obstacle 
imposed on it and that constantly re-creates the world. Labor – mate-
rial or immaterial, intellectual or corporeal – produces and reproduces 
social life, and in the process is exploited by capital. This intermingling 
of capital and labor becomes the new ground for resistance. Here Hardt 
and Negri encapsulate their project: ‘The creative forces of the multitude 
that sustain Empire are also capable of autonomously constructing a 
counter-Empire, an alternative political organization of global flows and 
exchanges’ (2000: 53).
The war machine is irrepressible, autopoietic and endlessly resource-
ful; a perpetual and continuous act, it is the driving creative force behind 
capital that capital seeks to control through its axioms. It is essential not 
to underestimate the extraordinary potential of the war machine; for 
Deleuze and Guattari it is ‘another species,’ ‘another nature,’ ‘another 
justice,’ ‘another origin’ (1987: 352, 353, 354).6 This aspect of Deleuze’s 
political ontology is entirely in step with Occupy’s modus operandi. 
Everything is to be questioned using weapons and terms specific to the 
particular circumstances, the kind of violence to be resisted, and the joy 
to be released across the entire social field – made in the moment for the 
moment without coda or rules. This is an astonishingly flexible method, 
requiring no authorization from a creed or hierarchy.
Whilst Conley speaks to the advancing multitude, those cultural 
producers that create new nomadic, rhizomatic identities out of new 
spaces, for Burrows the war machine’s specificity arises from its perfor-
mance of resistance. He examines a range of political actions (swarms, 
teach-ins, collective action), some of which he took part in, in terms of 
how they occupy space, or how they created ‘four-dimensional spaces.’ 
Burrows draws out the complexities of three different expressions of 
refusal united in their rejection of the exigencies of neoliberal capitalist 
production. Each of them says ‘no’ to alienation by, or participation in, 
the already legitimized spaces of political discourse or civil society. This 
saying ‘no’ also involves refusing the affirmative search for solutions or 
exploring grounds for compromise. It takes the form of developing other 
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spatial dynamics beyond the enclosed, regimented and delimited spaces 
of the public and private, of the media, commerce and political institu-
tions – breaking these divisions down and thinking transversally across 
them. As Holland remarks, rather than making demands on a suppos-
edly democratic system, Occupy Wall Street (OWS) tried to instantiate 
and illustrate what true participatory democracy looks like. Burrows also 
positions art as the privileged ground for engendering a spirit of the col-
lective and for opening horizons. In doing so, he addresses the various 
ways in which protests are able to challenge dominant subjective and 
discursive formations by experimenting with the production of negative 
space or vacuoles of non-communication. He notes that for Deleuze and 
Guattari the negative space is non-incorporable, non-subsumable, as the 
war machine operates to decompose rigid forms: ‘The war machine is the 
surest mechanism directed against the formation of the State’ (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1987: 357).
Burrows thinks through the various forms of saying ‘no’ and shows 
how in many circumstances refusal can be recuperated, accommodated, 
commodified and marketized; as he puts it: ‘the crumbling edge of capi-
talism is also the cutting edge of capitalism.’ He compares the quiet, 
steadfast, ultimately suicidal refusal of Melville’s Bartleby with Nick 
Land’s theorization of both non-compliance and the problems inherent 
to organization. The war machine Burrows describes is resistant, actively 
negative, and creates conflict not by answering power but by opening up 
a new space for experimenting with affirmation and negation. The cre-
ation of collectives as an art practice brings together the various com-
plexities at work here, not least in the enactment of a new sense of space 
and time through a new alignment of actual and cyberspace. This is in 
step with those art practices that over the last 40 years have striven to be 
non-subsumable by the market. Burrows contends that becoming minor 
within the global art establishment parallels – many would argue leads – 
the new politics of our age.
Along with Mecchia, Holland measures how the term ‘war machine’ 
was developed in response to May 1968, but can be adjusted to the 
imperatives of Occupy. He highlights how the war machine creates role 
specializations, is horizontal in its organization, and ‘operate[s] via con-
tagion, enthusiasm, esprit de corps, and solidarity (Deleuze and Guattari 
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1987: 241–9, 267–9, 278, 366–7, 384, 390–93) rather than strict obliga-
tion or duty,’ although, he warns, there is nothing ‘that can be considered 
decisive’ about this modus operandi in itself, since the Tea Party move-
ment, and indeed the stock exchange, share many of these features of 
the war machine. Notwithstanding this caveat, when looking to under-
stand Occupy’s potential for social transformation the concept of the war 
machine provides an invaluable tool. Historical change does not come 
only through violent revolution or sudden ruptures but also through slow 
developments in thought, affects and perception, through the shifting 
and sliding of subjectivities and communities. As we are seeing today, the 
potential for a revolution in consciousness is observable in the exceed-
ingly clear political bifurcation that is taking place between diametrically 
opposed political ontologies, the furthest poles of which being exempli-
fied by Occupy and the Tea Party.
Refusal is also central to Holland’s analysis. He suggests that a slow-
motion general strike (a strike against everything) may be taking place 
in the widespread subtraction of our collective and individual experience 
from the machinery of neoliberal capitalist production. It is clear that vast 
numbers of people are either reduced to exhaustion and dismay by capi-
talism’s rage against love, community, and social solidarity, or are enraged 
by informed analyses of climate change, wealth distribution, people 
trafficking, the prison–industrial complex, modern-day slavery and so 
forth, and emboldened by experience in resistance movements across 
the globe. It takes time to create new networks and new subjectivities, 
and taking back time is both the method and objective of many of these 
disparate political groupings. Holland leaves open the question as to 
whether this will prompt a sudden irruption of the political unconscious 
or will continue in slow motion. Either way, ‘the hoary old reform–revo-
lution conundrum’ does not become an issue because neither is negated 
in the open-ended political utopianism of Occupy.
VII. Money and Debt: Towards a Minor Marxism
Anti-Oedipus is a difficult read. It is Deleuze and Guattari at their most 
infuriating and perplexing, and yet it may be their most prescient text. 
For Holland it provides an indispensible anatomization of how the 
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conversion of wealth into capital and work into dependent wage labor is 
central to the development of capitalism, and charts a path through dif-
ferent conceptualizations of money, debt, control societies and capitalist 
axiomatics to arrive at what appears to be capitalism’s essence, the con-
junction of three flows of decoding consisting of:
The decoding of land flows, under the form of the constitu-
tion of large private properties, the decoding of monetary 
flows, under the form of the development of merchant for-
tunes, the decoding of a flow of workers under the form of 
expropriation, of the deterritorialization of serfs and peasant 
landholders. (Deleuze 1971)
The conjunction of the deterritorialized flows of abstract capital and 
abstract labor and their reterritorialization in the form of private prop-
erty forms the center of the many ‘factitious reterritorializations of capi-
talism.’ In turn, private property functions to alienate the wage laborer 
whose so-called free labor serves as their only property, removed from 
their material and incorporeal reproduction of worlds, selves and the 
socius. Only as a consequence of these conjunctions could capitalism sta-
bilize and endure.
In Anti-Oedipus we find that whilst critiquing all forms of arbores-
cent thought, particularly Freudianism and Marxism, Deleuze and 
Guattari assert that capitalism has an archetypal structure. At first blush 
this appears to be a contradiction, but we should consider the difference 
between seeking to determine the essential nature of a thing and ana-
lyzing a historically contingent organization of forces. Indeed, there is 
a mood of exhaustion in contemporary Deleuzian scholarship, and the 
proliferation of Deleuzian aesthetics, the various alibis for rhizomatic 
absentmindedness and the championing of the liberating potential of 
desire and schizoid expressivity. This reading (clarified in some detail in 
this volume by Mecchia) has led to attempts to articulate a more care-
ful and coherent Deleuzian political philosophy, achieved not least by 
the works of Ian Buchanan. A useful introduction to the basic principles 
of Deleuze and Guattari’s political, social and economic thought can be 
found in Buchanan’s 2008 Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus (88–116), 
which concerns a particular section of Anti-Oedipus (pages 139–262). 
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These pages outline the relation of Deleuze and Guattari’s political 
ontology to psychoanalysis and Marxism, as well as their reliance on 
Nietzsche’s anthropological account of the role of credit and debt in the 
formation of human societies and the development of consciousness.
To briefly summarize: Anti-Oedipus offers a typology of three inter-
related social formations in terms of the regulation of flows by coding. 
In the primitive/territorial period, bodies, acts, symbols, territories and 
subjectivities are enacted together in everyday life, initiations, rituals and 
language. The despotic age is characterized by an overcoding by the state, 
money and religion, whereby finite porous bonds are overcoded on the 
body of the despot. Finally, in the civilized/capitalist age, overcoding is 
replaced by capital’s ‘most characteristic’ and ‘most important tendency’ 
of decoding and deterritorialization. The capitalist social machine is 
fundamentally different from the primitive and despotic abstract social 
machines in that it functions not by codes but through decoding and 
deterritorialization (Deleuze and Guattari 2000: 34). It is the first society 
in history where the aim of production is not to serve another end (social 
bonds or overcoding), but serves its own purpose: production for pro-
duction’s sake. The ‘essence of wealth’ is no longer a concrete objective 
thing, but ‘the activity of production in general’ (Deleuze and Guattari 
2000: 270). As I highlight, the key objective of a mappable number of 
super-corporations and political institutions is the takeover, domination 
and then destruction, through monopolization, of the market. Thoburn 
likewise notes that production in general does have a purpose – the self-
expansion of capital, the maximization of ‘surplus value’ from the expan-
sive potential of life.7
This system is held in place by axioms. First amongst which is that 
‘Man must constitute himself through the repression of the intense ger-
minal influx, the great biocosmic memory that threatens to deluge every 
attempt at collectivity’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 190). Deleuze and 
Guattari’s political ontology is a theory of the connectedness of all things 
in the great germinal wash of life: the same wash of life that is the force 
behind the multitude. Capitalism’s first axiom is to replace this with the 
assertion of capital’s immanence. This harnessing of life’s plenitude, diver-
sity and vital creative force serves not the good of all but the acceleration 
of capitalist accumulation.
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Central to the transition from the primitive/territorial to the des-
potic epoch was the role played by the development of money. In the 
primitive/territorial age, goods were exchanged according to a system 
of barter.8 Credit and debt were measured using various fungible, finite 
recording systems criss-crossing a palimpsest of social and familial reg-
isters which laid the foundation of the development of thought (where 
thought is taken to include shared beliefs, alliances and filiations, inher-
ited myths, social practices, recognitions and scales of values, affects, 
soma, and so forth), and social obligations. Money was not introduced to 
facilitate barter but imposed by the despot to secure his power and exact 
tribute. This, along with the development of abstract labor and capital, 
laid the foundations for the development of capitalism. The conjunc-
tion of these great forces of decoding were exacted through the figure 
of money, which retained the imprint of its originative incarnation as a 
power of command.
My own chapter shows how money, while its infinite variety of uses 
may be impossible to fully theorize, should be understood in terms 
of the originative division, forged in the transition from the primitive 
to the despotic age, between its dual functions as credit and exchange. 
The self-same coin acts according to two valences as credit, which allows 
for accumulation, the extraction of tribute and the power of command, 
and exchange, which facilities both invention, creativity and the multi-
tudinous expression of desire. Exchange money is ‘impotent’ and turns 
us into slaves of the social machine of production and consumption 
wherein all desires are decoded and recoded into the general equivalence 
of money: ‘under capitalism, all the flows of desire, and all of the intensi-
ties of life become grounded on one single flow: the quantifiable medium 
of capital and exchange’ (Colebrook 2006: 50).
There is then a profound ambivalence at the heart of money. It facili-
tates the creative potentials of unlimited exchange and it also allows for 
quantitative exchange as a substitute for the time-consuming, socially 
complex and never quite concluded palimpsest of different mecha-
nisms of trade.
Quantitative measurement as a substitute for rational value 
judgment confers supreme moral security and intellectual 
comfort: the Good becomes measurable and calculable; 
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decisions and moral judgments can follow from the imple-
mentation of a procedure of impersonal, objective, quan-
tifying calculation and individual subjects do not have to 
shoulder the burden [of decision making] anxiously and 
uncertainly. (Gorz 1989: 121)
However, these extraordinary freedoms are curtailed as money becomes 
the supreme, indispensible criteria and single measure of value of all 
things. These values and criteria are largely determined by the manner 
in which is money is issued and the purposes to which it is put. These 
ambivalences and contradictions at the heart of money are fundamental, 
and Philip Goodchild’s project is to show how thinking and reason are 
grounded in the same processes. Looking across the epochs we can ques-
tion whether the great advances in trade and social development would 
have been possible without the cooperation and coordination introduced 
by the single quantifying measuring scale provided by money. Likewise, 
would the industrial revolution have been possible without credit?
These contradictions may explain why money’s other side, its ‘power 
of command’ and extraction through rent and tribute, remains unhin-
dered and leads to chronic overproduction, breathtaking inequality and 
wastefulness of human potential, and an inescapable, incessant schiz-flow 
of creative invention and destruction rather than revolution. What is hid-
den is the simple fact that money’s ability to facilitate the expression of 
life’s potential is severely curtailed by its issuance as credit money by the 
banks. Indeed, the appearance of a primary equilibrium of prices leads to 
a belief in an underlying principle of equality that conceals entirely func-
tional and fundamental inequalities. As Goodchild, one of the foremost 
interpreters of Deleuzian economic theory, notes:
Since money is created as debt, and debt must be repaid in 
the form of money and more debt, and debt becomes the 
supreme principle of theoretical knowledge, practical con-
duct, and mutual trust, then this perspective of evaluation is 
not chosen but imposes itself. (2013: 53)
Taking up the challenge of making Deleuze ‘relevant’ to policy forma-
tion and institution building, I ask whether the practical policy formu-
lations of the political campaign group Positive Money (whose agenda 
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is to strip banks of the right to create money) might be read as classical 
political economic manifestations of Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophi-
cal speculations.
Also assessing the fundamental importance of debt to the fabric of 
neoliberalism, Holland argues that credit money creates three decisive 
forms of dependency: the enforced selling of labor-power to capital; 
enforced consumption in markets whose exchange values are bogus; and 
the creation of psychological dependency, leading to a state of debt peon-
age. For Holland, a minor Marxism seeks to overturn these dependen-
cies. Because money is imbricated in the very foundations of subjectivity, 
thinking and power relations, this is not a single-issue campaign but one 
that strikes at the heart of capitalist production and is a direct invocation 
to the multitude to express its collective agency and challenge capitalist 
axiomatics. Indeed, the importance of this cannot be understated in so 
far as the creditor and debtor relation is the primary machine for the pro-
duction of the difference which arrests and plunders the plenitude of all 
other differences.
Debt servitude under neoliberalism has similar characteristics to ser-
vitude under the despot: it is ‘a debt of existence, a debt of the existence 
of the subjects themselves’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2000: 197). As such, a 
debt strike has the potential to release a collective identity from servitude 
to infinite debt, sending lines of flight in unforeseen directions across 
oceans of repressed fears, unlocking desire and thought and allowing for 
layer upon layer of armor to fall. At stake in such a debt strike would be 
not only billions of dollars of social and private debt, but (to paraphrase 
Anti-Oedipus (Deleuze and Guatarri 1983: 180)), all the stupidity and 
arbitrariness of the laws, all the pain of the initiations, the whole perverse 
apparatus of repression and education, the red-hot irons and the atro-
cious procedures that breed man, mark him in his flesh, render him capa-
ble of alliance and form him within the debtor–creditor relation.
Both Holland’s and my own essays in this volume discuss primitive 
accumulation in terms of an array of debts and obligations being traded 
according to a palimpsest of fungible relations before the demands of 
exchange facilitated by money. Colebrook reminds us of an essential but 
under-studied component to this theory: that the fabric of the socius in 
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the form of obligation and mutuality, dependence and merit, was realized 
through the practices of theft and gift.
Deleuze and Guattari detail how in the primitive/territorial age the 
destruction of surplus production in rituals or potlatch not only used 
excess to create a filiative lineage of social adhesion but also allowed 
obligations to remain, as the absence of wealth held in reserve necessi-
tated continued social dependency. Mecchia reports on Pierre Clastres’ 
view that ‘many world populations were not frugal and stateless because 
of scarcity and political primitivism, but as a consequence of an explicit 
political decision, notably the unwillingness to engage in labor contracts 
and political representations.’ Celebrations and expenditure to demon-
strate excess, along with enactments of rituals and inscriptions, are all 
forms of gift that are very different from just simply giving something 
away, or from messy reciprocal gift-giving; they are commitments to the 
social bond. Buchanan (2008) explains that the chief doesn’t exchange 
his wealth for allegiance; rather, through these practices he converts 
wealth into allegiance. Gift is also a form of trade, and to give often 
implies a power relation as the gift bestows power in the form of repu-
tation, rank and sociability, which implies its mirror in the form of alle-
giance. By giving, credit is accrued, but also life force is expended, and by 
expending is in turn increased; ‘the gift is the spending of energy not for 
the sake of return, indeed one’s force is increased the more one spends’ 
(Colebrook 2006: 126).
To a large extent to steal is to be, and very often the gift is indistin-
guishable from theft as elaborate feasts and gift-giving become a way 
of converting goods into prestige and allegiance: ‘to prevent this from 
becoming an exchange the ritual of gift giving must make the gift seem 
like a theft’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2000: 203). Before there is an econ-
omy allowing for the exchange of property, and before there is anything 
like scarcity, need or interest, Deleuze and Guattari argue for a milieu of 
forces that is neither the rapacious world of capitalist acquisitiveness and 
theft, nor a benign moral nature attuned to social harmony and benevo-
lence. Once social systems are formed from a war machine that is a play 
of forces before interests and property, then a milieu of rivalry, envy and 
rank inevitably follows precisely because of establishing the single force 
of the proper or of ownership.
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In the primitive/territorial age inscription on the body was often 
the instrument for bonding the protocols of theft and gift: as Nietzsche 
says, when impressed through pain, things are remembered. The rites of 
inscription, tattooing, scarring, painting and piercing served many pur-
poses; the tribe was bonded by attaching bodies to symbols, minds and 
the socius (the body and gaze and the tribe are assembled at once, collec-
tively), creating lateral alliances that countered the power of filiation and 
lineage and extending filiations to the extensive allying relations of the 
tribe. These rituals, dependencies and alliances warded off the uncontrol-
lable power of unleashed exchange.
In sum, the requirements of the socius were enacted through systems 
(machines) of inscribing and marking, rituals and the measuring of credit 
and debt, to which the practices of theft and gift were essential: theft and 
gift are a style of relation that preceded coding as mother, child, priest, 
and despot. As Colebrook points out, theft and gift were fundamental to 
the creation of stable points within the psychosocial fabric and for the 
formation of territories, which in turn is a pre-requisite for the creation of 
genuine difference and genuine exchange.
What is to be found in the primitive/territorial society is exactly what 
the term implies: territories rather than exchange, stable points rather 
than equivalences. In our age, territories are formed primarily through 
the possession of capital, land and political power. Before the emergence 
of the exchange of equivalences and accumulation of abstract capital 
through money, territories were assemblages of natural disequilibriums 
between alliances, filiations, and potentialities expressed through the 
‘powers to differ actualized in productive encounters.’ Genuine difference 
and genuine exchange, as Colebrook points out, leads away from insecu-
rity, moralizing and the fear of living a full and active life towards vitality 
and arousal; ‘I steal therefore I become’ and ‘I give therefore I accrue,’ are 
not forms of ‘power over but power to’ (Colebrook 2006: 134).
Desiring life is intensive difference. A body is made up of 
powers to differ, and these powers are actualized in pro-
ductive encounters. Theft and gift are precisely the pro-
cesses that allow for these differences to be expressed. 
(Colebrook 2006: 134).
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The requirement of the socius was therefore that potency, agency, lever-
age and force create relatively stable terms, and intensive difference is 
a pre-requisite for a genuine calculation to be made regarding who has 
taken what. Such calculation, as I show, is taken by Nietzsche to be the 
foundation of thought.
In the primitive/territorial epoch we see an assemblage of adjunctive 
and disjunctive relations and collective territorialization occurs when the 
tribe is marked by ‘processes [that] allow organs such as the eyes, penis, 
breast or head to be experienced collectively’ (Colebrook 2006: 144). 
This collectivism also leads to a proto-individualism, as only in a form of 
territorialization can the body take itself as an individual; and individual 
memory, or a sense of self existing in time, is dependent upon collective 
memory. As Holland, Colebrook and I all make clear, fundamental to this 
process is debt and the ability to live up to a promise. As I argue:
Certainly, without rational thought, anticipation and predic-
tion, man would not survive; but memory is more than that. 
It lays the foundation for the formation of will by the creation 
of a link between ‘I will’ and the actual manifestation of the 
will in action. In this way an infallible psychological law leads 
to predicable subjects who, in turn, provide the infrastructure 
for the social bond.
Also emergent from this process is accumulation achieved not through 
expropriation but as a result of harboring and storing and the process of 
exchange, which together form the conditions for a nascent capitalism. 
Economic and subjective differences, a ‘this is mine and that is yours’ or 
‘non-exchangeable and non-substitutable’ singularities between two dis-
cernable persons, are pre-requisites for trading. The emergence of capi-
talism was a consequence not of determining laws of history, nor of an 
underlying human nature, nor of a law of struggle or economic produc-
tion, but of a specific historically contingent assemblage of forces.
VIII. Deterritorialization, Reterritorialization, and Smooth Space
Deleuze and Guattari are often presented as being in thrall to the deter-
ritorializing effects of capitalism. Fueling this perception, Anti-Oedipus 
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presents the ‘schizo’ as a figure of revolution, freed from the shackles of 
the despot and capital as a signifier-scrambling agent traversing the strata 
in a mode of permanent revolution. As early as 1991 Eugene Holland 
attempted to dispel the resulting misconception of an absentminded, 
sensation-fetishizing Deleuze and Guattari by demonstrating how in A 
Thousand Plateaus this revolutionary schizoanalytic fever became more 
tempered. What is usually overlooked is that de- and reterritorializa-
tion are tendencies not oppositions. They are aspects of the same pro-
cess; as deterritorialization creates a space for reterritorialization, reter-
ritorialization leaves a vacuole in its wake: ‘the least deterritorialized 
[element] reterritorializes on the most deterritorialized’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987: 174).
Capitalism’s great potential and allure is precisely that it is the first sys-
tem whose modus operandi is immanent to a process that constitutes the 
formula of all being. But capitalism does not merely ‘deterritorialize with 
all its might’; its force is determined by axioms irrespective of the damage 
caused to the oikos, the planet and life itself. Occupy and Deleuze’s phi-
losophy seek not to restrain capitalism (and life’s) fundamental tendency 
towards deterritorialization but to bring about new kinds of reterritoriali-
zation organized around much more rejuvenating forms such as assem-
blages, social machines, plateaus and smooth spaces.
If a motif can be discerned in the many vectors of thought and diverse 
positions that make up this volume, then it turns on the question of ter-
ritorialization in relation to potentials of causality, agency and leadership 
as well as the necessity of resistance and antagonism. It is a question of 
how these might be realized in pragmatic formations in the creation of 
territories, negative spaces, new subjectivities and sensibilities, and in 
new ways of understanding economics, particularly in relation to debt. 
We should not just occupy empty spaces but, as Conley puts it, ‘rethink 
and refashion space by means of new distributions,’ maintaining a com-
mitment to change ‘though rearranging inherited configurations of life.’ 
To occupy does not necessarily imply taking over a psychical territory 
or seizing the fort but can be pure movement in the form of cadences 
and rhythms, drawing lines or tracing diagrams. And for such change to 
happen something has to happen first: the ‘preoccupation’ of a myriad of 
micro spaces that have to be pried open to bring about new sensibilities 
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in the formation of other intelligences. Preoccupation for Conley entails 
new modes of thinking, experiencing and perception which, when held 
together by affective intensities, create a new plateau: Occupy.
In What is Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari note that ‘the territory 
implies the emergence of pure sensory qualities, or sensibilia that cease to 
be merely functional and become expressive features, making possible a 
transformation of functions’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 183). Thoburn 
saw this happening first-hand at OccupyLSX, where sensibilia took the 
form of a struggle for ideas, gestures, placards and signs, information 
systems, a collective will to self-education, the immersion of subjects in 
shared ideas and in the deployment of new social technologies. These 
expressive, sensory qualities were manifested most clearly by the tent, 
where the experience of poverty, precarity, debt, and racism – as well as 
the spatial arrangements of the city, the gendered divisions of labor and 
the partitions of public and private – were all refashioned in a different 
type of dwelling and form of possession. For Thoburn, the tent expressed 
and created a territory at once:
The tent undid patterns of behaviour, laws, sensory structures, 
and economic forms that determine that space as a road, 
stage for commerce and governance, or municipal park. But 
if the tent and tripod deterritorialize in this way, they simul-
taneously generate a new territory, they reterritorialize into an 
Occupy camp or a street party.
Thoburn’s interest is in how two different modalities of composition, ‘the 
sensory or expressive quality of Occupy and its meaning or explicit poli-
tics,’ formed ‘a mutually sustaining encounter.’ He likens this new form of 
territorialization to the art object, which for Deleuze is always a composi-
tion of material form and expressive qualities. The art object as ‘monu-
ment’ is a fabulation, rather than a representation or image, and this fab-
ulation has to capture something of the struggle to live, to express the 
struggle for existence. In this way, artistic and socially progressive forms 
lift ‘suffering’ to the level of ‘aesthetic expression.’
In a paper similarly concerned with aesthetics, Burrows writes of 
swarms, teach-ins and collective actions spearheaded by art students, 
made possible by the knotting together of ‘the seemingly infinite, 
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inhuman scale of cyberspace and communication technology with the 
space and time of occupation and protest.’ This knot of cyber and physi-
cal space enabled individuals who may have previously felt atomized to 
discover the joys of collective action. For Burrows reterritorialization 
took the form of the creation of negative spaces in the various practices 
of saying ‘no’; in this way he shows the versatility of the war machine, 
specifically how new collective assemblages created new space-times and 
the production of a negative space became the material of protest. The 
breadth and scope of the war machine is also drawn out by Holland, who 
reminds us of Deleuze’s insistence that the war machine ‘exists only in its 
own metamorphoses’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 366) or ‘in specific 
assemblages such as building bridges or cathedrals or rendering judge-
ments or making music or instituting a science, a technology’ (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1987: 366).
Attending to the question of space, Buchanan addresses how, in 
rupturing the striated spaces of capitalism, Occupy instigated a change 
in sense and perception through the creation of smooth spaces. This 
amounts not so much to a change in the state of things, or redefining the 
map, as to the creation of a new way of being in space. For Deleuze and 
Guattari smooth space speaks not of a flattening, but of social relations 
where regularities, points, measurements and predetermined modes of 
being give way to openness, and where multiplicitous relations and dif-
ferently accented rhythms create irregularities and constant itinerancy. 
For Buchanan, following Harvey, it is in smooth space that the new com-
mons is to be found – not as a presumption of commonality but in terms 
of a regard for contingency and variation, where instability and incoher-
ence is to be worked through in the manner of Occupy rather than con-
cealed beneath conviviality or the false ideal of ‘the public.’ Buchanan 
stresses, partly in response to Badiou, that the ‘Idea’ in the form of an 
affirmation of what might be possible, rather than a state of ressentiment 
or anger, is essential to the creation of smooth space. Deleuzian analy-
sis of social space concerns less how to create the conditions for univer-
salizing concepts such as ‘a public’ than how to construct a place where 
genuine conflicts between ideas are given expression. We might say, as 
Thoburn does, that dissolving the passivity of consensus, antagonism and 
dissensus fosters a sense of alertness and empowers people and groups 
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to embark on multifarious forms of resistance. In this sense, the smooth 
space of Occupy is a territory wherein further, deeper and more exten-
sive conflicts are to be assembled.
Smooth space for Mecchia is nomadically itinerant, vibrant and open, 
but densities or refrains emerge within it to create points from which life 
may be processed or machines assembled. Smooth space contracts and 
opens, and conjunctions between forces emerge. Following such con-
junctions, Mecchia addresses how de- and reterritorialization are played 
out in the figure of the subject. First, deterritorialization means taking 
apart existing egos as well as monolithic and totalizing philosophical 
and psychoanalytical theories and, most importantly, their ties to capi-
talist de- and reterritorializations. Second (or better concomitantly), it is 
necessary to reterritorialize in the figure of the ‘anthropos,’ understood 
as a ‘dynamic, material figure of political subjectivity’ that criss-crosses 
the striated spaces of social organization. For Mecchia the anthropos is 
both a method and an analytical category, the meeting place of which 
was given material expression at Occupy. It does this through a collective 
conceived not in terms of party structure, nor as subject to the demands 
of ‘truth,’ but as an assemblage of empirical, machinic processes that are 
transversal across striated spaces: ‘neither man nor woman, rich or poor, 
powerful or subjugated – what constitutes this kind of collective organi-
zation is … one of the most powerful practico-theoretical figures for our 
understanding of the emergence of the Occupy groups.’
For Nunes also, binary oppositions such as ‘openness against clo-
sure, diversity over unity, spontaneity over purposive organization, rhi-
zome over arborescence, deterritorialization over reterritorialization’ 
are all equally unreliable. Nonetheless, as tendencies, the drift towards 
either end of these poles is obvious. The crucial issue is how in any given 
situation these tendencies are to be balanced and to what purpose. For 
example, as Nunes notes, at one end of the scale, formlessness only serves 
to lay political movements open to irrelevance and capture, but he is 
also at pains to show how, at the other end of the scale, vanguard poli-
tics can no longer capture or mobilize new forms of political protest, or 
the emergent sensibilities of political collectives. For Nunes the ‘twilight 
of the vanguard’ has seen the emergence of multiple vanguards, collec-
tive assemblages and packs, all of which are experiments with political 
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transformation in ways that retain the maximum degree of openness and 
mobility. Rather than universal forces of history or the endless struggle 
between capital and labor, the nature of event and the complexity of our 
times require new more mobile forms, thinking strategically about how 
to take on the war machine at its most abstract, precisely in the man-
ner of Occupy.
For Protevi, Occupy created an environment for people to show 
their faces to each other, assume an identity, and challenge the ‘crystal-
lization of the collective affect of shame in the American air.’ By showing 
their faces to each other in a new collective space the Occupiers sought 
to counteract existing stratified and homogenized affects ‘by creating a 
positive affect of joyful solidarity.’ Placing body next to body and becom-
ing immersed in the shared expression of the chant are forms of vibrat-
ing and being in phase: an indissoluble togetherness capable of creating a 
positive intermodal feedback of percept, affect and sense.
IX. Conclusion
War machines, smooth spaces, packs, assemblages, plateaus, becoming-
minor, transformations in subjectivity, the creation of new collectivities 
and forms of distributive leadership – all these ideas and processes are 
addressed in relation to Occupy in the chapters that follow. While there 
are many other aspects of Deleuze and Guattari’s political ontology that 
could also be invoked and applied here, it is hoped that these are suffi-
cient to demonstrate how their political concepts are relevant to this 
new neo-feudal age and to the type of sociopolitical movements that 
have emerged in response. Life flows, life is irrepressible, the question is 
always what social forms might be created to make these flows more mal-
leable, open, flexible and more able to express the creativity that lies at 
the heart of human nature and life. This book articulates a shift away from 
the fetishization of deterritorialization towards fluid and open forms 
of territorialization as figures of potency, agency, leverage and force, in 
search of genuine difference. As Deleuze and Guattari say, everywhere, 
‘the depth of difference is primary’ (1994: 51). The aim of politics is to 
release difference from its entrapment within the logics and axiomatics 
of capitalism. Capitalism is a difference-producing machine that cannot 
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tolerate its own plenitude. In response, rather than following the Deleuze 
popularized in some circles of accelerated difference we need to find or 
invent, with Occupy, difference-affirming machines. Occupy’s ‘Let these 
Facts be Known’ captures the myriad forms of minoritarianism that 
allow for contradictory, antagonistic, connective, rhizomic differences. 
Recognizing that our urgent times do not afford us the luxury of absolute 
deterritorialization or fantasies about an outside to capitalism, Occupy 
is intensely pragmatic – all of its groups and assemblies are charged with 
experimenting with questions of how to devise practical solutions to the 
problems of the state, democracy, economy and social relations. In the 
end, both Occupy and Deleuze are rooted in practical analysis, and both 
reject the stifling alternative ‘reform or revolution,’ because both under-
stand that ‘the question [of revolutions] has always been organisational’ 
(2007: 143): the organization of flows into autopoietic and highly rela-
tional structures.
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Notes
1. The anthropological view of politics sees the institutions and structures 
of political life as contingent. And the premises and principles that 
underpin these are far from taken from given but the subject of enquiry and 
comparison. 
2. All references unless cited otherwise are to papers in this volume.
3. Claire Colebrook, endorsement for Ian Buchanan’s Deleuze and Guattari’s 
Anti-Oedipus (2008). 
4. Most obviously: Deleuze and Political Activism (2010) edited by Marcelo 
Svirsky; Deleuze and Marx and Politics (2003) by Nicholas Thoburn; Deleuze 
and Politics (2008) edited by Ian Buchanan and Nicholas Thoburn (2008); 
Deleuze and the Social (2006) edited by Martin Fuglsang and Bent Meier 
Sørensen; Deleuze and Marx (2009) edited by Jain Dhruv; as well as numerous 
titles by the Deleuzian entangled Phillip Goodchild.
5. As illustrated in Deleuze (2008). 
6. See also Marzec (2001).
7. As Anne Pettifor points out: real wealth should be seen not in terms of the 
tangible stuff (homes, money land) but in terms of the intangible stuff the 
economic power that wealthy people are able to exercise by virtue of the fact 
they have got assets, those assets enable them to borrow and leverage their 
wealth at a rate that is unprecedented in human history. For example the 
Glazier brothers bought Manchester United using very little of their own 
money, they used borrowed money. They had some collateral but the real 
collateral was Manchester United football team itself, and its supporters 
and its streams of revenue. They were about to purchase a football club and 
make others pay for the debt, through buying tickets, televisions rights, 
tee-shirts. Those revenue streams are paying down the debt incurred by the 
Glazier families is an exact example of how the rich are further enriched 
by the enforced indebtedness of others. See Boom Bust (June 5, 2014), 
RT America. Accessed April 25, 2015 from: https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=1Yqalvi5jUM 
8. The first coinage by the Lydian or Phrygian despots in the Greek colonies on 
the Aegean around 680 BC, probably for fiscal, military and political purposes 
rather than for trade; coinage only acquired a use in trading between cities 
in the following century in the main Greek trading ports, such as Athens. 
(Goodchild 2008: 28).
Chapter 1
On Anthropolitics: From Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia to Occupy and Beyond
Giuseppina Mecchia
The events related to the Occupy movements caught many by surprise: 
how often, especially but not only in the USA, have we seen people 
occupying the streets and parks of major Western cities, in the very 
strongholds of global capitalism, expressing a radical opposition to their 
most profound economic and social determinations? As the persuasion 
exerted by the capitalist way of life became more globally widespread, 
one might have despaired that such a mobilization could still be possi-
ble. Even more striking was the pointed eloquence of the demonstrators, 
who performed an impeccable analysis of the financial crisis that started 
in 2008 and chose to bring it forth in deeply significant public–private 
spaces. From Zuccotti Park in New York City, just a few blocks from Wall 
Street, to St Paul’s Cathedral in London, a few hundred yards from the 
London Stock Exchange, students, long-time activists and newly minted 
militants decided to take their message to the streets. Leaving the mes-
sage aside for a moment, the mere appearance of these crowds was worth 
pondering: how could the protesters have materialized, both physically 
and psychologically? How could it be that in an age when our mental 
abilities and physical resources seem to have been completely coopted by 
economic imperatives, so many of us could suddenly break the spell? In 
other words, how does the subject of politics emerge – if only from time 
to time – from the dejection of every day drudgery and delusion?
Nothing less than a social psycho-philosophy of the subject could 
start to account for such an event, and this is the direction that I will take 
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in this chapter. In the following pages, I will argue that Gilles Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari left us with basic elements of an ethico-political stance that 
can best let us understand the political discourses and practices that saw 
in the Occupy movements their most recent instantiation. In particular, 
their common work on schizoanalysis will help me propose the concept 
of the anthropos as a dynamic, material figure of political subjectivity. 
Defined as the psychosocial subject of the schizoanalytic unconscious, 
such a figure can help us conceive not only capital’s current grip on global 
forms of life, but also and most importantly the limits of such a hold and 
the spaces that can still be reclaimed for anthropolitical projects of libera-
tion and affective redirection.
Before going any further, a few words about schizoanalysis are in 
order. While the limits of this chapter don’t allow me to go into the more 
technical details of their presentation, let us remember that Deleuze and 
Guattari introduced the concept in Anti-Oedipus as a political response 
to some contemporary trends in psychoanalytic thought. We should 
remember how, in the early 1970s, Lacan’s pessimism about the move-
ments of May 1968 – when he famously claimed that the students were 
simply looking for another master – was becoming increasingly influen-
tial in intellectual circles, and was later promptly adopted in the reaction-
ary atmosphere of the 1980s. The Lacanian unconscious cares little about 
history and political change: deeply rooted mechanisms of physical and 
mental dependency internal to the human physiology and familial struc-
tures remain constant, and beside stoic acceptance and analytic lucidity, 
little or no space is left for any serious questioning of one’s determina-
tions. Political revolt is largely presented as an ultimately insignificant 
smoke-screen, behind which an immutable tale of suffering and neurosis 
continues to unfold. To this pessimist narrative – always liable to become 
a socially conservative political stance – Deleuze and Guattari opposed 
a revised version of the Lacanian unconscious, at once less chronically 
despondent and more politically satisfying. In the chapter entitled ‘A 
Materialist Psychiatry,’ we read that contrary to Lacanian orthodoxy, the 
productions of desire are real, and are borne by the machinic investments 
expressed by constantly created bodies and minds:
If desire produces, its product is real. If desire is productive, it 
can be productive only in the real world and can produce only 
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reality. Desire is the set of passive syntheses that engineer par-
tial objects, flows and bodies, and that function as units of 
production. (Deleuze and Guattari 2009: 26)
The task of schizoanalysis is then progressively made clear: intervening 
in the ‘passive syntheses’ that constitute the ‘partial objects’ of desiring 
production, responding to the suffering caused by deadly investments in 
oppressive and stunting processes – be it familial entrapments, capital-
ist cooptation or statist bureaucracies – with an effort to follow decoded 
‘schizzes,’ defined as the desiring chains working toward the ‘continual 
detachments’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2009: 39) of ‘disjunctive’ moves 
against pre-determined, ready-made individualized significations. 
Refusing the normative call to individualization and the injunction to 
name oneself as attached to a specific desire, those who follow the schiz-
zes resist filling the space of the ‘I’ understood as the isolated subject of a 
reified identity:
There are those who will maintain that the schizo is incapable 
of uttering the word I, and that we must restore his ability to 
pronounce this hallowed word. All of which the schizo sums 
up by saying: they’re fucking me over again. (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2009: 23)
Deleuze and Guattari are careful to contextualize their rethinking of the 
psychoanalytic unconscious in relation to a critique of capitalism, through 
the different social mutations of private property and accumulation, since 
‘it is this form that produces the capitalist field of immanence, “the” capi-
talist, “the” worker … [and that] produces a vast conversion of this world 
by attributing to it the new form of an infinite subjective representation’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2009: 303). Only by perceiving one’s ‘subjective 
representation’ as the result of an oppressive, even deadly, assignation can 
one try to redirect one’s energies in a less nefarious manner.
The Occupy movements, in this respect, were profoundly ‘schizoana-
lytic’: supported by non-proprietary and anonymous cultural forces such 
as Adbusters or Anonymous itself, and by individuals whose identities 
of workers/unemployed/students/producers became the asignifying 
numeric symbol of the 99%, the people involved in these actions were 
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able to defy and physically contradict – at least for a time – the capitalist 
subsumption of their mental and social energies.
On Capitalist Crises and Insurrectional Responses
Although I intend to formulate a critique of the present with a focus on 
the Occupy movements, there is no better introduction to my main argu-
ment than a very old quotation taken from A Thousand Plateaus:
Doubtless, the present situation is highly discouraging. We 
have watched the war machine grow stronger and stronger, as 
in a science fiction story; we have seen it assign as its objec-
tive a peace still more terrifying than fascist death; we have 
seen it maintain or instigate the most terrible of local wars as 
parts of itself; we have seen it set its sights on a new type of 
enemy, no longer another State, or even another regime, but 
the “unspecified enemy”… Yet the very conditions that make 
the State or the World War Machine possible, in other words, 
constant capital (resources and equipment) and human vari-
able capital, continually recreate unexpected possibilities for 
counterattack, unforeseen initiatives determining revolution-
ary, popular, minority, mutant machines…the unassignable 
material Saboteur or human Deserter assuming the most 
diverse forms (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 422).
The second installment of the diptych Capitalism and Schizophrenia was 
originally published in 1980, eight years after the publication of Anti-
Oedipus and as a result of about ten years of cooperation between the two 
co-authors. It is, of course, very difficult to reconstruct with any accuracy 
the historical context of what they then called ‘the present situation.’ 
Nonetheless, the policies adopted by a number of Western powers in the 
late 1970s to counter internal and external threats were the source of the 
‘discouragement’ felt by many activists at that time.
A few, certainly insufficient, reminders do in fact allow us to recon-
struct some aspects of the book’s present, in a highly interdependent 
international context: the escalation of the American–Russian conflict in 
Iran and Afghanistan at the end of Jimmy Carter’s presidency in the US; 
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the brutal repression of socialist regimes in Central and South America 
throughout the 1970s, largely fomented by the US secret services; the 
internal repressive tactics adopted by Western countries to quell internal 
dissent, Italy being a particularly relevant case in point; the protection 
of Western-backed autocratic rulers in the Muslim world, from Mubarak 
in Egypt to Suharto in Indonesia; the cynical use of the Arabo–Israeli 
conflict to maintain a Western, capitalist bastion in the Middle East; the 
continuing intervention of the former colonial powers in the national 
politics of the African states. All of the above, of course, was occurring 
at terrible human costs, easily accepted in the name of the ‘peace’ that 
reigned in the hegemonic political and economic centers – no longer eas-
ily identifiable as ‘states,’ since the democratic institutions were already 
being deprived of their significance by global corporate interests – that 
could bring ‘death’ through ‘local wars’ to populations deemed unworthy 
of preservation. Whether those populations were dissenting minorities 
within specific states, or burgeoning democratic republics in certain key 
areas for global capitalist investment, the result was the same: an unre-
lenting pounding from the capitalist ‘war machine.’ The last years of the 
Cold War, in this respect, were particularly ferocious, and would con-
tinue to be so throughout the 1980s. The progressive realization that the 
so-called ‘socialist’ republics only reproduced capitalist economic imper-
atives, transferring them on a bureaucratic state apparatus, contributed to 
an intense feeling of impotence and pessimism.
I offer these blatantly inadequate historical pointers not so much 
to reconstruct what would have been the ‘unique’ context of Thousand 
Plateaus, but rather to underscore how the ‘present situation’ of capital-
ist hegemony is always ‘discouraging’ and potentially soul-crushing for its 
subjects. Indeed, equally dramatic lists could be offered when discussing 
many other historical ‘conjunctures,’ including our own, and none would 
appear much rosier. Still, A Thousand Plateaus also registered the specific 
fatigue felt by many activists after what was called ‘the long 1968’ in Italy, 
Germany and France (Félix Guattari being himself a particularly poi-
gnant case in point). There is certainly a shift in tone from the expansive, 
ebullient pages of Anti-Oedipus, which was written in the years between 
1969 and 1972, when a more revolutionary tone and a certain kind of 
Marxist critique were still commonly heard in many different variations 
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not only in France but in several Western European countries. By the 
time the first French edition of A Thousand Plateaus went to the presses, 
the repressive side of the Western ‘state apparatuses’ was back in full, self-
congratulatory swing. When the two volumes of the diptych reached 
their Anglophone audiences – Anti-Oedipus in 1983 and A Thousand 
Plateaus in 1987 – their audiences were fully into the grips of the reac-
tionary capitalist politics of the Thatcher–Reagan era and the last military 
flashes of the Cold War.
Not surprisingly, the ‘present’ geopolitical situation was once again 
quite bad. But even then, new forms of progressive political engagement 
saw the light of day – think about the environmentalist movements and 
the LBGT1 mobilizations: clearly, there is no absolute, unique determina-
tion of subjectivity, but an infinitely modulated continuum of sociopsy-
chological investments. While all of them are eventually captured by col-
lective assemblages, the opportunity to orient one’s libidinal investments 
along axes diverging from capital’s command is implicit in the deterrito-
rialized forms of existence that capital itself creates. Since the production 
of affect is intrinsic to any material assemblage, from molecular energy 
to the emotions of human beings, any structure of power rests on and at 
the same time is canceled by subjective investments that can move away 
from it through autonomous social redirections of affective investments, 
if only for a time. Such redirections were, as we have already seen, the 
very task of schizoanalysis, since its job is to ‘discern, at the level of groups 
or individuals, the libidinal investments of the social field’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2009: 350). The libidinal subject appearing at the crossing of 
these investments is the schizoanalytic subject that later in this chapter I 
call the anthropos.
It is essential to remember that neither Deleuze nor Guattari thought 
that any ‘present situation,’ however dire, was irrevocably and uniquely 
bound to the deadly consequences of capital’s grip on power. On the con-
trary, it is precisely after this assessment that they remind us that both 
technology – ‘constant capital’– and people – ‘human variable capital’ 
– always retain the potential to create minoritarian ‘mutant machines’ 
able to ‘sabotage’ and escape molar and molecular capitalist imperatives. 
But how can the schizoanalytic process operate such as shift, and go, so 
to speak, from ‘discouragement’ to ‘counterattack,’ from ‘terrifying’ to 
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potentially ‘revolutionary’ situations? Is it possible to affirm, socially, psy-
chologically and philosophically, that figures such as saboteurs, deserters, 
strikers and occupiers are indeed possible, even when they appear histori-
cally doomed, without resorting to the abstract and factually inadequate 
principles of liberal democracies, such as human equality and freedom of 
speech? In the rest of this essay, it will be my contention that yes, there 
is a way to think the immanent potentialities of the social subject, and 
that it may be present, more than anywhere else, precisely in the kind of 
thought that is present in Capital and Schizophrenia, and more specifically 
in the conceptual configuration of the schizoanalytic subject. It is this 
new ‘anthropolitical’ figure that I will try to delineate in the remainder of 
this paper, taking a little pre-emptive detour through the objections that 
have been raised against it.
One More Effort, If You Want to be Materialist!
After decades of controversies, it is inevitable that before articulating the 
outlines of what I consider to be the innovative conception of subjectiv-
ity that emerges from the combination of Deleuze’s brand of materialist 
thought and the analytic, practical anthropology that he elaborated with 
Félix Guattari, I should address some of the objections that have been 
raised against its politics, because they are extremely useful to the articu-
lation of the affirmative moments of my argument. I focus on the issue 
of materialism because the stakes of this appellation are still quite high 
when one wants to position one’s critique within the Marxist legacy of 
the political critique of capital.
First of all, the highly interdisciplinary and somewhat unruly philo-
sophical lexicon of Capitalism and Schizophrenia, with its concomitant 
revision and expansion of classically Marxist categories and fields of 
inquiry, certainly contributed to its muted political reception in many 
leftist academic circles, in France and abroad. Additionally, the unortho-
dox theoretical credentials of Félix Guattari, joined to what is considered 
a more ‘bourgeois,’ classical practice of philosophy on the part of Gilles 
Deleuze prior to their collaboration, have determined several thinkers to 
either completely ignore the books the two co-authored during the last 
twenty years of their lives, or to simply focus on the indictment of the 
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political implications of Gilles Deleuze’s own philosophy. Some, in fact, 
have done both; most notably Alain Badiou, more indirectly Jacques 
Rancière and more recently Peter Hallward. Since all of these thinkers 
are involved in revised continuations of the Marxist critical field, with its 
attendant claim to an immanence-based, material understanding of poli-
tics and subjectivity, a brief recapitulation of their positions is an essential 
first step in articulating the specificity of schizoanalysis, precisely because 
it has been so blatantly misrepresented by other self-defined leftist and 
post-Marxist philosophies.
I will not delve into the personal aspects of Badiou’s ressentiment 
against Deleuze, that François Dosse details in his excellent double biog-
raphy of Deleuze and Guattari, and Badiou himself acknowledged in his 
introduction to Deleuze: The Clamor of Being (1997). For the sake of this 
essay, we should simply remember that Badiou’s critique of Deleuze’s phi-
losophy rests on two main theoretical objections: Deleuze’s ontological 
grounding of the concept of difference in the Spinozian understanding of 
the modal, singular but infinite unfolding of substance, and his adherence 
to a stoic version of materialist metaphysics, which finds in matter itself 
the principle of its own evental appearance.
Without going into great detail, we can say that Badiou’s main argu-
ment is that Deleuze is too much of a ‘vitalist’ to be really revolutionary, 
since a Stoic understanding of matter does not allow for absolute dis-
continuities, such as, for instance, political revolutions. As he says in his 
book, ‘it remains impossible to subsume such change under the sign of 
Life, whether it is renamed Power, élan or Immanence. It is necessary to 
think discontinuity as such’ (Badiou 2009: 362). According to Badiou, 
only a highly formalized understanding of multiplicity, rooted in math-
ematical representations such as set theory, accompanied by an equally 
formal representation of a Lacanian subject of absolute discontinuities 
– historically embodied in a recurring cast of characters, such as Saint 
Paul, Mallarmé, the Maoist Red Guards or indeed Badiou himself as 
faithful monument to May 1968 – can prevent us from sliding into an 
inherently conservative praise of Life as ahistorical, inherently conserva-
tive substance.
The most important and not-enough-discussed political conse-
quence of this position is that for the Badiouan subject of truth, neither 
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psychological nor bodily determinations are really necessary, since those 
pertain to life and not to the discontinuous event: what somebody will 
or will not be, will or will not do in a specific sociohistorical framework 
doesn’t really enter Badiou’s original field of argumentation. While in a 
recent essay he has acknowledged that any truth procedure is dependent 
on subjective supports that are ‘spatial, temporal and anthropological’ 
(Badiou 2010: 2) he does not consider them essential enough to actually 
talk about their psychosocial materiality. Even in Logics of Worlds (2006), 
when he recognizes that the theories exposed in Being and Event (1988) 
could not distinguish fascist processes of subjectivation from progressive 
ones, Badiou does not get involved in any analytic, conceptual assessment 
of specific ‘subjects to truth.’2 To be fair, Badiou does not really enter into 
issues of materialism as he rejects any critique coming from ‘empiricist’ 
positions, and his activist past does not prevent him from saying that 
‘communist is no longer an adjective qualifying a politics’ (Badiou 2010: 
3). But how can we not acknowledge that the very essence of the Occupy 
movements is in fact a ‘communist’ politics, both in theory and in prac-
tice? Clearly, Badiou’s reliance on mathematical and monumental repre-
sentations prevents his political philosophy from accounting for these 
historical occurrences, since such an account needs to broach issues of 
political economics and social critique, which are ultimately excluded 
from Badiou’s thought, which in turn is entirely narrated through sym-
bolic abstractions, such as ‘Idea,’ ‘Humanity,’ ‘History,’ the ‘State,’ and 
monumental subjects, such as Mao Tse-tung, Robespierre or Saint Paul, 
even as their lack of reality is constantly reaffirmed. The ‘imaginary’ 
nature of political subjectivation is affirmed in distinctly Lacanian terms, 
as if this were still the only valid model for unconscious mechanisms of 
subjectivation: this is precisely the crux of Deleuzian/Guattiarian schizo-
analytic theory, and is one that Badiou never confronts.
While different in theoretical arguments and presuppositions, it 
becomes increasingly clear that there exists, in fact, a kind of continuity 
between Badiou’s positions and those elaborated by Jacques Rancière, 
who, like Badiou, needed to distance himself from an Althusserian past 
that seemingly condemned the political subject to an eternal entrapment 
in ideological determinations. Rancière’s first book, Althusser’s Lesson, 
originally published in 1974, was an early indictment of Althusser’s 
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version of ‘scientific Marxism,’ which seemed to negate the possibility of 
political awareness for a subjectivity unmediated by a knowledge admin-
istered by didactical powers, such as a party or an academic discipline, be 
it economics or psychoanalysis.
In the following years, Rancière refreshingly demonstrated that, his-
torically, things don’t really happen that way, since the people always – 
although rarely – find a way to break through the ideological chains forced 
upon them. For Rancière, language does not inevitably push us in the 
domain of ideology or of the unconscious shackling of the Lacanian field, 
but is the privileged faculty allowing all antagonistic processes of political 
subjectivation. While the linguistic contents showered on us by power 
might seem overwhelming, the linguistic faculty per se remains a beacon 
of equality for all political subjects, no matter how socially degraded.
Rancière builds a precious archive of examples illustrating this 
basic principle, from the Roman plebs seceding on the Aventine Hill, 
to the French students reacting against university policies in the 1990s. 
Rancière’s affirmative, non-apocalyptic version of the people’s history is 
indeed a welcome contrarian voice in the midst of postmodernist politi-
cal defeatism – one might think about Baudrillard’s apocalyptic proph-
esies, or even Derrida’s latest recourse to de- and then re-constructed 
ethical principles. However, as I have argued elsewhere, it is precisely 
the indiscriminate applicability of Rancière’s principles that also makes 
them, so to speak, almost politically unusable in their tautological self-
presentation. Badiou’s recourse to logic and mathematics can be likened 
to Rancière’s almost exclusive reliance on the faculty of language – both 
largely considered as an ahistorical a priori – for the founding of an egali-
tarian political project. The Aristotelian identification of language as the 
defining faculty of the human being, along with Aristotle’s separate defi-
nition of man as ‘political animal,’ are powerfully bridged by Rancière, 
who establishes a poignant causal continuity between the two.
It is indeed surprising that two former students of Althusser, the pow-
erful theorist of the conjointure as the historicist understanding of what 
Deleuze might have called a ‘state of affairs,’ should have spent the best 
part of their philosophical careers trying to distill the ‘pure’ principles – 
in the case of Rancière – or ‘logical’ presentations – in the case of Badiou 
– of an eternal figure of political subjectivity. Neither of them, it should be 
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noted, is the least concerned with issues of political economics, political 
anthropology or social psychology. Even when Badiou talks of the exclu-
sion of the Inuits from Quebec’s electoral laws between 1918 and 1950, 
nothing is said of them, or by them: only logical schemes of ‘relations’ 
between them and the state are drawn in a way irrespective of whether 
they occurred or not (Badiou 2009: 307–24). Understandably wary of 
falling into the traps of determinism, both Badiou and Rancière stay away 
from temporal considerations altogether, condemning the bodily incar-
nations of political subjectivities – what Badiou calls ‘incorporations’ 
to an Idea – to theoretical irrelevance, keeping them only as the names 
attached to a monumental historical archive. It is not surprising, in this 
context, to hear Rancière ask, in the context of a 2009 colloquium about 
the rebirth of the ‘communist’ hypothesis in light of the financial crisis, 
‘with whom, with what subjective forces, can you imagine building this 
communism?’ (Rancière 2010: 175). The reliance on the verb ‘imagine’ 
is very significant in this respect, since if Occupy showed us something 
it is that communist subjectivities don’t need to be imagined externally: 
rather, they constitute themselves according to variable personal and 
historical circumstances, retraceable through and by a schizoanalysis of 
desire and realization.
The fact that Rancière still conceives of ‘communism’ as a project situ-
ated outside of its specific actuation – if only to negate it – tells us that 
there is a surprising lack of involvement, on his part, in the sociopsycho-
logical mechanisms that allow such actuations to occur. What is at stake 
in political insurrections is not the presupposed equality of all minds, but 
the workings of the bio-political unconscious, of the bodies struggling 
for the access to their own potential energies, of the brains polluted by 
cultural inanities and creating life spaces that eschew some of the most 
destructive determinations brought upon us by the current stage of cog-
nitive capitalism.
Language is not an empty faculty, free to create any locution at any 
given time: our lexicon, and therefore our conceptual arsenal, both 
depend on the conditions of our cognitive experiences. While I praise 
and share Rancière’s invaluable openness to the future of politics and 
his admirable refusal to assess historical postmodernity along apocalyp-
tic lines, I consider his understanding of language dangerously detached 
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from what Bateson once called ‘the ecology of the mind,’ that is, the envi-
ronmental milieu that supports our brain function. Similar objections 
could be levied against the Italian philosopher Paolo Virno, who, like 
Rancière, seems to be too dependent on Aristotelian and formal linguis-
tics to engage in a genuinely materialist critique of psychosocial struc-
tures and physical determinations.
Both Badiou and Rancière – and more recently Paolo Virno – have 
found an eager audience in British and North American academia. As a 
concrete and remarkable case of derivative theory, I will reference here 
Peter Hallward, a much younger, Canadian political philosopher, who 
is greatly indebted to both philosophers and shares several of their basic 
theoretical moves. Hallward, however, maintains a strong Leninist back-
ground that leads him to the formulation of a political ‘voluntarism’ even 
more radical than the apostolic ‘fidelity’ requested of the Badiouan ‘sub-
ject of truth.’ And like Badiou, he is staunchly anti-Deleuzian. His 2006 
book, tellingly entitled Out of This World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of 
Creation, recasts and radicalizes Badiou’s critique of Deleuzian poli-
tics, most notably in the methodological exclusion of the volumes 
co-authored with Félix Guattari and the accusation of Stoic, even aris-
tocratic, detachment linked, once again, to a naturalistic vitalism consid-
ered incapable of formulating a political critique of contingent forms of 
power. Hallward proposes nothing less than a neo-Leninist vanguardist 
practice for the engaged intellectual, predicated on a strict – one might 
say ascetic – adherence to certain principles, or truths. This is almost 
paradoxical, since Hallward had already reproached both Deleuze and 
Guattari for formulating a ‘non-specific’ theory of singularity in his ear-
lier text, Absolutely Post-Colonial (2001), while at the same time he him-
self was rejecting the inscription of the political subject in his or her own 
sociohistorical determinations. The political subject appears as process 
of relational ‘de-specification,’ always consciously embraced by a ‘respon-
sible’ agent (Hallward 2002: 50). It is true that in his work on Haiti, 
Hallward devotes unrelenting attention to the economic, cultural and 
social specificities of that particular community; however, his inflexible, 
transcendental conception of political subjectivity puts him in a difficult 
double bind when thinking about issues of political agency. This is a dif-
ficulty that he shares most clearly with Badiou, but also, I would contend, 
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with the kind of linguistic understanding present in Rancière’s concep-
tion of equality and democracy.
My critique should not be interpreted as hostile: I do appreciate the 
fact that all of these thinkers remain steadfast in their opposition to pres-
ent and past forms of capitalist and bureaucratic domination. However, I 
think that all of them, and maybe most notably Hallward, who explicitly 
declares his own inscription in Marxism–Leninism, need to operate an 
exceedingly difficult intellectual torsion in order to maintain their theo-
retical presuppositions. They all engage with but ultimately reject mate-
rialist empiricism – maybe the most concise definition of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s thought – as viable foundation for political critique in general 
and for the description of the political subject in particular. To a certain 
extent, even the ultimate Marxist legacy, which remains the critique of 
political economy, is tossed to the side. Their ‘political unconscious,’ to 
quote Jameson, is entangled in the formal positions attributed to it by 
psychoanalytic and linguistic representation. Whether such represen-
tation is ‘true’ or ‘false’ is not, of course, what is at stake here. Rather, 
what needs to be questioned is the impossibility, for them, of theoreti-
cally accounting for the ‘here’ and ‘now’ of political constitution. What 
Deleuze and Guattari allow us to think is the materiality of such constitu-
tions, in their transversal crossing of the striated spaces of social organiza-
tion. It is in the ‘empiricist’ – or even Stoic – articulation of materiality 
and autonomy, of singularity and immanent collective connectivity that 
the most precious contribution of Deleuze – and Guattari – to political 
philosophy is to be found, as I will argue in the rest of this chapter. In the 
articulation of the schizoanalytic subject as anthropolitical agent we can 
find maybe the most faithful rendition of the occupier, a figure that is as 
material as it is complex, embedded in the deepest recesses of contempo-
rary forms of subjective formation.
From Anthropological Abjection to Anthropolitical Autonomy
It is not by chance that I evoked Hallward’s 2001 book on post-coloni-
ality: in fact, powerful objections to the political content of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s two volumes on capitalism and schizophrenia have also come 
from scholars deeply engaged in post-colonial studies, although others 
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have readily embraced their understanding of singularity as a powerful 
antidote to theories of alterity. While Gayatri Spivak famously attacked 
both Deleuze and Foucault for what she considered their adherence to a 
non-examined model of Western authoritarian discourse – male, white 
and European – Chris Miller furthered this critique to denounce Deleuze 
and Guattari’s very use of anthropological sources. For him, it was outra-
geous to see how these sources were often the work of researchers actively 
involved in colonial administrations, or at least always structured accord-
ing to the anthropologist’s own hegemonic cultural framework. In her 
essay, Spivak embraces Derrida’s deconstructive project as a radical ques-
tioning of Western knowledge, and considers it the only political horizon 
for the self-aware Western intellectual. Miller, on the other hand, rejects 
the very possibility of combining archival research – anthropological or 
other – with any theoretical content, lest we reproduce the discursive 
domination of the Other in making him or her a simple ‘case in point’ for 
an abstracted, de-contextualized concept, such as ‘nomadology’ or ‘the 
war machine.’ Neither Spivak nor Miller considers the theory and prac-
tice of schizoanalysis worthy of mention, while I would argue that the 
white, male and European subject of thought is completely debunked by 
the transformation it incurs during the schizoanalytic process.
In fact, what is rejected without theoretical examination by these 
otherwise brilliant scholars is the very possibility that Deleuze and 
Guattari’s conception of ‘machinic,’ ‘desiring’ subjects – fully articulated 
in their material constitutions but not ideologically pre-programed by an 
external, univocal power (be it the state or capital) – might indeed be a 
truthful one, to be affirmed not according to an empty, Badiouan ‘fidel-
ity,’ but as a powerful extension of Marxist political economy and Engel’s 
attempts at a socialist anthropology. In this respect, only an examination 
of the basic tenets of schizoanalytic theory and practice can truly account 
for the desirability of Deleuzian-Guattarian political theory.
This is why the use of anthropological materials in Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia is to be understood as an effort to detach the construction 
of subjectivity from its current, hegemonic forms, all tied to capitalist 
de- and reterritorializations of subjective productions. Far from indulg-
ing in sentimental primitivism, Deleuze and Guattari repeat a typically 
Marxist gesture; that is, they construct a diversified, historical archive of 
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economic and social subjects, organized around the two axes of space 
and time. This is in fact the mode that organizes the project of Capital
as narration. Therefore, when Paul Patton says that Deleuze and Guattari 
engage in a neo-Marxist ‘universal history’ (Patton 2000: 88), it is impor-
tant to introduce an essential modification: while Marx relegates the 
primitive mode of production to a historical past that conceives the mod-
ern capitalist mode of production as the inevitable telos of modern forms 
of progress, Deleuze and Guattari adopt a slightly different ‘universal’ 
perspective. For them, capital and the state apparatus are both present 
and absent in all societies, either as accepted realizations or, more impor-
tantly, as rejected virtualities.
In their treatment of primitive and despotic societies in Anti-Oedipus, 
and later in the separate but interconnected chapters of Thousand Plateaus 
devoted to nomadology and the war machine, segmentarity, and appa-
ratuses of capture, they give us a way to conceive different world popu-
lations in their respective social inscriptions. What emerges from these 
pages, densely populated with more or less realistic characters, is a world 
crisscrossed by innumerable political striations, where nothing is truly 
impossible or, inversely, absolutely necessary. This is why not only his-
tory, but also anthropology, have been essential to the formulation of the 
political theses of Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Far from being ‘primitiv-
ist,’ the recourse to anthropology is essential in trying to assess the psy-
chosocial constitution of today’s collective becomings, such as those that 
prompted a people to occupy public spaces in the Occupy movements.
Of course, one has to be careful: we are not talking here of the struc-
tural anthropology of Levi-Strauss, which is still excessively dependent 
on an unrepresentable center – the incest taboo, for instance – for the 
subsequent representation of family and social segmentarity emanat-
ing from it, but rather an account mediated to Deleuze and Guattari 
by Pierre Clastres, a friend and contemporary of Félix Guattari and an 
assiduous participant in Deleuze’s seminars at Vincennes in the mid-
1970s. Before his premature death in 1978, Clastres had furthered in his 
fieldwork some of Marshall Sahlins’ earlier discoveries: most notably, in 
Stone Age Economics (1972), the Marxist anthropologist had reported 
that many world populations were not frugal and stateless because of 
scarcity and political primitivism, but as a consequence of an explicit 
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political decision, notably the unwillingness to engage in labor con-
tracts and political representations. These were ‘societies of abundance,’ 
although they appeared destitute to ‘bourgeois ethnocentrism’ (Sahlins 
1974: 3). Sahlin’s arguments extended to politics: in these societies, the 
political sphere is often unrecognizable to us simply because the political 
function has not been reified by a bureaucratic apparatus, but has been 
retained by the social body itself.
Clastres pushed Sahlins’ argument a step further: it is precisely 
because the primitive society refuses the alienation of power that it also 
prevents the accumulation of wealth on the part of one or several of its 
members. Some primitive societies, therefore, invest their psychosocial 
affects and productive energies in ways that are not pre- but anti-modern. 
They are, in sum, fully ‘communist,’ both economically and politically, 
even if such a definition can appear Western-centered and anachronistic. 
Furthermore, Clastres recognizes the very profound political motiva-
tion for the immense amount of technical and human effort that primi-
tive societies devote to war. In many respects, war defines the commu-
nity and, among other things, ensures one of the most common social 
axiomatics, the one that defines specific gender roles. Additionally, war 
allows the primitive subject to deal with death and other forms of natural 
and cultural exteriorities.
Against all odds and maybe counter-intuitively, it is through war that 
social subjects reaffirm themselves as ‘free’ and ‘autonomous’ within the 
bounds of their collective organization and biological determinations. 
Such an affirmation does not need to concern itself with the ‘reality’ of 
its claims: it just works, insofar as it ensures a certain kind of collective 
organization. Even more importantly, Clastres shows how the primitive 
socius was perfectly able to ‘modulate’ its own apparently rigid dichoto-
mies, such as male/female, warrior/mother, and so on. In certain cases, 
he observed that some male subjects refused the ultra-masculine asso-
ciation with ‘warrior societies,’ adopting a more domestic, village-bound 
existence. Same-sex physical relations were also widely present, and were 
accommodated in different manners, allowing for ‘men’ to actually dress 
as women and share in their occupations.
 In other words, far from being rigid, blind, limited, anti-statist, 
and anti-capitalist, communities were even able to decode their own 
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segmentarity, and to allow some of the deterritorialized affective ‘flows’ 
traditionally associated with capitalist monetization. Their struggles 
against capitalist imperialism within the different national incarnation 
of the Western colonial project should not prevent us from recogniz-
ing that, as a self-declared Deleuzian Brazilian anthropologist recently 
said, ‘the molecular dissemination of “subjective” agency throughout the 
universe, in testifying to the inexistence of a transcendent cosmologi-
cal point of view, obviously correlates with the inexistence of a unifying 
political point of view’ (Viveiros 2010: 48). In fact, already in the 1990s, 
the French anthropologist Marc Augé thought that anthropology could 
be reborn around the project of substituting multiplicity for otherness, 
starting to see how different subjective singularities could aggregate in 
different collective assemblages, producing ‘an effective, lived contem-
poraneity’ (Augé 1999: 53). This is why I believe that the anthropologi-
cal subjects that allowed Deleuze and Guattari to formulate their theory 
of schizoanalysis were not simply a ‘bad faith’ version of the Western, 
capitalist matrix. The anthropos – neither man nor woman, rich nor poor, 
powerful nor subjugated – that constitutes this kind of collective orga-
nization is – at least as far as I can see – one of the most powerful prac-
tico-theoretical figures for our understanding of the emergence of the 
Occupy groups.
We should not romanticize what I call here anthropolitical thought: 
there is no individual freedom or desire, since if anthropology and social 
psychology tell us anything, it is that libidinal investments are always 
attributed to and captured by a ‘body without organs,’ the socius. The 
utopia of desire is not present in Capitalism and Schizophrenia, nor any-
where else in schizoanalytic thought: such a utopia is capital’s ruse, which 
makes us believe that its own deterritorialized monetary flows are in fact 
synonymous with subjective ‘freedom.’ Deleuze’s thoroughly Spinozist 
attentiveness to issues of rationality, knowledge and power, as well as 
his stoic sobriety, prevent him from ever landing into utopian territory. 
Guattari’s awareness of the micro-politics of psychological and political 
collective investments also keeps him within an expanded Marxist frame-
work of local and contingent struggles, to be fought in the affective re-
directions of otherwise deadly global imperatives.
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Occupy as Anthropolitical War Machine
The Italian autonomist activist and sociologist Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi pow-
erfully commented on the success that Anti-Oedipus had in the politi-
cal organizations flourishing in Italy – and in other European countries, 
one might add – in the 1970s. This interest was reciprocal, and when 
Bifo escaped to Paris in 1977, chased by an arrest mandate, Deleuze and 
Guattari told him that they were very interested in the Autonomia move-
ments, where ‘Anti-Oedipus had made an impact’ (Berardi 2008: 145). It 
is well-known that practices such as the unauthorized occupation of pub-
lic spaces, and other minor legal infractions such as squatting and even 
limited self-supportive theft – then called ‘proletarian expropriation’ – or 
the payment of a lower fee for a certain service – then called ‘self-price 
reductions,’3 were widely used in the Autonomia version of anti-capital-
ist politics.
Remarkably, the various movements tied to this kind of activism were 
also heavily invested in the establishment of deterritorialized modes of 
communication and affective networking: Bifo himself established the 
now famous Radio Alice on the newly liberalized radio frequencies, 
where one could hear both political discussions and children’s fairy tales. 
Feminist groups, students, squatters and other subjects could use the 
radio facilities. The temporary nature of these non-institutional arrange-
ments did not prevent them from playing a fundamental role in the nur-
turing and perpetuation of anti-capitalist thought and practice during 
otherwise very difficult years.
It is undeniable that Guattari’s understanding of ‘transversality,’ as a 
practice able to cut through macro-political forms of social organization, 
and the consequent politicization of the schizoanalytic understanding of 
the unconscious, were possible within the context of an intense, interna-
tional web of concrete political engagements. These groups are indeed re-
enactments of the anthropologically excavated ‘war machine,’ as a subject 
of political and social struggle for autonomy and self-definition. It would 
be wrong, of course, to attribute to the war machine intrinsic terroristic, 
military or fascist determinations. The collective assemblages autono-
mously organized by the anthropos as psychosocial subject can be directed 
away from deadly forms of capture, and instead flourish as alternative life 
forms, against and in spite of bureaucratic and capitalist command.
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Even during the ‘dark years’ of global capitalist triumph – mostly 
the 1980s and the 1990s – the dissident political subjectivities that had 
started their political engagements within the framework of autonomist 
redirections of Marxist anti-capitalist critique kept to their guns, theoriz-
ing, among other things, the advent of cognitive capital and ‘immaterial’ 
forms of command and the necessity of rethinking anthropological cat-
egories such as gender and even humanity. In other words, even as the 
military-bureaucratic state apparatus commanded by globalized capital-
ist organization extended its grip on present forms of life, it also brought 
with itself new morphologies of political engagement.
There is no doubt that we are the utterly embedded subjects of global 
capital. However, there is always the possibility for an affective and 
political redirection of our subjective investments. Today’s anthropos, 
understood as the body carrying the constantly mutating unconscious, 
machinic investments theorized by schizoanalysis, can break through 
the capitalist axiomatic, and challenge, at least for a while, its political 
arrangements. Anthropological and sociopsychological considerations – 
the very stuff of schizoanalytic critique – are necessary if we want indeed 
to constitute collective environments that make such redirections possi-
ble. An understanding of political subjectivity fully engaged in the mate-
riality of the minds and bodies actually living in a certain social milieu is 
necessary if we want to extract ourselves from formalist and ultimately 
extremely abstract definitions of the political subject.
Even more importantly, we have to understand that language, and 
the equality that it presupposes, is not independent from the brains that 
conceive it, each time anew. We are engaged in a struggle for concepts, 
for bodies: will we promote the global space of capital’s domination, or 
will we ‘occupy’ it, exposing its exploitation and living against it? What 
the Occupy movements demonstrate, is that these occupational prac-
tices do indeed occur, and they do so because the affective investments 
of the anthropos are never fully exhausted by the powers encroaching on 
them. In fact, the anthropolitical thought of Deleuze and Guattari might, 
indeed, help us to keep cultivating the falsely ‘primitive’ reflex that refuses 
the instauration of inequality and exploitation that is the main form of the 
capitalist relation to the anthropos and to the earth. This is what Occupy 
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was and is about, and in this respect, if Capitalism and Schizophrenia can 
indeed teach us anything, I deem it to be a good lesson.
Works Cited
Augé, Marc. 1999. An Anthropology for Contemporaneous Worlds. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press.
Badiou, Alain. 2009. Logics of Worlds. London: Continuum.
Badiou, Alain. 2010. ‘The Idea of Communism’. In The Idea of Communism. Ed. 
Costas Douzinas and Slavoj Žižek. London: Verso: 1–14.
Berardi, Franco ‘Bifo’. 2008. ‘Interview with Giuseppina Mecchia, July 11 2005’. In 
Félix Guattari: Thought, Friendship and Visionary Cartography. London: Palgrave 
2008: 141–68.
Clastres, Pierre. 1989. Society Against the State: Essays in Political Anthropology. 
Brooklyn: Zone Books.
Clastres, Pierre. 2010. Archeology of Violence. New York: Semiotext(e).
Deleuze Gilles and Guattari, Félix. 1987. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia. Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press.
Deleuze Gilles and Guattari, Félix. 2009. Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. 
London: Penguin Books.
Hallward, Peter. 2002. Absolutely Post-Colonial: Writing Between the Singular and the 
Specific. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Hallward, Peter. 2006. Out this World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation. London: 
Verso.Miller, Christopher L. 1993. ‘The Post-Identitarian Predicament in the 
Footnotes of A Thousand Plateaus: Nomadology, Anthropology and Authority’. 
Diacritics 23 (3): 6–35.
Patton, Paul. 2000. Deleuze and the Political. London: Routledge.
Rancière, Jacques. 2010. ‘Communists Without Communism?’. In The Idea of 
Communism. Ed. Costas Douzinas and Slavoj Žižek. London: Verso: 167–77.
Sahlins, Marshall. 1972. Stone Age Economics. Chicago: Aldine-Altherton.
Spivak, Gayatri. 1988. ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’. In Marxism and the Interpretation 
of Culture. Ed. Lawrence Grossberg and Cary Nelson. Urbana and Chicago: 
University of Illinois Press: 271–313.
Viveiros de Castro, Eduardo. 2010. ‘The Untimely, Again’. Introduction to Archeology 
of Violence. Pierre Clastres. New York: Semiotext(e).
On Anthropolitics 87
Virno, Paolo. 2002. Quando il verbo si fa carne: Linguaggio e natura umana. Torino: 
Bollati Boringhieri.
Notes
1. The acronym for Lesbian, Bisexual, Gay and Transgendered people did not 
exist at the time. However, it is in the late 1970s and in the 1980s – thanks in 
part to another crisis, the AIDS health emergency – that these groups entered 
the sociopolitical scene on the footsteps of the receding feminist wave. 
2. Badiou seeks to follow a ‘materialist dialectic’ understood as ‘the deployment 
of a critique of every critique’ (Badiou 2009: 8). Even in this restricted sense, 
he says that the complexity of subjective operations ‘was not even broached in 
the purely ontological treatment of Being and Event ’ (Badiou 2009: 8). 
3. Respectively, espropri proletari and autoriduzioni in the original Italian. 
Chapter 2
Semantic, Pragmatic, and Affective 
Enactment at OWS
John Protevi
Housecleaning
The Occupy movement shows us how the semantic, pragmatic, and affec-
tive – meaning, action, and feeling – are intertwined in all collective prac-
tices. The intertwining of the semantic and the pragmatic – what we say 
and what we accomplish in that saying – has been a topic of interest in the 
humanities and the critical social sciences for almost 50 years, since its 
thematization by Austin and its codification in speech act theory; wide-
spread interest in affect has been more recent, but the interplay of its twin 
roots in Tompkins and Deleuze – producing a sort of evo-neuro-Spinoz-
ism – has been usefully explored in The Affect Theory Reader (Gregg and 
Seigworth 2010). It’s now time to bring speech act theory and affect the-
ory together in understanding the role of political affect (Protevi 2009) 
in the Occupy movement.
To do that, we’ll need some housecleaning. The first thing that needs 
to go is the concept of ideology. Deleuze and Guattari say in A Thousand 
Plateaus: ‘Ideology is a most execrable concept concealing all of the 
effectively operating social machines’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 68). 
I take that to mean that we have to thematize political affect to under-
stand ‘effectively operating social machines.’ From this perspective, the 
real ‘German ideology’ is that ideas are where it’s at, rather than affect. It’s 
political affect that ‘makes men fight for their servitude as stubbornly as 
though it were their salvation.’
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Why won’t ‘ideology’ cut it? It doesn’t work because it conceives of 
the problem in terms of ‘false consciousness,’ where that means ‘wrong 
ideas,’ and where ‘ideas’ are individual and personal mental states whose 
semantic content has an existential posit as its core, with emotional con-
tent founded on that core, so that the same object could receive different 
emotional content if you were in a different mood.1
Thus to take up the great OWS poster, ‘Shit is fucked up and bullshit,’ 
the core act posits the existence of shit, and then we express our emo-
tional state by predicating ‘fucked up and bullshit’ of it, whereas we could 
have predicated ‘great and wonderful’ if we were in a different mood.
But that is ‘execrable’ for Deleuze and Guattari, because it’s far too 
cognitivist and subjectivist.
It’s too cognitivist because it founds emotion on a core existence-
positing act, and too subjectivist by taking emotion to be an ‘expression,’ 
something individual that is pushed outward, something centrifugal. 
For them, emotion is centripetal rather than centrifugal, or even bet-
ter, emotion is for them the subjectivation, the crystallization, of affect. 
Now Deleuze and Guattari do have a corporeal/Spinozist notion of affect 
involved with the encounter of bodies, but they also have what we could 
call a ‘milieu,’ or ‘environmental’ sense of affect. Here affect is ‘in the air,’ 
something like the mood of a party, which is not the mere aggregate of 
the subjective states of the party-goers. In this sense, affect is not emer-
gent from pre-existing subjectivities; emotional subjectivities are crystal-
lizations or residues of a collective affect.2
Enacting the Political
Having done away with ‘ideology’ as an analytical concept, we can turn 
to a simple, powerful talk by Judith Butler at OWS (Butler 2011a), which 
calls upon the classic ‘very well then, we demand the impossible’ trope, 
and ends with the wonderful line, ‘we’re standing here together, making 
democracy, enacting the phrase, “We the People”.’
A longer talk by Butler in Venice (Butler 2011b) discusses constitut-
ing political space while acknowledging the material precarity of bodies, 
developed alongside a critical analysis of Arendt’s notion of a political 
‘space of appearance.’ The overall aim is set forth here, where Butler states, 
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‘a different social ontology would have to start from the presumption that 
there is a shared condition of precarity that situates our political lives.’
A brief excerpt from the beginning of Butler’s Venice talk sets out 
some of the main lines of thought that would go toward this ‘different 
social ontology’:
assembly and speech reconfigure the materiality of public 
space, and produce, or reproduce, the public character of that 
material environment. And when crowds move outside the 
square, to the side street or the back alley, to the neighbor-
hoods where streets are not yet paved, then something more 
happens. At such a moment, politics is no longer defined as 
the exclusive business of public sphere distinct from a private 
one, but it crosses that line again and again, bringing attention 
to the way that politics is already in the home, or on the street, 
or in the neighborhood, or indeed in those virtual spaces 
that are unbound by the architecture of the public square. 
(Butler 2011b)
But in the case of public assemblies, we see quite clearly not only that 
there is a struggle over what will be public space, but a struggle as well 
over those basic ways in which we are, as bodies, supported in the world 
– a struggle against disenfranchisement, effacement, and abandonment.
The role of the body in social ontology need not be limited to shared 
precarity, however, as important as that is to emphasize in order to break 
down notions of individuals as disembodied bundles of rights. We can 
also think the positive affective contribution of public assemblies. In this 
case, the city government of New York unwittingly helped OWS tap into 
the affective potential of collective ‘bodies politic.’ I’m talking here about 
the human microphone, which works, quite literally, to amplify the con-
stitution of political space by assembled bodies.
The human microphone thus offers an entry into examining political 
affect in the enacting of the phrase ‘We the People’ at OWS. It shows us 
how direct democracy is enacted by producing an intermodal resonance 
among the semantic, pragmatic, and affective dimensions of collective 
action. It also shows how the production of contemporary neoliberal sub-
jects (homo economicus as self-entrepreneur, as individual rational utility 
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maximizer) is so successful and so pervasive as to be invisible. The city 
thought they were hurting OWS by banning bullhorns when in fact they 
helped them immensely by allowing the affect produced by entrained 
voices, a collective potential they could not grasp.3
Entrainment
For some time now I’ve been fascinated by William McNeill’s Keeping 
Together in Time: Dance and Drill in Human History (1995). McNeill 
studies the political affect dimension of entrainment (the falling into 
the same rhythm) by collective bodily movement as in communal dance 
and military drill. The neuroscientist Scott Kelso has studied all sorts of 
small-scale examples of entrainment (toe-tapping and so on) by using 
dynamic systems modelling (Kelso 1995). A famous macro example of 
spontaneous entrainment is the Millennium Bridge episode in which the 
unconscious synchronization of walkers produced a resonance effect on 
the bridge that caused a dangerous lateral sway (Newland, no date). The 
developmental psychologist Colwyn Trevarthen has studied mother–
infant inter-corporeal rhythms in terms of ‘primary intersubjectivity’ 
(Trevarthen 1979).
The upshot of this research is that humans fall into collective rhythms 
easily and that such collective rhythms produce an affective experience, 
a feeling of being together, an eros or ecstasis if you want to use classical 
terms, the characteristic joy of being together felt in collective action.4
So I wonder if the human microphone (Ristic 2011), an invention of 
the OWS assembly when NYC banned electric bullhorns, doesn’t con-
tribute a little to the joyful collective affect of OWS. (Needless to say, the 
prospect that the human microphone might aid in the production of such 
collective joy frightens the right-wing commenters (Dyer 2011)). It’s not 
quite a choir, but it’s a chorus, and so the bodies of the chanters (their 
chests, guts, throats, eardrums) would be vibrating at something close to 
the same frequency, something close to being in phase.
Now I’m not a reductionist; the semantic cannot be reduced to the 
corporeal; the message isn’t dissolved into the medium. What inter-
ests me is how in the human microphone the message (enacting the 
phrase ‘We the People’) is resonant with and amplified by the medium 
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(collective rhythm). In her Venice talk Butler analyzes the Tahrir Square 
chant translated as ‘peacefully, peacefully’ in these terms:
Secondly, when up against violent attack or extreme threats, 
many people chanted the word ‘silmiyya’ which comes from 
the root verb (salima) which means to be safe and sound, 
unharmed, unimpaired, intact, safe, and secure; but also, to 
be unobjectionable, blameless, faultless; and yet also, to be 
certain, established, clearly proven. The term comes from the 
noun ‘silm’ which means ‘peace’ but also, interchangeably and 
significantly, ‘the religion of Islam.’ One variant of the term 
is ‘Hubb as-silm’ which is Arabic for ‘pacifism.’ Most usually, 
the chanting of ‘Silmiyya’ comes across as a gentle exhorta-
tion: ‘peaceful, peaceful.’ Although the revolution was for the 
most part non-violent, it was not necessarily led by a princi-
pled opposition to violence. Rather, the collective chant was 
a way of encouraging people to resist the mimetic pull of mili-
tary aggression – and the aggression of the gangs – by keep-
ing in mind the larger goal – radical democratic change. To 
be swept into a violent exchange of the moment was to lose 
the patience needed to realize the revolution. What interests 
me here is the chant, the way in which language worked not 
to incite an action, but to restrain one. A restraint in the name 
of an emerging community of equals whose primary way of 
doing politics would not be violence. (Butler 2011b)
This is an insightful, eloquent analysis of the pragmatics and semantics 
of the chant. So it’s not to undercut it that I call attention to the material 
dimension of the resonating bodies that accompany the semantic content 
and pragmatic implications of this chant. It’s to point to the way in which 
an analysis of material rhythms reveals the political affect of joyous col-
lectivity, and the intermodal (semantic, pragmatic, affective) resonance 
such chanting produces.
Semantic, Pragmatic, and Affective Enactment at OWS 93
Shame and Joy
Joy in entrained collective action is by no means a simple normative 
standard. There is fascist jy; the affect surging through the Nuremberg 
rallies, building upon and provoking even more feeling, was joyous. If 
there is to be any normativity in political affect it will have to be active 
joy rather than passive joy; active joy I understand as ‘empowerment,’ the 
ability to re-enact the joyous encounter in novel situations, or to put it in 
semi-California-speak, the ability to turn other people on to their abil-
ity to turn still others on to their ability to enact active joyous collective 
action, on and on in a horizontally radiating network, or, to use Deleuze 
and Guattari’s term, a ‘rhizome.’
Now political affect doesn’t occur in a vacuum. It’s not a matter of 
implanting a new feeling in any empty body; it’s a matter of modu-
lating an ongoing affective flow. So the joy of OWS has to convert a 
mood of shame.
What counts in the ‘effectively operating social machine’ demonizing 
welfare in the USA is the shame attached to receiving public aid without 
contributing to society with your tax dollars. It’s shameful to have lost 
your job or your home; you’re stupid, a loser to have been in a position to 
lose it, and you’re a lazy, stupid loser if you haven’t found another one, or 
if you never had one in the first place. You don’t arrive at this American 
shame by aggregating individualized, subjectivized, packets of shame; 
you get shamed subjects as the crystallization of the collective affect of 
shame in the American air.
And so you don’t combat this shame by trying to change individual 
people’s ideas, one by one, with information about unemployment 
trends; you combat it by showing your face, by embodying your lack of 
shame, by putting a face on unemployment or homelessness. You coun-
teract the existing collective affect by creating a positive affect of joyful 
solidarity. Shame isolates (you hide your face); joyful solidarity comes 
from people coming together. Its joy is released from the bondage of 
shame, to follow up on the Spinozist references.
What’s especially heartbreaking, then, about the wearethe99per-
cent.tumblr site, is that so many people still have some shame, as they 
only peek out from behind their messages. Hence the importance of the 
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Occupy meetings; shared physical presence, showing your whole face: 
these create the positive affect, the shamelessly joyful solidarity needed 
to fully overcome shame.
Fighting the residual shame, the half-faces of private pictures sent to 
a website: that’s what makes the collective occupation of space so impor-
tant: bodies together, faces revealed, joyously.5
So I’m going to propose that a full enactment of direct democracy 
means producing a body politic whose semantic (‘we are the people, we 
are equal, free, and deserving of respect in our precarity and solidarity’), 
pragmatic (the act of respecting and supporting each other the assembly 
performs), and affective (the joy felt in collective action) registers reso-
nate in spiralling, intermodal feedback.6
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Notes
1. There are many ways of relating cognition and emotion, without even 
bringing in the relations of this ‘analytic’ vocabulary with that of the 
Husserlian noesis/noema scheme. Still, I hope this will suffice just to get some 
traction on the problem.
2. When I was unemployed, some 15 years ago, for six months, I was often 
overcome with shame, no matter how often I reminded myself of the objective 
factors, the nonsensical nature of the affect, etc. But where did I pick up this 
shame? I can’t see how it was transmitted to me by another actual instance 
of shame. You could say I had been socialized so that I carried a latent 
disposition to shame that became occurent in the right circumstances. But 
that’s hardly less ‘metaphysical’ than an account of virtual or environmental 
collective affective with shamed selves crystallized out of that. I don’t think 
we’ll escape metaphysics that easily; there’s a lot of potential versus actual 
metaphysics to be worked out there in the latent versus occurent disposition 
scheme, as I try to do in Protevi 2010.
3. Another topic for analysis would be the bike generators being set up at OWS. 
In another possible blunder, recalling that of the banning of bullhorns, the 
city confiscated gasoline generators prior to the late October snowstorm. The 
brilliant OWS response was to acquire bicycle generators. Will there be an 
analogous affective supplement from taking turns on the bikes to generate 
electricity?
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4. We touch the question of emergence here, which is notoriously difficult, as 
it intersects methodological individualism. But that is not just a method of 
the social sciences. It’s all too often the source of policy prescriptions, so that 
methodological individualism tends to slide into ontological individualism; as 
the quip goes, “methodology becomes metaphysics” (Ostrom 2005).
5. Faces are an extremely important factor in political affect. In analyzing 
OWS we’d have to consider the use of the Guy Fawkes/V is for Vendetta 
masks; ‘faceless corporations’; and the ‘faciality machine’ in Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987.
6. Many thanks to The New APPS Blog, authors and commenters alike, for help 
with this essay.
Chapter 3
Pack of Leaders: Thinking Organization and 
Spontaneity with Deleuze and Guattari
Rodrigo Nunes
The issue of leadership is one of several overlaps that have been spotted 
between the thought of Deleuze and Guattari and the movements that 
arose in 2011 – a heady year that began in late 2010 with the English stu-
dent movement, saw the emergence of the Arab Spring, Spain’s 15M, the 
English riots, Occupy Wall Street, and continued into 2012 with Mexico’s 
Yo Soy 132 movement, among others. Whether it is because of a debt 
to anarchism (Graeber 2011), because networking and web 2.0 are like 
second nature to most participants, or because their acute awareness of 
the crisis of representative politics spills over into distrust of any form of 
representation, these movements have tended to eschew leaders, spokes-
people and fixed structures beyond open assemblies and working groups. 
In doing so, they have been widely perceived as subscribing to a logic that 
Deleuze and Guattari describe as rhizomatic (open, mutable, horizontal, 
spontaneously organized) as opposed to arborescent (closed, fixed, verti-
cal, structured).
In what follows, I argue that this is not the whole picture. As much 
as a closer reading of Deleuze and Guattari makes any simple opposi-
tion between rhizomatic and arborescent more complex, a more atten-
tive examination of these movements shows that they are not entirely 
free from phenomena of leadership and representation. This does not 
mean that they are at fault in any way, failing to meet some standard of 
openness and horizontality, or are somehow disingenuous. On the con-
trary, it is the idea of such a standard, or the notion that ‘organization’ and 
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‘organizational form’ necessarily denote hierarchies and vertical struc-
tures, that Deleuze and Guattari can help us put into question. Rather 
than disproving the overlap between their philosophy and these move-
ments, then, we can actually discover a deeper, more complex connec-
tion that helps shed light on how these movements work and some ways 
in which they could transform their practice.
This essay’s first two parts are dedicated to showing how phenom-
ena of leadership, vanguard and representation manifest themselves in 
contemporary movements, arguing that these are not just ‘residues’ of a 
representative politics to be overcome, but an unavoidable aspect of poli-
tics itself. In particular, I will draw on Deleuze and Guattari’s distinction 
between the crowd and the pack to argue that these movements, rather 
than leaderless, display what could be called distributed leadership. In the 
third, I will develop some consequences of this by showing how the rela-
tion between spontaneity and organization must be rendered complex, 
and how distributed leadership calls for thinking organization in terms 
of complementarity. In the last section, I argue that Deleuze and Guattari’s 
concept of becoming-imperceptible offers a key with which to think the 
organizational and strategic tasks facing these movements today.
I. Synecdoche Wall Street
One of the reasons why movements like the Arab Spring, 15M and 
Occupy are seen as bypassing representation and leadership lies in their 
relation to mass organizations. For much of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, mass organizations were a pillar of radical or progressive poli-
tics. Forming, maintaining and perfecting them were indispensable steps 
towards social transformation; their development was both a condition 
for, and the material substrate of, the historical movement of social trans-
formation itself. Mass organizations were burgeoning class consciousness 
in externalized, materialized form; what gave that consciousness a visible 
face and a cadre that could spread it. Mass organizations were something 
like a collective memory device, whose very body registered its develop-
ment: the tactics that worked, the mistakes that cost dearly, the victori-
ous ‘lines,’ the individuals who had acquired greater experience and pres-
tige. As such, they were indispensable to a collective learning process that 
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proceeded towards ever greater unification: organization by trade lead-
ing to organizations uniting workers across trades, and then to a party 
through which the class could represent itself politically, in parliament 
and outside it.
By contrast, most important mass movements since the late 1990s 
have gone without – or even against – mass organizations, or involved 
them in minor roles. This is partly because of the historical crisis of left-
wing parties and trade unions, and the broader crisis of representative 
politics. While the emancipatory movements of ‘really existing socialism’ 
became exploitative and oppressive regimes, parties and trade unions in 
countries where socialism did not ‘win’ not only manifested the same 
problems to variable degrees (authoritarianism, lack of accountability, 
bureaucratization), they often effectively worked to stymie social mobi-
lization and radical demands. This process, already visible in the post-war 
welfare state and national liberation struggles, became more acute with 
the neoliberal restructuring from the late 1970s onwards. 
This is where the crisis of representation in the left opens onto the 
crisis of representative politics in general, in response to which protesters 
around the world have risen in recent years. Most ‘mature’ democracies 
have effectively become two-party systems where both parties represent 
essentially the same interests, so that the key political antagonism today is 
between the overrepresented (‘the 1%’ with disproportionate economic 
and political clout) and the under- or unrepresented (everyone else, ‘the 
99%’). Whereas from the 1940s to the 1970s the welfare state was, in the 
global North at least, the gravitational center of politics, and the politi-
cal system offered a more or less accurate representation of the two key 
opposing forces – capital and (stable, Fordist, industrial, unionized) labor 
– neoliberalism functions less as a point of equilibrium than as a natural-
ized, almost invisible background. As a result, the options on the table 
tend to be only slight variations on the same formula, tailored to cater for 
the small interest groups which, in a context of indifference generated by 
the lack of real options, decide whether an election goes this or that way. 
While no doubt far from the extremes of Egypt or Tunisia, even the ‘best’ 
Western democracies are mired in cronyism and elite rule. This is what 
has been dramatically laid bare by the crisis begun in 2008. It is hardly 
surprising that contemporary movements should bypass, even avoid 
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mass organizations, when the parties and unions that historically repre-
sented the working class are equally implicated in the crises’s causes and 
results, helping usher the ‘bailouts’ and ‘austerity measures’ with which 
governments have made populations pay the ransom exacted by finance.
This subjective rejection is, however, not a sufficient cause for how 
they have developed. We must add to it an objective condition, the wide-
spread access to means of production and diffusion of information, of 
which the material substrate is above all the internet. It may be true that 
‘drums, fires, incendiary tracts, running down the backstreets, word-of-
mouth, ringing bells’ (Badiou 2011: 39) were ‘for centuries’ what mobi-
lized masses of people; but just hurriedly dismissing ‘Facebook and other 
such nonsense of alleged technical innovation’ (Badiou 2011: 39) we risk 
missing the quantitative and qualitative differences that our technologi-
cal conditions represent. 
Quantitatively, they vastly increase both the potential reach of calls to 
action and the information on which they are based, as well as the speed 
of their spread across networks; not only do they generate more instant 
connections among a greater number of people, they create connec-
tions among people and groups that are distant from each other, to some 
extent transcending the requirement of physical proximity. Qualitatively, 
they create a continuous background of exchange of information, partici-
pation and collaboration beyond the limits of physical proximity (neigh-
borhoods, workplaces, countries) and belonging (to a political organiza-
tion, a movement, an ethnicity). Under certain special conditions, this 
can scale up in unpredictably big and fast ways, and move from the virtual 
environment into the ‘real’ world.1 For that same reason, social technolo-
gies also provide a sort of continuous ‘schooling’ in networked organiza-
tion, so that it appears as the ‘natural’ organizing logic for most people 
living in the landscape created by these technological transformations. 
Consequently, less open and flexible, less collaborative and participatory 
logics will tend to be seen with suspicion.
If we abstract too quickly from specifics in search of universal, transh-
istorical ‘constants’ we end up treating material media as indifferent and 
interchangeable, as if the internet and drums were just instruments to do 
the same thing, and our materialism becomes impoverished. However, 
we can find a first approach to questions of leadership in one of the eternal 
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constants of uprisings identified by Badiou. As he puts it, ‘however large 
a manifestation’ or revolt, ‘it is always hyper-minoritarian [archi-minori-
taire],’ (Badiou 2011: 90) composed of an ‘acting and thinking minority’ 
(Badiou 2011: 134) whose irruption makes a previously hidden social 
antagonism visible. In these conditions, ‘the “deep country”2 disappears 
and the spotlight is put on what could be called a mass minority’ (Badiou 
2011: 134; italics in the original). Badiou calls this phenomenon ‘con-
traction’: ‘the situation is contracted into a sort of representation of itself, 
a metonymy of the overall situation’ (Badiou 2011: 104). It is, in fact, a 
specific case of metonymy called synecdoche, the figure of speech in which 
a part stands for the whole.
Is any politics thinkable without synecdoche? Even in the direct 
democracy of a General Assembly is there not a split between those who 
speak and those who stay silent? Does not even the most immediate form 
of mass politics, the multitudinous expressiveness of street protest, cre-
ate a cleavage between those who are there and those in whose name they 
are there?  While concepts like ‘emancipation’ and ‘revolution’ obviously 
suggest ideas of people getting rid of representatives, taking charge etc., 
the only political process in which a part (‘the most active,’ ‘the most 
conscious,’ ‘the most enraged’, ‘the most experienced’) would not, at 
least temporarily, stand in for the whole (‘the workers,’ ‘the poor,’ ‘the 
oppressed’) would be one in which all concerned became equally active, 
conscious, enraged, experienced at the same time.3 This, whether we 
like or it not, is at best improbable; despite the large numbers that have 
become mobilized across the world in recent years, it is certainly not the 
case with the movements we see now. As Jodi Dean (2011: 229; italics in 
the original) pointedly remarked, ‘Occupy Wall Street is not actually the 
movement of the 99 percent of the population of the United States (or 
the world) against the top 1 percent. It is a movement mobilizing itself 
around an occupied Wall Street in the name of the 99 percent’. Inevitably, 
even non-representative politics involves a moment of representation. 
The difference is rather between a representation that strives towards its 
own overcoming (in non-representative) and towards its own stabiliza-
tion (in representative politics).
There is, of course, nothing wrong with this: it is a necessary feature of 
political processes, whether in the slow work by which some organizers 
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catalyze a collectivity’s dissatisfaction into political action, or in the 
mass upheavals that divide and energize whole countries. Apparently, 
the absence of mass organizations, rather than eliminate this, multiplies 
it. Until not long ago, mass mobilization tended to be the preserve of 
mass organizations; initiative came from them, their backing was crucial 
for success. As the heyday of mass organizations receded, their numbers 
dwindled and their mobilizing capacity shrunk, we have seen more and 
more relatively small groups of people – lone individuals at the limit – 
take initiatives which, amplified by technological interconnectedness, 
may strike the right affective tone to connect with widely shared feelings, 
and offer relatively clear and feasible action points that masses of people 
can engage in, producing effects that far exceeded their original condi-
tions. If it is possible to speak of a ‘twilight of vanguardism’ (Graeber 
2004), it seems to be an ironic consequence of the proliferation, rather 
than the end, of vanguards – the dawn of diffuse vanguards.
II. The Crowd, the Pack, the Vanguard-Function
‘Vanguard’ was, particularly in the Marxist tradition, the name given to 
this synecdoche; a metaphor borrowed from military language, it indi-
cated ‘the most advanced detachment’ in the struggle of the proletariat. 
In The Communist Manifesto (1848), Marx and Engels (2000: 255–6) 
presented communists as ‘the most advanced and resolute section of 
the working-class parties of every country, that section which pushes 
forward all others,’ while also having ‘over the great mass of the prole-
tariat the advantage of clearly understanding the line of march, the con-
ditions, and ultimate general results of the proletarian movement.’ We 
can see how this fits in the narrative about class-consciousness and mass 
organizations laid out above. Even if it is the capitalistic development of 
productive forces that creates a politically conscious proletariat (by cre-
ating consciousness of material conditions), the process does not take 
place all at once and in uniform manner; it is driven by a fraction of the 
proletariat that becomes increasingly purposive, active and experienced, 
and whose job it is to share that purposiveness, activity and experience 
with others. ‘Vanguard’ thus refers to two synecdoches, one contained 
in the other. Internally to a movement or political process, there is one 
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part (‘communists’) that shows others the way (‘other working-class par-
ties’); yet this movement or process, taken as a whole, expands by attract-
ing those around it (‘the great mass of the proletariat’ and fractions of 
other classes).
While retaining these two different moments, ‘vanguard’ is used here 
in a way that differs from the orthodox Marxist idea in a crucial aspect. So 
as to get to this difference, let us first go through Deleuze and Guattari’s 
analysis of two different logics of group function – identified, following 
Elias Canetti, as the crowd and the pack.4
The crowd is characterized by ‘large quantity, the divisibility and 
equality of number, concentration … unitary hierarchical direction, the 
organisation of territoriality or territorialisation’; the pack, in turn, by 
‘small or restricted numbers, dispersion … qualitative metamorphoses, 
inequalities as remainders or thresholds, the impossibility of a fixed total-
isation or hierarchisation, the Brownian variation of directions, the lines 
of deterritorialisation’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 46).5 The distinction 
between the two is projected directly onto that between the arborescent 
and the rhizomatic – and, as with the latter, 
‘[t]he point is not to oppose the two types of multiplicities 
(…) according to a dualism that would not be worth more 
than that of One and multiple. There are only multiplicities of 
multiplicities that constitute a single assemblage, that operate 
in the same assemblage: packs in crowds, and vice-versa. Trees 
have rhizomatic lines, but the rhizome has points of arbores-
cence.’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 47; italics in the original).
In other words, these are oppositions in thought that in reality only ever 
occur in a mixed state (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 593). They indicate 
two tendencies present in every assemblage, and two frames of reference 
according which to analyse them, depending on whether we look at them 
from the point of view of already given differences (and identities) or 
‘understand [them] in intensity’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 44). And 
while Deleuze and Guattari (2004: 31) oppose the arborescent and the 
rhizomatic ‘not as two models,’ but as something ‘acting as a model … 
even if it produces its own flights,’ and something ‘acting as an immanent 
process that upsets the model …  even if it produces its own hierarchies,’ 
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it is better to stress the processual nature of both. The model is not 
imposed from the outside without being immanently produced: the pack 
can become a crowd the moment it starts holding up a model of itself and 
defining itself according to a group identity, a bivalent logic of belonging/
not belonging, identification with a leader etc. Still, it remains affected by 
what pulls it in different directions and partially upsets arborescence with 
new rhizomatic processes. However fixed a territory, it is ‘inseparable 
from vectors of deterritorialisation that work it from the inside,’ (Deleuze 
and Guattari 2004: 635) and so it is always possible that arborescence be 
reverted and what is (mostly) crowd develop back into (mostly) pack.
The question of how leadership functions in the pack and the crowd 
helps us clarify how the word ‘vanguard’ can apply to phenomena like 
Occupy and the Arab Spring. Confounding schematic oppositions 
between hierarchy and non-hierarchy, vertical and horizontal structures, 
Deleuze and Guattari speak of ‘equality’ in relation to the crowd and 
‘inequalities’ in relation to the pack, and of leaders in relation to both. 
There is equality in the crowd in the sense that all places are assigned, 
and everyone (apart from leaders) is the same before the group; there 
is inequality in the pack to the extent that there are no fixed roles or 
places, rather constant movement as the pack itself changes direction in 
Brownian (that is, random) motion.
In this sense, even if the pack and the crowd ‘at times oppose each 
other and at times interpenetrate,’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 46) it can 
also be said that the pack is the truth behind the crowd, or the ground 
zero of group behavior. Not because it is an ‘elementary anarchism’ 
repressed by social organization, or a primordial formlessness behind 
form, or an originary evolutionary state, but because social organiza-
tion and institutionalization is what selects and stabilizes some ways of 
organizing, some forms, which the pack instead is constantly producing 
and destabilizing. At the limit, the whole of society, to the extent that it is 
open to deterritorialization, is virtually a pack, however much it may be 
actually segmentarized as a crowd. 
This allows us to draw a distinction between the objective, teleologi-
cal understanding of a vanguard whose sway over the Marxist tradition 
helped engender the pathology of vanguardism, and what can be called 
the vanguard-function. The latter is what Deleuze and Guattari (2004: 
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298) call the ‘cutting edge of deterritorialisation’ of a situation or group-
ing – that part which, having started to function in a different way, opens 
a new direction that, after it has communicated to others, can become 
something to follow, divert, resist (or ‘imitate’, ‘oppose’ and ‘adapt’, as per 
Gabriel Tarde’s three social laws).6 The vanguard-function is objective in 
the sense that, once the change it introduces has propagated, it can be 
identified as the anomalous cause behind a growing number of effects. 
Yet it is not objective in the traditional Marxist sense of a deterministic 
or transitive relation between an objectively defined position (class, class 
sector etc.) and the occurrence of a subjective political breakthrough 
(event), itself underpinned by a conception of history as following neces-
sary laws. Where a process starts, which direction it takes, who ‘steers’ or 
‘diverts’ it, what is its course – these can be determined retrospectively, 
but never in advance. While it is no doubt possible to hazard more or 
less educated guesses (depending on how well one can read the symp-
toms announcing potential events), there are no laws behind this. It is 
only in this objective but non-transitive sense that the Arab Spring, 15M, 
Occupy etc. can be called ‘vanguards.’
We can now extend this concept beyond the synecdoche between 
these movements and the rest of society to its second moment, the 
vanguard (or vanguards) within the vanguard. What changes the pack’s 
course is an animal pulling the group in one direction and the rest sud-
denly following it, changing the group’s shape and structure as they do. 
It is not the case that the pack is leaderless, then, but the opposite: every 
member is a potential leader. And this, rather than an ideal of horizon-
tality that would amount to no less than absolute equality, is what best 
defines the way in which the movements of the last few years organize. 
Distributed leadership, not assemblies or horizontality, is their defining 
trait.7 If the pack is the degree zero of collectivity, and distributed leader-
ship is the kind of organization proper to it, we can conclude that distrib-
uted leadership is the degree zero of organization. That would no doubt 
be true; at the same time, it is important that we appreciate the extent 
to which contemporary communication technology expands the poten-
tial for it. 
When crowd and pack are contrasted according to large and small 
numbers, as Deleuze and Guattari do, this should be understood less in 
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terms of an actual numerical limit (the pack is non-denumerable and 
defined by intensive relations, and, as we know from recent experience, 
can be very large indeed) than as referring to a problem of scalability: the 
greater the number, the harder it is for the pack not to become a mass. 
The consequence here is the same as that of stressing the interpenetra-
tion and processual nature of crowd and pack: notions like ‘verticality’ 
and ‘horizontality’ cease to be substantialized, or treated as properties 
that necessarily adhere to certain substances or organizational forms 
(‘the party’, ‘the multitude’), and are instead regarded as vectors, virtual 
tendencies that it may be necessary to foster or check in a given situa-
tion. Now, the problem of scalability applies to direct democracy much 
more stringently than it does to distributed leadership, especially in the 
present conditions: there is a limit to how far an assembly can be scaled 
up without either ceasing to be functional or ceasing to be an assembly. 
From before they hit the streets until now, the movements of the last few 
years have effectively moved like packs, with small groups (even indi-
viduals) starting initiatives that would snowball into much larger effects. 
Therefore, not only can they be collectively described as parts function-
ing as vanguards in relation to the whole of society, their very develop-
ment is characterized by different groups, occasionally even individu-
als, occupying vanguard-functions at different points, breaking through 
inertia and impasses on how to move forward. This is why the twilight 
of vanguardism is not the same as the end of vanguards but, on the con-
trary, a result of their proliferation: the more there are potential occupiers 
of the vanguard-function, the harder it becomes for a single vanguard to 
become stabilized.
The point about the pack being the ground zero of social organization 
can be taken further still. If the way group formations move at the most 
elementary level, even when under control ‘from above,’8 is through dis-
tributed leadership, it follows that absolute horizontality – a completely 
level playing field, a strictly leaderless situation – is impossible: ‘There is 
no going back, there is no anarchism’ (Guattari 2006: 196). There is no 
situation in which phenomena of distributed leadership do not occur, 
essentially because there is no situation in which deterritorialization does 
not occur, and pack leaders or vanguard-functions are no more than vec-
tors of deterritorialization. Does this then mean that the demand for ‘real 
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democracy’ can never be realized? Certainly not in the sense of a fully 
stable final state of perfection. ‘Real democracy’ is ultimately no more 
than the endless work of unmaking and bypassing the stratifications that 
create imperfection, as much as allowing other, more useful stratifica-
tions to develop (while trying to keep some of their dangerous tenden-
cies in check). There is only less or more democracy, not full democracy 
(or equality, or horizontality), and embracing imperfection as necessary 
– which need not, but can no doubt also work as an excuse for defeatist 
pragmatism – is at the same time a pre-requisite for clarity regarding the 
goals of struggle, and a realistic appraisal of existing practice.
At the same time, while distributed leadership is no definitive guar-
antee against arborescence, it is not undemocratic either (unless, that 
is, democracy is understood in absolute terms). Its very principle is that 
‘vanguards’ can in principle emerge from anywhere, and the more con-
nected and mobilized a movement is, the more likely this is to happen. It 
is true, of course, that the more connections or prestige a group or indi-
vidual have, the more likely they are to be noticed. However, to speak of a 
vanguard-function is to say that something leads to the extent that it is fol-
lowed: it ‘works’ when it ‘works,’ and does not work when it does not, in 
ways that may even damage its power to ‘work’ in the future. As Deleuze 
and Guattari (2004: 46) put it: ‘The leader of the pack or the gang plays 
move by move, must wager everything in every hand, whereas the group 
or crowd leader consolidates or capitalizes on past gains.’ Therefore, while 
it precludes the possibility of a perfectly level playing field, distributed 
leadership leaves the field open to difference, making the rise and wane of 
different ‘vanguards’ possible.
III. Becoming, Spontaneous and Organized
What an examination of the pack suggests is a complication of the usual 
opposition between leadership and spontaneity: the pack’s ‘spontaneous’ 
movement results from its following one or more individuals that come 
temporarily to occupy a vanguard-function.9 Besides, this function both 
occupies a singular point and progressively propagates across the whole, 
so that ‘vanguard’ can be said of an action’s originator, but also of the first 
to follow it, those who join in subsequently, and so on. At the same time, 
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the occasional ‘leader of the pack’ is said to be a vector of deterritorial-
ization, itself following a movement that was already present at least in 
potential, a ‘creator’ or ‘originator’ only in being the first to grasp it. In 
order to better understand this, it is worth taking the time to unpack what 
Deleuze and Guattari mean by ‘events,’ the generic term that they ascribe 
to such ‘spontaneous’ changes in direction.
Events have a complicated structure. The same event happens on dif-
ferent levels and, in a way, more than once; it is at once a discontinuity 
concentrated on a point and a continuous process, an ‘eventing’ that hap-
pens over time. To begin with, for any event there will be several layers 
of causality at play; these will be, for example, a series of long-held griev-
ances, a history of collective frustrations and personal humiliations, etc. 
At this point, however, those under the effect of these causes will still 
be operating within a pre-defined space of possibilities that constrains 
what reactions are imaginable: the situation itself cannot be overcome, 
although there may be individual routes of negotiating it (small acts of 
transgression, escapist compensation, episodes of ‘acting out,’ opportu-
nistic collaboration, etc.). Something boils under the surface, but there is 
no way it could emerge; acting on it does not even appear as a possibility 
yet. Then, however, a new cause may act as a catalyst, focusing the exist-
ing layers of causality on a point, and a virtual threshold is crossed – new 
dispositions and potentials emerge, accompanied by a transformation in 
sensibility: the situation is now perceived as intolerable. In a sense, the 
event has already happened; the field of possibilities expands, and even 
rational calculations change – just yesterday you were wondering how 
long you could extend a cigarette break, now you are asking yourself how 
to organize a walk out.
The event is a rupture, firstly, because it is an excess over its causes, 
a break with linearity, ‘a bifurcation, a deviation in regard to laws, an 
unstable state’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2003: 215). It is unpredictable in 
advance and only appears as possible after the fact: ‘as much as one can 
and must assign in the causal series the objective factors that made such a 
rupture possible … only what belongs to the order of desire and its irrup-
tion can account for the reality that [this rupture of causality] acquires at 
that moment, in that place’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2005: 453). Secondly, 
it creates new possibilities, which in a sense makes it a necessary given for 
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what comes afterwards: ‘an event can be countered, repressed, recuper-
ated, betrayed, it nonetheless … cannot be surpassed: it is an opening of 
possibles’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2005: 453).
This is the event as ‘pure becoming,’ a virtual transformation 
abstracted or subtracted from actual states; but the event is not just a 
pure becoming, it is also a becoming something else. A ‘virtual mutation’ 
must be followed by an ‘actualising mutation’ (Zourabichvli 2000: 344), 
which is the means through which a shift in sensibility is given a form: 
new words, acts, behaviors, the actual and perceptible inscription of a vir-
tual and sensible change in bodies and assemblages. It is through them 
that the event actually takes place, transforming the world around it, and 
is communicated. It may be that only a few have crossed the threshold, but 
once they change, that change can be shared.
This is how the event, which has already happened once in a virtual 
mutation and twice in the creation of new individuations, can happen 
many more times as it spreads. But this means that ‘spontaneity’ is not, 
as is often thought, the absence of any form; on the contrary, the event’s 
actualizing side is precisely the passage from formlessness to (new) form. 
Gilbert Simondon (2005: 549), whose philosophy of individuation pro-
foundly influenced Deleuze, draws an explicit comparison between a 
metastable state of ‘supersaturation,’ in which ‘an event is ready to take 
place, or a structure ready to emerge,’ and a ‘pre-revolutionary’ one: ‘all 
it takes is for a structural germ [germe structural] to appear.’ An actual-
izing mutation (a perceptible change in behavior, practices, relations) is 
such a ‘structural germ’: a new form that spreads across a field that is ripe 
for the event – even if, while the event is still ‘eventing,’ not exhausted 
in its potential, this new form is far from fixed, and rather than being a 
model to be consciously imitated or rejected, it is communicated and 
propagates through changes in sensibility.10 Here we see the correlation 
between event and subject: it is ‘when history tips over into meaning-
lessness,’ literally ‘breaks the norm’ and creates something new, ‘that the 
subject comes onto the scene, bringing everything into doubt and pro-
ducing a new utterance, an operation of the signifier as expression of a 
meaning, a possible split in a given order, a breach, a revolution, a cry 
for radical reorientation’ (Guattari 1984: 175). Yet this subject is not an 
autonomous, sovereign agent, but the way in which the event expresses 
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itself. It exists to the extent that it affirms the event, as much as the event 
exists only because it expresses itself in this subject. ‘[T]he event creates 
a new existence, it produces a new subjectivity’ (Deleuze and Guattari 
2003: 216), but not as a cause external to its effects; it is in producing such 
transformations that the event ‘events.’ The subject is therefore what con-
stitutes itself around the feeling that a rupture has taken place (‘it can-
not go on like before’), and must respond to the event by ‘forming new 
collective assemblages that correspond to the new subjectivity’ (Deleuze 
and Guattari 2003: 216).
Thus, if we still speak of spontaneity – a discontinuity, an excess over 
causes, a break with existing constraints and the previously mapped 
space of possibilities – it is neither as a free creation nor as an absence of 
form. The event expresses an expansion of freedom and contingency, not 
an elimination of all constraints, and is inseparable from the ‘structural 
germs’ that, in giving it viable forms, actualize it.11 We can therefore see 
why there is no contradiction in speaking of spontaneity and distributed 
leadership. In fact, we can easily track the emergence of recent move-
ments by observing how a few spontaneously created forms, in propagat-
ing across networks, brought those very movements into existence: the 
protests in Sidi Bouzid around Mohamed Bouazizi’s suicide mushroom-
ing into protests across Tunisia, as the first cries of ‘Step down, Ben Ali’ 
were heard; the camps that spread from Tahrir Square to the Maghreb and 
Mashreq, then to Spain, Israel, the US and around the world; the original 
Adbusters ‘Occupy Wall Street’ meme, ‘taken seriously’ by activists who 
started organizing around the idea, until its replication across the US.
What these examples also show is that, even if there is a sense in which 
the event is a rupture ‘out of the blue, … in its becoming, it escapes his-
tory’ (Deleuze and Negri 2007: 231), there is nothing magical or ethe-
real about it. On the contrary, it demands work; to say that propagation 
happens at a virtual or sensible level does not make its conditions any 
less material. The examples above make it evident that the various ‘van-
guards’ (several of them for each movement) had to spend a fair amount 
of time honing their messages, building alliances, creating the necessary 
channels and platforms (face-to-face meetings, Facebook pages, websites, 
Twitter and Youtube accounts etc.), organizing protests, producing and 
circulating videos, images, texts, memes.12 There is a much more complex 
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interplay between ‘spontaneity’ and ‘organization’ than a simple opposi-
tion between the two would allow. On the one hand, the tactics that suc-
ceeded in producing large-scale outbursts generally did so because they 
were sufficiently open-ended, inclusive and adaptable to allow people to 
become involved in their own terms and through progressive steps, rather 
than having to conform to a predefined activist style and identity over-
night. Some have described this as ‘open code activism’ in comparison 
to open code software.13 On the other hand, if it were not for a backbone 
of committed activists working from the early days, many of which had 
years of political experience behind them and belonged to pre-existing 
groups and networks, these movements would not have turned out the 
way they did. The fantasy of thousands of entirely unconnected individu-
als magically turning up at the same place at the same time is simply a 
myth; the reality is closer to a continuous ‘eventing’ in which small ‘van-
guards’ slowly built up (and others no doubt withered), until the event 
irrupted in full force on the streets. A series of small, ever growing syn-
ecdoches, leading to that sudden, exponentially larger synecdoche that 
Badiou calls ‘contraction.’
If we understand spontaneity as formlessness, it is easy to slip into 
imagining organization as its total opposite – the fixation of a rigid form, 
the party. It is certainly common that unreconstructed Leninists ‘pay lip 
service to a certain right to spontaneity in a first moment’ (Deleuze 2004: 
278), but only as ‘a transitional manifestation that must be left behind for 
a “superior” phase, marked by the setting-up of centralist organisations’ 
(Guattari 1984c: 66). But the problem also works the other way round: a 
paranoid fear of organization, too sharp a distinction between the ‘good’, 
‘spontaneous’ moment (which ‘belonged to everyone’) and the ‘bad’, 
‘transcendent’ one (in which ‘some people tried to take control’) can 
block the way to necessary new creations. Understanding spontaneity as 
the creation and propagation of new form, on the other hand, poses a dif-
ferent set of problems than any binary choice between either spontane-
ity or organization: what forms to propose, what forms to select, which 
forms to connect to.
There are, of course, many steps between selecting some incipi-
ent forms that manifest themselves in actions, conducts, discourses 
etc., and developing organizational consistency (more clearly defined 
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responsibilities, structures and criteria of membership, more permanent 
participation etc.). But the point is, first, that ‘organization’ should be 
understood as a continuum that stretches between those two things and, 
second, that it will always be a matter of choosing how to manage tenden-
cies towards openness or horizontality, closure or verticalization.14 The 
‘formlessness or party’ option not only posits organization as synony-
mous with a radical discontinuity, it assumes organizational unification 
as a self-evident value, or the telos towards which organization should 
tend. Thinking in terms of distributed leadership, on the other hand, 
suggests that a movement choosing a course of action (which is neces-
sary) does not entail choosing a single course of action (which is not). 
If different initiatives spring up that are not defined by mutually exclu-
sive group identities, but coalesce around complementary strategic and 
organizing wagers (fighting foreclosures, debt, austerity measures etc.), 
divisions appear as the means to better pursue different but convergent 
goals, rather than as splitting a presumed common goal several ways.15 A 
political process is then more like an ecosystem than an army, even if ide-
ally it should also be capable of functioning as an army when necessary. 
It is possible to advance without advancing as a single column, as long 
as the forms created adequately respond to real tendencies or potentials, 
possess the organizational consistency required by the tasks they pose 
themselves, and remain open and responsive to their, continuously reca-
librating strategy and tactics, and avoiding bad forms of stratification.
IV. Becoming-Anonymous, Becoming-Imperceptible
As we have seen, an event ‘events’ if it is actualized into something new; 
‘without history, experimentation would remain indeterminate, uncon-
ditioned’ (Deleuze and Negri 2007: 229). If nothing is done to actual-
ize existing potentials into new forms, they could simply be incorpo-
rated into the existing situation (opportunism, identitarianism), or be 
displaced into much worse forms (what Deleuze and Guattari call ‘black 
holes’: fascism, terrorism, suicide, etc.). To avoid decisions, and the divi-
sions they bring, in the name of an indefinite potential or diversity to be 
preserved at all costs, is therefore not an option. In fact, remaining stead-
fastly against any actuality often belies an implicit reliance on teleology 
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– something we should be all the warier of if we abandon the orthodox 
Marxist’s explicit reliance on the notion of a historical development 
governed by necessary laws. The notion that strategic initiatives or new 
forms should be rejected because ‘the process,’ left to its own devices, 
will produce the right solutions is not only paradoxical – ‘the process’ 
is treated as something separate from the individuals that constitute it, 
and having the power to arrive at solutions without any of its participants 
actually proposing any – but also premised on some kind of teleological 
necessity.16As Deleuze and Guattari remind us, it is necessary to create 
‘collective assemblages’ that can give a body to the event, and we shirk 
that challenge at our own peril. The wager that defines their political 
thought, perfectly summarized by Guattari in 1973, is that we can hope 
for nothing else than a continuous effort to keep in balance the two fun-
damental – and fundamentally contradictory – demands of revolution-
ary struggle.
‘These two struggles need not be mutually exclusive:
The class struggle, the revolutionary struggle for libera-
tion, involves the existence of war machines capable of stand-
ing up to the forces of oppression, which means operating with 
a degree of centralism, with at least a minimum of coordination.
The struggle in relation to desire requires collective agen-
cies to produce a continually ongoing analysis, and the sub-
version of every form of power, at every level.’ (Guattari 1984: 
62; my italics)
Against the usual misconception that sees them as unwavering par-
tisans of openness against closure, diversity over unity, spontaneity over 
purposive organization, rhizome over arborescence, deterritorialization 
over reterritorialization, the point for Deleuze and Guattari is rather that, 
even if the poles in each pair tend to be conceived as mutually exclusive, 
this need not and should not be the case.17 Rather than simply invert the 
choice historically made by Marxism–Leninism (for closure, unity, pur-
posive organization, arborescence, reterritorialization), the challenge 
is to invent forms capable of maintaining the two poles in maximal ten-
sion: the most openness with the most closure, the greatest unity with the 
greatest diversity, and so on.18 ‘The good form,’ as Simondon (2005: 543; 
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italics in the original) describes it, ‘approaches paradox without becoming 
a paradox, contradiction without becoming a contradiction.’ It is not stable 
(cancelling out potentials), but metastable (capable of retaining the most 
tension). It is therefore not a matter of finding a stable ‘golden mean’ – 
as a recipe that could be transposed to any set of conditions – but of a 
constant readjustment under every new situation so as to prevent either 
pole from taking over. ‘As long as we see ourselves as having to choose 
between either the impotent spontaneism of the masses or the bureau-
cratic and hierarchical encoding of a party organization,’ says Guattari 
(1984: 230–1; italics in the original), ‘all “liberation movements” of 
desire will find themselves taken over, or encircled and marginalized.’19
Or, as Deleuze (2004: 279) summarizes it: ‘It is evident that a revolution-
ary machine cannot be satisfied with local and punctual struggles: hyper-
desiring and hyper-centralised, it must be all of it at once.’
Instead of fighting or ruing organization and its risks as something 
that comes from outside, that ‘others’ impose on ‘us,’ the real test lies in 
becoming those ‘others,’ that is, in taking responsibility both for the cre-
ation of collective assemblages and for their risks – for developing collec-
tive capacity to act and mechanisms to analyse and subvert ‘every form of 
power’ that endangers the continuity of a process, including one’s own.20
To be truly anti-Oedipal is to be self-subversive.21 This is why Guattari 
(1984: 41) says that ‘the fundamental problem of institutional analysis’ 
(the field in which he started out) is: ‘[C]an the group face the problem 
of its own death? Can a group with a historic mission envisage the end 
of that mission … ? Can revolutionary parties envisage the end of their 
so-called mission to lead the masses?’22 Starting with the Zapatista Army 
of National Liberation’s (EZLN) Subcomandante Marcos, facelessness 
and anonymity have been a recurring trait among movements of the 
last decades. Both a weapon against the targeting of leaders and a way 
of demonstrating the struggle’s openness to all comers, this has been a 
key element in creating an ‘open-code activism.’ Besides, when distrust 
of representation is rife, calls for action that are not ‘authored’ by estab-
lished organizations have a better chance of catching on.23 It is fitting that 
one of the most important groups to appear in recent years – if it can 
even be called that – is called Anonymous, and that their visible ‘face’ is 
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the Guy Fawkes mask worn by Alan Moore’s V, a sort of fictional forerun-
ner of Marcos.
At the same time, it is clear that one cannot be ‘anonymous’ forever. 
Even if we do not know Marcos’ face, he is still identifiable as an EZLN 
leader, and while the individuals in Anonymous may remain anonymous, 
the collectivity called ‘Anonymous’ itself cannot. If the vanguard-func-
tion leads, it inevitably becomes recognizable, even if only as something 
like a Twitter alias. Besides, there is an important difference between the 
localized kind of intervention that acts as a catalyst for a protest and the 
more continuous, long-term work of a campaign or group. In the latter 
case, becoming identifiable is unavoidable, and it is more likely that, how-
ever informal an organizational format might be, internal structures and 
leadership figures will emerge. 
Another of Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts may help us think beyond 
the limits of invisibility and anonymity: ‘becoming-imperceptible.’24 At 
first, the three may seem synonymous, or becoming-imperceptible can 
sound like the opposite of acting or leading. I would like to suggest, how-
ever, that it offers ways of thinking how to act and lead better, rather than 
not at all. The first thing to stress about the concept is that it refers to 
a kind of action. Although initially defined as becoming ‘like everyone/
the whole world [tout le monde]’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 342), it 
is poorly understood if treated as mere inaction or ‘going with the flow.’ 
To begin with, one actively strives to become imperceptible, choosing 
to suppress ‘everything that prevented us from slipping between things’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 344); one takes a step back from a consti-
tuted position (my group, my beliefs, myself) facing other constituted 
positions so as to become attuned to their common background: their 
virtual or unconscious conditions and the potentials present in the situa-
tion. It is a striving to place oneself in the position of the ‘anomalous’ ele-
ment that is a pack’s vector of deterritorialization, of which Deleuze and 
Guattari (2004: 299) say that it is ‘neither an individual nor a species’ 
and has ‘neither familiar nor subjectified feelings, nor specific or signifi-
cant characteristics,’ but ‘only affects.’
This means neither an elimination of the self nor the attainment of 
an ‘objective,’ God’s-eye perspective on the whole. It is true that Deleuze 
and Guattari (2004: 348) speak of a ‘plane of consistency or immanence’ 
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that, in the process of becoming-imperceptible, is ‘perceived in its own 
right.’ But it is so ‘in the course of its construction,’ that is, through exper-
imentation, and hence partially, rather than as if through external con-
templation. If ‘the unconscious must be constructed, not rediscovered’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2004:), it is because it is never given as such, as in 
some sort of fusional mystical experience, but only ever through a con-
ditioned, perspectival effort. Constructing means acting, selecting, con-
necting to some elements and not others, and in that process producing 
a new set of orientations for actual behavior. To have ‘only affects’ is to 
enhance one’s sensibility to the conditions of the environment and, as a 
consequence, to be better prepared to detect the latency of events and to 
intervene so as to bring them about.
This can be thought in relation to the distinction between actualizing
and realizing that François Zourabichvili (2000) correctly highlights as 
central to Deleuze and Guattari’s politics. To ‘realize a project’ is to depart 
from an already existing image or goal, and attempt to shape the actual 
according to it; to actualize is to experiment with or construct actualiza-
tions for a situation’s potentials, creating something qualitatively differ-
ent not only from what came before, but from what could previously be 
imagined as possible. The conception of action that corresponds to the 
first is that of a form that exists as a mental image being imposed on inert 
matter. In the second, an image cannot exist in advance – it is at best a 
hunch – because the matter acted upon is not inert: it has potentials of 
its own, with an agency of their own, responding to action, resisting it, 
diverting it or accelerating it, so that the final result is truly unpredictable. 
‘To realise a project produces nothing new’ if all it does is add existence 
to an idea that was already given as a possibility; ‘those who intend to 
transform the real according to their previously conceived idea do not 
take transformation itself into account’ (Zourabichvili 2000: 337).
Furthermore, if the matter on which the agent intervenes is not 
merely passive, it is because this matter is the very environment in which 
the agent moves – which therefore acts back on her, even to the point of 
transforming what she might desire or imagine. Instead of expecting to 
control that environment or wishing to fully determine its future states, 
the goal of actualization is more modest: to propose or induce a change, 
to introduce positive and negative feedbacks that indicate a direction 
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without predetermining it (which would be impossible).  To see oneself 
as an element that is both passive and active in a milieu that is also both 
things, instead of a separate agent seeking to mold inert matter according 
to a preconceived image, weakens the egoic, heroic investment in one-
self as ‘the vanguard,’ ‘the radicals,’ ‘the revolutionaries’ is undermined. 
One’s actions and identity cease to be the be-all and end-all condition 
for change, and are placed in a broader picture in which agents can be 
relativized to the point of ‘facing their own death’ – that is, the partiality 
and limits of their intervention and even, as the case may be,  the need 
for its overcoming or disappearance if it becomes superfluous or counter-
productive. It is not just that this conception is less prone to authoritar-
ian drifts, or more open-ended; it also involves greater attention to the 
conditions of action, and thus tends to be more flexible both in ‘meeting 
people where they are’ and in anticipating and negotiating changes in the 
environment. Ethereal as it may sound, ‘becoming-imperceptible’ should 
therefore be understood as becoming more realistic about oneself and the 
real potentials and limitations of a process. 
This relativization of the agent in favour of the environment and a sit-
uation’s conditions might suggest that becoming-imperceptible involves 
an unconditional commitment to seeking compromises or maintain-
ing broad consensus at any cost; but one thing does not follow from the 
other. First of all, becoming-imperceptible is precisely not about negoti-
ating differences understood as given or striking balances among fixed 
positions identifying each actor or part of a process. While constituted
difference is what stops agents from ‘slipping between things’, becoming 
imperceptible means looking for the constituent differences that underlie 
them, and acting on those. Differences as they exist are not absolute val-
ues in themselves, although they are part of the material that one must 
act upon, and must be taken into account as such. From the point of view 
of becoming imperceptible, it matters more that one is sensitive to dif-
ferences that can exist – that already exist in potential – and to construct 
the transversal connections that can provide them with a plane of con-
sistency, without those necessary leading back to the agent herself. To 
turn one’s gaze away from discontinuities (constituted difference) and 
towards continuity (the potentials that traverse a situation and can con-
stitute new differences) does not entail that the goal should always be 
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that of maintaining continuity, let alone assuming or producing homo-
geneity. Divisions exist – between ‘the 1%’ and ‘the 99%’, the over- and 
the under-represented, white and non-white, majorities and minoritarian 
becomings etc. –, and overcoming them will more often than not require 
asserting their existence and creating new ones.
To the extent that events are ruptures, and that one seeks potentials 
in order to elicit and propagate events, becoming imperceptible is part 
of intervening so as to create ruptures; it is a moment in the hard work of 
‘eventing’. The question is what ruptures to produce, and how – where to 
draw the lines, in which direction to move, how to retain enough open-
ness, where to be divisive and where inclusive, when to go with the flow 
and when to interrupt it. Sometimes, attempting to push things beyond 
the vaguest agreement will result in a process’ implosion or one’s own 
isolation; if new ruptures are to be created, one will have to wait, to be 
flexible, to ‘read the mood’. In other cases, a ‘spontaneous’ action that ini-
tially garnered little consensus can produce a widely shared qualitative 
change – for example, the way in which the storming of Conservative 
party headquarters in London galvanised the UK student movement of 
2011 (cf. The Free Association 2011). 
This shows that neither ‘maintaining continuity’ or ‘asserting division’ 
can be turned into categorical imperatives for political action. Whether 
continuity or division is preferable is a badly posed problem. Properly 
political (that is, practical) problems are always a matter of what conti-
nuity, what division, when, how, how much. The experimental character 
of becoming-imperceptible, its reference to a specific process or situa-
tion, highlights this. By the same token, it indicates that the point of an 
intervention is not itself, but what it does: one intervenes not in order to 
assert oneself or the correctness of one’s position, but in order to produce 
effects. There is no advantage to respecting differences if that only means 
that existing differences will remain the same; nothing is gained from 
asserting division if all it does is divide us from everyone else. It is key 
to the idea of an ‘open code activism’ that revolutions should be ‘come 
as you are’ affairs; but they will not have been revolutions if they do not 
result in ‘leaving as you were not’. The whole point of political practice is 
what happens in the middle, and how to make it happen. 
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Notes
1. Javier Toret (2013) notes that, while ‘the nodes more connected to the 
explosion’ of the movement became weaker, ‘a remarkable flow of interaction 
and daily work has remained,’ being occasionally reactivated by ‘the 
connection with circles that are less internal to the process’ through ‘new 
(even if smaller) events that make social malaises transversal with network 
processes,’ and thus are ‘re-actualisations of the 15M DNA.’ This leads him to 
distinguish four moments of the 15M process: ‘gestation,’ ‘explosion and birth 
of the network-system,’ ‘globalisation’ (including Occupy and the October 15, 
2011 day of action) and ‘evolution, development and mutation.’ 
2. Pays profond, in the sense that one speaks, for example of the United States’ 
‘deep south.’
3. This helps explain the appeal that activists of a radical libertarian and 
egalitarian bent sometimes find in a certain millenarianism: thinking 
a radical change that happens ‘at once’ (brought about, for example, by 
ecological collapse) allows us to bypass all the dangers (the formation 
of leaders and hierarchies, compromise) and the daunting work of a 
transformation taking place over time. 
4. I follow the standard English translation of the German Masse (masse, in 
French) as ‘crowd’; cf. Canetti (1981). Brighenti (2010: 297) compares 
Canetti, Gabriel Tarde and Deleuze and Guattari as proponents of a concept 
of multiplicity eschewing classical dichotomies between individualism 
and holism, agency and structure, micro- and macro-sociology by making 
the individual into ‘something that exists only within … a range located 
between two other regions,’ the infra- and the interindividual (which we 
could, following Gilbert Simondon, name ‘pre-’  and ‘trans-individual’). It is 
curious, then, that he fails to note how Deleuze and Guattari misread Canetti, 
opposing ‘pack’ and ‘crowd’ as intensive and extensive multiplicities, when 
Canetti sees both in intensive terms. For him, the pack is defined primarily 
by its coming together around a specific goal and possessing only two of the 
characteristics (equality, direction) of the crowd (which also include density 
and the tendency to grow). Because of the latter trait (lack of growth), the size 
opposition between ‘crowd’ (larger) and ‘pack’ (small) has an importance for 
him that, as I will argue, it does not to Deleuze and Guattari – whose ‘pack’ 
and ‘crowd’ are arguably closer to Canetti’s ‘open’ and ‘closed’ crowds.
5. Throughout the following pages I will be working from the opposition as it 
is set out by Deleuze and Guattari, rather than Canetti’s actual definitions. 
If anything, Deleuze and Guattari develop in the crowd and the pack the 
opposition (itself drawn from Jean Paul Sartre) developed by Guattari (1984) 
between subjected and subject groups, which is taken up in Anti-Oedipus, 
where it appears as opposing groups that are revolutionary at the level of pre-
conscious investments to those that are revolutionary at the level of desire 
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(Deleuze and Guattari 2005: 470 et seq.). Later in his life, Guattari (2009a: 
48) would claim: ‘I no longer have much faith in the specificity of the group, 
and I would even say that I believe less and less in the existence of the group 
as an entity … I would like to start from a much more inclusive, perhaps more 
vague, notion of assemblage’. Cf. also Guattari (2009b: 179): ‘I’ve changed 
my mind: there are no subject-groups, but arrangements of enunciation, 
of subjectivization, pragmatic arrangements that do not coincide with 
circumscribed groups.’
6. Cf. Tarde (2002).
7. This point is developed at greater length in Nunes (2014).
8. Again, this does not mean that people are always ‘really free’ under control, 
but that the constraints put on their actions (which elicit and modulate as 
much as repress and prohibit them) never fully determine their content. It is 
to the extent that their actions are underdetermined that they are ‘free,’ not 
only to operate under those constraints but also, under certain conditions, to 
change the constraints themselves.
9. While I am staying close to the animal metaphor here, it should be clear that 
this need not be an individual; the cutting edge of deterritorialization could 
be a group, a new material relation, a human/non-human assemblage etc.
10. Cf. Simondon (2005: 544): ‘There can be no taking of form [prise de 
forme] without two conditions coming together: a tension of information, 
contributed by a structural germ, and the energy imprisoned by the milieu 
that begins to take form; the milieu … must be in a metastable, tense state, 
like a solution in supersaturation or superfusion, so as to pass into a stable 
state by liberating the imprisoned energy’ through the structuring work of the 
structural germ.
11. Guattari (1984: 17–23) introduces the concept of ‘coefficient of transversality’ 
to speak of the degree of freedom and contingency, or openness and 
indeterminacy – and the capacity to become aware of and manage them – in a 
group or institutional situation.
12. This point is further developed in Nunes (forthcoming). 
13.  I have heard the expression on three separate occasions from friends involved 
in the Spanish 15M movement.
14. On organization thought as a continuum, cf. Nunes (forthcoming). 
15. That initiatives should be based on political wagers means that they 
should arise from strategic appraisals of the situation rather than mere 
personal preference. Cf. Dean (2012: 228): ‘fearful of excluding potential 
opportunities, Occupy tried early on to avoid confronting fundamental 
divisions within the movement. (…) The effect, though, was to reduce 
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division to forking (in other words, to sublimate it). People pursued their own 
projects, perpetually splitting according to their prior interests and expertise.’ 
16. Other forms of implicitly teleological discourses that exist in the orbit of 
contemporary movements include a certain historical and technological 
optimism that places contemporary movements in a struggle between 
the old (representative democracy, rigid structures, hierarchy, monopoly, 
‘proprietary code’) and the new (‘real’ democracy, networks, decentralization, 
participation, ‘open code’), in which the victory of the new over the old would 
be assured by the arrow of time, rather than seen as the very object of the 
struggle; and an appeal to a ‘generic humanity’ seen not as the outcome of a 
struggle to overcome social antagonisms, as in the Marxist account, but as 
an underlying reality ‘veiled’ by divisions, ideologies, antagonisms etc., and 
therefore the object of a spontaneous self-reflexive awakening. Once the veils 
are lifted, the idea goes, it is inevitable that we see ourselves as essentially 
equal, and so inevitably bound to agree on the basics of how society is to be 
run. I develop the critique of positing a transcendence of the process over 
agents in Nunes (2013).
17. The problem of organization appears then as profoundly Leibnizian: 
‘obtaining as much variety as possible, but with the greatest order possible’ 
(Leibniz, 1989, § 58). 
18. Deleuze and Guattari never had any illusions, however, that this tension can 
be indefinitely sustained – stasis always wins in the end, as it is inevitable 
events exhaust themselves in their ‘eventing,’ eventually consuming their 
potentials or being captured by strata. This does not mean that they return 
us to the same place, which would make them mere blips in a constant 
underlying order, but that there is no final, perfect state, and at one point 
new potentials will have to be harnessed to go beyond the forms created by 
previous events – in that sense, movement always wins in the end. This is 
what leads Deleuze (with Parnet 2004) to jest – ‘but who did ever believe 
that revolution turn out well? … All revolutions fail. Everyone knows it… 
That revolutions fail, that revolutions turn out bad, that has never stopped 
people from becoming revolutionary … What people have to do in a situation 
of oppression or tyranny is effectively to become revolutionary, for there is 
nothing else to do.’
19. At around the same time, Guattari (1984: 65) comments on May 1968: ‘it is 
true that problems are now seen differently, but, equally, there has been no 
real break. This is undoubtedly because there is no large-scale machine for 
revolutionary war. We have to recognize that certain dominant images are 
still perpetrating their destructive effects even within revolutionary groups 
themselves.’
20. An example of the incapacity (or fear) of abandoning the position in which 
the vicissitudes of political experience can always be blamed on ‘others’ would 
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be the Invisible Committee’s (2014: 75) critique of the notions ‘constituent 
power’, ‘democracy’ and ‘government’ – which sounds woefully inadequate in 
its suggestion that the defeat of uprisings such as the one in Egypt would have 
resulted from failure to ‘deprive power of its legitimacy, make it acknowledge 
is arbitrariness,’ when they were actually interrupted by the arbitrariness of 
sheer force. 
21. I borrow this explanatory short-circuit from Viveiros de Castro (2009: 239). 
22. Interestingly, Guattari (1984: 202) comments that ‘one should still be a 
Leninist, at least in the specific sense of believing that we cannot really 
look to the spontaneity and creativity of the masses to establish analytical 
groups in any lasting way – though “Leninist” is perhaps an odd word to use 
when one remembers that the object at this moment is to foster not a highly 
centralized party, but some means whereby the masses can gain control of 
their own lives.’
23. Treating pásalo (the ‘pass it on’ tag tacked to the end of emails and text 
messages calling for actions) as the ‘unpredictable actor’ behind the 
movement of the indignados in Spain, Marta Malo (2011) observes that, as 
’the son of decades of political disaffiliation,’ ‘“pásalo” is wary, especially of 
organised groups’; when the latter attempt to use the same mechanism of viral 
spread, their initiatives fall flat.
24. Nicholas Thoburn (2010: 137) emphasizes Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘affirmation 
of ‘becoming imperceptible … as a political figure,’ aptly characterizing it as 
‘not a sublime end-point of spiritual inaction, but the immanent kernel of a 
militant political composition,’ and departing from ‘a clear disarticulation of 
political practice from the construction of coherent collective subjectivities,’ 
‘but in a fashion that bypasses the anti-group position with an orientation 
toward the discontinuous and multilayered arrangements that traverse and 
compose social – or, indeed, planetary – life.’
Chapter 4
Resistance to Occupy
Claire Colebrook
I
The title of my chapter indicates two senses of the concept of resistance, 
and two senses of the concept of occupation. The two contrary ten-
dencies of the concept of resistance take us to the heart of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s political philosophy. There is no authentic proletariat to whom 
one might appeal in political protests. Rather than think of a populace’s 
resistance to power or the state, in terms of opposition, one needs to 
think of political resistance at the molecular level: how might some forces 
– forces that compose us and what we take to be our interests – produce 
new formations that are not those of the standard political identities that 
make up political analysis? We might think of standard (molar) political 
resistance as – to use Foucault’s terms – too bound up with sovereign 
conceptions of power, as a repressive ‘power over,’ or as a ‘top-down’ 
power, against which life and liberty would be set. By contrast, Deleuze 
and Guattari theorize a sense of multiple and genuinely political resis-
tance: it is not a question of life resisting power, but of thinking – within 
each body – of resisting forces. In his book on Leibniz Deleuze describes 
the play of forces that would generate a relatively unified body. On such 
an account, for a body to resist would not be to appeal to natural desire or 
interests, but to have a feeling for the multiple tendencies that would then 
yield an inflection:
 I hesitate between staying home and working or going out 
to a nightclub: these are not two separable “objects,” but two 
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orientations, each of which carries a sum of possible or even 
hallucinatory perceptions (not only of drinking, but the noise 
and smoke of the bar; not only of working, but the hum of the 
word processor and the surrounding silence …). And if we 
return to motives in order to study them for a second time, 
they have not stayed the same. Like the weight on a scale, they 
have gone up or down. The scale has changed according to the 
amplitude of the pendulum. The voluntary act is free because 
the free act is what expressed the entire soul at a given moment 
of its duration. That act is what expresses the self. Does Adam 
sin freely? In other words, at that instant his soul has taken an 
amplitude that is found to be easily filled by the aroma and 
taste of the apple, and by Eve’s solicitations. Another ampli-
tude – one having retained God’s defense – is possible. The 
whole question turns on “laziness.” (Deleuze 1993: 70).
Adam chooses because he is taken over by the smell of the apple and the 
sounds of Eve’s voice, even though at another instant he might have been 
swayed by a contrary feeling for God. Put more concretely, we might say 
that political resistance would not lie in opposing power, but in having 
a sense or feeling for the inflections of power: why, if a body is tending 
one way towards refusing work (because of hunger and the fatigue from 
working multiple jobs) does another tendency take over, such as a feeling 
of obligation or fear? Deleuze seems at once to suggest that the question 
is less one of opposition than amplitude: if all I can feel, perceive and be 
is the immediacy of hunger and cold then that will be what prompts me 
to act (and so I may go to work, yet again, for just enough to survive). 
If however I could feel and perceive just a little more – if on the way to 
work another hungry, fatigued body described some other possible way 
of feeling – then I might choose to sit down, not work, occupy a city 
space and think of a different world: ‘The whole questions turns on “lazi-
ness”’ (Deleuze 70). This ‘laziness’ is that of amplitude, of how much we 
are able to feel, perceive and think. In his book on Leibniz, Deleuze sug-
gests that rather than follow Descartes’s notion of clear and distinct ideas 
– such that we know certain truths indubitably – we should understand 
that everything perceives the infinite, but with its own degree of confu-
sion or clarity. Rather than base politics on the subject’s own certainty 
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– each individual deciding for herself because only she can determine 
her own good – a collective politics might generate alternating relations 
of clarity and distinction. While Occupy may have been characterized 
by indistinction – never clear just who or what the movement repre-
sented, coming into being prior to any formation of an end or aim – its 
force and presence were clear (clear but indistinct), and as the movement 
grew in size it became capable of different and varying amplitudes. The 
political nature of Occupy cannot be understood by way of the subject, 
whose finite knowledge would determine a range of expertise, but does 
make sense according to Deleuze and Guattari’s sense of perception as a 
form of occupation and resistance: one perceives and knows according 
to where one is, and what impedes or enhances one’s range. This is not 
just to say that Occupy managed to generate a broad, indistinct but clear 
perception of its own force by gradually gaining self-perception by way of 
social media, but also that within each Occupy site there were moments 
of relative distinction where divergent demands of racial, ethnic, sexual 
and gendered justice came into relative conflict. It was occupation, or the 
assembling together of bodies, that generated multiple lines of resistance 
– both resistance to Occupy’s outside – the 1% – and within Occupy.
The use of relative quantities to name relations of resistance is closer 
to a Deleuzian politics of the monad rather than the subject: rather than 
a self who perceives its outside, political resistance is achieved by shift-
ing and constantly redistributed relations of force. There are not subjects 
who occupy and then resist; rather, there is an assembling of force, the 
formation of a territory, and then the self-perception of that force by way 
of its relative range of clarity and confusion. From the stable monad, a 
being defined by it locus and force of perception, Deleuze and Guattari 
argue for the nomad: a range of perception and force that is constantly 
shifting (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 573–4).
Deleuze and Guattari’s work therefore manages to weave together two 
contrary senses of resistance. The political concept of resistance is oppo-
sitional – as in the ‘French resistance’ – and is a resistance to an occu-
pying power. Deleuze and Guattari’s micro-politics intertwines oppo-
sitional resistance, especially in Anti-Oedipus, with the psychoanalytic 
concept of resistance: what stops a body, force or desire from doing what 
it wants to do? If one wants to resist politically, and oppose a power, then 
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one needs to ask about the powers within every body and every percep-
tion that impede or enhance its amplitude. Let us say that the political 
concept of resistance, captured in the historical moment of the French 
resistance (but also more broadly in anti-colonization movements), was 
that of opposing an occupying power, and that such a concept of opposi-
tional resistance has been increasingly problematized by another notion 
of resistance articulated by psychoanalysis: how is it that desire resists 
itself? It was this sense of immanent (rather than oppositional resistance) 
that Paul de Man deployed in the notion of resistance to theory: rather 
than imagine theory as something that could be easily achieved, such 
that we might step back from a field of forces and relations and grasp its 
higher logic, de Man argued that theory or the gaze of wise distance was 
not something that could ever be fully achieved. Resistance – or a cer-
tain immanent impossibility of fulfillment – is constitutive of any event 
of reading, or any attempt to grasp the sense of what one encounters. 
Blindness is constitutively coupled with insight, just as – for Deleuze and 
Guattari – all perceptions are distinct and confused, clear and indistinct. 
A body occupies a field and encounters its resistances with counter-resis-
tance. The theoretical desire is at once necessary to break with relations 
as already constituted, but always remains as a desire, never a final object 
(de Man 1982).
When Deleuze and Guattari write about micro-facisms, they focus 
the question of resistance and opposition at the level of desire (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1987: 31). If there is fascism, or the social-political organiza-
tion of all force towards a single transcendent end – the state, the people, 
the party – this is not because there is something that simply opposes 
desire; rather, desire itself has a tendency towards becoming resistant to 
its own tendencies:
You may make a rupture, draw a line of flight, yet there is 
still a danger that you will reencounter organizations that 
restratify everything, formations that restore power to a sig-
nifier, attributions that reconstitute a subject – anything you 
like, from Oedipal resurgences to fascist concretions. Groups 
and individuals contain microfascisms just waiting to crystal-
lize … Good and bad are only the products of an active and 
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temporary selection, which must be renewed. (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987: 9–10)
All those tendencies that might have once been so liberating when set 
against earlier modes of corporate capital, such as a stress on individual 
freedom, creativity, goals, and unity in opposition to a quantifying and 
reductive capital, might now need to be abandoned. Notions of individ-
ual freedom, creativity, personal fulfillment and work-life balance now 
service capital, while concepts of disorganization and lack of clear ends 
might be genuinely resistant. Such a shift of focus, away from a simple 
oppositional resistance towards internal resistance, is particularly rele-
vant today, looking back upon the potentiality of the Occupy movement.
In Anti-Oedipus Deleuze and Guattari reverse the usual notion that 
a politics of resistance would require strongly formed identities (in the 
mode of resistance to power by the populace). On the contrary, resis-
tance occurs through what has not yet taken on the form of ‘interests’ 
and certainly not of organization: ‘In order to resist organ-machines, the 
body without organs presents its smooth, slippery, opaque, taut surface 
as a barrier. In order to resist linked, connected, and interrupted flows, 
it sets up a counterflow of amorphous, undifferentiated fluid’ (Deleuze 
and Guattari 2004: 10). Like Foucault who also argued against the 
notion that power represses desire, Deleuze and Guattari do not accept 
that there is a good desire lying in wait for political liberation; politics, or 
the polity, begins precisely with the formation of objects or interests and 
does so by repelling a desire that is not yet organized. Disorganized desire 
is revolutionary; or, desire is disorganized and therefore is resistance and 
revolution, not because it opposes power, but because what we take to 
be power – the power of distinct terms – emerges by way of repelling or 
organizing desire. This is why Deleuze and Guattari specifically use the 
term desire rather than power (and this is where they mark their differ-
ence from Foucault). While accepting, following Foucault, that power 
is positive, they nevertheless seek to mobilize desire rather than power, 
for while power constitutes relations and points of stability, it is desire 
that exceeds any of the terms through which it flows, and is therefore not 
bound by the relations or organizations that generate the socius – desire 
exceeds resistance as opposition:
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Our only points of disagreement with Foucault are the fol-
lowing: (1) to us the assemblages seem fundamentally to 
be assemblages not of power but of desire (desire is always 
assembled), and power seems to be a stratified dimension 
of the assemblage; (2) the diagram and abstract machine 
have lines of flight that are primary, which are not phenom-
ena of resistance or counterattack in an assemblage, but cut-
ting edges of creation and deterritorialization. (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987: 531)
Placing their work in context one might say that the French resistance, 
and then the political milieu prior to May 1968, relied on a dichotomous 
notion of occupation and resistance: in the Nazi occupation of France, 
an outside had invaded the inside or the territory, and this outside must 
be resisted. But Deleuze and Guattari’s political theory, well before the 
Occupy movement, precluded any simple sense of an inside/outside of 
political territories. It is not the case that there is something like ‘a’ terri-
tory – a marked out and defined space – that is then occupied: this is the 
myth of nations, or the notion that space and place have some intrinsic 
proper being. Rather, it is by way of occupation, or by filling a zone or 
moving across a field, that something like ‘a’ space or territory is formed. 
This primary nomadism always occurs in relation (and by way of contes-
tation). In the beginning is the potential for occupying a space, and the 
mapping out of a territory; but the territory is therefore the outcome of 
deterritorialization: forces of desire enter into relation, producing a cer-
tain quality or space. Property is occupation, or the taking up of a space 
and of marking or ‘signing’ it as one’s own. There is something like a qual-
ity that is desired; there is ‘a’ desiring, and it is from this tendency to take 
up a quality that a territory is formed:
The expressive is primary in relation to the possessive; expres-
sive qualities, or matters of expression, are necessarily appro-
priative and constitute a having more profound than being … 
No sooner do I like a color that I make it my standard or plac-
ard. One puts one’s signature on something just as one plants 
one’s flag on a piece of land. A high school supervisor stamped 
all the leaves strewn about the school yard and then put them 
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back in their places. He had signed. Territorial marks are read-
ymades. And what is called art brut is not at all pathological or 
primitive; it is merely this constitution, this freeing, of matters 
of expression, in the movement of territoriality: the base or 
ground of art. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 316)
Here, Deleuze and Guattari articulate a politics of occupation and resis-
tance that is improper; in the beginning is the chance taking up of what is 
not one’s own as one’s own. It would follow from this theory of original 
occupation that it is not the case that there is a proper space of one’s own, 
that might then be taken over or occupied, and that this occupation must 
be resisted by some proper or innocent ‘outside’ of power. Rather, desire 
encounters resistance, and in so doing generates a space of ownness or 
an occupation. Occupation is the outcome of resistance, which in turn 
is dependent upon a desire that has no proper home or being. I would 
argue that there is something ‘necessarily appropriative’ about the mode 
of Deleuze and Guattari’s political theory: not only do they see the notion 
of the proper and property as dependent upon the seizing of a quality, 
their very style of thinking about politics transforms how we think about 
political theory. Rather than politics following on from an idea, rationale 
or decision – a commitment to freedom, the market, the individual or 
even justice – they commence with aesthetics in the strictest sense: a 
quality is seized. The notion that this quality is then a sign of one’s own 
identity or territory or property is a consequence of a certain reversal. In 
this respect their own theory is not only an overturning of Platonism (by 
placing ideas as effects of sensations) but also an overturning of a cer-
tain conception of resistance that would focus on a politics of good ideas: 
rather than demystifying or informing the masses of what they ought to 
desire, and rather than focusing on a politics of good thinking, they stress 
the event of occupation. Take up a space; write a placard, and sign it as 
your own. Philosophically, we might say that Deleuze and Guattari insist 
on internal relations: there are not qualities that enter into relation, but 
there are powers that have tendencies to establish certain styles of rela-
tion. This is to say that rather than a matter that is neutral and that is then 
differentiated from outside, there are tendencies to establish relations by 
way of matter’s inflections. Matter is not blank quantity without quality. 
Along with the commitment to internal relations, Deleuze and Guattari 
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also insist that relations are external to terms; to be weaker or stronger, 
master or slave, owner or thief, is not something one simply is, but occurs 
as the outcome of a field of contestation, resistance and occupation:
What does matter do as a matter of expression? It is first of 
all a poster or placard, but that is not all it is. It merely takes 
that route. The signature becomes style. In effect, expressive 
qualities or matters of expression enter shifting relations with 
one another that ‘express’ the relation of the territory they 
draw to the interior milieu of impulses and exterior milieu of 
circumstances. To express is not to depend upon; there is an 
autonomy of expression. On the one hand, expressive quali-
ties entertain internal relations with one another that con-
stitute territorial motifs; sometimes these motifs loom above 
the internal impulses, sometimes they are superimposed 
upon them, sometimes they ground one impulse in another, 
sometimes they pass and cause a passage from one impulse 
to another, sometimes they insert themselves between them 
– but they are not themselves “pulsed.” … On the other hand, 
expressive qualities also entertain other internal relations that 
produce territorial counterpoints: this refers to the manner in 
which they constitute points in the territory that place the cir-
cumstances of the external milieu in counterpoint. (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1987: 317)
The upshot of this ontology of internal relations, even though relations 
are external to terms is that resistance and occupation are ‘originary.’ 
Force or desire is not some bland undifferentiated generic void that 
requires relations to produce difference; desire differs and has a tendency 
to ‘pulse’ in distinct ways (internal relations, or a potentiality to express 
in a certain manner). By the same token desire does not determine in 
advance the terms that will be effected from encounters; whatever ten-
dencies or ‘pulses,’ a desire might express there are also relations that are 
irreducible to the relatively stable points generated:
we should say that there are two politics involved … a mac-
ropolitics and a micropolitics that do not envision classes, 
sexes, people, or feelings in at all the same way. Or again, 
Resistance to Occupy 133
there are two very different types of relations: intrinsic rela-
tions of couples involving well-determined aggregates or 
elements (social classes, men and women, this or that par-
ticular person), and less localizable relations that are always 
external to themselves and instead concern flows and par-
ticles eluding those classes, sexes and persons. (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987: 196)
I would suggest that the first wave of French post-structuralism, or the 
first uptake of French post-structuralism, stressed external relations: a 
system of differences (such as langue) was the condition for some point 
of stability or sameness. It would follow, then, that politics might depend 
on solicitation or disturbance of a system from within, given that there 
would be nothing (or no thing) outside the constitutive differences that 
enable points of seeming identity. By contrast, Deleuze and Guattari 
combine internal relations (a force’s desire or tendency) with external 
relations, or the constituted differences that generate stable points.
We might think, then, of the genealogy of French post-structural-
ism as an initial phase focused on the resistance to occupation. Nazi 
occupation of France was, ostensibly, the intrusion or installation of a 
foreign and pernicious body into a democratic polity; the French resis-
tance directed against occupation relied upon the rebellion and refusal 
by a polity that could conceive itself as other than the invading forces. 
Deconstruction’s ongoing response to this notion of occupation as intru-
sion or contamination by an external evil has increasingly been one of a 
politics of auto-immunity: there is no innocent body politic that is acci-
dentally or tragically overtaken by forces of violence, terror and total-
izing power, for in order to constitute any ‘we’ or body proper there 
must have been some violent and homogenizing event of recognition 
that established the purity of the border and the putative innocence of 
the ‘we.’ Put in an overly simple way we might say that in an age of self-
satisfied democracy and good feeling – where violence and terror appear 
to be located elsewhere – it would be theoretically requisite to point out 
that ‘our’ supposedly democratic and inclusive body politic was always 
already contaminated by violence, terror and exclusion. From Derrida’s 
early work on Levinas (where he argues that some domestication of the 
other is necessary to avoid a worse violence of absolute exclusion) to 
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the vogue for Agamben’s notion of sovereignty as necessarily premised 
on violent abandonment, I want to suggest that a politics of pointing 
out law’s non-purity or ‘our’ complicity was appropriate for an epoch of 
seeming democracy. Derrida frequently situated his work in opposition 
to the seeming triumph of liberalism; Specters of Marx (1994) was at least 
in part a criticism of Fukuyama’s theory of the late twentieth-century’s 
freedom from imposed ideologies (Derrida 1994a: 70–1). Lest we be too 
smug about our freedoms and the sanctity of law and the polity, or lest 
we feel that we can enjoy the good conscience of being open to the oth-
erness of the other, deconstruction was always there to remind ‘us’ that 
the condition for hospitality and recognition was always, necessarily and 
essentially, a ‘lesser violence’ (Derrida 1978). I would suggest, though, 
that the twenty-first century requires a shift in the modalities of political 
critique: rather than insisting that the claims for liberal freedom are alibis 
for market freedom, it is more appropriate to consider why late capital-
ism seems to have abandoned even the ideal of liberalism.
One of the figures of the Occupy movement designates a shift in pro-
portions; the ‘99%’ motif is part of a broader and highly complex nar-
ration of changes of distribution (the way in which income differentials 
have broadened, the increase of wealth in the hands of a few, the differ-
ence in wages rises for the top few as compared to the bottom few, and 
the very figure of 1% indicating contraction rather than the quality or 
structure of power per se). Let us say that deconstruction was concerned 
with a post-Marxist politics of contamination and complicity; there is no 
pure nature, no spirit, no woman, and no original use value outside the 
logics of technology and exchange. Any claim to good conscience or to 
being purely democratic, in a space outside the rationalization of moder-
nity, would need to be demystified, such that deconstruction could not 
posit any actual or grounding justice, but only a justice or democracy to 
come (Derrida 1994a). But, as the Occupy narratives make clear, things 
have changed, and it is perhaps not the ideological lie of capitalist free-
dom, democracy and individualism that needs to be an object of critique; 
the problem is not liberal capitalism. In the heyday of critiques of bour-
geois liberalism what had presented itself as capitalism (freedom of the 
market, choice, opportunity, autonomy and equality) was actually an ide-
ological lure to cover a logic of market ruthlessness; it would make sense, 
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in an era of individualism, to demystify the supposedly free subject, and 
point out that the free individual has always been determined as free to 
buy, sell and choose – once market conditions are accepted. And it would 
then make sense to think deconstructively about the forces of exchange, 
signification and relation that preclude any simple self of reflection or 
deliberative reason.
But what if even that minimal alibi of capitalist liberal theory is 
over and we are now in the grips of a flagrant neo-feudalism that does 
not even pay lip service to liberal ideology? In such a case, theory that 
deconstructed autonomy, self-presence and liberal self-determination – 
theory that pointed out contamination – might be less pertinent than a 
theory that aimed to think points of resistance within a general economy. 
Perhaps we can put it this way: against notions of presence, deconstruc-
tion was always a strategy of complicating and de-purifying sites of sup-
posed origin (such as nature, the individual, consciousness or reason), 
and it would follow from this deconstructive force that liberalism would 
always have to be held to account if it tried to appeal to ‘the’ individual 
as some sovereign point upon which a polity of fairness might be based. 
Theoretically, such a mode of critique is all sound and pertinent, and it 
would always serve as a lever against notions of political purity and integ-
rity, and would also – as Derrida’s critiques of occupation and the French 
resistance proceeded to do – be necessary to point out that the suppos-
edly evil, external and occupying power against which one poses resis-
tance is never quite as other as one might like to believe. Deconstruction 
tirelessly resists any notion of a simply accidental and evil other against 
which one might posit one’s self as a beautiful soul.
But here we need to think about another or supplementary theoretical 
logic focused less on pointing out the absence of purity or the impossibil-
ity of a locus outside systems of difference and exchange, and more on the 
point at which subtle differences of degree reach singular points and then 
create differences in kind. Rather than insist that there is nothing outside 
the text, we might want to examine the ways in which text – or forces 
of difference that are better thought of as desire – generate relations. We 
might need to do this because today we are experiencing not the liberal 
lie that a deliberating subject precedes and tempers capitalist exchange, 
but a full-blown abandonment of any notion of force or resistance.
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I would suggest that May 1968 is a date that marks a demystification 
of the innocence and purity of labor as a simple outside of capitalism and 
ideology: there is no authentic human materiality that one might appeal 
to as a lever of resistance beyond capital. It would become the task of 
post-68-theory – as deconstruction evidenced – to problematize the rela-
tions among political bodies. If 1968 marks a threshold beyond which 
labor could no longer act as a foundation, there is a futher disturbance 
once liberal capitalism becomes subject to new forms of restriction in the 
name of security. I would suggest that 9/11 operates as a counter-date 
that allowed for the suspension of liberal illusions and that various crises 
– from the war on terror to the global financial crisis – enabled excep-
tional and executive interventions that abandoned all attempts at illu-
sions of freedom and individualism. If corporations are now individuals 
then it is perhaps not the figure of the individual that needs to be decon-
structed, and instead one needs to generate some resistance from within 
the system, techne, and difference that does not come from the purity of 
an outside. That is, rather than democracy or ‘justice to come’ (which 
would rely on us being critical of any sense that ‘we’ have achieved a posi-
tion of legal good conscience), we need to think of occupation. What is 
sought is not some outside or beyond of capital but a rendering radical 
of capital from within. The problem with the 2008 global financial crisis 
was not that it was a victory of liberal capitalism, or even neoliberalism, 
but that it was the hijacking of the means of capital – exchange – while 
allowing some points to be exempted from the general terrain of dif-
ference and relations. The banks that were too big to fail emerged from 
what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as archaisms: feudal strongholds that 
remain rigid despite shifting into the openness of money, credit, specu-
lation and futures. Not everything was subjected to the axiomatic of 
capital, and not everything was deemed to be no more significant than 
the flows that passed through it. If banks were too big to fail this was not 
because liberal ideology had triumphed, but because something that had 
always been radical in liberalism was reterritorialized: the very capacity 
for money to create flows and exchanges was impeded by the unit and 
mechanisms of money itself (banking, finance, traders).
The enemy, in short, is no longer bourgeois ideology and the putative 
benevolence of the market, but archaisms and rigidities that were never 
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fully eliminated in the illusory heyday of post-war liberalism. What the 
concept of occupation offers is not an outside, but a way of calculating 
capitalism’s rigidities and points of surplus. By occupying Wall Street the 
protestors re-mapped the notion of an open, decentered and ‘global’ cri-
sis: the resistance to the 1% was not some Manichean appeal to the purity 
of the people but a form of minor politics in which the point of resistance 
had no identity other than that of its situation within an already distrib-
uted terrain. The 99% do not share a common ground, for the number 
labels a mass not an identity. The objections to the 1% were not directed 
to a ‘who’ or some essential enemy, but to the terrain or territory that 
by differences of degree created new thresholds and points of survival. 
To take an analogy from gender politics: if we think of ‘woman’ as some 
redemptive outside to patriarchy, then we remain in a logic of good and 
evil. To free oneself from this moralism it would be necessary to decon-
struct sexual difference and abandon the figure of some great feminist 
beyond. There is no woman, only something like ‘woman to come.’ But 
in a post-feminist (or supposedly post-racial) America where it is vulgar 
to talk in essentialist terms about gender (or race or class), what happens 
when one no longer has an outside or resistant counter-identity? When 
Deleuze and Guattari theorized ‘becoming-woman’ they did so in the 
context of minor politics, and in a way that is pertinent for Occupy in the 
twenty-first century: there is no ‘man’ and we cannot try and save our-
selves by way of the values of humanity or mankind, but we can think of 
the formation – by way of occupation – of local movements that disturb 
and decenter a system (such as Wall Street) that does not circulate widely 
and freely but constantly exempts itself and saves itself. Just as ‘becom-
ing-woman’ created a line that was not that of self-constituting man, so 
‘occupy’ generates a different line of becoming that is not that of capital 
growth and renewal.
II
Chronologically deconstruction does not precede Deleuzism, just as 
Jacques Derrida is hardly of an earlier generation than Gilles Deleuze. 
Today, though, there does seem to be some sort of sequence whereby one 
begins logically with the notion that it is difference or external relations 
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that constitute relatively stable terms, and that one cannot step outside 
difference (deconstruction); then one takes the next step and starts to 
think about just what force, life or matter it is that generates difference 
(Deleuzism). Even in terms of literary history there is the high postmod-
ernism of quotation, linguistic and textual self-reflexivity, and then a shift 
to local and multiple narratives focused on perception, feeling and the 
body. One can think here of Don Delillo’s classically postmodern White 
Noise (1985) with its reference to simulacra, media, spectacle and cli-
ché, and then the same writer’s later Body Artist (2001) or Point Omega 
(2010) concerned far more with the visible and the sensible. Similarly, 
feminism seemed to be dominated by constructivist or linguistic con-
ceptions of gender, subsequently displaced by a turn to the body; more 
often than not the same texts were involved but were read differently. 
Historically or critically (at least for the English-speaking world) the high 
era of deconstruction was in the 1980s and 1990s, and was then followed 
by a series of ‘turns’ away from a perceived textualism or overly literary 
post-structuralism towards a more vital, material and engaged Deleuzism.
This sequence coincides, I would suggest, with different political 
problems. For deconstruction one needed to problematize liberal anti-
foundationalism; it is not sufficient to say that in the absence of any 
determined law one must decide for oneself, for one is always already 
complicit, determined and within the domain of difference that enables 
one to think and speak. There is no pure outside, and no site of good con-
science. The liberal individual simply substitutes rather than displaces the 
onto-theology of the West, and needs to be deconstructed by insisting 
on one’s inescapable location within difference. Deleuzism, from a simi-
lar genealogy, is less about demystifying origins and instead remystify-
ing: how do some figures seem to rigidify or reterriorialize, despite our 
cynicism? Or, why is it that despite capitalism and cynicism desire is still 
enslaved to Oedipal, familial and personal rigidities? How did capital 
manage to escape difference and allow one axiom to overcode all others? 
More specifically, how – in this era of late capitalism and the supposed 
liberation of all exchange from moral conceptions of justice and fairness 
– were some entities (banks, money, and economic wisdom) deemed to 
be too important to be exposed to the contingency of force and survival? 
The problem is no longer the ideology of capitalist individualism and its 
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dream of free exchange that needs to be tempered by an insistence on the 
constitutive differences that open the field of the market and the polity. 
Rather, one needs to ask, as Deleuze and Guattari do, about the ways in 
which figures like the family, the self, the economy, and even one’s own 
desire impede desire’s own tendencies.
These different political problems – deconstruction’s war on the tyr-
anny of pure presence and Deleuze’s attempt to think, within difference, 
of a difference that makes a difference – present two modes of occupa-
tion. For deconstruction, one is always already occupied from without; 
when ‘I’ speak I do so by way of anarchical and archival forces of inscrip-
tion that will always open any text or anything I say to an unpredictable 
future. For Deleuze and Guattari concepts of minor politics and ‘becom-
ing-woman’ are less about the futural force of an utterance and more 
about the creation of minimal, barely discernible, not quite identifiable 
forces that occupy a field, taking on the same voice and then stuttering 
and reproducing different relations and combinations: resistance is not a 
question of borders or futures but is immanent. Consider what Derrida, 
in Specters of Marx, does with Marxist utopianism: there is no proper 
spirit that has been alienated by capital, but one can think, from within 
capital and technology, of that which haunts, repeats and solicits capi-
tal. Such a force is anarchic and cannot be held to account. It is radically 
futural, promissory and quasi-Messianic. It follows, for deconstruction, 
that literature is allied to justice because literature liberates a text from 
any grounding voice or context, allowing it to say anything whatever. 
By contrast, Deleuze and Guattari’s politics is less that of a virtual future 
and less aligned with a mode of writing that is sent like a missive into 
an unimagined series of contexts. Rather, minor politics and minor lit-
erature occur as positive deflections and new forces that open in the here 
and now. For Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka generates minor literature, not 
because he imagined a Law beyond actual laws, but because he wrote 
of burrowing animals, corridors, castles, and endless machinations that 
were so cramped that they offered no outside and certainly no conception 
of man or ‘the people.’ Deconstruction tirelessly opened texts to a tran-
scendence or promissory power they could not contain: ‘justice to come,’ 
‘absolute forgiveness’ or ‘infinite hospitality,’ and was no doubt a great 
rejoinder to the smug post –Cold War ethics of the end of history. But 
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by theorizing minor politics, nomadism and becoming-woman, Deleuze 
and Guattari offer a counter-foil not so much to liberal dreams of the end 
of history, but to today’s neo-feudalisms that have reinstalled centralized 
power by way of notions of either financial emergency or post-political 
market freedom. That is, whereas capitalism was once moralized as a 
natural outcome of individual freedom, and was therefore haunted – as 
Derrida argued – by a necessary alienation that resided in any linguis-
tic or economic system, twenty-first century capitalism has emptied the 
concept of personhood and markets of all moral sense. Corporations are 
people, and markets are not the means through which individuals exer-
cise freedom; the market as such takes on its own godly being. Rather 
than the grand ideas of justice, democracy, hospitality and forgiveness 
that marked deconstruction, Deleuze and Guattari look at local, multi-
ple and rogue incursions: rather than focus on the radical promise that 
resides in philosophy’s never vanquished promise, their minor politics 
emphasizes the ways in which the introduction of the smallest distances 
and differences enables a new relation to the whole.
Don’t rewrite Plato or Heidegger from within, re-read the metaphysics 
of the West; reconfigure all the voices, desires and potentials that already 
compose the assemblage of the world. Occupy a site; think locally, and 
destroy the globalizing tendencies that generate notions of ‘the market,’ 
‘the people.’ As John Protevi has argued, the attention to politics at the 
level of ideas is itself an ideology; rather than see the polity as effected 
from our systems of language and thought, we might think more various 
layers of forces that are material, virtual, linguistic, textual, local, geologi-
cal and so on (Protevi 2013).
This distinction and sequence of deconstruction preceding Deleuzism 
(as it plays out in the history of Anglo-American theory) is partly an effect 
of the order of translation, and partly to do with intellectual and institu-
tional history: phenomenology rather than Bergsonism was dominant in 
US and UK continental philosophy departments. Perhaps, also, the fact 
that ‘theory’ took place in literature departments rather than philoso-
phy departments meant that a tendency towards textualism would win 
out over theories (such as Bergson’s) that were based on intuition rather 
than language. I want to make another suggestion about the way we think 
of these two broad theoretical dominants, which are sometimes seen as 
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opposites (the linguistic focus of deconstruction versus Deleuze’s mate-
rialism and vitalism), and sometimes seen as a sequence, with Deleuze 
taking the problem of difference further, beyond language and humans. 
Sometimes this is how Deleuze and Guattari present themselves in rela-
tion to deconstruction, and how Deleuze thinks about his own relation-
ship to writers like Foucault (Deleuze 2006: 62). One way to read Deleuze 
today is to see him as having picked up on a Spinozist tradition of politics 
and Marxism that has been overshadowed by French Hegelianism and 
that is being rethought today. But to state the relation and sequence this 
way is to think at the level of the history of ideas, and to think that ideas 
have a semi-autonomous history (which is itself a Marxist–Hegelian 
notion). But what if ideas are expressive, and what if the Deleuzian-
Spinozist-materialist ‘turn’ were an unfolding of new potentialities and 
forces of life? I want to suggest that this is indeed the case and that the 
vogue for a Deleuzian mode of politics is enabled by a positive sense of 
occupation and a mode of politics that is less attuned to resistance; by the 
same token I want to suggest that deconstruction was broadly focused on 
the positivity of resistance in opposition to occupation.
Thinking about the shifting sense of occupation is not merely an 
observation in the use of a word – or what it means to occupy – so much 
as a different mode and style of political force. If occupation once figured 
the imposition of illegitimate power in an otherwise democratic polity, 
then it would make sense to question – as Derrida does – the supposed 
purity and integrity of the putatively innocent democratic state. If, as is 
increasingly the case, it is no longer a question of a state presenting itself 
as democratic by excluding and abandoning a few, then one needs to 
reconsider how concepts such as democracy have increasingly less force. 
This is what I mean by referring to a new feudalism: rather than promot-
ing the free and open market that accidentally leaves a few at the bottom, 
it is now widely accepted that the few at the top will do all they can to 
maintain wider and wider difference; the very concept of banks that are 
‘too big to fail’ reinstalls a power that exists by fiat rather than right. A 
few – the 1%, who now flagrantly name and mark themselves as excep-
tional by means of bonuses and stately architecture (such as Manhattan’s 
Trump Tower) – have abandoned any pretension of the good polity. How 
does political critique proceed when bourgeois liberalism is no longer 
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an ideology that sanctifies laissez faire capitalism, and when capitalism is 
no longer a general egalitarianism but operates as an all-inclusive, global 
and crisis-ridden system that requires autocratic intervention and vari-
ous states of emergency in order to save the few who are too big to fail? 
I would suggest that we need to shift from a deconstruction of presence, 
consciousness, autonomy and integrity (which would be required in 
order to resist the lures of liberal individualism, or to resist the figure of 
the integrated and bound political body), and move towards a positive 
sense of occupation. How might one take up some point of disturbance 
within an already disturbed, distributed and decentered political field 
that is now flagrantly open to appropriation by an opportunistic and con-
tingently autocratic 1%?
III
Deconstruction can be seen as bound up with the type of politics required 
by the French resistance: a politics in which something like occupation 
occurs – a hegemonic power installs itself and produces an internal out-
side such that one’s state and language are no longer one’s own. (And this 
problematic resistance continues with post-68 theorizations of how one 
might be politically mobilized without appealing to some innocent or 
natural outside, such as ‘the worker,’ or ‘the other.’ It also continues in 
post-colonial theories of mimicry, irony or parody: disturb the system of 
differences from within.) The politics of resistance in this sense is at once 
oriented against imposed power from without, while being critical of any 
posited innocence or freedom that would naturally resist occupation.
The Nazi occupation of France had a particularly profound effect on 
intellectual life, but Jacques Derrida’s experience of occupation was even 
more tortured. The problem of one’s own identity and displacement 
within one’s own country and language were intensified by the fact that 
Derrida lost his French citizenship as a youth under the Vichy regime. 
From his own account this meant that Derrida was alienated from the 
simple resistance to occupation. Those who considered themselves to 
be ‘purely’ French could regard the intrusion of Nazism as an external 
evil, robbing them of the proper. For Derrida, there was an ‘occupation 
without occupation’: the supposed interiority of one’s own language and 
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identity was already an intrusion of an outside. There is never anything 
natural about citizenship for Derrida, but the experience of one’s identity 
as precarious occurs not only in events of explicit political occupation 
(where one is overtaken by an other), but in modes where no occupa-
tion is required, for the very regime in which one lives and is a citizen 
may suspend belonging, producing one as a foreigner in the same place 
where one was once at home. The passage in which Derrida describes 
‘occupation without occupation’ is worth quoting at length for its mark-
ing of three points: the way in which a ‘mass’ becomes stateless; the way 
in which this displacement occurs without one knowing, and without 
one being spatially displaced; and the curious relationship this bears to 
occupation, for it is the valiant notion of the French resistance against 
occupation (or that a certain evil was deemed to be external) that Derrida 
challenges. Displacement, non-identity and foreignness are internal, and 
become forces for a life-long mourning:
As we know, citizenship does not define a cultural, linguis-
tic, or, in general, historical participation. It does not cover 
all these modes of belonging. But it is not some superficial or 
superstructural predicate floating on the surface of experience.
Especially not when this citizenship is, through and 
through, precarious, recent, threatened, and more artificial than 
ever. That is “my case”; the at once typical and uncommon 
situation of which I would like to speak. Especially not when 
one has obtained this citizenship in the course of one’s life, 
which has perhaps happened to several Americans present at 
this colloqium, but also, and above all, not when one has lost 
it in the course of one’s life, which has certainly not happened to 
almost any American. And if one day some individual or other 
has seen their citizenship itself withdrawn (which is more 
than a passport, a “green card,” an eligibility or right to vote), 
has that ever happened to a group as such? I am of course not 
referring to some ethnic group seceding, liberating itself one 
day, from another nation-state, or giving up one citizenship 
in order to give itself another one in a newly instituted state. 
There are too many examples of this mutation.
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No, I am speaking of a “community” group (a “mass” 
assembling together tens or hundreds of thousands of per-
sons, a supposedly “ethnic” or “religious” group that finds 
itself one day deprived, as a group, of its citizenship by a state 
that, with the brutality of a unilateral decision, withdraws it 
without asking for their opinion, and without the said group 
gaining back any other citizenship. No other.
Now I have experienced that. Along with others, I lost and 
then gained back French citizenship. I lost it for years with-
out having another. You see, not a single one. I did not ask for 
anything. I hardly knew, at the time, that it had been taken 
away from me, not, at any rate, in the legal and objective form 
of knowledge in which I am explaining it here (for, alas, I got 
to know it in another way). And then, one “fine day,” with-
out, once again, my asking for anything, and still too young 
to know it in a properly political way, I found the aforemen-
tioned citizenship again. The state, to which I never spoke, 
had given it back to me. (Derrida 1998: 15–16)
‘Resistance,’ for Derrida, names a certain French nationalist myth of 
noble opposition to occupation; what needs to be thought, against this 
innocence, is an occupation without occupation, or the way in which 
without any physical or actual intrusion of an other there might nevertheless 
be an expropriation of citizenship, and one that occurs without the gran-
deur of an event. Deconstruction therefore refuses the sense of resistance 
that defines itself against occupation, and instead poses another resistance, 
one that is internal and complicit, without innocence or purity. Rather 
than resistance being a force that a body exerts on an intruding outside, 
deconstruction worked with a constitutive and positively negative resis-
tance. That is, rather than see the self as occupied from without by repres-
sive forces, it is from the experience of resistance or opposition that one 
imagines that there must have been a pure and present subject; it is after 
the intrusion of otherness that one imagines an original subject. It fol-
lows that we might think of deconstructive politics as a war against the 
myth of occupation as an oppression that comes from without; we are 
constituted through resistance, but this resistance is against the impossi-
ble truth that there is nothing outside the text. It is a resistance to theory.
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Derrida will insist on a politics that does not yearn for some space 
outside the limits of law, but that uses the logic of law to think a justice 
that will always remain ‘to come.’ Resistance, thought in terms of psycho-
analysis, names the subject’s own stifling of the truth: their symptom is 
not an affliction from without but something taken on such that they can 
imagine themselves suffering from an outside. If we accept constitutive 
resistance then justice will not be what the other destroys by way of occu-
pying my proper terrain of citizenship, for there is no proper, no justice 
and no terrain of one’s own. Resistance is first and foremost a resistance 
to the very forces of non-presence, negativity and non-identity; these 
differential forces, though precluding pure presence are nevertheless 
capable of generating justice, if there is such a thing. Writing on Foucault’s 
attempt to (as Derrida sees it) find a historical space outside the rational-
ization and incarcerating logic of modernity, Derrida responds with a 
‘perpetual threat’ that will always destroy the logic of opposition:
For, in principle, all these determinations are, for the histo-
rian, either presences or absences; as such, they thus exclude 
haunting; they allow themselves to be located by means of 
signs, one would almost say on a table of absences and pres-
ences; they come out of the logic of opposition, in this case, 
the logic of inclusion or exclusion, of the alternative between 
the inside and the outside, and so on. The perpetual threat, 
that is, the shadow of haunting (and haunting is, like the 
phantom or fiction of an Evil Genius, neither present nor 
absent, neither positive nor negative, neither inside nor out-
side) does not challenge only one thing and another, the very 
logic of exclusion or foreclosure, as well as the history that is 
founded upon this logic and its alternatives. What is excluded 
is, of course, never simply excluded, not by the cogito nor by 
anything else, without this eventually returning – and this 
is what a certain psychoanalysis will have also helped us to 
understand. (Derrida 1994b: 242)
For Derrida, then, psychoanalysis is both about internal resistance, or a 
self that cannot confront its internal occupation, its own non-presence to 
itself. For Paul de Man, certainly not speaking in psychoanalytic terms, 
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resistance to theory is not about refusing to believe this or that claim or 
argument; it is not like resistance to climate change or resistance to other 
inconvenient truths. It is resistance to the untruth of truth: one imagines 
that one’s beliefs, attitudes, memories and narratives are faithful doubles 
of the real world. Theory, for de Man, is the cold and ruthless stare one 
directs at the inscriptions that compose one’s world and one’s inno-
cence – the truth being elsewhere but never assimilable, certainly not in 
some graspable ‘outside’ (de Man 1982). Theory is at once necessary and 
impossible: the task of reading and thinking lies not in finding the pro-
per foundation or ground of politics, but in a blank ungrounding. Theory 
strives to see the world without the joys of meaning and ownness, even if 
theory necessarily falls back into yet one more narrative of the proper. I 
would suggest that de Man’s concept of resistance to theory – that there 
is not some simple lapse that precludes us from confronting the mispri-
sion between the inscriptions we take to be ours as opposed to the world 
that we take to be natural and there for representation – allows us to grasp 
deconstruction’s conception of politics at its most rigorous. If there is no 
seamless or natural relation to the real, then political theory has as its task 
a form of anti-foundationalism that emphasizes the impossibility of find-
ing a space outside the contested field of differences; this impossibility 
and undecidability is what we resist, and what we resist most notably in 
myths that would posit evil as some external occupying power.
That is, far from the emphasis on resistance (or our necessary captiva-
tion by inscriptive systems) generating a political laissez faire and acqui-
escence to late capitalist abandonment of truth, it is our necessary resis-
tance to truth (or the untruth of truth – the truth that there is no truth) 
that provides one way of thinking politics outside the mode of occupa-
tion. We should reverse the anti-theory notion that French thought 
destroyed truth and left us with a world of amoral nihilism and relativ-
ism. Quite the contrary: today there is no shortage of truth. Fox News, 
tabloids, MSNBC, the Tea Party, what’s left of the left: all declare quite 
shrilly that a certain path must be followed. And as Bruno Latour (2014) 
has pointed out, we seem to have abandoned scientific doubt when it 
comes to economists who tell us that we must bail the banks out now, and 
not wait for further evidence. At the same time we seem so committed 
to the idea of truth and verification that we do not act on evidence for 
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climate change, because we are waiting for all the acts to come in. We suf-
fer – today – not from doubt and relativism, but from a literalist notion 
that there is a truth and that there is one system that grants us access to 
the world: the new positivism of finance. So when Deleuze insists in his 
books on cinema that we have stopped believing in the world, and when 
(with Guattari) he describes capitalism as a dominance of cynicism, this 
needs to be understood alongside the theory of the despotism of the 
signifier: it is as though there is at one and the same time an abandon-
ment of the distance between sign and world, and a simple acceptance 
of the single system of signs that compose the shrill certainty of the 
world as it is, capitalism as we know it in its flagrant ‘just so.’ The value 
of de Man’s insistence on theory and Deleuze and Guattari’s insistence 
on minor politics is that rather than aim to disturb language from within, 
one accepts the non-coincidence of linguistic systems with other strata, 
and refuses the privilege accorded to any single system that would pres-
ent itself as the code of all codes, the narrative of all narratives. This is not 
simply another form of liberalism whereby the absence of ultimate truth 
places us in a position of deliberation and ongoing communicative reflec-
tion: for there will always be some sort of appropriation of one strata 
by another, and a laziness that resists the complex multiplicities that go 
beyond any single polity. Resistance is constitutive; there will always be 
some refusal of the blank stare of theory that abandons hope of grasp-
ing some innocent ‘outside’ (de Man), always a resistance to immanence 
as such that is not immanent to any transcendence (Deleuze). But there 
are two ways of thinking radical immanence or non-transcendence. What 
the absence of any privileged outside meant for the time of deconstruc-
tion in the 1980s and 1990s was that capitalism should not be opposed in 
any simple way. There has always been techne and alienation. It is not the 
case that we might step outside ideology and find the truth for the very 
notion of an original truth that some sign system might grasp is ideology. 
Resistance to the necessary distance of signs and the banality of inscrip-
tion is ideology; that resistance is neither avoidable nor capable of being 
reformed. Instead, all we have is a tireless war on all the modes of tran-
scendence that might present themselves as good or benevolent outsides.
In response to this we might want to ask: was not the 2008 global 
financial crisis precipitated precisely by just this abandonment of 
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reference? But things are not so simple, for while it is the case that 
futures, derivatives, hedge funds and the selling on of toxic assets enabled 
an ungrounded and uncontrolled system that went into free fall, the 
problem was neither unbridled exchange nor the absence of real value, 
but some ongoing notion that exchange was grounded in assets and that 
there would ultimately be a way of translating numbers back into mate-
rial wealth (if there is such a thing). There is nothing at all valid in the 
notion that post-structuralism’s critique of representation plays a role in 
nihilism, relativism and capitalist cynicism. On the contrary, it is still the 
case that incontrovertible truths are asserted without any sense of the 
impossibility of determination; we are now referring to corporations as 
individuals, assuming that these entities are real, bounded and agential. 
Indeed, the 2008 crisis was possible precisely because some myth of 
reference precluded examination of an essentially virtual network: sup-
posedly, at the base of it all, there were commodities, homes attached 
to mortgages, speculation about buyers and sellers – all real and mate-
rial things. The problem lay in the notion that financial circulation was 
ultimately grounded on things, or that financial speculation wasn’t the 
entirely fictional enterprise that it was. The very idea that banks operated 
as some necessary structure that was so significant as to be too big to fail 
did not come from a postmodern notion that reality is untethered, quite 
the contrary.
What is required, then, is not some naïve reaction that turns us back 
to reality, and that expels deconstruction as a ‘sign of the times’ of late 
capital. Rather, the next question or problem after we accept anti-foun-
dationalism, is how deterritorialized, groundless, unnatural, and open 
exchange gets reterritorialized into some manufactured or hallucinated 
center? How is that in all this free-floating speculation some bodies came 
to be foundational, and eventually too big to fail? How did certain bod-
ies, faces and persons maintain the prestige that enabled them, after the 
2008 US election, to suspend social policies for emergency bail-outs, as 
though crisis rendered certain forms of expertise more powerful? The 
problem is not nihilism, decentering and lack of foundations and values; 
it is the failure to render nihilism active, for it was the experience of crisis 
and ungrounding that allowed for a seizing of autocratic authority and an 
ongoing practice of disaster ethics: in an age of volatility and precarious 
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life – we are told – we cannot afford to be too relativist, and need to turn 
back to management and expertise. Should we really be thinking that in 
a time of crisis we need to buoy up some sites of concentrated capital 
in order to keep the rest of the field in play? Or, would it not be a ques-
tion – without any illusion of stepping outside of capitalism – of expos-
ing points of theft? When Deleuze and Guattari insist that the social field 
begins with theft not exchange, they do not so much oppose capitalism as 
they create an idea of powerfully destructive excessive capital. If life were 
simply free exchange then there would be no basic stability, but if force is 
‘originally’ stored, taken, harbored and then squandered, one site in the 
field appears as powerful and even structural. It is not from scarcity that 
political assemblages are formed, but from excess and theft: a body seizes 
and stores force, and from that pooling of force an organized or deterri-
torialized reference point is constituted. Political life occurs as the repres-
sion of exchange, not because exchange is foundational but because radi-
cally unimpeded flows of exchange would destroy the relatively stable 
points achieved by marking out quantities or properties as one’s own: 
desire begins not from a stable point that one might then establish as a 
site of exchange, but from a seizing of force that establishes a stability 
(territorialization), and that enables a system of exchange that – in turn 
– is never fully free but always referred to a locus (deterritorialization). 
One steals therefore one becomes. It is only by impeding an absolutely 
deterritorialized flow that anything like a territory is assembled:
It is theft that prevents the gift and the countergift from enter-
ing into an exchangist relation. Desire knows nothing of 
exchange, it knows only of theft and gift …
Will it be said that, if desire knows nothing of exchange, 
it is because exchange is desire’s unconscious? Will this be 
explained by the exigencies of generalized exchange? But 
what entitles one to declare that shares of debt are secondary 
compared with a totality that is “more real “? Yet exchange is 
known, well known in the primitive socius-but as that which 
must be exorcised, encasted, severely restricted, so that no 
corresponding value can develop as an exchange value that 
would introduce the nightmare of a commodity economy. 
The primitive market operates through bargaining rather 
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than by fixing an equivalent that would lead to a decoding of 
flows and a collapse of the mode of inscription on the socius. 
We are brought back to our point of departure: the fact that 
exchange is inhibited and exorcised by no means attests to 
its primary reality, but demonstrates on the contrary that the 
essential process is not exchanging, but inscribing or marking. 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 186)
We can think of the way plants store energy by way of photosynthesis, 
with the whole human strata being possible because of the appropriation 
of that energy. In the beginning is metabolism or the enhancement of one 
body by the appropriation of energy of another. Bodies are distributed 
according to the extent to which they can appropriate (and then squan-
der) to the point of elevating themselves above the threshold of need. If 
we accept this account of politics, concerned less with beliefs, conscious-
ness, identity and rights and more with pure quantities (or intensities 
that create quantities, for it is storing and harboring that enables the cal-
culation and exchange mechanisms of money), then we might think less 
of finding some outside of capital and instead think of the way in which 
theft produces authority.
Is this not what the Occupy movement succeeded in part in achiev-
ing? Rather than the identity of friend and enemy, good and evil, or 
inside and outside, it was a question of distribution and hoarding to the 
point where shifts in quantity produced kinds – we are now dealing with 
percentages, not individuals. We need to reverse the notion that late 
capitalism is calculative without morality, and instead say that exchange 
and genuine calculation – who has taken what – is impeded by morality, 
by wars on welfare and various other supposed threats to life and fam-
ily. Again it is sanctimonious truth – the truth of capitalism in its current 
form as the only way – that needs to be destroyed by a sense of simula-
tion, inscription and a mode of theory that refuses such smug certainty. 
Power has always been achieved by impeding exchange and establishing 
a moral center, but the new feudalism that marks the present is closer to a 
primal horde of flagrant appropriation and imposition of necessity than it 
is to a falsely universalizing bourgeois township of self-interested traders.
In this respect, we need to think beyond deconstruction’s sense of 
necessary occupation and resistance, but not because what we need is a 
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good old-fashioned dose of truth and reality. Think of how futures and 
hedging ‘worked,’ or the ways in which speculation enabled persons who 
were nothing more than agents of exchange (day traders, brokers); this 
system of exchange was made possible only by way of the lure that there 
was some ultimate reality or substance to what was being exchanged. 
Ostensibly, hedge funds bet on future outcomes, just as mortgages are 
originally debts attached to property, but are subsequently circulated and 
repackaged. Money markets also function on the lure of substitution, or 
that money is the sign of value. There is, in the world of unbridled finance 
no shortage of realist fictions. The crisis was enabled precisely by what 
de Man referred to far more broadly as aesthetic ideology: the notion 
that the figures that captivate our attention are signs of an underlying and 
amenable reality. One needs to criticize speculation not because it takes 
its gaze off reality and starts to bet wildly on what has no substance, but 
because it deploys a language (or tropology) of substance and reality. 
What is really occurring is the creation of power by way of the illusion of 
substance in the hands of a few who are stealing the practice of exchange. 
On the surface the numbers being circulated in the years leading up to 
the crisis were signs of people’s savings, houses and futures; but as pyr-
amid and Ponzi schemes disclosed, there was no pyramid, no base that 
was big enough to support the heights of financial fantasy.
IV
What does this mean for thinking about theory and politics today? First, 
I would suggest that what Deleuzian or Deleuzo-Guattarian modes of 
politics offer is an intensification, rather than reversal, of the positive 
sense of resistance and occupation. Their use of the term ‘desire’ is the 
very opposite of the ‘desires’ of consumers for products; desire is revo-
lutionary – directly – because it is without anchor in identities or invest-
ments (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 113). What is resisted and repressed 
is desire, and desire is not a quality so much as a quantity without quality:
Capitalism institutes or restores all sorts of residual and arti-
ficial, imaginary, or symbolic territorialities, thereby attempt-
ing, as best it can, to recode, to rechannel persons who have 
been defined in terms of abstract quantities. Everything 
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returns or recurs: States, nations, families. That is what makes 
the ideology of capitalism “a motley painting of everything 
that has ever been believed.” The real is not impossible; it is 
simply more and more artificial. Marx termed the twofold 
movement of the tendency to a falling rate of profit, and the 
increase in the absolute quantity of surplus value, the law of 
the counteracted tendency. As a corollary of this law, there is 
the twofold movement of decoding or deterritorializing flows 
on the one hand, and their violent and artificial reterritorial-
ization on the other. (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 34)
To take up a space – to occupy – and then to do so in the name of a differ-
ential – 1% versus 99% – is to begin to destroy the field of political identi-
ties, interests and realities, and to do so by way of thinking intensities: at 
what point does a differential produce an intolerable relation? Second, 
this shift in inflection opens up a different way of thinking about capital-
ism: deconstruction would, strictly, not be able to posit some historical 
outside to the system of capital. The notion of a proper relation to work, 
the earth, nature or production, that would then be overtaken by some 
external evil needs to be countered by thinking of internal occupation: to 
speak, write, think, work, dream, desire and demand justice is already to 
speak in a language that comes from elsewhere, that is other. For decon-
struction this means that rather than trying to think of some point before 
or outside capital, and rather than resist capital, one needs to think jus-
tice, democracy, hope and the future as that which disturbs all the forces 
of resistance and occupation that preclude any pure outside.
By contrast with this critical and negative mode of deconstruc-
tion, Deleuze and Guattari think quite positively about what it is to be 
occupied by the voice of an other, what it is to be invaded, overtaken, 
by a voice not one’s own. It is in their book on Kafka that they take the 
same starting point of deconstruction – signs are not signs of the world 
but are positive creations of territories – but generate a different line of 
departure. Rather than accept the mournful distance of the destruction 
of the dream of reference, they theorize a minor politics. Kafka, a Jew, 
wrote in German and in doing so was a foreigner in his own tongue; far 
from seeing this in terms of being internally occupied (having an identity 
disorder), language becomes a force liberated from expression, identity 
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and reference. A minor literature frees signification from the ideology of 
the aesthetic: this is not the great voice or art that is expressive of ‘the 
people.’ In Kafka, it is both as though language appears as already oddly 
inhuman, not one’s own, and as not aligned with any tradition expressive 
of mankind. The people are missing and the words and signs proliferate 
less as claims or promises of an imagined future than as disturbances of 
meaning. If minor literature breaks from the coherence of the canon and 
is written not as the expression of ‘a people’ but more as the marking out 
of inscriptions that stake out differences that do not yet have sense or ref-
erence, then minor politics – we might say – could be something like a 
scream, noise, mark or disturbance that is not yet expressive of a people, 
nor even of a hoped for reality:
A minor literature doesn’t come from a minor language; it is 
rather that which a minority constructs within a major lan-
guage. But the first characteristic of minor literature in any 
case is that in it language is affected with a high coefficient of 
deterritorialization. In this sense, Kafka marks the impasse 
that bars access to writing for the Jews of Prague and turns 
their literature into something impossible  – the impossibil-
ity of not writing, the impossibility of writing in German, 
the impossibility of writing otherwise. The impossibility of 
not writing because national consciousness, uncertain or 
oppressed, necessarily exists by means of literature (“The lit-
erary struggle has its real justification at the highest possible 
levels”). The impossibility of writing other than in German 
is for the Prague Jews the feeling of an irreducible distance 
from their primitive Czech territoriality. And the impossi-
bility of writing in German is the deterritoralization of the 
German population itself, an oppressive minority that speaks 
a language cut off from the masses, like a “paper language” 
or an artificial language; this is all the more true for the Jews 
who are simultaneously a part of this minority and excluded 
from it, like “gypsies who have stolen a German child from 
its crib.” In short, Prague German is a deterritorialized lan-
guage, appropriate for strange and minor uses. (This can be 
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compared in another context to what blacks in America today 
are able to do with the English language.)
The second characteristic of minor literatures is that every-
thing in them is political. In major literatures, in contrast, the 
individual concern (familial, marital, and so on) joins with 
other no less individual concerns, the social milieu serv-
ing as a mere environment or a background; this is so much 
the case that none of these Oedipal intrigues are specifically 
indispensable or absolutely necessary but all become as one 
in a large space. Minor literature is completely different; its 
cramped space forces each individual intrigue to connect 
immediately to politics. The individual concern thus becomes 
all the more necessary, indispensable, magnified, because a 
whole other story is vibrating within it. (Deleuze and Guattari 
1986: 16–17)
Thinking of minor politics and minor literature in this way might help us 
enhance a new sense of resistance and of occupation that was the hall-
mark of the Occupy movement. First, if we accept that deconstruction 
has put paid to any notion of innocence or purity outside capital (pre-
cisely because to speak is already to be operating within some already 
constituted system of exchange and differences), then we can take one 
step further by beginning with minor literature. Rather than accept that 
one is always already alienated from one’s own language, one writes in 
the manner of an alien and alienates language from itself. Think of the 
slogan of the 99%: part of the effectiveness of this rhetorical gesture was 
that on the one hand it had no real referent (for the accuracy of the num-
ber did not answer to any constituted group at all, but was something 
like a bet, as though simply declaring ‘we are the 99%’ might gesture to 
a ‘people to come’); on the other hand the grouping also performed a 
certain event of non-identity – not workers, not women, and certainly 
not those who claimed to possess a grander demystifying knowledge that 
would be other than the calculus of Wall Street. The group who occu-
pied Wall Street were in no way ‘representative’ of any 99%, but they were 
installing themselves precisely in the pseudo-actual or quasi-actual site 
of the illusion of capitalist reference. One of the main criticisms of the 
movement was lack of direction, lack of coherence and a certain youthful 
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opportunism, as though there had been a joyful decision just to make 
some noise and situate oneself somewhere, with rationale and politics 
being an afterthought.
And it is here that we have to take quite seriously what the concept of 
minor politics offers, and how it helps us think of a new mode of resis-
tance that emerged in the Occupy movements. How does one resist 
a power without positing oneself as some more enlightened or more 
authentic body whose very exclusion from power grants one a right and 
capacity to speak critically? A certain Marxist conception of the worker 
(whose labor will always grant them a genuine sense of the struggle of 
existence and resistance of the real) is easily more authentic than the 
Wall Street banker whose life consists only of numbers. Similarly a cer-
tain conception of feminism, ranging from eco-feminism’s insistence on 
women’s proximity or association with nature to corporeal feminism’s 
critique of an abstract and quantifying modernity would seem to offer 
us levers against the ravages of capital; but such motifs do so by way of a 
fantasy that resistance comes from outside.
Occupy was not a workers’ movement, nor a women’s movement; 
it was – by contrast – a movement that can be thought of by way of a 
Deleuzian conception of sexual difference, which follows on from 
the conception of minor politics. As Deleuze and Guattari note in A 
Thousand Plateaus one might accept, now and again, the force of majori-
tarian claims – such as those that conceive women as a group who have 
been deprived of a voice and who now wish to speak. But a minor politics 
is one that begins with becoming-woman: what if there is no space outside 
that might enable one to form a new identity? What if the term ‘woman’ 
were composed from the terrain one wishes to destabilize? What if one 
were always already occupied by the forces from the outside such that 
it would be more forceful to focus less on identity than anonymity, not
being of one’s own kind, such that becoming-woman would be minor in 
refusing authenticity, identity and propriety? One does not mourn, but 
intensifies, identity disorder: mark one’s political movement by installing 
oneself in a space, making noise, then giving oneself a number (99%). 
This war of becoming is a war of differentials, not peace opposed to war, 
but a war on the rigidification of the field.
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In the beginning of the Occupy movement there was no body, not 
even a mass, but simply a disturbance and a sense of occupation that 
was spatial and virtual. The movement was in part performative: occu-
pying Wall Street did not occur because of the fulfillment of a task, but 
instead generated a series of tasks. Install oneself somewhere and then 
that will constitute who one is, ‘we are the people who occupy,’ rather than 
‘we occupy because we are the people.’ And it is this rhetoric of a non-
identity achieved by taking up a space and a number that I would argue is 
one of sexual difference: for an encounter is sexual when forces enter into 
relation and composition and then generate rogue and unpredictable 
(and certainly not productive, but often creative) outcomes. The sense 
of occupation may once have been marked by a notion that who ‘I’ am is 
always already other; I am always already occupied, and this foreignness 
to oneself is precisely what one most resists. But today there is another 
sense of what it means to occupy: one does not resist or overthrow exter-
nal or imposed power from some inside. To occupy is to produce a terri-
tory: not a territory of bodies who share a common ground. By occupying 
common ground the multiple bodies of the Occupy movement rendered 
that ground open, virtual, viral and creative. The spread of Occupy was 
less by way of identity, belief or program and more by way of replication, 
such that others started to Occupy in cities as far afield as Melbourne and 
London, and then produced resistance not to some alien and external evil 
but rather to a distribution and calculus that might be thought otherwise, 
though not in any moment of purity, nor from some innocent outside.
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Chapter 5
Preoccupations
Verena Andermatt Conley
In the introduction to his translation of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s 
A Thousand Plateaus, a breathtaking study of capitalism and schizophre-
nia in the shape of a mosaic, Brian Massumi declares that the philoso-
phers urge those who contest current modes of governance to occupy the 
street rather than to hold the fort. Taking to the street, the history of civil 
disobedience tells us over and again, is risky business. Yet of late people 
have taken to the street in many of the world’s urban centers.
Much has been said and written since 2011 about what now is often 
simply called Occupy, from its possible origin in the Arab Spring (2010) 
and the Indignants Movement in Spain (2011) to its visibility today as 
an adventitious worldwide movement. Not only in the media but also in 
unlikely places such as the academy, discussions have focused on Occupy 
in the context of social injustices and economic inequality for which banks 
and financial centers have become symbolic icons. In the United States, 
‘Wall Street,’ a place name (as it had been in the sub-title of Melville’s 
‘Bartleby the Scrivener,’ a tale anticipating much of what Occupy hap-
pens to be), functions as a synecdoche of an implacable barrier, the great 
white wall of capital. The occupation of Wall Street (or rather, of the con-
tiguous Zuccotti Park) represented the 99% of the underprivileged and 
the unemployed in their fight and resistance against the 1% holding the 
fort, and its outcroppings in and around the stock exchange.
Can it be asked if Occupy was a social and a political movement, bear-
ing comparison with not a full-fledged revolution such as that of 1789 
or 1917, but at the very least with a rebellion or a revolt in the manner 
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of 1968, where the Sorbonne was occupied for days and nights on end, 
the revolt having for a first time united students and workers? If so, and 
if it has political mettle, what is its future? Or is it simply a ritual celebra-
tion that – as Roland Barthes stated long before the fact in Mythologies 
(1957), a collection of studies of popular culture – depoliticizes itself 
in the pleasure of its performance? Slavoj Žižek, a sympathetic critic, 
warned the participants of Occupy of the risks of turning their move-
ment into a narcissistic festival in place of a manifestation of dissensus. He 
asked participants not to become enamored with themselves:
The danger [is] that [the protesters] will fall in love with 
themselves, with the nice time they are having in the ‘occu-
pied’ places. Carnivals come cheap – the true test of their 
worth is what remains the day after, how our normal daily life 
will be changed. We spend a pleasant moment together here. 
But remember, carnivals are cheap. Of importance is the day 
after, when people go on with their everyday lives. That’s the 
moment to ask whether anything has changed? (Žižek 2012)
Other philosophers and cultural theorists have been less critical. Judith 
Butler argues that Occupy is a bodily outcry and a demand for a physical 
and mental space in which to live:
When bodies gather as they do to express their indignation 
and to enact their plural existence in public space, they are 
also making broader demands. They are demanding to be rec-
ognized and to be valued; they are exercising a right to appear 
and to exercise freedom; they are calling for a livable life. 
These values are presupposed by particular demands, but they 
also demand a more fundamental restructuring of our socio-
economic and political order. (Butler 2011)
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, in turn, in a pamphlet entitled 
‘Declaration’ write that as a movement of revolt Occupy is symptomatic 
of ‘dominant forms of subjectivity produced in the context of the current 
social and political crisis. [They] engage four primary subjective figures – 
the indebted, the mediatized, the securitized, and the represented – all of 
which are impoverished and their powers for social action are masked or 
mystified’ (Hardt and Negri 2012). When Žižek cautions against slogans 
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and Butler calls for a life worth living; or when Hardt and Negri urge 
humans who are immobilized and infantilized by the media to go beyond 
a threshold of revolt, we can read in filigree many of the Gilles Deleuze 
and Félix Guattari’s reflections on resistance. Often in similar terms, on 
the heels of 1968, denouncing the state of the world under capitalism in a 
phase of rampant and destructive expansion, they urged students, readers 
and listeners to pry open spaces within its sphere that might enable the 
beginnings of a greater reinvention and recomposition.
What are the links between the philosophers’ preoccupations and 
those both of Occupy Wall Street and of Occupy in general? It is well 
known that the two philosophers consider concepts to be both intellec-
tual and political instruments carried in a ‘toolbox.’ What can be drawn 
from their ‘toolbox,’ Deleuze’s metaphor for the arsenal that can be put 
to the use of rearranging inherited configurations of life? In addition to 
practical concepts, what is the dynamism and force of conviction that we 
can lift from their writings to help Occupy thrive? While Žižek, Butler 
and especially Hardt and Negri (the most ‘Deleuzian’ of the chosen list) 
try to address today’s problems, I propose first to go back to the philoso-
phers’ pronouncements and then to see if and how they can be articu-
lated with Occupy today.
The call to occupying the street rather than holding the fort runs 
through Deleuze and Guattari both literally and metaphorically. The phi-
losophers emphasize change through movement and flow, be it of people, 
desire, affects or thought. Advocating an ever-unfinished, non-dialectical, 
and non-hierarchical model of constructive dissent, they do away with 
the Marxian notion of class structure to consider social conflict in terms 
of mobile micro- and macro-cosms, ever-shifting lines, rhythms and har-
monics. Already in 1975, in the French version of their first co-authored 
book, Kafka, Toward a Minor Literature, Deleuze and Guattari emphasize 
the need to put a dominant idiom into a condition of variation. Never 
stable, a dominant language, a common and unquestioned lingua franca
that generally controls subjectivity, is modulated where popular use of 
dialects, vernaculars, verbal aberrations and multilingualism alters its 
unilateral (and clearly monolingual) character. When used tactically, 
minor languages instill into dominant rhythms cadences of stunning 
variety (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 100–110). In 1976, in Rhizome: 
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Introduction (translated as On the Line (1983)), the philosophers write 
about how the line, la ligne – rather than the point or period that tends to 
‘stop’ a harmonic flow – can be drawn to chart new mappings for the ends 
of mental and physical de- and reterritorialization. When they are draw-
ing lines, diagrams or making maps, individual subjects or groups seek 
to invent other ways of moving about and through an otherwise highly 
regimented world. On the Line serves as the introduction to A Thousand 
Plateaus, as I suggested, a mosaic, motley, or variegated work that 
addresses the question of how to occupy a space through what Deleuze 
and Guattari call rhizomatic or adventitious and multilateral think-
ing. If Anti-Oedipus, the first volume of Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 
had focused on exposing and abolishing a system that blocks all roads 
to change, the second volume, A Thousand Plateaus, of ostensibly more 
pragmatic virtue, shows how rhizomatic thinking makes transformations 
both imaginable and possible.
In this very spirit Deleuze and Guattari look to another literary 
example in an idiom other than their own. Henry James’s ‘In the Cage’ 
(roughly dated 1884), an aptly titled novella in which the protagonist, 
engaged to a dull and rigid clerk finds how a simple variation in the 
order of things happens to change her life (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 
95–100).1 At the beginning of the story, living within the narrow confines 
of a routine, she moves on a ‘molar, rigid line of segmentarity’ (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1987: 195). An event takes place when a couple enters the 
shop at which the clerk works to send enigmatic telegrams that put the 
young clerk, almost unbeknownst to herself, on a ‘molecular, supple 
line of segmentation’ (196). She becomes preoccupied with what she has 
heard and witnessed. The heroine eventually reaches a kind of abstract 
line that ultimately she refuses either to draw or to follow. When she goes 
back to her fiancé she is no longer on the same line. Her life has been 
altered. She has traced a line of flight that within her milieu takes her else-
where or, as it were, that deterritorializes. A seemingly banal, everyday 
event affects her and makes her occupy space differently. By extension, 
what and how she becomes can be linked to Occupy whose members, 
by virtue of a seemingly unimportant event, have a suddenly different 
purchase on their surroundings. In their reading of ‘In the Cage’ Deleuze 
and Guattari distinguish three intermingling sorts of lines: a line of ‘rigid 
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segmentarity,’ another of ‘molecular segmentarity’ and an abstract line, a 
line ‘of flight.’ The first line, they write, is one of words and interminable 
conversations and the second of silences and allusions. However, when 
the line of flight flashes the heroine jumps upon and rides with it. She 
(and for the sympathetic reader, the ideal personage she would become) 
can finally speak literally of anything without respect to a given position 
or place. Implied from the philosophers’ reading is that, in a creatively 
intransitive sense, cage or no cage, she truly occupies.
Elsewhere in A Thousand Plateaus ways of detaching oneself from a 
territory by drawing a line or tracing a diagram (which is tantamount to 
occupying) are discussed in a series of chapters or what, varying on the 
idiolect of Gregory Bateson, they call ‘plateaus.’ The latter are territories 
held together by affective intensities made possible at a specific moment 
in history from which, in the ‘present’ (for the authors the aftermath of 
1968), they think and write. Next to chapters on variations in language 
and the tracing of lines and diagrams, the philosophers introduce a set of 
plateaus that deal specifically with space. A gridded – or striated – city or 
state space, they claim, is always riddled by another movement that con-
tinually ‘smoothes’ it, that introduces play, that creates openings through 
which one can move and think otherwise. They advocate the privileging 
of nomos or open spaces over the closure of logos and/or reasoned dis-
course. In short, they urge people to occupy the street mentally or physi-
cally rather than hold the fort against an overarching order from outside 
or above. From an event that took place in 1227, when what they call 
the ‘war machine’ appeared on the Asian Steppes, Deleuze and Guattari 
endeavor to inflect the heavily organizational spaces of their own time 
with others that they see marked by creative compositions and uncom-
mon rhythms (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 363). One hundred pages 
later, they return to the same place, to the steppes, where they note: to 
write is to resist and to think is to voyage ‘in place’ (Deleuze and Guattari 
1987: 482). To think and to write mean to leave the habitual, repetitious, 
rigid line of segmentarity while staying in place:
To think is to voyage … what distinguishes the two kinds of 
voyages is neither a measurable quantity of movement, nor 
something that would be only in the mind, but the mode of 
spatialization, the manner of being in space, of being for space 
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(emphasis added). Voyage smoothly or in striation, and think 
the same way… But there are always passages from one to 
the other, transformations of one within the other, rever-
sals … Voyaging smoothly is a becoming, and a difficult, 
uncertain becoming at that. It is not a question of returning 
to preastronomical navigation, nor to the ancient nomads. 
The confrontation between the smooth and the striated, the 
passages, alternations and superpositions, are under way 
today, running in the most varied directions. (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987: 482)
Elsewhere, they link such transformation and opening of passages to 
what they call the continual intermingling of affect, percept and concept, 
or as Deleuze put it in a letter to Réda Bensmaia, new ways of feeling, 
new ways of seeing and new ways of conceiving.2 Again, the three modes 
are simultaneously circulating through one another.
Writing at a time of social and political turmoil arising simultane-
ously all over the world, from Algeria to Vietnam, from Cuba, Central 
and Latin America to the civil rights movement in the United States, the 
philosophers briefly sense a generalized ‘becoming-minoritarian’ that – 
they are adamant – has much to do with ways of distributing and occupy-
ing space, with putting into variation, or with deterritorializing through 
drawing lines and crafting diagrams. Now, years later, it can be asked if 
and how their philosophical pronouncements, which are never celebra-
tory but, based as they are on the irruption of a sudden ‘preoccupation,’ 
resonate with Occupy. Has Occupy also put a dominant discourse into 
variation? Has it led to the creation of new diagrams, the deterritorial-
izing our sensibilities, and conceiving different and varied modes of 
occupying space?
A response to the question can be broached through the events that 
meshed with the writing of A Thousand Plateaus. The very real though 
brief euphoria that Deleuze and Guattari felt around May 1968 and that 
later inspired its sequel did not last (Dosse 2007: 208–21; 297–308). 
Soon, what Guattari called the ‘Winter Years’ came with a keenly felt 
influx of rampant corporatism and economic globalization (Guattarri 
1986). In strong contrast Paul Virilio looked upon 1968 dismissively, 
calling it a simple rehearsal, a piece of play-acting, a kind of pseudo-event. 
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Sympathetic and possibly in accord with Virilio, notably after the fall of 
the Iron Curtain, Deleuze and Guattari did not join the chorus of those 
praising the event as the triumph of liberalism. Without nostalgia or 
despair, each in turn – Guattari in 1989 and Deleuze 1990 – denounced 
the new state of the world (Dosse 2007: 458–9). Deleuze’s outlook 
became bleak. At the end of Negotiations (1990), first in an interview 
with Negri titled ‘Control and Becoming’ and then in a short addendum, 
entitled ‘Postscript on Control Societies,’ he notes without nostalgia 
that we have lost the world (Deleuze 1995: 167–82). It has been taken 
from us. No real resistance is possible when money, not affect, neither 
variation nor pulsation, is the currency of life. Because it wafts in the 
flow of capital, he speculates, even art, that had once produced singulari-
ties and made possible invention and creativity, can no longer be coun-
tenanced. Perhaps the only thing left is the opening of small vacuoles 
from and within which to think otherwise. At the time of his suicide in 
1995 Deleuze was rumored to have said that mentally and physically he 
was finished.
In The Three Ecologies (1989), Guattari for his part decried the loss 
of the subject and of human relations in an age that is in the grip of 
infantilizing media in collusion with omnipotent corporate control of 
the state. In the post-Fordist era, consumerism, he argued, transforms 
humans into market samples and collectivities into molar aggregates. He 
called for a reconstruction of the subject on his terms: by emphasizing 
singularities, in the making of rhizomatic connections, and by advocat-
ing a collective solidarity. Building on an existential vocabulary, Guattari 
notes the ‘fragility’ of the subject as a for-itself – opposed to the in-itself, 
immobilized by debt and lobotomized by the media – and its capacity 
to change. Crucial for our purposes is that Guattari asserts on the one 
hand that changes can occur autopoietically, unbeknownst to the subject, 
before she or he even opens onto the environing world. In either case, 
something suddenly affects the subject that leads to a ‘preoccupation’ of 
sorts, an event which produces a change in the individual or in the social 
body. Even among large aggregates of given populations spontaneous 
change and types of recomposition are possible. Singularities or groups 
move about and across striated spaces under the impetus of a different 
affect, without colliding head-on with the group or territory they are 
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leaving. Guattari speaks of a gradual slippage and of ‘soft subversions’ 
(Guattari 2009). On the other hand, in a world reduced to systems of 
economic, juridical, scientific signs, those who are in a position to affect 
subjectivities – educators, architects, urban planners, artists, media peo-
ple, but also those in music, fashion or food – need to show a sense of 
responsibility in order to induce change in others. They drive a wedge 
into a given state of things that will cleave and then lead to other mental 
and social preoccupations from where, eventually, transformations can 
be addressed. Preoccupations occur spontaneously at the same time that 
those in a position to affect subjectivities are aware of their responsibility 
of initiating change.
For Deleuze and Guattari, revolutions fail wherever they are anchored 
in history. What is needed is a becoming-revolutionary of the people, 
that is, a constant turning away from history and toward the future in 
anticipation of other events. They privilege art (provided that its relation 
with the world is not in collusion with capital and marketing), singularity 
(which is plural insofar as it does not belong to individuals) and invention 
(which is related to the force of an event). Militantism is important, but 
it can only be temporary and cannot be reduced to slogans. In Guattari’s 
words, one has to be ‘analytically militant.’ In The Three Ecologies, he 
argues that singularities come together temporarily to militate for certain 
short- or long-term objectives, such as the rights of women, of gays and of 
the flora and fauna composing the environment. Guattari does not pro-
vide an economic strategy but focuses rather on the reinvention of the 
subjects or, on ‘effects of subjectivation’ to foment a change in thinking 
and social exchange that will yield a more just but also a more enjoyable 
world where, just as Judith Butler has it, life is worth living.
The philosopher makes it clear that ecology, a way of addressing and 
governing one’s oikos or the earth as habitat, bears at once mental, social 
and natural components. Nature is not something ‘to go back to’ (if it 
ever has been), but something that must be considered carefully in terms 
of the way it is ‘occupied.’ In consort with Claude Lévi-Strauss he recog-
nizes the impossibility of separating nature from culture. With the help 
of Gregory Bateson’s Steps to an Ecology of Mind (1972) (that had been 
a bible for the generation of 1968), he notes the importance of the feed-
back loop that can (as well as it cannot) assure change, alteration, and 
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a dynamically corrective operation of the environment. Yet, as with the 
social and built environment, natural environments must be dealt with 
from today’s conditions, where new and other dynamisms are at stake. To 
be dealt with properly, Guattari argues, the environment requires another 
sensibility and intelligence.3 Life, he claims, has always been at war with 
nature. Defending himself against the accusation made by François 
Dosse of being utopian, he writes elsewhere, and presciently (in view of 
the ineffectiveness of today’s governing institutions), that the conserva-
tives, that is, those who insist on a return to ‘an older, simpler way’ of liv-
ing are those whose politics are regressively ‘utopian.’
With a distant memory of the sixties, a decade that saw a general-
ized ‘becoming-minoritarian’ in the midst of many uprisings all over the 
world, today a belief persists that a dynamics can be lifted from that era. 
However, with further demographic explosions, a continued intensifi-
cation of capitalism, the changes wrought by the electronic revolution, 
and the very real and rapid depredations of the environment, our world 
seems light years away from what he knew or envisaged. Already in 1983, 
Guattari wrote that ‘what is terrifying is our lack of collective imagination 
in a world that has reached such a boiling point, our myopia before all 
the “molecular revolutions” which keep pulling the rug out from under 
us at an accelerated pace’ (Guattari 2009: 307). And this pace has acceler-
ated over the last few decades with molecular revolutions in myriad areas. 
How then can we use the philosophers’ toolbox while updating its imple-
ments that had been made perhaps for a slower world that, both ther-
mally and figuratively, is now at boiling point? What kind of collective 
imagination can we muster to tackle social, political and environmen-
tal problems?
A sense of an answer may be in the here-and-now. Glimpses of such 
an updating of Deleuze and Guattari’s dynamism have come, and con-
tinue to come, with Occupy. With popular uprisings, from the Arab 
Spring and the Indignants in Spain to the recent mass protests in Greece, 
Turkey, Brazil and again in Egypt in June 2013, new diagrams have been 
charted, novel occupations of space essayed and worldwide demographic 
shifts undertaken. The liberal euphoria of 1989 seems to be giving way to 
another sensibility and, hopefully, a new form of intelligence that does 
not simply speculate on the equivalence of material, natural and cultural 
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goods in terms of the augmenting flow of capital.4 New and spontaneous 
preoccupations have arisen among groups at the grassroots levels. Others, 
engaged in fields pertaining to the creation of subjectivities – educators, 
urban planners, artists (including many media artists) – have developed 
a sense of social responsibility that makes preoccupations perceptible. 
As Žižek warned the participants of Occupy Wall Street, to be sustained, 
the movement has to go beyond self-congratulation. The movement has 
to continue to resound as a compelling imperative, and as an aphorism 
of action and not only a slogan or a piece of shorthand. It is incumbent 
upon militants to be analytical and, in turn, to tactically revise and cor-
rect their positionings, and to shift the loci of their occupations. The rev-
olution cannot, in Deleuze and Guattari’s terms, become the object of its 
own history. Its success depends on the becoming-revolutionary of the 
people in order to be part of a short- and long-term transformation. As 
they remind us, beginnings are difficult and outcomes uncertain. Yet, as 
Samuel Beckett, through the ambulation of his personages show us, one 
needs to go on.
In the 1960s, a generalized ‘becoming-minoritarian’ was unified in 
its fight against capitalism, as well as a dying colonialism and rights for 
blacks, women and gays, as well as a return to ‘nature.’ Today, issues are 
more complicated and their scales are different. While Occupy can be 
seen as a global movement in its struggle against economic and social 
injustice, its virtue and its success are found in its variety. ‘Mediatized, 
securized and represented subjectivities’ are more easily found in certain 
areas of the globe than in others. Occupy is aiming to reach the theoretical 
plateau on which the philosophers moved about by urging local groups 
to reterritorialize subjectivity and to advocate an active prying open of 
myriad microspaces that can bring about new sensibilities, indeed, other 
forms of intelligence that, in the words of Jacques Rancière, do not asso-
ciate economics with politics and that, as Guattari and Butler noted, 
make the earth habitable and life worth living. It is perhaps in the open-
ing of micro-spaces that the movement has its most resounding success.
More delicately, however, when thinking from today’s conditions, pro-
ponents of the movement understand and contend with infinite modes 
of expansion and subtle smoothing of spaces that capitalism otherwise 
continually coopts. Occupy must deploy a strategy of civility to engage 
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long-term transformation. As Deleuze and Guattari put it, the becom-
ings that it seeks are difficult to obtain and their results always uncertain. 
Over the last few years, a preoccupation, however faint, that reintroduces 
idealism has become perceptible. In addition to the occupation of micro-
spaces, it is in fields such as education, urbanism, architecture and the 
environment that a shift has become noticeable among a newer genera-
tion seeking to redirect its thoughts and energies for the sake of social 
justice, the rights of fauna and flora or simply put, for a life worth living 
and a habitable world. These issues are often local and require coordina-
tion of analysis and careful exercise of militancy by which preoccupa-
tion becomes occupation – occupation such that new affects generate 
percepts and concepts.5 In this light, Occupy’s aphorism of action has to 
be carried out in the accompaniment of an ongoing question on how to 
occupy a space, that is, how to open and distribute it, and how to develop 
a different sensibility and intelligence that, although situated within capi-
talism, runs against its grain. A different sensibility calls for ways of exist-
ing that both embrace singularity and collectivity and recognize both 
transversality and interdependence. It thinks change from today’s condi-
tions, from the standpoint of a global scale and from that of locales in 
their many-faceted and ever-changing conditions. A different intelligence 
does not measure the state of things in terms of profit alone. Its condition 
of difference seems at times difficult to generate in the present ‘climate,’ 
notwithstanding Occupy’s success that is yielding hints of what it can be. 
As Deleuze and Guattari had argued, a kind of ‘preoccupation’ that rises 
spontaneously, autopoietically, is the pre-condition of the creative intel-
ligence of singular and collective occupation. In addition, those who are 
in a position to affect subjectivities share the responsibility of introduc-
ing a wedge in people’s thinking and open spaces for charting new lines 
of inquiry.6
The question Occupy asks today is how to reorient social, economic 
and artistic production for collective benefit. And for the two philoso-
phers ‘artistic’ did not mean a vaguely creative act (that, in fact, they 
dismissed as ‘vitamin induced,’ or bien vitaminé). They noted then what 
needs to be noted now: in a state of occupation in the economy in which 
it is born, art has to do with invention and experimentation and not just 
with testing and bigger markets. In the wake of Deleuze and Guattari and 
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the artists they championed, we can say that Occupy aims to produce a 
different type of singular and collective existence. Retrospection tells us 
that they ask to create an oikos or habitat in dynamic process. The type of 
occupation for which Deleuze and Guattari had virtually argued would 
change awareness. To be preoccupied is to be aware of occupation before 
occupation ‘takes place.’ Preoccupation is a situated place at the level of 
affect, a sense of something that stirs, turns into a percept and eventually 
becomes a concept. As the philosophers had underscored over and again, 
a new sensibility is fostered under the influence of other forms of intel-
ligence; added to the intuitive sort of the artist, are those of scientists and 
philosophers who too create new plateaus and new dynamisms.
Occupy thrives on creativity in an era of new modes of communica-
tion, but also on creatively passive militancy. It is hopefully part of a long-
term projection that can be measured in terms of duration. Occupy began 
with a sudden and contagious preoccupation, that has inspired a desire to 
occupy space otherwise. Like the philosophers of 1968 before them and 
with their tools refashioned for use in the twenty-first century, occupi-
ers of mettle are those who rethink and refashion space by means of new 
distributions and redistributions: who value nomos against logos; who, 
refusing refuge in the fort, circulate in both real and electronic streets. 
Occupation always begins with an event, a rupture, a sudden surge of 
affect. It begins with preoccupation.
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Notes
1. ‘In the Cage’ is included in MD Zabel (Ed.), Henry James: Eight Tales from 
the Major Phase (New York: Norton, 1969). Deleuze and Guattari make little 
mention of the cage as a prison, composed of crisscrossed wires, in which 
the female is traditionally (and iconically) confined. One set of lines is thus 
opposed to that of another, the heroine’s that crosses the barrier. 
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2. Footnote letter to Réda Bensmaia. 
3. Massive technological interventions alone, Guattari speculated, will alter 
the environment for the better, including worldwide installations of oxygen-
producing space stations. He traced a line of reflection between science and 
fiction, and he even wrote a film script, Un amour d’Uiq (Guatarri 2012). In 
their introduction to his posthumous publication, “Uiq, Un cinéma de l’infra 
quark,” the editors, Sylvia Maglioni and Graeme Tomson, write that Guattari 
cherished Ridley Scott’s film Bladerunner, especially the scene in which 
two replicants, Roy and Pris, hide in the apartment of a genetic engineer, 
JF Sebastian. Guattari is said to have seen in this scene a kind of Spinozist 
drifting of their intelligence and a desire to transform their life into a field of 
experimentation.
4. In Spaces of Hope, David Harvey (2000) could be in fact the geographer of 
vacuoles that in their later writings Deleuze and Guattari were advocating. 
5. If after what was perceived as the Arab Spring and the protests in Spain 
and Greece, the widespread and sudden success of Occupy suggested the 
beginning of another worldwide wave of protest as in the nineteen-sixties, the 
movement has, for the time being, often been more immediately successful at 
the local levels. For example, in “Occupy Utica, Occupying a Small Rustbelt 
City,” the authors show how for reason of its precise, concrete and attainable 
demands that include local school programs, extension of social services (of 
which a psychiatric clinic would be a part) and even the organization of a May 
parade in honor of labor, Occupy was successful and produced change. The 
members involved realized the importance of moving past the celebratory 
moment of occupation and toward an active occupying of a space (Khatib, 
Killjoy and McGuire 2012, cited in Le Monde diplomatique, January 2013). 
6. In ‘The Third Ecology,’ in Ecological Urbanism, (Doherty and Mostafavi 
2010), Sam Kwinter argues that the sixties were not all that bad even if it is 
now fashionable to say so. Deleuze and Guattari did recognize the decade 
as important when people were briefly animated by a desire to militate for 
social justice, the lowering of production and a more just distribution of 
the renewable wealth the world can provide. They had a sensibility that 
acknowledged beauty in the nature of things.
Chapter 6
Minor Politics, Territory, and Occupy
Nicholas Thoburn
This chapter is the amended text of a talk given at Occupy London’s 
School of Ideas as part of a workshop called ‘Deleuze and Guattari and 
Occupy,’ February 25, 2012.1 A little context may be instructive. Having 
moved from the Bank of Ideas in an occupied UBS office, the School of 
Ideas was situated in a spacious and attractive school building that had 
been left vacant for three years prior to its occupation. Two days after this 
workshop the School of Ideas was evicted in a coordinated move with the 
eviction of the main Occupy London camp at St Paul’s Cathedral (at over 
four months, the world’s longest running of the 750 camps that sprung 
up in the wake of Occupy Wall Street, the Spanish indignados, and the 
Arab Spring).2 Upon eviction, the School of Ideas was immediately bull-
dozed – a fitting emblem of the wanton destruction that characterizes the 
current round of neoliberal restructuring and public service cuts.
Westminster local authority, just down the road from the School of 
Ideas, encapsulated the boorish swagger of the new culture in its promo-
tion of the cuts to Housing Benefit: ‘To live in Westminster is a privilege, 
not a right’ (Westminster Council press officer quoted in Gentleman 
2012). Inner London is indeed to be the class-cleansed home of the priv-
ileged, a middle class enclave serviced by a newly suburbanized and ever 
more precarious working class – Westminster’s own figures project that 
17% of primary school pupils could be forced by the cuts to move out of 
the borough. Meanwhile, at the other pole, the 2012 ‘millionaire’s budget’ 
cut taxation for the rich – those on incomes of £1m will benefit annually 
to the tune of £42,500.3 No wonder recent years have seen the police and 
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law courts shift up a gear in the discipline, punishment, and brutaliza-
tion of student demonstrators, anti-cuts activists, and the young people 
involved in the 2011 riots – a move undoubtedly driven by concern that 
the normalization of this grotesque inequality can’t hold indefinitely.
In repurposing the vacant UBS office and abandoned school, Occupy 
London spun such critical threads as these through neoliberalism, cuts, 
housing, and the city, and did so in ways both analytical and practical. 
But the Bank then School of Ideas also had a distinct pedagogical dimen-
sion. In Chile, California, Britain, and elsewhere, direct action against 
neoliberal education policy has been a leading edge of the current cycle 
of struggles. These education struggles have been largely defensive, fight-
ing for the last remnants of a model of liberal education that is far from 
perfect, albeit that it is vastly superior to the emerging neoliberal model 
of debt-financed vocationalism. But the composition of this struggle 
has also been characterized by new critical knowledges and solidarities, 
as funding cuts in tertiary and higher education, creeping privatization 
of educational institutions, student debt, the casualization of academic 
labor, and graduate unemployment have drawn together a diverse range 
of actors that have interrogated the forms, functions, and possibilities 
of education at a new level of intensity. The School of Ideas, like other 
autonomous educational endeavours, was interlaced with these develop-
ments, as participants in various struggles cycled through the building 
and shaped it in their own ways. But it was also something that ‘stood 
up on its own,’ to make use of an expression I discuss below. Equal 
parts co-learning school, workshop, community center, organizational 
base, public interface, and home, one might say that the School of Ideas 
amplified (not isolated) the critical intellectual function and culture of 
Occupy London, and it was in that context that a sizeable group gathered 
on a bright winter’s morning to discuss Deleuze, Guattari and the poli-
tics of Occupy.
Minor Politics
With the UK government itching to criminalize squatting, it’s a real plea-
sure to be speaking in a building that is undergoing ‘public repossession,’ 
so I’d like to thank Andrew Conio for organizing this workshop and the 
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School of Ideas for hosting us.4 What I want to do in this talk is work 
through three of Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts that are helpful in 
thinking about Occupy. What do I mean by ‘helpful?’ My aim is delib-
erately not to try and explain Occupy, to sew it up in a theory – that for 
Deleuze would be to negate what is inventive in a movement, but also to 
lose the inventive quality of theory, making it merely a representation of a 
state of affairs. Instead my approach will be to use theory to reflect upon 
certain themes or problems in Occupy, looking at how these problems 
can be approached with Deleuzian concepts in a way that may help shed 
light upon them and aid their further development. It’s a recursive rela-
tion, for reflection upon Occupy’s themes or problems should also help 
extend Deleuzian concepts, lending them a contemporary vitality.
Given that this workshop is concerned in equal measure to bring 
Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts into relation with Occupy and to offer 
an introduction to Deleuze and Guattari as political thinkers, I’m going 
to try and strike a balance between concept and Occupy, leaving space for 
us to expand upon the points I make about Occupy in the discussion. The 
concepts and problems that I address in turn are: minor politics and the 
99%; territory, expression, and occupation; and fabulation and agency.
I will start with ‘minor politics’ and fold in some comments about 
the 99% – though bear with me, the relation may not at first be apparent. 
Running throughout Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy is a notion that 
politics arises not in the fullness of an identity – a nation, a people, a col-
lective subject – but, rather, in ‘cramped spaces,’ ‘choked passages,’ and 
‘impossible’ positions; on the condition, that is, that ‘the people are miss-
ing’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 15–16; Deleuze 1989: 216; Deleuze 
1999: 133). To understand how this anti-identitarian formulation works, 
we need to consider their concepts of the majoritarian and minoritarian.
As Deleuze and Guattari have it, majority describes a system of iden-
tities that are constituted and nurtured by social relations to the extent 
that ‘the social milieu serv[es] as a mere environment or a background’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 17). The minoritarian condition, on the 
other hand, is one where social relations no longer facilitate coher-
ent identity, for they are experienced as riven with competing impera-
tives and constraints. As such, the social ceases to be mere background 
and floods individual experience, as life becomes a tangle of limits or 
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‘impossibilities’ – let’s say, the experience of poverty, precarity, debt, rac-
ism, but also the spatial arrangements of the city, the gendered divisions 
of labor, the partitions of public and private, dominant linguistic forms, 
in their myriad combinations in each particularity. It is a condition that 
‘forces each individual intrigue to connect immediately to politics,’ for 
without an autonomous identity, even the most personal, individual situ-
ation is always already comprised of social relations. And vice versa: this 
immanent relation to the social is not a flattening of particularity, quite 
the contrary. For the mesh of complex and contradictory social relations 
in every particularity is such that ‘[t]he individual concern thus becomes 
all the more necessary, indispensable, magnified, because a whole other 
story is vibrating within it’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 17). Particularity, 
then, is constituted by and interlaced with social relations, and it is on 
this condition, not some kind of minority identity, that minor politics is 
founded. So, what Deleuze and Guattari call ‘major’ or ‘molar’ politics 
expresses and constitutes identities that are nurtured and facilitated by a 
social environment, whereas minor politics is a breach with such identi-
ties, when the social environment is experienced as constraint, as percep-
tion is opened to what is ‘intolerable’ in social relations (Thoburn 2003).
Deleuze uses an appealing image to convey a sense of this minor con-
dition. He says that to be on the Right is to perceive the world starting 
with identity, with self and family, and to move outward in concentric cir-
cles, to friends, city, nation, continent, world, with diminishing affective 
investment in each circle, and with an abiding sense that the center needs 
defending against the periphery. On the contrary, to be on the Left is to 
start one’s perception on the periphery and to move inwards. It requires 
not the bolstering of the center, but an appreciation that the center is 
interlaced with the periphery, a process that undoes the distance between 
the two (Deleuze and Parnet 2012).
It is clear thus far that the minoritarian is a structural condition. And it 
is one that is very much entwined with developments in global capitalism. 
For the imperative of capital to set and overcome limits (an appreciation 
of which is the basis of Deleuze and Guattari’s Marxism)5 has produced 
an ever more fragmented, variegated, and mutable patchwork of unequal 
exchange, exploitation, and poverty, where the identity structures of 
Fordism no longer hold and ‘peripheral zones of underdevelopment’ 
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become constitutive features of the ‘center.’ ‘Ours,’ as they say in 1980, ‘is 
becoming the age of minorities’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 469).
But, if structural, the minoritarian is also something that is actively 
affirmed, constituted as a politics through a certain ‘willed poverty’ – a 
persistent deferral of subjective plenitude that forces ever-new critical 
engagement with social relations – such that, as Deleuze and Guattari 
quote Kafka, ‘one strives to see [the boundary] before it is there, and 
often sees this limiting boundary everywhere’ (Deleuze and Guattari 
1986: 19, 17). And here we encounter a second aspect of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s relation to Marx. For the minoritarian is framed as the contem-
porary condition of the proletariat, provided that we understand the pro-
letariat, with Marx, not as a substantial subject but as the immanent cri-
tique of capital, and, hence, of itself, insofar as the working class is itself a 
functional product of capital, the subjectivity of labor:
The power of minority, of particularity, finds its figure or its 
universal consciousness in the proletariat. But as long as the 
working class defines itself by an acquired status, or even by a 
theoretically conquered State, it appears only as ‘capital’, a part 
of capital (variable capital), and does not leave the plan(e) of 
capital. (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 472)
What does all this mean in practice? Politics can no longer be a question 
of self-expression, of the unfurling of a subjectivity or the self-assertion 
of a people, because in this formulation there is no identity to unfurl. 
Instead, minor politics is the critical engagement with the social relations 
that traverse each particularity, the relations through which life is experi-
enced as cramped and intolerable. By social relations I mean the whole 
gamut of economic structures, urban architectures, gendered divisions of 
labor, personal and sovereign debt, national borders, housing, policing, 
workfare – whatever combination it might be in any particular situation. 
And there is an important propulsive or motive aspect to this formula-
tion. For, rather than allow the solidification of particular political and 
cultural routes, forms or habits, the active deferral of identity works as 
a mechanism to induce continuous experimentation, drawing thought 
and practice back into a field of problematization, where contestation, 
argument, and engagement with social relations ever arises from the 
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experience of cramped space. The constitutive sociality of this ‘incessant 
bustle’ dictates that there can be no easy demarcation between concep-
tual production, personal style, concrete intervention, tactical develop-
ment, or geopolitical events, and there is plenty of space for polemic 
(Kafka 1999: 148) – it is a vital environment well expressed in Kafka’s 
seductive description of minor literature:
What in great [or ‘major’] literature goes on down below, 
constituting a not indispensable cellar of the structure, here 
takes place in the full light of day, what is there a matter of 
passing interest for a few, here absorbs everyone no less than 
as a matter of life and death. (Kafka, quoted in Deleuze and 
Guattari 1986: 17)
The Grid of the 99%
What has this account of minor politics got to do with Occupy? I want 
to consider that question through the theme or problem expressed in the 
Occupy slogan: ‘We are the 99%.’ It is a complex problem with compet-
ing formulations, some of which articulate a troubling tendency toward 
identity.6 But it also contains progressive political content, which is my 
point of focus here. First, ‘We are the 99%’ is an assertion that the vast 
majority of the world’s population are exploited by and for the wealth 
of a small minority. It names, in other words, a relationship of exploita-
tion and inequality. The intervention of minor politics here would be to 
follow those in Occupy who push for an understanding of this formula-
tion of inequality and exploitation as an intrinsic feature of capitalism. 
Framed in this way, inequality and exploitation signify not so much the 
control of one group, the 99%, by another, the 1%, nor even the distribution 
of wealth, but the very form that life takes in such a system, where the ‘we’ 
(as well, indeed, as the ‘1%’) is wholly a product of the social relations of 
that system, its political potential lying not in asserting its collective iden-
tity, but in perceiving and challenging its intolerable conditions. Second, 
in naming this inequality and exploitation, ‘We are the 99%’ simultane-
ously designates a breach with such social relations, or pushes for such a 
breach. Let me stress again that in neither aspect does the slogan name a 
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substantial identity; rather, it at once names and cuts the social relations of 
exploitation, among those who feel cramped by these relations, feel their 
intolerable pressure.
This naming and breach in capital is of course very general, without 
immediate purchase on concrete particularities. And here lies the risk 
of a tendency toward identity, as the generality is mistaken as naming 
a coherent group of people, a political subject. But ‘We are the 99%’ is, 
rather, something like a ‘formula’ or, to use a term with more spatial con-
notations, a ‘grid.’ It lays out the abstract principle that can be taken up 
and extended by any person or collective that would embody or express 
it in their concrete experience; indeed, it is an abstract principle that only 
has any meaning or purchase insofar as it is expressed in particular cir-
cumstances. In order to see how this grid functions, I want to compare 
it to one that Occupy is more or less directly opposed to, the grid of par-
liamentary democracy. Parliamentary democracy is, for Deleuze, a grid 
laid out across social space that seduces and channels political activity 
through its specific forms and structures:
Elections are not a particular locale, nor a particular day in 
the calendar. They are more like a grid that affects the way we 
understand and perceive things. Everything is mapped back 
on this grid and gets warped as a result. (Deleuze 2007: 143)
Politics in this way gets ‘warped,’ as he puts it, because everything is 
reduced to and formatted by the status quo, to the perpetuation of that 
which gave rise to politics in the first place. A fundamental aspect of this 
warping is the exclusion of problems of inequality and exploitation from 
the realms of political interrogation. This was of course Marx’s insight,7
but the condition is currently so acute that it has widespread, even popu-
lar recognition, as Greece and Italy have unelected technocrats imposed 
on the populace to force through hitherto unknown assaults on living 
standards, as the ConDems slice up the National Health Service while 
claiming that it matters not ‘one jot’ whether it is run by the state or pri-
vate capital.8 This is why Occupy’s much remarked upon refusal to make 
demands is so important and so much a product of our times. A demand 
is a mechanism of seduction into the grid of democratic politics, a means 
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of channelling the political breach with capital right back into the institu-
tions that perpetuate it.
In contrast, the grid that is constituted by the slogan ‘We are the 
99%’ is very different. Rather than a mechanism of seduction into the 
status quo, it is a means of multiplying points of antagonism, or, in more 
Deleuzian terms, it extends the process of perceiving the intolerable and 
politicizing social relations. As I said, this does not occur in general, but 
from people’s concrete and situated experience – it is a variegated field, 
where the points of problematization are housing repossession, the lay-
ing waste of public services, privatization of common resources, debt, 
police violence, workfare, and so on, and the tactics range from occu-
pying social space, through the Oakland general strike, to direct actions 
against eviction from foreclosed housing, non-payment of debt, the 
hacking activities of Anonymous, or ‘public repossessions’ as we have in 
this building. Put another way, the grid is a catalyst across the social, not 
an aggregating body extending ever-outwards from Zuccotti Park but a 
zigzag, a discontinuous and emergent process. Again, it’s not a catalyst 
because people come to recognize themselves in it as an identity – even 
a collective identity – but because they come to embody and express its 
abstract problematic in concrete circumstances.
Before moving on I want to directly address two points that are 
implicit in what I’ve said so far. First, it is not infrequently said by those 
involved in Occupy that it in some sense is creating the new world in the 
shell of old; that practices of collective decision, direct action, coopera-
tion and care, global association, and so on, are a kind of communism in 
miniature. Certainly, all of these collective practices are crucial to under-
standing the unfurling of Occupy, to its effectivity and affective consis-
tency, to the complex pleasures and pains of being a part of it. But from a 
minor political perspective, the risk with this formulation is that Occupy 
turn inwards, valorizing its own cultural forms at the expense of self-
problematization and an ever-outward engagement in social relations. 
Occupy’s vitality lies in its extension and intensification of the problem-
atic of the 99% through an open set of sociopolitical sites and events, 
in what is of course a highly segmented and stratified terrain (where, to 
return to my earlier point, the fact of segmentation negates any notion 
that the ‘we’ of the 99% could designate a coherent subjectivity). For it is 
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in and through these sites and events that the world’s population exists, 
and from which an unknown set of possible futures will emerge. To iden-
tify those futures with the cultural forms discovered in Occupy camps 
would be naïve at the least, and risks a conservative reduction of the 
movement’s minor political potential, a reduction to identity.
Second, refusing to make demands is not a refusal to speak – to for-
mulate and express our anger, hopes, and desires, to name the particu-
lar problems of which we are concerned – and to seek practical effects. 
On the contrary, to work through the problems of Occupy requires an 
incessant production of critical knowledge and practice, knowledge and 
practice that needs to be circulated in the extension and development of 
these problems. The point is that this critical production is immanent to 
Occupy, or to the social relations that Occupy politicizes, not a pleading 
for recognition from an external power or a transposition of its problems 
into the grid of parliamentary democracy. We have seen Occupy develop-
ing slogans and concrete decisions that move toward defining what the 
movement wants, as part of reflection on how it may get it – and this of 
course is encouraging. But such formulations need to have a minor politi-
cal ‘efficiency,’ as Guattari has it, they must be adequate to the specific 
and mutating problems of Occupy and its world, not reproduce them-
selves at the level of cliché: ‘either a minor language connects to minor 
issues [which should not be taken to mean ‘small’ or exclusively ‘local’ 
issues], producing particular results, or it remains isolated, vegetates, 
turns back on itself and produces nothing’ (Guattari 1995: 37). All this 
knowledge production will involve critique, contestation, and the devel-
opment of divergent positions. Deleuze and Guattari are certainly inter-
ested in the way group consistencies emerge from distributed decision 
– let’s say, the process of ‘consensus’ in Occupy’s General Assemblies 
– but a good problem is not best extended in thought and practice by 
pretending that we all agree: ‘The idea of a Western democratic conversa-
tion between friends has never produced a single concept’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1994: 6).
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Territory and Expression
I will move now to my second main concept and problem – on this and 
my third point I will be more concise. I want to look at an aspect of the 
tactic of occupation, specifically the tent, and explore their relation to 
Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts of ‘territory’ and ‘expression.’
The tent in an Occupy camp is first of all a practical object. It enables 
space to be taken and occupied for a certain duration. In this respect it 
has a family resemblance to the tripod as was used by Reclaim the Streets 
in the 1990s, an object that worked at once to cut the flow of traffic and 
act as a catalyst in the occupation of a road and the emergence of a street 
party. In Deleuzian terms, both tent and tripod play a part in ‘deterritori-
alizing’ the space in which they operate – that is, in undoing the patterns 
of behavior, laws, sensory structures, and economic forms that determine 
that space as a road, stage for commerce and governance, or municipal 
park. But if the tent and tripod deterritorialize in this way, they simul-
taneously generate a new territory, they reterritorialize into an Occupy 
camp or a street party.
To construct such a territory is of course difficult. It requires con-
siderable knowledge of the territory that is to be undone: the govern-
ing legal situation, movements of traffic, an intuition about likely police 
tactics, potential solidarities and enmities of the locale, and so on. The 
constructed territory is thus a finely balanced constellation and can be 
easily botched. Things in London might have been different, for example, 
if Paternoster Square hadn’t been barred and Occupy had not instead 
ended up on land owned by the Church.
But let’s turn to consider the characteristics of Occupy’s territory. 
Deleuze and Guattari make a rather intriguing argument that the con-
struction of territory goes hand in hand with art, that art is a question 
of home or habitat: ‘Perhaps art begins with the animal, at least with the 
animal that carves out a territory and constructs a house.’ Such territory 
is functional, of course, but it is simultaneously sensory and expressive, 
that is, artful: ‘the territory implies the emergence of pure sensory quali-
ties, of sensibilia that cease to be merely functional and become expres-
sive features, making possible a transformation of functions’ (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1994: 183). These tangled aspects of habitat and expression 
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are apparent, for example, in the ‘art’ of the Bowerbird, whose courtship 
rituals involve the production of elaborate decorated structures.
What are the components of this constructed territory? Well, they 
are drawn from the environment, from existent materials – in the case of 
the Bowerbird, twigs, berries, bottle-tops – but they are also qualities and 
forms that emerge in the process of construction:
This emergence of pure sensory qualities is already art, not 
only in the treatment of external materials but in the body’s 
postures and colours, in the songs and cries that mark out 
the territory. It is an outpouring of features, colours, and 
sounds that are inseparable insofar as they become expressive. 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 184)
The St Paul’s occupation is very much this kind of constructed territory. 
It comprises practical materials, the tent of course, items of furniture, 
cooking equipment – but also placards and signs, books, newspapers, 
drums, assemblies, hand signals, the people’s mic, photographic images, 
livestreams, YouTube clips, the OccupyLSX website and Twitter feed, 
and so on. My point is not to proclaim that Occupy is ‘art’ exactly, but to 
suggest that alongside the practical tactics of occupation, the construc-
tion of territory through these functional components also includes an 
expressive, sensory quality that becomes an inseparable aspect of the occu-
pation.9 This is one explanation, for instance, of the production of news-
papers at the Occupy camps, when online production and distribution is 
clearly more practicable. As well as being an object of news, discussion, 
and practical politics, the newspaper in this regard is also a bloc of sensa-
tion, an aesthetic expression of Occupy.
Tent as Monument
You might ask, ‘What’s the relation between this sensory or expressive 
quality of Occupy and its meaning or explicit politics?’ For Deleuze and 
Guattari the two are different modalities of composition that come into a 
mutually sustaining encounter. They sometimes use a surprising word for 
these works of art or works of territory – they call them monuments:
Minor Politics, Territory, and Occupy 183
the monument is not something commemorating a past, it is 
a bloc of present sensations that owe their preservation only 
to themselves and that provide the event with the compound that 
celebrates it. The monument’s action is not memory but fabu-
lation … [It] confides to the ear of the future the persistent 
sensations that embody the event: the constantly renewed 
suffering of men and women, their recreated protestations, 
their constantly resumed struggle. (Deleuze and Guattari 
1994: 167–8, 176–7; emphasis added)
So, the monument, the bloc of sensation, celebrates the event of which it 
is a part. In our case, it celebrates the suffering and struggle that is named 
and enacted by the slogan or grid of the 99%.
I have mentioned the range of artefacts that constitute the work of 
territory, the monument, but the tent is a special case. It is of course a 
habitation, that’s what distinguishes it from the tripod I mentioned ear-
lier. As habitation it has great tactical value in the endurance of Occupy 
camps, even through the winter. But it also comes with particular sen-
sory associations or expressive qualities. A tent pitched in the inner city 
conveys something of the fragility of life, the precariousness of existence 
– ‘bare life,’ if you will, an impersonal quality of all life. And this imper-
sonal, precarious life is filtered in our time through the specific condition 
of homelessness, as soaring rents, mortgage foreclosures, evictions, ben-
efit and wage cuts, debt, and unemployment tip the home into a state of 
crisis. Indeed, as we’re seeing with the rise of ‘tent cities’ in the US and 
elsewhere, the tent has become a very real habitation for a considerable 
volume of displaced people, a feature of Occupy camps themselves: ‘a 
part of the homeless has become Occupy London, and a part of Occupy 
London has become the homeless.’10
This quality of life – fragile, impersonal, damaged – is central to the 
tent as monument, lifting ‘suffering’ to the level of aesthetic expres-
sion without losing any of its ‘struggle.’ Even in its expression of suffer-
ing, then, the tent is no abject object. And it also conveys a rather joyous 
quality of mobility. At risk of playing to a cliché, it is the dwelling of the 
nomad so dear to Deleuze and Guattari, where dwelling is part of an itin-
erant process, tied not to land but subordinated to the journey – the pro-
duction of a ‘movable and moving ground’ through ‘pitching one’s tent’ 
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(Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 105).11 With the tent, then, we see some-
thing of the tactical or practical aspect of Occupy interlaced with its sen-
sory or expressive quality: a tactic, and a sensory bloc – both, for Deleuze 
and Guattari, are constitutive of its territorial form.
The nomadic tent – this production of a movable and moving ground 
– orients our attention to a final aspect of the territorial form of Occupy. 
In constituting its territory, Occupy needs to remain open to a strong 
degree of deterritorialization of its own. Indeed, the relation should be 
reversed – Occupy’s reterritorializations need to play only a ‘secondary’ 
role to the onward and open process of deterritorialization if it is not to 
become blocked, bogged down, identified in its new territory (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1988: 508). Deterritorialization in this way lends an evental 
quality to a social formation, the ungraspable and often highly seductive 
character of a formation whose directions remain unmapped, indeter-
minable, full, as Deleuze has it, of virtuality. But what does deterritorial-
ization mean in more practical terms? You can think of deterritorializa-
tion here as the spatial dimension of that minor political opening to the 
social that I began with, the process of warding off identity and problema-
tizing social relations. It is a central problem of Occupy, as well expressed 
in one editorial of The Occupied Times:
[The eviction of Occupy Wall Street from Zuccotti Park] trig-
gered a period of self-examination about how the Occupy 
movement might best move forward beyond its signature 
tents and into communities, enacting the movement’s core 
message through practical action rather than symbolism. 
It is a journey that has seen American occupiers leave tents 
behind in favour of defending the homes of those about 
to be foreclosed … Thanks to equal measures of adroitness 
and serendipity, Occupy London’s initial encampment at St 
Paul’s Churchyard has now far outlived Zuccotti Park in dura-
tion … It would be a bitter irony – and a failure of enormous 
proportions – if we allowed our comparative security to stop 
us seeing some of our more distinctive tactics for what they 
are: a tool to be employed only for as long as they remain 
useful. Useful tactics generate change. They inspire others 
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to act. To do that we must look outwards. (The Occupied 
Times 2012: 2)
This process of deterritorialization concerns not only the dynamics of the 
one territory, but also the relation or reverberation with other territories 
or social formations. The obvious example is the relation with St Paul’s 
itself. There’s a clear sense in which Occupy subjected St Paul’s to a force 
of deterritorialization, Occupy’s minor monument undoing at the bor-
ders Wren’s rather more major monument and the Church’s structures 
of authority. Hence we witnessed the resignation of the canon chancel-
lor, Giles Fraser, and Occupy’s forcing of the Church to reflect upon the 
politics of Christianity and its relation to the city’s banks. In turn, this 
strange reverberation between Occupy and St Paul’s had some effect on 
the territory of the popular imagination, if we can call it that, even on its 
dominant media representation. The obvious hypocrisy of the Church in 
its initial dealings with Occupy seemed to lift and project the image of 
Occupy in the popular imagination, lending it a degree of popular sup-
port that it may not have had if it had been in a straight face off with bank-
ers and police (for despite all that we have witnessed since 2008, when 
the lines are drawn between police and resistance in this way, common 
sense, ever re-charged by news media, unfortunately still tends to pros-
trate itself to the truths of authority).
There are of course other points and possibilities of reverberation: 
other Occupy camps, the hacker activities of Anonymous, precarious 
workers, rootless graduates, assailants of workfare, those involved in edu-
cation campaigns and struggles against public service cuts, and so on. 
The aim of political theory informed by Deleuze and Guattari would be 
to consider the specific qualities or features of these interlaced points, all 
of them groping toward some sort of patchwork of politicized relations.
Fabulation and Agency
Thus far I have worked through two sets of concepts and problems: 
minor politics and the 99%; and territory and occupation. I want to end 
now with a brief sketch of a third concept and problem. This is Deleuze 
and Guattari’s concept of myth or fabulation and the problem of the col-
lective agency of Occupy. In theory circles at the moment and in some 
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commentary on Occupy there are indications of a return to voluntarism, 
with talk of the people’s ‘will’ as driver of change. From a Deleuzian per-
spective, such voluntarism abstracts an integrated subjectivity from what 
are in fact multiple and disjunctive levels of subjective determination (in 
dimensions that are economic, libidinal, semiotic, organizational, etc.), 
and so fails to ascertain from where politics comes, or to address the 
realities of conflict and reaction amidst and between social formations. 
Deleuze and Guattari would counter this voluntarism with the minor 
political emphasis on practical problematization that was the focus of 
the first part of this talk – political composition not formed of a generic 
quality of human will to overcome all contradictions, but arisen amidst 
the specific and multiform material conditions of ‘the present state of 
things,’ as Marx has it (Thoburn 2013). But there is an additional aspect 
of Deleuzian philosophy that is helpful for getting at the issues of collec-
tive agency or force that those who appeal to the people’s will are, rightly, 
interested in.
Concepts, problems, territories, and so on are constructed by their 
human and non-human participants in the kinds of ways that I have been 
discussing. But they also have a self-positing character – they are created 
by participants, and they simultaneously create themselves, they have a 
life of their own: ‘Creation and self-positing mutually imply each other 
because what is truly created, from the living being to the work of art, 
thereby enjoys a self-positing of itself, or an autopoietic characteristic by 
which it is recognized’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 11).
This isn’t easy; most created entities collapse without becoming self-
positing. But if an entity does achieve this, if it can ‘stand up on its own,’ as 
Deleuze and Guattari put it, then you have something interesting, some-
thing with an agency all of its own (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 164). 
You have a revolution, an art work, a concept, or in our case, you have 
the Occupy movement. What does it mean to say that Occupy is self-
positing? It means that as well as being generated by the people, tactics, 
objects, slogans, sounds and so on that are a part of its territory, it also 
takes on a life of its own, a life that pulls its constituent parts along, creat-
ing them as parts of its event.
Now, when Deleuze and Guattari discuss this self-positing process 
in the context of politics, they sometimes describe it as a process of 
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‘fabulation.’ It’s a word you might have noticed earlier in the quotation 
about the monument. Fabulation or myth-making occurs when the shock 
of an event – be it an earthquake, a work of art, a social upheaval – pro-
duces visions or hallucinatory images that substitute for routine patterns 
of perception and action and come to guide the event. In Deleuze and 
Guattari’s reading, fabulation is a weapon of the weak, a means of fabri-
cating ‘giants,’ as they put it – germinal agents with real world effects in 
the service of political change (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 171). What 
is perhaps most appealing in the context of Occupy is that these fabula-
tions or myths are not so much located in individual people – the cults of 
personality, for instance, of Lenin, Mao, Churchill, what have you – but 
have a desubjectified or anonymous quality, generated and held in the frag-
mented bits of events, stories, medias, affects, material resources, and are 
associated as much with ‘mediocrity’ as with the grandiose (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1994: 171). In this way Deleuze describes myth as a ‘monster,’ it 
‘has a life of its own: an image that is always stitched together, patched up, 
continually growing along the way’ (Deleuze 1989: 150; Deleuze 1997: 
118; Thoburn 2011).
Occupy has had something of this mythical quality, an agential power 
of its own that exists among and between us, and that pulls its particu-
larities along. I’ll end by pointing to one small (and by no means unprob-
lematic) artefact in this myth: the Guy Fawkes mask. Think how different 
these two images of political myth are. Mao, a concentrated myth cen-
tered, in demagogic fashion, on an individual and the truth of his infal-
lible thought. And the Guy Fawkes mask, an anonymous, distributed 
power – a part of the myth of Occupy, open to anyone, signifying a resist-
ance to closure in a leader, vaguely menacing, a little bit silly, mediocre 
even, and pop-cultural to boot. The mask’s impersonal mythical power is 
well expressed in a cartoon in The Occupied Times, a cartoon that takes its 
words from Subcomandante Marcos (and Thomas Müntzer in turn) and 
so forms a red thread across to another political myth of our time: it’s not 
‘who we are’ that’s important, but ‘what we want’: ‘everything for every-
one’ (The Occupied Times 2011: 2).
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Notes
1. A different version of this article was published previously in Mute. Many 
thanks to Mute for allowing its republication here. See http://www.metamute.
org/editorial/articles/minor-politics-territory-and-occupy
2. See Simon Rogers, ‘Occupy protests around the world: full list visualised’, 
The Guardian (November 14, 2011), available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/
news/datablog/2011/oct/17/occupy-protests-world-list-map#data
3. See Patrick Collinson, ‘Budget 2012: Earning £1m? Your Tax Cut Will Pay for 
a Porsche’, The Guardian (March 21, 2012), available at: http://www.guardian.
co.uk/uk/2012/mar/21/budget-2012-earning-1m-tax-cut-pay-for-porsche
4. Since this talk took place, the ConDem administration has enacted what Tory 
regimes have long threatened, making squatting in residential properties 
a criminal offence. The government and media bogeyman, as ever, was the 
squatter who moves into an occupied family home; a clear ruse to deflect 
from the disgraceful situation where people sleep on the streets when 610,000 
homes lie empty in England alone. See Empty Homes Agency, ‘Statistics’ 
(October 2014), available at: http://www.emptyhomes.com/statistics/ 
Attacking working class housing on another front, central government has 
set rents for local authority and housing association tenants to rise to 80% of 
those in the private rental sector, a move that in many parts of the country 
effectively brings to completion the destruction of council housing that began 
with Margaret Thatcher’s policy of ‘right to buy.’ 
5. ‘Félix Guattari and I have remained Marxists, in our two different ways, 
perhaps, but both of us. You see, we think any political philosophy must turn 
on the analysis of capitalism and the ways it has developed. What we find 
most interesting in Marx is his analysis of capitalism as an immanent system 
that’s constantly overcoming its own limitations, and then coming up against 
them once more in a broader form, because its fundamental limit is capital 
itself ’ (Deleuze 1999: 171).
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6. The critique of the formulation of the 99% is well made in Clinical Wasteman, 
‘No Interest but the Interest of Breathing’, Mute, Available at: http://www.
metamute.org/editorial/articles/no-interest-interest-breathing
7. It is worth sketching Marx’s thesis here, and keeping in mind Deleuze and 
Guattari’s distinction between major and minor politics while doing so, for 
the correspondence is striking indeed. Rather than engage with the human 
as social animal – as ‘species being’ in all the socioeconomic complexities 
and antagonisms of its production – bourgeois politics abstracts an isolated 
individual – a ‘partial being,’ the ‘individual withdrawn into himself, 
his private interest and his private desires’ – and devotes all its energies 
to securing this subjectivity. Here, ‘the whole of society is there only to 
guarantee each of its members the conservation of his person, his rights and 
his property’, and, as such, the political ‘sphere in which man behaves as a 
communal being [Gemeinwesen] is degraded to a level below the sphere in 
which he behaves as a partial being.’ This is not a mere ideological ruse, but 
a structural feature of the inverted subjectivity of capital, where the worker, 
who is wholly a product of capitalist social relations, experiences life as an 
individual ‘free’ to sell her labor-power on the open market. It is upon these 
conditions that Marx can proclaim with every reason – and some irony – that 
capital, for all that it ‘comes dripping from head to toe, from every pore, with 
blood and dirt’, is indeed a ‘very Eden of the innate rights of man’ (Marx 1975: 
2301; Marx 1976: 926, 280). 
8. See ‘To be honest I don’t think it should matter one jot whether a patient is 
looked after by a hospital or a medical professional from the public, private or 
charitable sector’, Tory health minister Lord Howe, quoted in Nick Triggle, 
‘Private Sector Have Huge NHS Opportunity’, BBC News (September 7, 
2011), available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-14821946
9. The bowerbird is certainly not the last word on ‘art’ in Deleuze and Guattari. 
I should point out that despite possible indications to the contrary here, 
their writing on art is not best viewed through the avant-garde lens of the 
subsumption of art and everyday life, for they invest considerable import in 
the exacting forms and techniques of modernist practice, in painting and 
cinema especially (see O’Sullivan 2005; Zepke 2005).
10. See the ‘Occupy London Homelessness Statement’, available at: http://
occupylondon.org.uk/homelessness-statement/
11. Many thanks to John Bywater for pointing out this passage on the ‘English’ 
taste for camping, which helps counter any Orientalism in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s concept of nomadic dwelling.
Chapter 7
September 17, 2011:  
Occupy without Counting
Ian Buchanan
The events of September 2011 will probably go down in history in much 
the same way as the events of May 1968, with no-one being able to decide 
what, if anything, actually happened.1 Zuccotti Park in New York City 
briefly flickered in the global consciousness as the spark that threatened 
to ignite a global revolution, just as the Latin Quarter of Paris had four 
decades earlier (Buchanan 2008: 7–12). Within a month over 150 
Occupy events were taking place all over the world and as one expects 
these days the movement was even more prominently and diversely 
represented on the internet. The message the occupiers wanted to relay 
was both simple and complex. ‘We are the 99%,’ they said: the part that 
in Rancière’s terms effectively has no part because the other 1% control a 
profoundly disproportionate share of national – global – wealth (the top 
1% in the US have a greater net worth than the bottom 90%), (Rancière 
1999: 9). They demanded nothing except to be noticed. Although they 
received support from a number of labor unions, including teachers 
and health workers who marched in solidarity with them on October 
5 and November 17, 2011, they were on the whole chary of being too 
closely identified with established political groups. Partly this was out of 
a fear of being coopted, but largely it had to do with the collective desire 
to create a new kind of political organization that was ‘leaderless and 
directionless’ (Greenberg 2011: 12). The occupiers confounded virtually 
every attempt the mainstream media made to understand what was going 
on. Their silence about what they wanted made the point that there is no 
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democratic agency in the US that their concerns could be addressed to 
because all of them are in some way or another beholden to the corporate 
world. And it was this basic fact of American – global – life that they 
wanted to draw attention to and initiate a change in what environmental 
activist Bill McKibben usefully refers to as ‘the political consciousness’ 
(Greenberg 2012b: 47).
Occupy Wall Street and the corresponding Occupy movement 
that sprang up in its wake was premised on the idea that change is not 
achieved by violence or extortion, but rather by presence and perma-
nence. The occupiers put their bodies on the line in order to make their 
point. Situated in Lower Manhattan, literally on the doorstep of Ground 
Zero, Zuccotti Park is anything but a park, if by that we mean lush green 
spaces like New York’s own Central Park or Hyde Park in London. It is 
rather just over 3,000 square meters of concrete interspersed by a few sap-
ling trees that in time may give it at least the appearance of a park. There 
are no toilet facilities or any other basic amenities needed to sustain life 
in a reasonable degree of comfort. So the occupation called for hard liv-
ing and ingenuity. They were fortunate that the weather remained mild 
for the first couple of weeks but by late October the first snows had fallen, 
making life very uncomfortable indeed. Because generators weren’t per-
mitted, electricity had to be produced using pedal power. It was the drive 
in the legs of determined occupiers that heated frozen bodies and kept 
the media center going and recharged all the cell phones and laptops. 
Amplifiers weren’t permitted either, so public meetings were facilitated 
via a call and response process in which the speaker’s words were relayed, 
person to person, from the front of the audience to the rear. The occupi-
ers were aided by the fact that Zuccotti Park is a private park controlled 
by Brookfield Properties, who were far from supportive. This meant it 
was exempt from curfew laws that would have applied in a public park. 
Occupying Zuccotti Park was never easy and the City of New York did 
everything it could to make it as difficult as possible. It directed homeless 
people towards the park and dropped off released prisoners there and 
infiltrated the occupiers and spied on them, with the result that several 
were put on charges. Then on November 15, 2011, the police cleared the 
park and brought the occupation to an end.2 The occupiers produced a 
manifesto of sorts, ‘The Declaration of the Occupation of New York City,’ 
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as well as a kind of newspaper, The Occupied Wall Street Journal, which 
published ideas put to and ratified by the General Assembly, an ad hoc 
group of occupiers who listened to and voted on proposals presented to 
them by anyone with the interest to do so. Some of the proposals were 
practical – such as Adbuster editor Micah White’s call for the reinstate-
ment of the Glass–Steagall Act, which from 1933 until 1999 separated 
commercial and investment banking, thus protecting America from 
precisely the kind of speculative lending that led to the global financial 
meltdown of 2007 – but many were not, at least not in a straightforward 
sense. Calls that corporate influence on government should be ended 
cannot easily be enacted.3 But the manifesto was never really that impor-
tant as far as the wider public was concerned. It functioned simply as a 
chronicle of what the people were thinking in those heady weeks of the 
occupation, rather than a carefully thought out and precisely articulated 
position statement, much less a utopian vision of the future. The true 
legacy of Occupy Wall Street will not be found in its pages. It was rather 
the process of putting the manifesto together that was important not the 
end result. Its production was an example of participatory democracy in 
action – the set of principles the occupiers wanted to live by was created 
and embraced by the occupiers themselves. All proposals required the 
support of at least 90% of the General Assembly in order to be ratified, 
which is far more onerous than parliamentary democracies anywhere 
else requires. And of course that was precisely the point: it demonstrated 
that democracy as we know it, that is, democracy as it is practiced in the 
United States and elsewhere is a pale shadow of ‘true’ democracy, which 
is open to all and premised on the notion that only near-consensus can be 
regarded as representative of the will of the people. As impractical as this 
model of democracy might be, its symbolic value should not be underes-
timated. It bespoke a powerful hunger for social justice, for a political and 
economic system that represents the needs of the many not the greed of 
the few that not even President Obama could fail to perceive.4
One may put it even more strongly than that. It could be said that the 
occupiers staging of ‘real’ democracy revived the idea that, as Rancière 
argues, political society is at its core, in its very foundation, consensus 
driven: ‘[B]efore becoming the reasonable virtue of individuals and 
groups who agree to discuss their problems and build up their interests, 
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[consensus] is a determined regime of the perceptible, a particular mode 
of visibility of right as arkhê of the community’ (Rancière 1999: 107). 
Consensus is not the goal of politics, but its starting point, its possibility, 
because it stipulates that everyone has the right to be counted, to count, 
in the formation of political ideas and decision. But as Rancière also 
argues, consensus is in some ways the end of politics precisely because 
it demands/assumes that everyone is, has been, counted and therefore 
leaves no place for the part who have no part. It obscures, then, the place 
of dissent (Rancière 1999: 116). The staging of a regime of consensus 
within a political environment such as twenty-first century USA that 
does not even pretend to be motivated by or interested in consensus as 
a political ideal escapes this double bind because it simultaneously per-
forms consensus as an idea but does so in a context in which the per-
formers continue to be viewed as belonging to the part who have no part. 
Occupy Wall Street was in this sense a highly complex piece of political 
theatre, but it was also more than that because the effects of its perfor-
mance were not purely symbolic, but completely real.
There are of course obvious political reasons why certain commenta-
tors would want to deny that anything takes place in these kinds of events 
in which a populace suddenly and without warning or obvious provoca-
tion decides to express its dissent, and does so in a way that isn’t aimed at 
either bringing down a particular regime or taking power. It is hardly sur-
prising that pundits who generally identify with the hegemonic regime 
would tend to claim that events like Occupy Wall Street are ultimately 
inconsequential, that is more or less their reason for being. It is a bread-
and-butter move for someone like Niall Ferguson to claim that Occupy 
Wall Street is a giant, misguided waste of time because the real issue of the 
day isn’t the fact that the top 1% control the bulk of the nation’s wealth, 
it is fact that there are so many baby boomers around getting ready to 
hoover up all that free money from social security and government health 
insurance (Mills 2011). What is surprising, though, is that the number 
of basically sympathetic observers, including Michael Greenberg (who 
otherwise does such a marvellous job of reporting on Occupy Wall Street 
for The New York Review of Books) should find the movement wanting. 
In an article that documents the way the New York police infiltrated and 
harassed the occupiers, Greenberg describes the occupiers as corrupted 
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by their own ‘inviolable purity of principle (“We don’t talk to people with 
power, because to do so would be to acknowledge the legitimacy of their 
power”).’ I do not want to suggest that the occupiers should somehow 
be seen as immune to criticism. But I do want to suggest that the politi-
cal frameworks in place today are in many ways conceptually inadequate 
to deal with events like Occupy Wall Street, which falls outside most 
people’s standard paradigms for understanding political interactions 
between the manifestly powerful and the apparently powerless. Usually 
power is equated with violence and more especially the control of the 
right to violence. The fact that non-violent movements like Occupy Wall 
Street challenge that very idea, indeed that basic assumption, that politics 
ultimately boils down to who has the best weapons and the most troops 
is in many ways the most overlooked (in the media, I mean) aspect of 
political activism today.
Conceptual advances are, in this sense, political acts in themselves, 
because they open a space, or more precisely, create the form of the 
expression for new political ideas (as the content of the expression) and 
thereby enable political voices to be heard that would otherwise be pre-
sumed silent or adjudged irrelevant.
This is one of the key reasons that the concept of the event has 
been so central a preoccupation for critical theory for the past decade 
or more; it is starting point for any inquiry about ‘what happened?’ Of 
the several philosophers who have given thought to the concept of the 
event, the most influential – in critical theory, at least – are undoubtedly 
Alain Badiou and Gilles Deleuze. The event is a crucial concern for 
both, but they each approach it quite differently. At the risk of grossly 
oversimplifying their respective arguments, I will try to generalize the 
difference between them as follows. For Badiou the event gives rise to 
truth (it is truth’s condition), whereas for Deleuze it gives rise to sense 
(it is sense’s condition). Badiou’s event, as a truth-event, demands our 
commitment – it therefore hovers on the border between conscious and 
unconscious, voluntary and involuntary, that which we choose to do and 
that which we feel compelled to do. Our commitment to a particular 
truth is not so much a rational decision based upon the weighing up of 
evidence as a lightning strike, an epiphany that hits us and in an instant 
reshapes our view of the world. Badiou tends to give mathematical 
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examples to explain what he means by truth because for him the real 
quality of a truth is its inarguable nature: a triangle has three sides, a 
square has four, and so on. Similarly, one could look to physics, and the 
various laws formulated there: gravity means everything must fall. It is 
an open question, it seems to me, whether any political idea can attain a 
comparable status, but for Badiou this is what conviction would mean in 
a political context: the unshakeable belief in the rectitude of a particular 
idea and the concomitant clarity of perception this conviction affords 
(Badiou 2012: 60–61).
For Deleuze, too, the event is a kind of lightning strike, but it demands 
only that we adapt to it. It does not demand our conviction, or even our 
belief. The event for Deleuze is an eruption of immanence, if you will, 
a bursting forth of a kind of immanent time-space continuum in which 
something transcendent (sense) appears. In a late essay, published after 
his death, Deleuze even called this type of eruption of immanence ‘life’ 
(Buchanan 2006). In his work with Guattari, space was usually referred 
to as smooth space (but it had other names as well – the body without 
organs, the plane of immanence, the plane of composition, the plateau 
and so on). This life-sense as we may perhaps call it (to distinguish it 
from ordinary or semantic sense) has a structuring effect inasmuch as it 
gives shape to the world as we live and experience it. F. Scott Fitzgerald’s 
notion of ‘the crack’ is, for Deleuze and Guattari, something of a 
touchstone example of what they mean by the event. It is a kind of mental 
‘clean break,’ a ‘brain snap’ as some people say, after which nothing is the 
same. Examples of cracks might include the realization that one’s job 
is worthless and not deserving of the effort you put into it, or that you 
aren’t as talented as you once thought (which was Fitzgerald’s feeling), 
and so on (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 198–200). This is by no means at 
odds with anything Badiou says about the event, except that for Deleuze 
this eruption of immanence (the opening up of a smooth space in other 
words) does not necessarily correlate with an idea of truth. It is also 
worth noting that the event for Deleuze and Guattari is not measured 
by a change in the state of things – a large crowd gathering in a public 
square in Cairo or camping out in New York City is not intrinsically an 
event in Deleuze and Guattari’s thinking. It only becomes recognizable as 
an event if it brings about a transformation of thought itself, if it yields a 
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new idea, a new way of acting.5 And I would argue that is precisely what 
Occupy did: it opened up a new space of thought.
In contrast to Badiou’s truth-event, Deleuze and Guattari’s smooth 
space of thought, or life-sense, is not universal or universalizable. The 
crack Fitzgerald experiences is a truth for him, but not for anyone else, 
not even Zelda Fitzgerald, who experienced her own crack. It is his sense 
of his world, not anyone else’s. That’s why we call it his life. And even if we 
empathize with his outlook on things and feel that it somehow describes 
our own world too, that it has something to say about our own life, it is 
a not a truth we can be faithful to in Badiou’s sense (as he applies it to 
ideological worldviews like communism, for instance). I can believe in 
the existence or occurrence of the crack (‘clean break,’ ‘brain snap’, etc.) 
in someone’s life, but only in a formal sense. The specific content of 
someone else’s crack will always elude me because as Tolstoy more or less 
said we’re all unhappy, that is to say, broken or cracked, in our own way. 
What pushes me over the edge does not have to be the same as whatever 
pushes another person over the edge for us to both say we’ve experienced 
a crack. Yet for that very reason our respective experiences of cracking 
are only comparable in an abstract way. This is not to say that for Deleuze 
and Guattari there are no such thing as collective events, or events that 
affect more than one person, but it does mean that universality cannot be 
one of its defining criteria, as it is for Badiou. The other difference is that 
for Deleuze and Guattari the life-sense event is involuntary – Fitzgerald 
doesn’t choose to accept or adhere to the crack, it comes up upon him 
without him knowing about it in advance and leaves him a changed man 
in its wake. For Badiou, in contrast, the event requires our fidelity, we 
have to choose to believe in it and place it at the center of our lives.
The event for Deleuze and Guattari is a radical break with the normal 
continuity of things that at once interrupts the usual flow of daily life 
and initiates its own counter-flow.6 This was precisely what Occupy Wall 
Street did: it brought about a radical break with the normal continuity of 
daily life, not just in lower Manhattan, but globally, as the whole world 
stopped to see what was happening there. That it could do so without 
violence or even the threat of violence is remarkable, particularly in an 
era that is in many ways defined by the so-called ‘War on Terror,’ which 
had its beginnings – Ground Zero – a short distance from Zuccotti Park. 
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Having said that, it is important to see that Occupy Wall Street’s non-
violent approach, the so-called passive resistance it exercised, is anything 
but passive. It is a misnomer that robs the non-violent approach to 
protest of its core, namely the galvanizing effect of a desire for change. As 
Perry Anderson writes, Ghandi himself translated satyagraha as ‘truth-
force’ rather than passive resistance. Inspired by Tolstoy, Ghandi coined 
this neologism himself to conceive a vision of non-violent resistance 
infused with a religious idea of transcendence (Anderson 2012: 6).7 For 
Badiou, this is precisely how an event like Occupy Wall Street works. 
It ignites what he calls a ‘truth process’ – it makes apparent to all that 
‘human animals are capable of bringing into being justice, equality, 
and universality (the practical presence of what the Idea can do). It is 
perfectly apparent that a high proportion of political oppression consists 
in the unremitting negation of this capacity’ (Badiou 2012: 87).
The fact that people take the trouble to interrupt their own lives 
to commence and participate in an occupy movement and do so in 
substantial numbers is living proof that in the words of the anti-WTO 
protesters from the decade before Occupy Wall Street, ‘another world is 
possible.’ What counts is the act, the willingness to disrupt one’s own life 
and beyond that the lives of others, and beyond that the life of the social 
machine itself. As Badiou puts it, speaking of the occupation of Cairo’s 
Tahrir Square in January 2011, which sparked the Arab Spring: even if 
the occupiers ‘are a million strong, that still does not represent many of 
the 80 million Egyptians. In terms of electoral numbers it is a guaranteed 
fiasco! But this million, present in this site, is enormous if we stop 
measuring the political impact (as in voting) by inert, separated number’ 
(Badiou 2012: 58). Deleuze and Guattari call this space one occupies 
without counting ‘smooth space,’ which they contrast to ‘striated space.’ 
In what follows I will argue that Occupy Wall Street can usefully be 
thought of as having created a new kind of smooth space. Ironically, it 
is perhaps Badiou who, while severely critical of Deleuze’s attachment to 
the concept of the virtual, gives us the most useful illustration of precisely 
what is meant here by smooth space. Speaking of Spain’s indignados, the 
loose social movement which arose in response to the ‘austerity measures’ 
the Spanish government was forced to impose by the European Central 
Bank as a condition of its debt relief (following the global financial crisis 
September 17, 2011: Occupy without Counting  199
of 2007 and the resulting meltdown of the euro), Badiou argues that as 
noble as their cause is, because it is fuelled only by negative emotions – a 
desire for ‘real democracy’ to replace the ‘bad democracy’ they have to 
live with – their movement isn’t as powerful or as sustainable as it would 
be if it were underpinned by an ‘affirmative Idea’ (Badiou 2012: 97). The 
Idea, Badiou says, is blind to the self-evidence of what is before it – the 
local defeats, as in the case of Occupy Wall Street, which was rousted out 
of Zuccotti Park after only two months – and far-sighted concerning the 
future that no-one else has eyes to see – it isn’t concerned with results, 
with counting in the here and now, what it awakens is the force of History 
itself, the certainty that nothing – not even capitalism – is forever (Badiou 
2012: 98–9).
Now, I would not want to say that smooth space is identical with 
Badiou’s conception of the Idea, but I do want to make the point that it 
is both conceptual and historical in nature. Take for example Deleuze 
and Guattari’s key exhibit, Paul Virilio’s concept of the ‘fleet in being.’ 
At a certain point in history, naval commanders arrived at the idea that 
the ocean could be dominated by the superior mobility of forces and the 
power to interdict the mobility of others rather than through the control 
of fixed positions. This idea, which was fully an event in both Badiou’s 
and Deleuze’s terms, was communicated from sea to land to air to space. 
Now war in all its modalities is informed by this idea. There have been 
moments when this idea has seemed out of step with history. Germany’s 
Schlieffen Plan to sweep across Western Europe came horribly unstuck 
in 1914 when their planned war of mobility was unseated by the twin 
powers of the machine gun and barbed wire and turned into a standstill 
war of attrition claiming the lives of millions. But almost as soon as the 
first trenches were dug the opposing forces began scheming to regain 
the power of mobility and within the space of a few years solutions were 
found: tanks and airplanes rendered the gridlocked space of the battle-
field smooth all over again. In this way a new pattern of action was set in 
motion: striated space was to be defeated by technological advancement. 
But within a few decades, by the time of the Vietnam War, if not sooner, 
this model was also brought unstuck. Today, the incredible mobility 
of high-tech weapons is countered by the fluidity of the identity of the 
enemy. The unseen and unknown enemy compels the one who seeks 
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them to give up at least some of their mobility for the apparent security 
of checkpoints and surveillance procedures. In each instance, the Idea 
of space dominated by mobility remains very much alive (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987: 480).
It is this power – the power of an Idea as a force that shatters or cracks 
the status quo and lets in a new kind of light, one that hasn’t shone there 
before – that is the key to understanding Deleuze and Guattari’s concept 
of smooth space. Let me offer a different example that will hopefully 
bring it into even sharper relief. I would claim that smooth space is com-
parable to David Harvey’s conception of the urban commons. He argues 
that the 2011 occupations of Syntagma Square in Athens, Tahrir Square 
in Cairo, and the Plaça de Catalunya in Barcelona transformed these pub-
lic places into latter day variations of the medieval idea of the commons. 
Importantly, although these spaces are all physical places that one can go 
and visit, the urban commons itself is not, it is a social relation, and that 
is precisely how smooth space should be understood I believe. Harvey 
writes: ‘The common is not to be constructed, therefore, as a particular 
kind of thing, asset or even social process, but as an unstable and mal-
leable social relation between a particular well-defined social group and 
those aspects of its actually existing or yet-to-be-created social and/or 
physical environment deemed crucial to its life and livelihood. There is, 
in effect, a social practice of commoning’ (Harvey 2012: 73). The key to 
commoning, as Harvey sees it, is that it removes the relation between a 
group and a space from commodity exchange: the commons is off-limits 
to the market. This amounts to saying the commons is a virtual space as 
Deleuze and Guattari would put it and that the virtual space of the com-
mons is produced by the occupiers of that space, which is an important 
clarification of what Deleuze and Guattari mean by smooth space.
Virtual does not mean unreal, as Deleuze and Guattari often remind 
us. The virtual is fully real, as real as an idea, an image, and an innova-
tion, is real. It is real because its effects are real. Here one might think of 
Jameson’s frequently made point about the need to keep alive what he 
calls the utopian imagination: without bold ideas for the future, that is, 
ideas which envisage a break – a disruption, as Jameson calls it – with the 
present state of affairs we are condemned to simply let things continue as 
they are. And this, as Walter Benjamin rightly said, is the real emergency. 
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The smooth space may not suffice to save us, as Deleuze and Guattari 
caution, but it does at least apply the handbrake to history and that may 
just be enough.
Works Cited
Anderson, Perry. 2012. ‘Ghandi Centre Stage’. London Review of Books ( July 5): 3–11.
Badiou, Alain. 2012. The Rebirth of History: Times of Riots and Uprisings. Trans. 
Gregory Elliott. London: Verso.
Buchanan, Ian. 2008. Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus. London: Continuum.
Buchanan, Ian. 2006 ‘Deleuze’s ‘Life’ Sentences’. Polygraph 18: 129–47.
Greenberg, Michael 2011. ‘In Zuccotti Park’. The New York Review of Books 
(November 10). Accessed May 4, 2015 from: http://www.nybooks.com/articles/
archives/2011/nov/10/zuccotti-park/?pagination=false
Greenberg, Michael. 2012a. ‘New York: The Police and the Protesters’. 
The New York Review of Books (October 11). Accessed May 4, 2015 
from:  http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/oct/11/
new-york-police-and-protesters/?pagination=false
Greenberg, Michael. 2012b. ‘What Future for Occupy Wall Street?’. The New York 
Review of Books (February 9–22): 46–8.
Harvey, David. 2012. Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution. 
London: Verso.
Mills, Nicholaus. 2011. ‘Occupy Wall Street: A Primer’. The Guardian (November 
7). Accessed May 4, 2015 from: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/
cifamerica/2011/nov/07/occupy-wall-street-primer
Rancière, Jacques. 1999. Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy. Trans. Julie Rose. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Notes
1. In November 2011, Nicholaus Mills from The Guardian in the UK helpfully 
published a cross-section of opinions from prominent cultural and political 
pundits, spanning the spectrum from Naomi Klein to Niall Ferguson. See 
also the April 2, 2012, issue of The Nation, which similarly carries a round-up 
of opinion on the occupy movement, albeit all from a left perspective.
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2. Details of living conditions are drawn from Greenberg (2011).
3. Examples drawn from Greenberg (2011).
4. In a speech given on December 6, 2011, at Osawatomie, Kansas, President 
Obama said that the issues identified by the Occupy Wall Street movement 
were the ‘defining issues of our time’ (Greenberg 2012b: 46).
5. As they observe, following Gabriel Tarde, the French revolution began when 
peasants stopped doffing their caps to the aristocracy, not when the heads 
began to roll (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 216).
6. In their book on Kafka, Deleuze and Guattari describe this counter-flow as a 
‘witches’ flight.’
7.  In an interesting twist of history, the Phillip Glass opera based on the life of 
Ghandi, Satyagraha, was playing at the Lincoln Center in New York for much 
of the period of Occupy Wall Street’s tenancy at Zuccotti Park. See Greenberg 
(2012b: 46).
Chapter 8
Negative Space War Machines
David Burrows
‘Suck My Kutzs’1
With the first cuts, the first voids appear. The first negative spaces appear. 
A window in London’s Milbank is kicked repeatedly, cracks radiate from 
a hole – filmed and photographed by much of Britain’s news media. The 
following day, footage of a fire extinguisher dropped by a student from 
the roof of the Conservative Party’s HQ is uploaded to YouTube. The fire 
extinguisher scatters ranks of police who survive unscathed except for 
minor injuries. Nervous systems are stimulated by the first day of mass 
protest against plans to charge full fees for undergraduate education in 
England and Wales. The mass media twitch and pulse anticipating the 
conflict to come.
Day X. The stepson of a millionaire rock star – ‘out of his mind’ on 
LSD, whiskey and valium – swings on a flag poll at the Cenotaph in 
Whitehall, London. Kettles are sprung like traps on unsuspecting pro-
testors. Some though are prepared. The Book Bloc batter police lines 
with scaled-up cardboard replicas of Our Word is Our Weapon (2002) by 
Marcos, End Game (1957) by Beckett, One Dimensional Man (1964) by 
Marcuse and Just William (1921) by Compton. Others improvising with 
metal barriers join them and punch holes in the cordon at Parliament 
Square. As evening descends, the government votes to increase university 
fees for home and European students and confrontation between protes-
tors and police escalate. Television news leads with stories of violence in 
the streets of Westminster, an attempted storming of the Treasury and a 
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group of students sitting in the National Gallery, refusing to leave, sur-
rounded by ‘millions of pounds worth of paintings.’ Later, a chauffer-
driven Rolls-Royce limousine in London’s West End is splattered with 
paint. One of the vehicles windows is breached and an aristocrat sitting in 
the back seat of the car is poked with a stick.
On an overcast day in March, swarms of protestors peel off the Trade 
Union Congress (TUC) march to Hyde Park in London to occupy 
Oxford Street. A giant, ramshackle horse representing the TUC lumbers 
towards the center of Oxford Circus and is sacrificed. The pantomime 
horse is set on fire. Dense, black plumes of smoke are visible for miles 
around and the smell of melting tar fills the air. As does the sound of 
whirring electric motors closing shutters, signalling the area is closed for 
business. Rather than join the zombie-shuffle from point A to point B 
(the prearranged rallying point from which a message to the powerful is 
to be sent), a few thousand protestors transform the West End into a car-
nival of refusal. UK Uncut occupy the luxury goods shop Fortnum and 
Mason and police form a ring around the store, serving as a membrane 
for a vacuole of discontent.
At first, the UK’s news media equated protests against austerity mea-
sures with violent confrontation – the sought-after photograph was a 
smashed window. Soon another tale emerged, told by journalists close 
to the action: the birth of a new kind of protestor, the networked indi-
vidual connected through social media. This declaration was followed 
by another: a new kind of protest movement was identified by commen-
tators, presented as an alliance forged through weak links, rapid collec-
tive decision-making and organization without hierarchies. But there is 
another story to be told about this period of unrest and protest. As with 
other manifestations of refusal around the world in 2010 and 2011, pro-
testing against the coalition government’s austerity measures involved 
producing the space for protest. This took the form of occupations, pro-
test swarms, teach-ins and gatherings; collective actions that rejected rep-
resentational politics and embraced pragmatism and protocols and tactics 
developed by anti-globalization activists. All of which contributed to the 
production of protest as an occupation of space and time different to that 
sanctioned by orthodox political organizations and traditions. Protestors 
experimented with producing negative spaces that traversed and bored 
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holes into the representations of organized politics and the mass media. 
By 2011, for many the issue of education fees was succeeded by a focus 
on the 1% whose spiritual home is the square mile governed by the City 
of London Corporation, targeted by Occupy London. By then, opposing 
austerity was no longer equated with violence in the UK, rather it was 
equated with a group of people who met daily on the steps of St Paul’s 
Cathedral, experimenting with ways of living in tents in a small patch of 
ground in the heart of the capital.
This essay is concerned with this recent period of unrest and oppo-
sition to student fee increases in London, in particular the occupations, 
teach-ins and gatherings that not only manifested protest but the space 
of protest. It is an account that draws upon my involvement with Arts 
Against Cuts during this period, and thus will be a partial account and 
include an assessment of the role art played in producing the nega-
tive space of protest, experiments named here as negative space war 
machines. In this, the essay is specifically concerned with three interre-
lated problems.
1. Saying no. Protestors said no or expressed refusal in different 
ways, something mirrored in the discussions concerning nega-
tivity, refusal and affirmation that took place during this period 
of protest in various scenes or circles, many of which over-
lapped. Often views were polarized; actions and discussions 
included a militant rejection of affirmation as well as an explo-
ration of the relationship of dissent and affirmation. A constel-
lation of names, that include Marx, Deleuze, Negri, Marcos and 
Badiou, plotted different, competing political and philosophi-
cal ideas circulating during this period of unrest. However, to 
frame this period of protest with a political or philosophical 
concept or name would be unwise. Better to view recent pro-
tests as a testing ground for competing orientations, better to 
focus on the modes of operation employed than present the 
concepts and ideas of philosophers as providing meaning for 
events. To that end, this essay charts various instances of refusal 
and reflects upon the relevance of philosophical concepts and 
orientations. Two orientations in particular are addressed: (a) 
total refusal to produce anything that might hinder collapse or 
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facilitate business as usual; and (b) dissent as the space from 
which something new might be produced.
2. Space. Protestors were concerned with occupying places of 
commerce, institutions and (so-called) public space, and with 
the sphere of media communication and social network tech-
nology. A corollary of opposing the government was a ques-
tioning of hierarchical organizations and forms of decision-
making. Movements formed which knotted together two 
modes of address: the physical (face-to-face address) and the 
mediated (face-less or Facebook address). It is the latter mode 
of address that has received most media attention – producing 
the much-heralded networked individual already mentioned – 
but this is to misunderstand the role and importance of mass 
communication technology for many protestors, which as an 
important aspect of protest culture might best be considered 
as a tool rather than a point de capiton for protestors. A more 
accurate account of the role of communication technology in 
this period of protest would focus on the knotting of the seem-
ingly infinite, inhuman scale of cyberspace and communication 
technology with the space and time of occupation and protest. 
This knot of cyber and physical space enabled individuals who 
may have previously felt atomized to discover the joys of collec-
tive action. While the majority of protestors were far from class 
conscious, many shared a class identity of a kind: the educated 
without a future apart from the promise of debt slavery and 
precarious work if they could get it. One of the contentions of 
this essay is that it was physical space that served as the medium 
through which protestors produced a collective expression of 
refusal and commonism.
3. Art. While many artists and art students were involved in the 
protests, very little was produced by protestors that could be 
described as conventional art, or what style magazines and 
newspapers would term contemporary art. For the most part, 
banners and slogans were produced that articulated statements 
of opposition to the powerful. In addition to this, there were 
Negative Space War Machines 207
performances, writing and art produced for the like-minded – 
art for others involved in the movement. Both these approaches 
addressed what the role of art could be in this period of protest. 
Within gatherings of protestors, conventional art was not wel-
come or did not surface, not least because the hierarchies (and 
ideologies) of the business of art were at odds with the non-
hierarchical ideals of the movement. It is significant that anyone 
wanting to make art, perform or write can do so by protesting 
and find an audience at protest events. In fact, in the context of 
protest, it might be true to say anyone and everyone can be an 
artist if they wish to claim this mantle. In addressing the role 
of art during protest, alternatives to market and institutional 
conventions became tangible for many artists and students. 
Reflecting on this, this essay argues that it is art that turns its 
back on the powerful and public opinion to address or engen-
der a collective that is most worthy of attention, for such imper-
manent and contingent productions function to open up new 
horizons or perspectives beyond opposition in the spaces pro-
duced by protest.
Saying ‘no,’ occupying space and the production of art: three prob-
lems relating to this recent period of protest. It is no easy task to address 
them all and arrive at a coherent conclusion or overview. Instead this 
essay addresses the various ways protest challenged existing and domi-
nant subjective and discursive formations by experimenting with the 
production of negative spaces.
Just Say No!
In the novel Chevengur (1978), a story by the Russian writer Andrei 
Platonov, about a troubled utopia (a collectivized village), a man fright-
ens himself with a dream in which he thinks his heart has stopped and 
on awakening sits on the floor and asks, ‘Where then is socialism?’ He 
peers into a murky room but cannot find it. It seems to him that he had 
this thing already but wasted it in sleep amongst strangers. Fearing pun-
ishment he runs off ‘into his own distance.’ The reader senses that this 
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precious thing had already been lost before the man was visited by this 
disturbing dream or perhaps the precious thing was only ever an elusive 
idea of a thing yet to be produced.
Many involved in the protests have voiced similar feelings of disquiet. 
It is not that a precious thing has been lost exactly; rather, it is the feel-
ing that the act of saying ‘no,’ an act that should be simple and straight-
forward, is more complex than it once was. No doubt, this is due in 
part to many lacking a faith in any politics of representation. No doubt 
too, globalization has made opposing or reforming capitalism, the goal 
of many protestors in UK, a much harder task. During the print union 
and miner’s strikes in the UK in the 1980s, the unions identified a clear 
goal and course of action: stop the transportation of newspapers or coal 
by drawing a line, a picket line, across a gate or road. Action was envis-
aged as taking place on a local scale and having a national impact. In the 
1990s and 2000s different spatial configurations were produced. Anti-
capitalist movements traveled the world and converged on the gathering 
points and summits of global powers within various cities. In response, 
governments created secure lines or corridors between protected cor-
dons or sealed vacuoles, so as to allow business to be conducted with-
out interruption. The protestor’s actions, though often spectacular and 
confrontational, had little effect or influence. In recent times, occupation 
rather than confrontation has become prevalent, leading some to declare 
‘Bartleby, the Scrivener’ (1853) by Herman Melville to be the model for 
a new kind of protestor, and the first occupier of Wall Street.2
‘Bartleby, the Scrivener’ is a strange tale of a man staying put and 
refusing to do anything. Whenever his employer makes a request, includ-
ing asking the scrivener to vacate the attorney’s office in Wall Street, 
Bartleby replies, ‘I prefer not to.’ When asked about a change of employ-
ment or environment he indicates he would ‘prefer not to’ as he is not 
particular; that is, he has no specific desire to do anything in particular. 
What is confusing for the attorney, who means the scrivener well, is that 
Bartleby’s statement ‘I prefer not to,’ as Gilles Deleuze (1998: 68) argues, 
is asymmetrical grammar or agrammatical; it is the affirmation of a nega-
tive that withdraws from dialogue.
Paul Mason, in Why it’s Kicking Off Everywhere (2011), continually 
remarks upon how, in his encounters with European protestors, he rarely 
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encountered anyone willing or concerned with identifying with a polit-
ical ideology or set of demands. It might be the case that he didn’t try 
hard enough (the recent protests brought many class warriors out of the 
shadows and the websites of various protest collectives carry numerous 
statements and lists of demands); but Mason’s observation was echoed 
in oft-heard criticism of the movement’s refusal to identify as one mass or 
group promoting an agreed political doctrine, program or set of demands. 
When asked to articulate the political doctrines of various protest move-
ments many replied ‘I prefer not to.’ Mason understood something that 
others critical of the protestor’s lack of identification with a named or 
historic political position did not. The refusal to identify is a refusal of 
representation, a refusal of the modes and organizations of mainstream 
media and politics mentioned earlier. ‘Speak with us, not for us,’ as the 
popular refrain goes.3 And this approach is effective to a point; without 
a head to speak to or a name to cite or negotiate with, the conventions of 
representational politics fails.
Comparing Bartleby’s acts of refusal with recent protest might not 
be inappropriate though. The scrivener ends his days in a prison or asy-
lum refusing to eat and rejecting all assistance and kindness. Eventually 
he dies: a sad end but, as suggested by the narrator, perhaps one ensur-
ing Bartleby’s freedom or sovereignty until his last breath. Perhaps this 
is where the analogy of Bartleby as contemporary protestor seems lim-
ited, the scrivener’s silence and inactivity towards death would have been 
out of place in the camps occupying the steps of St Paul’s Cathedral in 
London and Zuccotti Park in New York. Bartleby’s asymmetrical gram-
mar and occupation of space is, however, a compelling example of a 
refusal that forecloses exchange and dialogue. Such refusal is relevant 
when analyzing recent dissent and also when differentiating between 
protests that demand the powerful accommodate or afford specific inter-
ests from the refusal that does not afford representation or dialogue, and 
declines accommodation by the powerful. In this latter mode of protest, 
the refrain ‘we prefer not to’ plays out in many different ways.
The voices that articulated the most militant forms of refusal argued 
that creative solutions and actions addressing the crisis of capitalism do 
nothing more than breathe life into the failing organizations and econ-
omies of capitalism. To explore this idea I turn to perhaps a surprising 
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source, the thoughts of Nick Land, the neo-reactionary philosopher 
whose early interpretations of Deleuze and Guattari’s writing were deliv-
ered with a negative charge. In the essay ‘Machinic Desire’ he states:
Capital is not an essence but a tendency, the formula of which 
is decoding, or market driven immanentization, progressively 
subordinating social reproduction to techno-commercial rep-
lication. (Land 2011: 480)
Land’s statement suggests that creative acts and social productions, even 
those deemed alternative or oppositional, feed capitalist and techno-
logical development: the crumbling edge of capitalism is also the cut-
ting edge of capitalism. Many would agree with Land’s assessment even 
if they reject his politics. Some protestors argued that only action (or 
inaction) that contributed to a catastrophic collapse of capitalist econo-
mies (for which no creative solution is produced) could arrest or resist 
this tendency of market-driven immanentization.4 The protestors’ refusal 
to develop hierarchical organizations and identifications and a fixed pro-
gram of actions echoed another aspect of Land’s (1997) early thinking, 
expressed in a short interview published online by Wire, in which he is 
asked about why the internet reproduces dull organizations and relations 
of power. He replies:
You have to understand that organisation involves subordinat-
ing low level units to some higher level functional program. 
In the most extreme cases, like in biological organisms, every 
cell is defunctionalised, turned off, except for that one special-
ised function that it is allocated by the organic totality. And 
hence the preponderant part of its potential is deactivated 
in the interests of some higher-level unity. That’s why the 
more organised things get, the less interesting their behavior 
becomes – “interesting” simply meaning here how freely they 
explore a range of possible behaviors, or how “nomadic” they 
are … Organisation is suppression. It’s more accurate to say 
that systems which avoid self-organisation whilst maintain-
ing trajectories of productive innovation end up parasitically 
inhabited by organisms of all kinds, whether those organ-
isms are biological organisms, corporations or state systems. 
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The history of life on this planet right through to Microsoft 
is of the successive suppression of distributed, innovated sys-
tems. (Land 1997)
This concern was not limited to a small community of protestors and phi-
losophers. The documentary filmmaker Adam Curtis has expressed simi-
lar reservations about the internet and social media technology, driven 
by narcissism and the ideologies of selfhood and selfishness. In talks and 
interviews he suggested that to advocate for self-organizing societies 
empowered by new forms of connectivity and communication was fool-
ish. His example of a game of Pong being controlled by ‘a hive mind’ is 
chilling (Curtis 2011). In 1991 in California, scientist Loren Carpenter 
invited a group of people to take part in an experiment. The group quickly 
perceived that by waving paddles with red and green faces they could 
control the virtual bats projected on a large screen in front of them. They 
do so as two groups, spontaneously playing the game without commu-
nication or instruction from a leader. Curtis hints that this so-called hive 
mentality or organization may just be articulating a pre-designed system; 
participants delight in their collective cleverness but ultimately they may 
be nothing more than an expression of that system. Curtis feels the same 
way about the internet, which he feels will be seen in years to come as 
an expression of powerful systems of control, Facebook being seen as 
similar to the social realist paintings produced in the era of Stalinism 
(Curtis 2011).
But rejecting collective action and communication, renouncing desire 
and doing nothing, as we learn from Bartleby, is perilous; it is after all an 
unaffordable path, and does not necessarily challenge existing relations. 
To avoid nihilistic paths or noble suicide, refusal must produce new 
horizons. In the interview Land suggests that while organization pro-
duces hierarchies and curtails potential, self-organization may counter 
parasitic inhabitation by various agencies, allowing bodies and minds to 
freely ‘explore a range of possible behaviors, or how “nomadic” they are.’ 
Perhaps Land articulates here something that many UK protestors val-
ued: self-organization or autonomy as opposed to majority rule or hierar-
chical organization of bodies and minds.
While it would not be true to say that protest groups eschewed orga-
nization or preparation, as stated earlier, many protestors did refuse to 
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create organizations with fixed and hierarchical roles in favor of gather-
ings convened by facilitators. These gatherings proceeded through spon-
taneous organization producing weak links between groups and individ-
uals and consensus voting (allowing people to opt out of actions).
The role of facilitator was often taken up or adopted by individuals 
in relation to the demands of a situation or event on the understanding 
that the role lasted for the duration of that event. Not only this, events 
and gatherings were arranged without a set program or agenda. At such 
events, the order of activities and items for discussion were decided on 
the day or through open space technology.5 The use of facilitators and 
open space modes of programming expressed an ambition to avoid fixing 
symbolic mandates and to produce a political movement that was mul-
tiple, flexible and peripatetic in action and word.
To further develop this discussion of movements that are not only 
nomadic in thought and deed but that foreclose dialogue with the power-
ful, the thoughts of Gilles Deleuze are helpful. Deleuze, in conversation 
with Toni Negri, argued that it was better to produce ‘a vacuole of non-
communication,’ to produce circuit breakers, ‘to prefer not to’ commu-
nicate rather than connect (Deleuze 1990: 175). For Deleuze, creating 
was something different from communication. He argued that resistance 
and communism has nothing to do with minorities or masses ‘speaking 
out,’ not least because speech and communication, which has become 
corrupted by money and unable to evade control, has to be hijacked 
(Deleuze 1990: 175).
What is a vacuole of non-communication? Perhaps it is merely a noisy 
arrangement, or a piece of nonsense? In the same conversation, Deleuze 
allows us to understand the potential genesis of this vacuole when he dis-
cuses the term ‘war machine,’ a term that has nothing to do with wag-
ing war as such (Deleuze 1990: 172). Rather, it is a term that refers to a 
particular occupation of space, an experiment within space and time, an 
invention of space and time. Deleuze makes this term concrete by sug-
gesting that the way the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) had 
to invent ‘space-time’ in the Arab context has been underestimated. To 
do so, the PLO became a war machine, marking out a territory where 
previously none existed, opening up gaps and negative spaces in the 
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discourses and organizations of local and international government and 
the mass media (Deleuze and Guattari 2003).
Franco Berardi aka Bifo (2009a) has proposed a similar idea when 
proposing that communism today is found in the production of singular-
ities (experiments with time) born from the necessity of collective action 
as means of survival and as the refusal of control and exploitation. Berardi 
argues that such singularities manifest as ‘the creation of an economy of 
shared use of common goods and services and the liberation of time for 
culture, pleasure and affection.’ Without dismissing Berardi’s arguments, 
the war machine can be defined as similar but different, in that it is not a 
singular experimentation with time and relations, or merely that, but an 
illegal or dissenting occupation and use of space and time too; a move-
ment that rejects existing hierarchies or representations and produces 
its own space and time where none existed before, as a direct challenge 
to the policing – the management and ordering – of existing space, 
resources and relations.
A Place Called Space
Before addressing detailed examples of how refusal is linked to the occu-
pation of space and time, and before examining the ways protestors knot-
ted cyberspace and occupied (physical) space, a clarification of the differ-
ent modes of protest so far considered is necessary. There are at least four 
modes of protest worth attending to.
1. Refusal through identification. Refusal as an act that 
demands the reform of existing laws or relations. This state-
ment produces identification with a specific narrative or rep-
resentation (an identification made with a cause or group that 
engages with representational politics, such as UK Uncut.)
2. Refusal through connection and detachment: the didvid-
ual. Refusal that leaves individual choice open by maintaining 
weak identifications with groups and causes or deferring iden-
tification. This gesture engenders a post-continuity subjectivity, 
contemporary with a post-continuity consumer culture. The 
networked individual,6 or what Deleuze (1990: 180) terms ‘the 
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dividual,’ is a connection between other connections; dividu-
als can articulate and be articulated by an organization, such as 
electronic media.7
3. Refusal through producing nothing. Refusal as an act that is 
not affordable (for an individual or others) and that welcomes 
the collapse or suspension of existing organizations without 
proposing anything but the destruction of existing relations: a 
refusal of affirmation, solutions or production of any kind.
4. Refusal through producing something different. Refusal as 
an act of dissent and as an experiment with producing a differ-
ent space and time from that produced by existing organiza-
tions of relations: a refusal that is unconcerned with communi-
cating or negotiating with existing hierarchies.
Of course, the four modes of refusal are not four different kinds of 
people; they are four statements that can be articulated by the same per-
son or group. The statements can be found in the testimonies of different 
occupations, three of which, issued in 2010, are cited below.8
Slade School of Fine Art Occupation Statement: We vehe-
mently oppose the transformation of the university sys-
tem into market based model; education should be a public 
debate, not a private economy. Therefore we the students of 
the Slade are offering a space for the assembly of all art col-
leges in England in order to organise non-violent direct action 
against what we view as an attack by the government on the 
arts. This is not a virtual exchange, this is a physical assembly. 
We are demonstrating the value of physical space for art edu-
cation through the continuation of our day-to-day activity, as 
well as by inviting other colleges to participate in open events, 
lectures and workshops. Our occupation is not designed to be 
disruptive, nor will it engender any damage to the building. 
Rather, we want to highlight the value of intellectual and cul-
tural exchange within art courses. This is not a boycott, it is an 
act of support (Slade Occupation 2010).
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At Goldsmiths College a less affirmative, more militant statement was 
posted – and staff were not allowed to work in the university’s occu-
pied library.
Goldsmiths Occupation Statement I: We have taken over 
Goldsmiths’ Library, the most publicly visible and accessible 
physical space in the college. We are opening it as a center 
for organization, available 24 hours a day to students and all 
those on the receiving end of the government’s assault in the 
Lewisham community. We support library staff at Goldsmiths 
and public libraries across Lewisham. The proposed changes 
in Higher Education represent a historically unprecedented 
attack on society. In response, we have taken the exceptional 
step of deciding that no staff shall work in the library building, 
although students are welcome to come and join us. Until our 
demands are met, there will be no business as usual at the col-
lege. (Goldsmiths Occupation 2010a)
Finally, a statement representing a group of people who occupied the 
library for a second time and shut it down.
Goldsmiths Occupation Statement II: I was among those 
supporting a real occupation of Goldsmiths this week. A 
large group of students, staff and supporters agreed before 
the library was occupied that only a significant disruption of 
the normal functioning of the university would contribute to 
blocking the govt’s plans and forcing action from the univer-
sity management. For me the idea that symbolic protests with 
banners, or more innovative tokens of opposition, are the only 
‘positive’ forms of protest is regressive aesthetically and politi-
cally … In a society in which just doing our jobs and carrying 
out our tasks – whether writing essays, teaching, or stacking 
(book)shelves – is the main way in which social relations are 
reproduced, it may be that NOT doing anything is our real 
weapon … So sitting in a library doing paid teaching or study-
ing work (like those attending radical teach ins with their rad-
ical paid teachers yesterday and today) is a purely symbolic 
gesture which refutes and undoes itself … They want to shut 
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down our society? Fine, we’ll shut it down. And not just for a 
few moments, or for a day, but for as long as it takes to reverse 
their decision to axe our services, our jobs, and our futures. 
(Goldsmiths Occupation 2010b)
Three statements, three negative spaces, three different expressions of 
refusal. The first and most affirmative statement proposes an occupation 
in which the university remains open but is run by the students as a plat-
form for national resistance and as a space to experiment with what the 
university could become. The last statement is damning of most of the 
actions carried out by the majority of protestors at this time and proposes 
that all universities, and society itself, should be shut down as a means 
of striking at the government. We can discuss who is right and wrong, 
which statement is the more idealistic, and whose actions are more sym-
bolic or pragmatic but this would require a second piece of writing. In cit-
ing these statements, the intention here is to draw attention to the ways in 
which space became the material of protest, and how the production of 
negative space became a means of resistance.
By examining the statements produced by the occupations we can 
see how refusal relates not just to the political and ethical orientations 
but the production of space. This should not be a surprise. First, the pro-
tests addressed the problem of who can afford to attend the institutions 
of education and culture, and which people and logics administer and 
organize these spaces. Secondly, protestors, by marching and occupying, 
discovered or confirmed that much so-called public space was constantly 
surveyed and policed in London, if not run by or owned by private com-
panies. Kettling, the restraint of groups of people as a means of contain-
ing protest or as a means of intimidation by the police, turned out to be a 
defining and politicizing experience for many. Finally, protest (in produc-
ing the space and time of protest) necessitated the occupation of space 
through swarms, teach-ins, disruption of business and the staging of 
spectacles. All of which required preparation – time and space – that for 
groups such as Arts Against Cuts and their fellow travelers took the form 
of direct action planning weekends at various student unions. For many, 
these were the encounters that mattered. Contrary to commentators 
who have focussed critically on the use of social network technology by 
protestors, face-to-face meetings in physical space were the medium that 
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forged collective action and occupations. The majority of protestors at 
these meetings, if employed, were mostly precarious workers or students 
whose withdrawal of labor would make little difference. In this context, 
where union muscle is not what it once was and marching toward violent 
confrontation a dead-end, the occupation of space as a means of forming 
collectives and resistance makes sense. Beyond refusing debt slavery, the 
occupation and use of space could be considered a key political problem 
or project of anti-austerity protestors.
Space is the Place
There is one more aspect of the production of negative space (as war 
machine) that needs examining, one already touched upon in com-
ments proposing that cyberspace and actual space were knotted together 
through protest swarms and occupations. The different scale and inten-
sity of relations (the different kinds of feedback) engendered by occupa-
tion meant that experimentation, collective action, and the formation of 
community were understood as more than a symbolic gesture. Protestors 
formed new subjective attachments through producing a space with an 
operational scale that facilitated affective and transformative action.
To explore this question of scale it is helpful to examine how com-
mentary on modes of attention and cyberspace has changed over recent 
years. Before the internet had become a common form of communica-
tion, Frederic Jameson, in Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late 
Capitalism (1991), argued that human perception was unable to deal 
with the invasion of mass media and communication technology in 
everyday life and environments, an event he announced as the dawn-
ing of a postmodern hysterical sublime. Jameson refers to the charac-
ter Jerome Newton, played by David Bowie in the film The Man Who 
Fell to Earth (1976), an alien who can watch 57 televisions all at once; 
something that Jameson suggests the human is unable to do (1991: 31). 
Franco Berardi (2009b: 89) has alluded to this discrepancy between the 
limited time and capacity that humans have to process information, mes-
sages and potential connections and the attention demanded by a seem-
ingly limitless cyberspace that can dominate our attention at work and 
play. For Berardi, fatigue and atomization rather than a hysterical sublime 
218 David Burrows
is the most likely result. Clearly, though, Berardi points to how we have 
evolved from the postmodern primitives described by Jameson, but to 
do so we have evolved into networked individuals – dividuals – continu-
ally making connections. The use of social network media by the occupa-
tions, while never fully cutting out the ‘middle man’ of mass media broad-
casters and communications corporations as some claimed, allowed 
networked individuals to plug into collective culture and space, and to 
broadcast from and about the actual spaces that they affected, controlled 
and transformed through action. This radicalization of the dividual went 
far beyond the act of creating Facebook pages. Two key examples of the 
knotting together of cyberspace and physical space to produce the nega-
tive space of protest are the creation of the smartphone application Sukey, 
developed by University College London students, to track the move-
ment of the police through gathering Twitter information and the use 
of text messages and other social media to amass and disperse swarms 
and occupations at rapid speed. Whilst remaining dividuals (connecting, 
circulating information and responding to messages) the protestors used 
cyberspace to physically manifest negative spaces within the city.
Mise en abyme
To address the role of art as negative space war machines during this 
period of protest it is important to clarify further what the term ‘nega-
tive space’ refers to in the context of art. The term is borrowed from an 
art school exercise that encourages abstract thinking and drawing. This is 
not a process of opposition or of producing opposites; drawing the ‘space 
of the negative’ is different from developing a piece of film as a negative 
for a positive photographic print. Rather a negative space drawing coun-
ters figuration, habits of seeing and thinking, and our perceptions of what 
exists. Negative space is produced through a process of experimenting 
with composition, a process that begins with observation (of things and 
the unoccupied space around things), but produces new and abstract 
arrangements (though a drawing might still bear the trace of the observed 
or recognizable world that has all but disappeared in the final image). By 
drawing empty space, by drawing nothing rather than things, the tran-
scription of outlines and spaces onto a two-dimensional surface creates 
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a composition that is ambiguous, one that could be viewed in multiple 
ways: shapes can be viewed as forms or spaces, as having depth or as 
being flat, as something or nothing. In this way, negative space drawings 
are experiments that lead to new combinations and relations of forms.
The association of negative space drawings with occupation and pro-
test came to mind not just because the occupations countered the sta-
tus quo but also because the process of occupation and swarming relied 
on spontaneity and a new counting or use of objects, environments 
and space. In this way, the art of protest, as the production of a negative 
space war machine, is understood as a performance or action that marks 
or inscribes a negative space. It is for this reason that negative space war 
machines are four-dimensional, operating beyond the one-dimensional 
ideologies of capitalist realism, the two dimensions of opposition and 
speaking to power and the three dimensions of pragmatic or direct action.
To expand upon the four-dimensionality of art as (negative space) war 
machines, five examples of art from this period of protest are presented 
below (though there are many other examples to choose from). All are 
unlikely to make their way into any archives or galleries of museums.
1. Society. Two artists produce a simple banner, red in color, 
baring the word ‘Society.’ The banner is unfurled and carried 
around London during the protests against austerity. The ban-
ner is carried by different people and taken to different loca-
tions where photographs are taken amongst protestors, next 
to a soldier standing guard in Whitehall and next to a fountain. 
Everywhere the banner is displayed a question is raised, ‘What 
constitutes society?’
2. Funeral March for the Liberal Party. On the day following 
the passing of the bill to increase students’ fees, a small group 
walk from High Holborn to Trafalgar Square in crow masks, 
howling and carrying wreaths. The event is best captured by 
Paul Mason in his book, Why It’s All Kicking Off Everywhere:
Whitehall and Parliament Square are still strewn with rub-
ble and missiles … Suddenly out of the dark comes the 
sound of drumming and wailing. Seven or eight figures 
emerge, dressed in black and wearing elaborate crows’ head 
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masks. They do a dance across three lanes of traffic into 
the middle of Parliament Square and approach the statue 
of David Lloyd George. And they lay a black wreath … 
“We’re here to mourn the death of the Liberal Party,” croaks 
the guy holding the drum, as he beats out a tocsin sur-
rounded by the masked, mainly female, wailers. This goes 
on for about five minutes. At no point do they attempt to 
photograph, film or otherwise record the performance. It is 
purely gestural, vanishing into obscurity the moment it is 
over. (Mason 2012: 53)
Throughout the march the mourners are spat at, sworn at 
and abused. The performance gauges that levels of anger and 
fear are high, and upsets the process of things quietly getting 
back to normal.
3. The Hive Manifesto (Arts Against Cuts 2010). A text pro-
duced spontaneously and collectively, by all who occupied 
the National Gallery on the night of Day X. As stated by Paul 
Mason, who also comments on the manifesto, no great work 
of literature perhaps, but a working through of protocols for 
refusal and modes of protest different to those sanctioned by 
representational politics (Mason 2012: 54). Protestors refused 
to leave the gallery until the manifesto was complete.
4. Long and Direct Weekends9 (and the Notice Boards, Maps 
of Spaces and Timetables They Produced). On several week-
ends, Arts Against Cuts and their allies held talks, discussions 
and workshops at various universities, each weekend produc-
ing intense collaborations and encounters. The protocols of 
open space technology were employed, so that all could stage 
a workshop, discussion or presentation or produce props, ban-
ners and posters. Maps, notice boards and timetables indexed 
rapid transformations of space and discussion; the timetables 
and notice boards bore the residue of intense encounters in the 
form scribbling, drawings, arrows, crosses, strikethroughs, felt-
tip and ink smudges, erasures, notes and tape.
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5. Merz Summer School.10 Perhaps inspired by the free schools 
of London and feeling they needed time to process all they 
had seen and done, perhaps needing time to work through 
the problems of collaboration and collective and individ-
ual action, and perhaps dissatisfied with universities as they 
existed and discussions dominated by lecturers and experts, a 
group of students involved in the occupations and protests left 
London for the Lake District to run their own summer school, 
open to all who wanted to attend, at the invitation of Kurt 
Schwitters’ Merz Barn.
Negative Space War Machines
In conclusion, it is important to acknowledge the protests and occupa-
tions discussed above failed to halt austerity measures (whether due to 
lacking critical mass or effective tactics) but the protests have a legacy of 
a kind. While it is true that the five examples above and the occupations 
in general posed no serious threat to the order of things, these negative 
space war machines experimented with specific problems concerning 
affirmation and negation, autonomy and collective action and the rela-
tion of cyberspace and physical space; all are problems relevant to poli-
tics and protest concerned with refusing existing relations and explor-
ing alternatives. Through actions and productions that were more than 
a communication of opposition, the occupations and the examples cited 
above share four attributes that define negative space war machines:
•	 Negative space war machines are not represen-
tational machines but address a problem.
•	 Negative space war machines are made 
in the moment for the moment.
•	 Negative space war machines contest space and its relations.
•	 Negative space war machines are produced collectively for a col-
lective (not as a political communication to a public or power).
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Notes
1. Slogan printed on an Arts Against Cuts sticker.
2. Journalist Hannah Gersen, commenting on Bartleby and Occupy Wall Street 
suggests, ‘If Occupy Wall Street has any goal, it should be to have the same 
effect that great literature has to unsettle,’ see ‘Bartleby’s Occupation of Wall 
Street’, The Millons (October 11, 2011), available at: http://www.themillions.
com/2011/10/bartleby’s-occupation-of-wall-street.html Other websites 
linking Bartleby to the occupations include Nina Martyris, ‘A Patron Saint for 
Occupy Wall Street’, The New Republic (October 15, 2011), availabe at: http://
www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/96276/nina-martyris-ows-and-
bartleby-the-scrivener and Jonathan Greenberg, ‘Occupy Wall Street’s Debt 
to Melville, The Atlantic (April 30, 2012), available at: http://www.theatlantic.
com/politics/archive/2012/04/occupy-wall-streets-debt-to-melville/256482
3. See Occupy London, ‘Statement on Autonomy’ (December 14, 2011), availabe 
at: http://occupylondon.org.uk/about/statements/statement-of-autonomy/
4. In relation to the problems of art and creativity, Reza Negarestani articulated 
a similar position in a discussion at the event ‘The Medium of Contingency’ 
at Thomas Dane Gallery, London on February 23, 2011, the day that protests 
against workfare and EMA (education maintenance allowance) cuts took 
place in the capital. In his talk Negarestani argued for artists to be complicit 
rather than creative with their materials and await contingencies or collapse. 
He urged artists to do nothing creative.
5. Open Space Technology (OST) is a mode of staging meetings that begin 
with no formal agenda other than an agreed theme, aim or problem. Such 
gatherings develop through bulletin boards and flexible timetables stipulating 
spaces or slots that are filled as the event progresses. Participants attend 
workshops or discussions depending on whether they feel they can contribute 
or the sessions are productive. OST was developed by individuals involved in 
business studies.
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6. Paul Mason describes such a protestor, @littlemisswild who joins an 
occupation by accident (she didn’t want to be alone and she is told she can 
twitter all she likes). She doesn’t know the history of the term ‘solidarity’ 
though she ends every tweet with the greeting, and she does not read books 
on politics if she can help it but reads twitter flows, blogs and websites to know 
what is going on, and she does know what is going on (Mason 2012: 41–2). 
7. Mason (2012: 79) describes another (mythical) figure in the same book, 
sitting in Starbucks, face colored blue from the reflected light of a laptop. 
She may be facebooking, designing, gaming, tweeting or planning protest 
and revolution, or all of these things at once. Mason suggests that this marks 
a shift in culture from a generation steeped in collectivism to a generation 
concerned with the expansion of the individual.
8. The term statement is used here to refer to performed or performative roles, as 
outlined by Michel Foucault who argued that a statement ‘is not a unit, but a 
function that cuts across a domain of structures and possibilities and unities, 
and which reveals them, with concrete contents, in time and space’ (Foucault 
1974: 79–118).
9. See Arts Against Cuts, ‘Arts Against Cuts: The Long Weekend’ (December 
2, 2010), available at: http://artsagainstcuts.wordpress.com/2010/12/02/
arts-against-cuts-the-long-weekend/
10. See Kurt Schwitter’s Summer School, available at: http://
kurtschwitterssummerschool.wordpress.com/
Chapter 9
Occupy America and the Slow-
Motion General Strike
Eugene Holland
I see three areas of significant overlap between the Occupy movement 
and Deleuze and Guattari’s political philosophy, and I will examine them 
under the rubrics of the war machine, ahistorical becomings, and the 
minor. Given that their first collaborative work, Anti-Oedipus, emerged 
at least partly as a reflection on the unanticipated political events of May 
1968, it would be very surprising if Deleuze and Guattari’s perspective 
turned out not to be relevant to the equally unforeseen resonance of the 
Occupy Wall Street movement throughout the United States (and indeed 
around the world) some forty years later. And it is the unforeseen quality 
of both these political movements that leads into the first two of the three 
topics under consideration in what follows.
War Machines
Although the term itself is in many ways misleading, the concept of the 
war machine is central to Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of poli-
tics and society, and especially to their conception of micro-politics, 
which is one of their most important contributions to political theory. 
While it is true that war machines do in certain specific circumstances 
make war, their essential characteristics are that they operate by means of 
a very particular kind of social cohesion, and that they produce change: 
in this respect, they would be better known as ‘mutation machines’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 229) or, as Paul Patton (2000) has 
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suggested, ‘metamorphosis machines.’ In order to evoke the kind of social 
relations characteristic of mutation machines, we can draw on Deleuze 
and Guattari’s distinction between pack and herd animals. Herd animals 
form an undifferentiated mass, and they all follow a single leader; this 
for Deleuze and Guattari is the epitome of the State form of social rela-
tions. Pack animals such as wolves interact very differently: for wolves on 
the hunt, there is a significant degree of role specialization, and the pack 
operates via the collective coordination of members’ activities rather 
than via obedience to a single leader. (While it is true that the dominant 
alpha-male and alpha-female of a wolf pack unilaterally determine the 
distribution of food after the hunt – as well as the distribution of mating 
opportunities, for that matter – they do not serve as leaders of the hunt 
itself, which operates instead via spontaneous or horizontal coordina-
tion.) The kinds of change produced by mutation machines, meanwhile, 
vary widely. Deleuze and Guattari even go so far as to say that the war 
machine ‘exists only in its own metamorphoses; it exists in an industrial 
innovation as well as in a technological invention, in a commercial cir-
cuit as well as in a religious creation’ or ‘in specific assemblages such as 
building bridges or cathedrals or rendering judgments or making music 
or instituting a science, a technology’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 366). 
Finally, and perhaps most important, mutation machines operate via con-
tagion, enthusiasm, esprit de corps, and solidarity (Deleuze and Guattari 
1987: 241–9, 267–9, 278, 366–7, 384, 390–93) rather than strict obliga-
tion or duty.
Certainly much of what happened during the events of May 1968 in 
France can be accounted for only in terms of enthusiasm and contagion 
rather than duty: a small student protest against corporate sponsorship 
of war gradually spread to become a general strike against the dissatis-
factions of French society as a whole. The Occupy Wall Street move-
ment of 2011 (OWS), in a similar way, spread rapidly to cities and cam-
puses around the country, and eventually to groups and places around 
the world. It operated by contagion rather than by obedience to a single 
leader or even a single platform or program. OWS also quickly devel-
oped both a remarkable degree of role specialization and very effective 
horizontal modes of cooperation and coordination. And although it was 
initially conceived and organized by an identifiable group of activists (as 
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was the initial French student protest), it very quickly grew beyond the 
bounds of anything they had imagined, and certainly grew far beyond 
anything they could control. Yet the fact that OWS can be said to have 
taken the form of a mutation machine does not make it a panacea: the 
contemporaneous right-wing Tea Party movement operated according 
to quite similar dynamics – although it did benefit from funding by the 
likes of the Koch brothers and from media hype provided by the likes of 
Fox cable news. As Deleuze and Guattari point out, the Nazis operated 
as an autonomous war machine before they took power and integrated 
that machine into the apparatus of state rule. Ultimately, then, the form 
of organization or of the social dynamics of a given group says relatively 
little about the content of their positions or activities. The value of the 
concept of the war machine is rather that it directs our attention to the 
manner in which these social groups or movements actually operate. And 
in OWS and the Tea Party movements, we have chosen rather extreme 
examples: it may be that elections in so-called liberal or representative 
democracies are always won or lost on the basis of which party can mobi-
lize more numerous and more energetic war machines operating on its 
behalf – from student volunteers going door-to-door, to volunteer house-
wives stuffing envelopes, to donors and campaign operatives themselves. 
Much like the stock market, electoral politics depends far more than is 
usually recognized on the kind of enthusiasm and contagion that are key 
elements of the war machine.
Since war machines operate on the Right as well as the Left, and every-
where in between, the fact that OWS took that form, or started out that 
way, cannot be considered decisive in evaluating its impact. But the same 
was true of the events of May 1968 for Deleuze and Guattari: within the 
span of a few months, the French movement had been re-absorbed into 
macro-politics as usual, with President de Gaulle receiving broad-based 
and strong support in the ensuing elections. But that doesn’t mean noth-
ing changed on the level of micro-politics. Deleuze and Guattari describe 
deep-seated effects on countless individuals, for one thing – in a portrait 
that might just as well suit a generation of young Americans who would 
soon participate in OWS:
The children of May ‘68, you can run into them all over 
the place, even if they are not aware who they are, and each 
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country produces them in its own way. Their situation is not 
great. These are not young executives. They are strangely 
indifferent, and for that very reason they are in the right frame 
of mind. They have stopped being demanding or narcissistic, 
but they know perfectly well that there is nothing today that 
corresponds to their subjectivity, to their potential of energy. 
(Deleuze 2006: 235)
And for another thing, the kind of movement that May 1968 was gets 
registered in the concepts (such as the war machine, micro-politics, etc.) 
that Deleuze and Guattari (and others) created in order to better under-
stand it and hopefully relay its potential to future generations. Finally, 
even when a social movement produces no apparent immediate results 
– as was the case with May 1968, and appears to be the case with OWS as 
well – it may have produced what Deleuze and Guattari call ‘incorporeal 
transformations’ whose real or corporeal effects only become apparent at 
some later time. Thus a judge’s sentence doesn’t in and of itself physically 
kill a condemned person on the spot: it produces an incorporeal trans-
formation, changing that person’s social and legal status from accused 
to condemned, which only later, barring unforeseen mitigating circum-
stances or disruptions, leads to corporeal death. But history is rarely (if 
ever) as clear-cut as a judicial proceeding: incorporeal transformations 
may occur without our even being aware of them at the time, such that it 
is only later that we ask ‘What happened?’ – what must have happened x 
months or y years ago, to lead up to the unforeseen changes we are wit-
nessing today? In a famous 1984 magazine article (later re-published as 
an essay in Two Regimes of Madness (2006)), Deleuze and Guattari even 
went so far as to claim that ‘May 68 did not take place’ (‘Mai ‘68 n’a pas 
eu lieu’); they characterize it instead as a ‘visionary phenomenon’ and 
a ‘pure event’ whose realization depends on society’s ability to develop 
‘collective agencies of enunciation’ to institutionalize the changes fore-
seen by the event: ‘French society has shown a radical incapacity to cre-
ate a subjective redeployment on the collective level, which is what ‘68 
demands’ (Deleuze 2006: 234). But the fact that no such agencies were 
found in the two decades following May 1968 doesn’t mean that they 
couldn’t develop in the future. And in the same way, incorporeal trans-
formations put into motion by OWS may yet bear fruit; there can be no 
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question that the movement has at least already completely transformed 
the social meaning of an otherwise anodyne figure, ‘the 99%.’
Ahistorical Becomings
In order to better understand the sense in which Deleuze and Guattari 
can say that May 1968 did not take place and yet call it a pure event, we 
must learn, along with them, to distinguish between history and becom-
ing, that is to say, between linear history and the potential alternatives 
to historical development they call becomings. History for Deleuze and 
Guattari is always a mixture combining linear development that is caus-
ally determined with bifurcation points that are unpredictable both as to 
when they occur and where they will lead. May 1968 in France, as we 
have seen, was a potential bifurcation point that could have led French 
society in a very different direction, but it didn’t (or hasn’t yet) because 
the requisite collective agencies of enunciation weren’t available. One of 
the important roles for political philosophy is to diagnose the becomings 
inherent in historical events, to extract what is ‘untimely’ (as they say, 
borrowing the term from Nietzsche), from linear historical determinacy. 
If Deleuze and Guattari were able to extract a concept of micro-politics 
from May 1968, is it possible today to extract concepts from OWS? We 
will return to this question below. But first we need to further examine 
the relation of becomings to history.
Conceiving of history as non-linear poses at least three kinds of prob-
lem. One is that historical achievements are never permanent. Deleuze 
and Guattari contrast May 1968 in France with the mid-twentieth cen-
tury American New Deal, inasmuch as the New Deal was able to insti-
tutionalize the solutions it envisioned to address the Great Depression. 
Yet those institutions have not survived decades of Republican attacks, 
so that now, even when confronting the worst economic crisis since the 
Great Depression, a new New Deal has not been possible. A second prob-
lem arising from non-linear history is the impossibility of identifying 
bifurcation points, or even assessing their potential when they are recog-
nizable. May 1968 may have set in motion deep-seated transformations 
in French society that will take decades to become visible – and the same 
may be true of OWS: perhaps it will have been a bifurcation point, and 
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we just don’t know it yet. Finally, in the context of non-linear causality, 
effects may be wildly disproportionate to causes – as in the famous (if 
fanciful) illustration of a butterfly flapping its wings and thereby contrib-
uting to a hurricane on the other side of the globe. Such disproportion-
ality adds to the difficulty of identifying bifurcation points in the first 
place, and to the impossibility of assessing their future potential with 
much confidence. What all this suggests for political strategy is a new 
way around the hoary reform–revolution conundrum. Given the non-
linear view of history, there is no point in waiting around for the right 
moment to make the revolution: we might miss any number of oppor-
tunities because we didn’t recognize them as tipping points. At the same 
time, there is no reason to shy away from reforms, even those that at the 
moment seem unlikely to produce widespread change, because with 
effects being disproportionate to causes, any one or combination of them 
might be or become a tipping point before or without our realizing it in 
the short-term. Political action must be worthwhile in its own right, in 
the short-term, as well as hold out reasonable prospects for contributing 
to significant and wide-ranging social change in the medium-to-long-
term. This was one of the most striking features of the Occupy movement 
in practically all of its incarnations: rather than simply calling for a more 
democratic society, as many political demonstrations tend to do, it actu-
ally enacted one. Food was collectively prepared and distributed; lending 
libraries and small discussion groups were established; most important, 
a whole set of informal discussion and decision-making procedures were 
developed for the General Assemblies (particularly in the face of police 
injunctions against the use of megaphones and PA systems). OWS tried 
to instantiate and illustrate what true – participatory – democracy looks 
like, rather than merely make demands of a supposedly democratic sys-
tem that it knew to be hopelessly corrupt. Yet at the same time, its pro-
pensity was emphatically not to ‘turn on, tune in, drop out’ (as it was for 
a portion of the 1960s counter-culture movement), but rather to take the 
example of more truly democratic social relations to the very ‘heart of 
the beast’ – Wall Street. So OWS had both a long-term or systemic large-
scale target (Wall Street) and an immediate small-scale goal (instantiat-
ing democracy), and satisfying this double requirement is one aspect of 
what I have called (Holland 2011) the slow-motion general strike, which 
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we will discuss below. But it poses some problems for the politics of the 
war machine, as discussed above. How do you make political action that 
is not obviously revolutionary into something contagious? How does the 
felt need for social change become urgent? In the 1960s United States, it 
was anti-war protest, and the prospect of dying in a war we didn’t believe 
in, that lent the counter-culture movement its sense of urgency; in 1960s 
France, however, there was no such focal point, and yet the French stu-
dent movement proved far more contagious than its American counter-
part, and ended up mobilizing a far greater proportion of the French 
people than were mobilized by the American counter-culture and anti-
war movements combined. The Occupy movement certainly became 
contagious, but despite the name ‘Occupy,’ it never had concrete long-
term ambitions: what will become of ‘Occupy 2.0’ is a pressing question 
that so far remains unanswered. One of the unfortunate difficulties of the 
war machine and non-linear history is that they are so unpredictable – 
practically by definition. It is just as impossible to produce enthusiasm 
or solidarity at will as it is to predict the timing or extent of a bifurcation 
point in advance. But it was certainly no accident that ‘ground zero’ for 
the Occupy movement was none other than Wall Street.
The Minor
And it may be just as revealing that the single most enduring, significant 
and vigorous off-shoot of the Occupy movement has been the (inaptly 
named) ‘Occupy Student Debt’ movement. To help explain why this 
might be so, we can turn to Deleuze and Guattari’s adaptation of Marx’s 
analysis of capital, which I call their ‘minor marxism’ (Holland 2011). 
The key difference between most ‘major’ or dialectical Marxism and this 
minor or structural marxism is that while the former focuses on the results 
of the dialectical process of capital accumulation, the latter focuses on the 
structural preconditions for capital accumulation – also known as ‘primi-
tive accumulation.’ The watchword of major Marxism follows from the 
dialectical precept of the negation of the negation: expropriate the expro-
priators; confront the power of accumulated capital head-on, and wrest 
it from its illegitimate private owners by force. The approach of a minor 
marxism is different: address the structural preconditions for capital 
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accumulation rather than the power of accumulated capital itself; disrupt 
and reverse the process of primitive accumulation. This is the basis of the 
strategy I call the slow-motion general strike. It is a general strike in that it 
is not directed against a single industry, but against capitalist industry as 
a whole; and indeed, following the example set in France in May 1968, it 
could be considered to be a strike against many or all facets of social life, 
not just industry – and in particular a strike against a nominally demo-
cratic political system that, then as now, has clearly not served the inter-
ests of the majority (the 99%). But the slow-motion general strike is also 
distinctive because, unlike the traditional or major general strike, it is not 
punctual and not confrontational: it unfolds gradually over the long haul 
rather than provoking (or hoping for) immediate wholesale changes in 
social life; and rather than confronting the power of accumulated capi-
tal, it seeks to undermine that power by subtracting greater and greater 
areas of social and economic activity from capitalist markets through 
the development of alternative economies and social networks that pro-
vide alternative means of life outside the circuits of capital. As the work 
of Gibson-Graham has amply demonstrated, economic activity already 
actually takes many different forms, even ‘under’ or ‘within’ capitalism, 
and many of them are in fact non-capitalist, if not explicitly anti-capital-
ist. The political strategy of a minor marxism thus centers around people 
gradually extricating themselves from dependence on capitalist markets, 
goods, and means of life, by instead relying on and further developing 
alternative means of life – community-supported agriculture, open-
source software, DIY (do-it-yourself), fair trade, the list goes on and on 
– until a tipping point or bifurcation point is reached where capitalist 
markets begin to starve and then eventually wither away. This is what it 
would mean to reverse the process of primitive accumulation from which 
capitalism first emerges and on which it continues to depend.
As Marx points out – although he waits until the concluding part of 
Capital, Volume One to do so – the process of ‘so-called primitive accu-
mulation’ (called so by Adam Smith) is better understood as a com-
bined process of accumulation and destitution. For capital investment to 
emerge, there must be a prior accumulation of wealth in liquid form (not 
land), available to be invested. But equally important, there must be a 
population stripped of their traditional livelihood, who thus have no way 
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of surviving other than by selling their labor-power for a wage. ‘So-called 
primitive accumulation,’ Marx insists, ‘is nothing else than the historical 
process of divorcing the producer from the means of production’ (1887: 
Ch. 26, Para. 3). Capitalism emerges on the basis of this fortuitous 
encounter between liquid wealth and destitute labor, which Deleuze and 
Guattari call the primary axiom of capital accumulation. Innumerable 
other axioms can be added and subtracted – consumer tastes, production 
technologies, state forms, and so on – but the axiom that converts wealth 
into investment capital and work into dependent wage labor remains at 
the heart of the capitalist mode of production. Major Marxism focuses 
on accumulation; minor marxism focuses on dependency. In the course 
of capitalism’s historical development, dependency has taken three basic 
forms. The first form of dependence to predominate was work: des-
titute workers were forced to sell their labor-power to survive. But this 
form was from the start inextricably linked to a second form, involving 
consumption: workers were obliged to buy means of subsistence from 
capitalists (rather than producing them independently). Availability of 
non-capitalist ways of procuring the means of life would aggravate capi-
tal’s ‘realization’ problem: capitalists can’t make a profit if the goods they 
produce are not bought back in sufficient quantities. As brute starvation 
(in some parts of the global economy) declines in importance as a way 
of enforcing dependency, marketing and advertizing intervene to make 
people psychologically dependent on the purchase of capitalist commod-
ities. Even leisure time gets commodified, as people become increasingly 
unable or unwilling to entertain themselves and purchase mass-produced 
entertainment instead. Even worse than the subsumption of production, 
consumption and leisure time by capital, however, is the third form of 
dependency, which is debt. As Deleuze puts it in his prescient essay on 
‘control society,’ ‘modern man is no longer a man confined, but a man 
in debt’ (Deleuze 1995: 181). This context renews and heightens the 
significance of the fact that the first known word for freedom is an eco-
nomic rather than a political term: it meant freedom from debt peonage. 
Trading the unfreedoms of disciplinary confinement for the unfreedom 
to go into debt in neoliberal society of control is hardly a bargain: while 
capitalist production and consumption certainly subsumed huge por-
tions of social life, the debt to capital weighs ‘like a nightmare’ on every 
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decision in every minute of every day, 24/7/365: for those in debt, each 
and every moment of their entire life must enter a calculus of whether it 
reduces, merely defers, or actually increases their debt burden.
But modern debt itself takes several different forms. Modern debt-
financed capital investment, of course, dates back to the early days of 
mercantile capitalism, and continues unabated under industrial capital-
ism. ‘The public debt [was] one of the most powerful levers of primitive 
accumulation’ from early on, according to Marx (1887: Chap. 31 Para. 
15). But as capitalist production develops and massifies, the ‘realiza-
tion problem’ emerges, as we have seen, and debt-financed consumption 
arises alongside debt-financed production. Indeed as long as profit gets 
extracted from the entire sum of exchanges between wages and com-
modity prices, capitalism requires debt-financed consumption in order 
to survive. But debt-financed consumption itself takes two very different 
forms. The first was the great Keynesian-New-Deal-Fordist-welfare-state 
gambit, whereby states would go into debt in hard times to bail out capital 
through deficit spending, with the expectation, supposedly, that the debt 
would be repaid in good times. Except that, as we know, the debt never 
does get repaid; instead, it continues to grow and grow and eventually 
goes through the ceiling – until or unless the ceiling itself is conveniently 
moved, as it has been repeatedly by bipartisan acts of Congress. But the 
debt ceiling can’t be moved forever, at least not without exposing the 
whole capitalist accounting system as a massive hoax or Ponzi scheme. 
The inevitable conclusion is that capitalism has been living on borrowed 
time for at least the last 83 years – or on borrowed money, which as we 
know is more or less the same thing. Nation states around the world, and 
not just the United States, face this long-term ‘sovereign debt crisis,’ as it 
is called – Argentina, notoriously, a decade ago; Greece, Italy, Spain, and 
Ireland more recently – with no final solution in sight. As the Occupy 
movement spread around the world, it often focused on this form of debt. 
But in the United States, the ‘original’ OWS focused on the other form of 
debt, which we can call neoliberal debt or indentured debt peonage – the 
kind that Deleuze associates with what he calls control society (Deleuze 
1995: 177–822). In this form, some of the debt required to keep capital-
ism afloat gets displaced from sovereign states onto private individuals 
(home mortgages, car loans, student loans, credit card retail debt, and so 
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on). While private consumer debt is hardly new, the scale of predatory 
abuse of consumers perpetrated by finance capital, including most nota-
bly in home mortgages and student loans, went through the roof, and 
were a key motivation for OWS, and for the choice of Wall Street as the 
place to occupy in the first place.
Minor marxism offers another kind of explanation for OWS choos-
ing Wall Street as its prime target, which has to do with the nature of 
debt to begin with. Marx likens the role of ‘so-called primitive accumula-
tion’ in bourgeois political economy to that of original sin in theology: 
it is crucial to everything that follows, but it itself remains unexamined 
and/or unexplained. Deleuze and Guattari offer a very different account 
of ‘primitive accumulation’: on their account, pre-capitalist accumula-
tion is responsible for the appropriation of surplus-labor long before 
the rise of capitalism, and the consolidation of capitalism as a mode of 
production entails the transfer of what had been an infinite debt from 
gods or despots to capital itself. What had been owed to them in vari-
ous forms of tribute or taxation is henceforth owed to capital in the form 
of interest. This means that finance capital has not just a historical prec-
edent (as most Marxists will admit, from the period of mercantile capi-
talism), but a theoretical precedence as well. For major Marxism, credit 
becomes possible because of, and out of, the surplus generated by capi-
talist production; the dialectical account occupying the first few hundred 
pages of Capital, Volume One shows how through a process of increasing 
abstraction money emerges from in-kind exchange, and then how the 
commodification of labor-power enables money to become capital, and 
finally how interest on money represents a share of the surplus-value gen-
erated through the production process owed to finance capital. Deleuze 
and Guattari, by contrast, insist that finance capital is prior to industrial 
capital not just at the historical emergence of capitalism, but in principle 
and throughout the history of capitalism. This is so in principle because 
Deleuze and Guattari follow Nietzsche in understanding money to be 
primarily a vehicle for debt and the establishment and enforcement of 
unequal power relations rather than a vehicle for the exchange of equiva-
lents among equal parties. For minor marxism, then, ownership of capital 
is first and foremost the power to create value ex nihilo, if only for the 
purpose of subsequently introducing it into the production process in 
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order to appropriate even more surplus-value. Modern state regulations, 
it is true, require what’s called a ‘cash reserve ratio’ – which means that 
banks must hold some modicum of assets against which to make loans; 
recently, these ratios have been found to be scandalously low, and have in 
some cases led to bankruptcy: but the point is that the cash reserve ratio 
for banks is never anywhere near 100% – so even if technically speaking 
capital is not being created completely ex nihilo, it is nonetheless the case 
that most of it is, and that a major function of the finance sector is, in the 
strongest sense, to invent or create fictitious capital for investment in pro-
ductive enterprises, with the expectation that surplus-value will be gen-
erated and some of it paid back in interest. With Wall Street’s develop-
ment of complex derivatives and markets for insuring them, the disparity 
between actual ‘industrial’ value and fictitious ‘financial’ value became 
too great and too obvious – yet another reason for choosing Wall Street 
as the prime target for the Occupy movement.
Minor marxism focuses on the dependence or ‘precarity’ generated 
by so-called primitive accumulation, and particularly by the degree of 
dependence accompanying the wholesale fabrication of ubiquitous 
debt relations by contemporary finance capital, among which the home 
mortgage and student debt crises became the most visible, and therefore 
became precipitating factors in the Occupy movement. A student debt-
strike is one of the most important ideas to emerge from the aftermath 
of OWS – but there is no reason to limit such a strike to students, when 
practically everyone suffers from the imposition of debt in one form or 
another. But eliminating or reducing debt is by no means the only laud-
able goal of the Occupy movement: its sights were set on far more than 
that. By modeling post-capitalist and post-representative social relations, 
OWS points to a more far-reaching and thoroughgoing transformation of 
contemporary society, which perhaps only a slow-motion general strike, 
based on principles similar to those instantiated in OWS, will be able to 
bring about.
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Chapter 10
Savage Money1
Andrew Conio
The process by which banks create money is so simple that the 
mind is repelled.
JK Galbraith (1975: 29)
Banks create money. That is what they are there for … Each 
time a Bank makes a loan … new Bank credit is created – 
brand new money.
Graham Towers, Governor of the Bank of Canada 1935 to 1955
The analyses of the banking system and prescriptions for repairing it by 
the monetary campaign group Positive Money have received a remark-
able degree of attention.2 The group has been party to policy discussions 
with governments, think tanks and research groups, has a reputable 
board of advisors,3 and has established a significant political presence, as 
well as attracting large public audiences, widespread media coverage and 
book sales unprecedented in the history of monetary reform campaigns.
Expressed with undue brevity their argument runs something like 
this: Our current economic problems stem largely from the fact that the 
banks have the ability to create endogenous money – money that they 
can then charge for. Almost the entire money supply is on loan from the 
banks: only 3% of the money in the system is notes or coins or reserves of 
the central bank, with the remaining 97% being created by the banks as 
debt. By paying interest on virtually every dollar or pound in circulation, 
we are, in effect, renting a privatized currency from the banks.
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This single feature impacts upon every aspect of economic and politi-
cal life. First, it is difficult to overstate the role that bank money played 
in the creation of the housing bubble. The rise in house prices was not a 
supply and demand issue: over the last 20 years US housing stock grew 
by 16%, meaning that the number of houses grew faster than did the 
number of people, whilst mortgage lending grew by almost 600% over 
the same period. Subprime mortgage lending increased from $30 billion 
a year to $600 billion a year in 10 years, leading to an effective doubling 
of house prices.
This endogenous form of money creation has distorted the UK 
national economy and cannot be disassociated from the gigantic Ponzi 
scheme that brought the world economy to its knees. It was the transfor-
mation of debt into tradable securities that made possible the invention 
of securitization and the armory of ‘financial weapons of mass destruc-
tion,’ as Warren Buffet dubbed them.
Bank-created money provided the base fuel for unrestrained money 
creation – taking into account the $1.5 quadrillion derivatives market, it 
is safe to say that in effect money creation became infinite. This is a sys-
tem whereby so-called fiat money, money that is not backed by reserves 
of another commodity, became virtual.
In a speech to the Committee on Monetary and Economic Reform, 
Michael Rowbotham (2013) dissects most clearly how a debt-based 
economy squeezes disposable income; it also squeezes the profit margins 
of businesses creating the need for cheaper and cheaper products and 
higher levels of mass production, which in turn creates increased impov-
erishment of the labor force, thousands of tons of cheap and disposable 
goods, and the unpayable social and environmental costs of production 
and distribution. Money creation is the main driver behind the impera-
tive for growth that is in essence the driver of ecological destruction.
As Ross Jackson notes, ‘the most important single factor that is driv-
ing our civilization toward ecological collapse is the promotion of great 
per capita consumption as the primary goal of every nation state at a time 
when we are already over-consuming’ (2012: 73). The stark reality is that 
if we continue to pursue the economic growth required to pay off the 
debts then runaway climate change is all but guaranteed.
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When banks create money they realize the stuff of wizards and leg-
ends. The magical power to create your own money in the form of an 
asset out of thin air is expressed by Paul Fisher (2013) thus:
When you start printing money, you create some value for 
yourself. If you can issue a thousand pounds worth of IOUs to 
everybody, you’ve got a thousand pounds for nothing.
From 2003 to 2013 the banks created £1trillion, netting 
interest of between £108bn to £217bn every single year. The 
financial system has effectively held the political system hos-
tage. As banks create money they have the power to shape the 
economy and decide the economic priorities of the nation.
With little bearing on any sensible measure of what counts as economic 
development and wealth creation, between 1980 and 2007 the assets of 
the banking sector grew from $2.5 trillion to $40 trillion. In 1980 bank-
ing assets were worth 20 times the then global economy; by 2006 they 
were worth 75 times (according to the UN). Due to this wizardry banks 
have an undue influence on the development of the economy. Asset-
stripping, off-shoring and speculative trading are now favored over the 
steady growth that emerges out of a commitment to manufacturing and 
long-term business-development. As a result, new money is often more 
likely to be channelled into property and financial speculation than into 
small businesses and manufacturing, with profound economic conse-
quences for society.4 Given that five banks control 85% of the money in 
the UK economy, a total of 87 board members (or 30 to 40 key decision 
makers) have effective control over the nation’s money supply.
Government has to gear its policies to keeping the money (debt) sup-
ply working, and because the banks are essentially responsible for that 
supply, when they get into trouble, government – that is, taxpayers – 
have to bail them out. We have no choice. We find ourselves in a posi-
tion where the banks’ lending is higher than all government spending. 
Further, each and everyone of us now has to shoulder the burden of this 
debt; the natural human propensity to take responsibility for oneself, to 
shoulder one’s burden, is exploited and masochistically internalized as 
we take upon ourselves the costs and risks of the economic and finan-
cial disaster.
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Financial markets became integral to the administration of pub-
lic debts, accompanied by an expansion of their logic, their rules, their 
imperatives and interests. This implies, finally, the shifting of the reserves 
of sovereignty. The financialization of government structures, the media-
tion between public and private debts have mechanized political deci-
sions as market-driven decisions; the markets themselves have become a 
sort of creditor-god, whose final authority decides the fate of currencies, 
social systems, public infrastructures, private savings, etc. (Vogl 2012: 5)
The overall effect of this cycle was a colossal transfer of wealth from 
the poor to the rich. Far from creating jobs, and prompting the miracu-
lous ‘trickle down effect,’ this wealth concentration created a restriction 
of real demand. The owners of assets (property, stocks and shares, pri-
vate equity, complex financial products, works of art, race horses, etc.) 
were able to use easy credit to inflate the value of those assets. By these 
means were they obscenely enriched. Those without assets and therefore 
without access to ‘easy credit’ were correspondingly impoverished. Thus 
did the rich get richer, and the poor poorer. The repugnant effects spread 
across household, regional and global scales as debt repayment was used 
to justify outcomes that would be intolerable in other circumstances: an 
avalanche of people losing their homes, who also can no longer afford 
healthcare; countries losing their economic sovereignty and devastating 
their social provision; cancellation of healthcare programs leading to the 
deaths of tens of thousands and, on a global scale, the hunger, even star-
vation, of vast numbers and the immiseration of millions.
The link between the housing bubble and money creation is clear, as 
is the relationship between the creation of the shadow banking system, 
the huge swathes of predatory products, and the ‘vulture,’ ‘voodoo’ or 
downright quasi-criminal speculative trading schemes that brought the 
world economic system to the brink of collapse. Bank credit provided the 
fuel, deregulation the environment, and algorithms the velocity required 
to create colossal sums and to some extent shield the players from their 
responsibilities.
For the Positive Money campaign group, the effect endogenous 
money has had on the banking sector betrays the structural flaw at the 
heart of the financial system in the form of ceding control of the nation’s 
finances to private interests. What has become clearer is the central role 
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money creation has played in this, along with the staging of a financial 
coup d’état by the financial services industry. A rogue, predatory indus-
try, bereft of moral values, has been bolstered by an idiotic idiom that 
models ‘only objective illusions’ (Goodchild 2013: 55) perpetuated by 
an economics profession that has captured the debate to the exclusion of 
any consideration of the values of life, ethics, species, planet, community, 
compassion, or the future of life itself.
However, whilst from the perspective of mainstream (neoliberal) 
economic theory, Positive Money’s thesis may be considered unortho-
dox, from a philosophical or anthropological perspective they rely on a 
set of conventional and unexamined predicates, particularly around the 
nature of money, which they take to be relatively colorless or frictionless 
instead of originativily and structurally riven with power relations. With 
regard to the history, nature and function of money this paper questions 
whether there exists an unbridgeable methodological, ethical or ontolog-
ical divide between speculative philosophy and political economy.
To answer this question, I propose a journey from the empirical pol-
icy-driven world of Positive Money to the experimental empiricism of 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, in order to test one against the other. 
I will examine the theory of money presented in Anti-Oedipus, which is 
coming to be regarded as a prescient and prophetic reading of contempo-
rary capitalism.
In conclusion, I suggest that the philosophical speculations of Deleuze 
and Guattari and Positive Money’s empirical approach to debt-based 
money can, despite emerging from wholly different epistemologies and 
methodologies, be overlaid, one atop the other like tracing paper, each 
ultimately saying the same thing. The political, economic, and philosoph-
ical consequences of this are far reaching. Not least in the identification 
of a potential meeting place for the most intensive critiques of capitalism 
as a totalizing ‘abstract machine’ and the political demands of policy for-
mation and reform.
Credit and Debt
The following discussion is framed by four works that have the strongest 
purchase on the issues at hand: Friedrich Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy 
Savage Money 243
of Morality (1887), David Graeber’s Debt: The First 5000 Years (2011), 
Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus, and Maurizio Lazzarato’s The 
Making of Indebted Man (2011). The first three books each delineate 
differently the same formative period in the development of humanity 
before the emergence of societies that were structured chiefly through 
the interaction of church, money and state. The period is outlined with 
different emphases but with substantive details in common as the ‘The 
Axial Age’5 (Graeber), ‘Primitive Society’ (Nietzsche), or ‘Primitive/
Territorial Society’6 (Deleuze and Guattari). Lazzarato’s work offers a 
reading of a new stage of capitalist development (contemporary finance 
capital) and the concomitant emergence of a new subject, ‘the indebted 
man,’ by way of the Nietzsche-inspired thoughts of Deleuze and Guattari.
Graeber accumulates extensive anthropological and historical evi-
dence going back millennia to take issue with the conventional view 
that money emerged in order to expedite barter and to demonstrate that 
coins were used in the Agrarian Age7 which preceded the Axial Age but 
were made to suit the needs of small city states, and acted as a currency 
of last resort – when informal credit systems became too unwieldy. They 
had few of the features which we would today associate with money.
This concurs with Deleuze and Guattari’s description of ‘primitive 
territorial’ societies where debt was plural, finite and based on systems of 
alliance. Indeed, in a recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) paper 
Benes and Kumhof (2012: 12) pull together an even wider range of 
accounts which in their different ways show that money did not develop 
out of the need to trade or as a way of measuring equivalences.
Nietzsche’s thesis in the Genealogy of Morals can be expressed in short 
order: man is innately aggressive, he expresses ‘enmity, cruelty, joy in pur-
suit, in attack, in destruction,’ and to think otherwise is naïvely to divorce 
man from his animal nature. In primeval times, within the ‘original tribal 
cooperatives,’ relations were principally relations of judgment and meas-
ure rather than cooperation and mutuality. Nietzsche (1998) outlines in 
his book On the Genealogy of Morality that man is ‘an inherently calcu-
lating animal,’ and selling and buying, together with their psychological 
attributes, are the oldest forms of social organization.
The character of the system for the measurement and collection 
of debts determined the logic of social exchange and relations. With 
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regard to non-payment of debts, punishment was not sought as a kind 
of revenge; instead, payment, even in another kind, was calculated for 
non-payment. The debtor was not cast as somehow in breach of a moral 
code or as having fallen short of some moral value. What was owed was 
not guilt, gratitude or supplication but the debt itself. Thus, as objec-
tive compensation for a crime, an eye could be taken for an eye. Debt 
was measured according to custom, payment due and taken; a pound of 
flesh or a child taken away could amount to a debt executed and payment 
measured precisely. Whilst savage means for exacting payment were 
used – amputation for example – they were measured without rancor or 
enmity as they allowed for a ‘natural discharge’ of anger, executed with a 
disinterested, enjoyable and affirmative malice. This was for Nietzsche a 
naïve and innocent type of cruelty unencumbered by sentimentality and 
piousness. Crucially, because they were dischargeable, debts in this sense 
were finite.
According to both Norman Brown in Love’s Body (1966) and Graeber, 
such debts owed to the gods were discharged periodically. Instead of an 
overarching concept of ‘indebtedness’ or guilt there existed a palimpsest 
of debts and credits as well as a multiplicity of systems for the collection 
of payment. Following Deleuze and Guattari’s account in Anti-Oedipus, 
Eugene Holland (1999: 65) writes that debt ‘was sporadic and reciprocal, 
remain[ed] immanent to the kinship system of blood-lineages and mar-
riage-alliances comprising savage social organisation, and function[ed] 
to prevent power from accruing to any one family or clan.’
In social relations, natural sadism and aggression could be aligned 
with and expressed through the collection of debts. A creditor’s balance 
could be taken in the form of his pleasure in the infliction of pain and his 
enjoyment of violation of the debtor. In this way, anger was not associated 
with unkindness but was an appropriate manifestation of an instinctual 
expression of power upon gaining the entitlement to mistreat another.
Clearly, today, human aggression is no longer expressed in this way 
– and, in Nietzsche’s terms, with good conscience. Instead, it is veiled 
behind malevolent sympathy or expressed in other dissimulated forms. 
What are a 25-year mortgage, homelessness, or the circus-like spectacle 
of The Jerry Springer Show if not forms of institutionalized cruelty? Mostly, 
though, the failure to exhibit natural aggression results in self-hating and 
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supplicant men bent over in prostration or, in Nietzsche’s contemptuous 
dismissal, ‘enjoyable self-flagellation.’
The ancient systems of debt, credit, calculation, measurement and 
collection were fundamental processes in the development of the process 
of thinking: ‘the very oldest form of astuteness was bred here’ (Nietzsche 
1998). Indeed, the debtor/creditor relation is the fundamental and pri-
mal psychological tendency, and the measurement of debts, obligations 
and payment was the driving force behind the development of think-
ing and consciousness. According to Nietzsche (1998): ‘To set prices, 
measure values, think up equivalences, to exchange things – that preoc-
cupied man’s very first thinking to such a degree that in a certain sense 
it’s what thinking is.’ Central to this was the understanding and admin-
istration of pain, and the psychological impact of the imprint of suffer-
ing. For Nietzsche, whatever is impressed through pain is remembered. 
Hence the highly ritualized individual and tribal enactments of tributes, 
sacrifices and punishments that were formulated to sear into the mind 
the ‘morality of custom’:
there is perhaps nothing more fearful and more terrible in 
the entire pre-history of human beings than the technique 
for developing his memory. ‘We burn something in so that it 
remains in the memory. Only something which never ceases 
to cause pain stays in the memory.’ (Nietzsche 1998)
Interestingly, only five or six of these seared memories have to be made 
ineradicable, as the subject will create the ties and connections sufficient 
to bind such wounds together into a whole conscious landscape.
For Nietzsche then, the individual’s capacity to participate in society 
was not born out of mutuality, sympathy or the modern psychology of 
identification, but from the violence used to secure the creditor–debtor 
relation. Out of this originating process emerges a man able to honor 
debts: ‘Man’ (manas), as Nietzsche points out, denotes a being that ‘val-
ues, measures and weighs,’ capable of reason and the capacity to ‘live by 
their word with the advantages of society.’
Clearly this is an account fundamentally at odds with the Levinasian 
model of a social bond borne out of a mutual recognition between indi-
viduals whereby both are dependent upon the Other for their own sense 
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of identity – a mutuality that ipso facto creates an ethical bond, as both 
are constitutive of each others’ sense of self. Such a model has the whiff 
of an infinite obligation about it. As captured by Couze Venn’s pithy para-
phrase of Levinas:
Such an ontological debt, arising from one’s inherent condi-
tion as a social being, entangled in a world of other beings, 
and as an essentially vulnerable and fragile being, necessar-
ily leaves us bereft because of the burden of responsibility for 
the other which it places upon us, a responsibility which can 
never be completely discharged since it calls for a generosity 
that entails the abnegation if not sacrifice of the self. (Venn 
forthcoming)
Nietzsche would denounce as idiotic the argument that the development 
of society, guilt, conscience and honor arose out of an innate human ten-
dency to share, commune and cooperate. For him, this is but the symp-
tom of a wilful ignorance of history and human nature. Indeed, it may be 
possible to ascribe the concern for ‘mutuality’ and ‘just’ relations between 
co-dependent equals merely to a superannuated calculation whereby 
those who measure a grievance calculate a ‘moral’ revenge that takes the 
form of malicious sympathy: ‘Everything has its price, everything can be 
paid off – the oldest and most naïve moral principle of justice, the begin-
ning of all “good nature,” all “fairness,” all “good will,” all “objectivity” on 
earth’ arises when man measures himself against another.
Certainly, without rational thought, anticipation and prediction, man 
would not survive; but memory is more than that. It lays the foundation 
for the formation of will by the creation of a link between ‘I will’ and the 
actual manifestation of the will in action. In this way an infallible psycho-
logical law leads to predicable subjects who, in turn, provide the infra-
structure for the social bond: not the other way round.
Money
‘Primitive/territorial’ society was characterized by multiple trading 
arrangements and various systems of record-keeping; sticks, shells 
and other simple devices were used to record debts. They were aids to 
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memory and accounting tools, but did not have the functions normally 
associated with money as exchange value, stores of wealth, or commod-
ity. Money in the form we know it today emerged out of conquest. It was 
the form in which the conqueror could extract tribute and/or facilitate 
expansion. A single currency replaced a myriad of logical currencies 
some of which were metal-based coinage. Here is Graeber:
Coinage, certainly, was not invented to facilitate trade. It 
appears to have been first invented to pay soldiers, probably 
first of all by rulers of Lydia in Asia Minor to pay their Greek 
mercenaries. Carthage, another great trading nation, only 
started minting coins very late, and then explicitly to pay its 
foreign soldiers. (2009)
After the violence of conquest, populations were enslaved and tribute 
extracted, not least to pay for the campaign and to create a market in 
which the conquerors were sole controllers of a currency invented pre-
cisely for purpose of control and domination.
The credit systems of the Near East did not crumble under commer-
cial competition; they were destroyed by Alexander’s armies – armies that 
required half a ton of silver bullion per day in wages. The mines where 
the bullion was produced were generally worked by slaves. Military cam-
paigns in turn ensured an endless flow of new slaves. Imperial tax systems, 
as noted, were largely designed to force their subjects to create markets, 
so that soldiers (and also, of course, government officials) would be able 
to use that bullion to buy anything they wanted (Graeber 2009).
The despot would impose his currency on the society, while local ‘cur-
rencies’ were downgraded in relation to a single representative of value, 
which served as the measure of power relations, hierarchy, social control 
and obligations.
Graeber puts this into sharp relief when he asks why the ruler created 
coins when he owned all the gold and silver mines anyway. The answer 
is that coins became not only the most efficient way of paying the troops 
and buying supplies, but also the main way of supplicating the popula-
tion in bondage who were required to pay their taxes in coins, which 
were exchanged for the produce they made. A relationship of disequilib-
rium thus becomes exquisitely efficient, and a hierarchical form of social 
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organization is sewn into the fabric of every exchange and relation. As 
Deleuze and Guattari note: ‘Money is fundamentally inseparable, not 
from commerce, but from taxes as the maintenance of the apparatus of 
the State’ (2000: 197).
Graeber’s agrarian and Deleuze’s primitive territorial worlds of finite 
dischargeable debts were thus gradually replaced – or in Deleuzian terms 
‘overcoded’ – by monetized debts as tributes. In the subsequent despotic 
societies the subject became ipso facto dependent upon the state/despot 
for his life and existence – the subject lived at the behest of the state, and 
was subject to the state. As monetized debt was also a debt of a life, ‘the 
infinite creditor and the infinite credit replaced the blocks of mobile and 
finite debts … the debt becomes a debt of existence, a debt of the exis-
tence of the subjects themselves’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2000: 197). The 
original palimpsest of multiple indebtedness within a horizontal mosaic 
of alliances that formed the community and weaved the social fabric was 
superseded by a system of vertical filiation to hierarchical powers: to 
God, the despot, money and the state.
The question as to which had precedence – despotic societies, world 
religions, states or money – may be impossible to answer; but that money 
and world religions emerged at the same time appears indisputable. Here 
it is worth quoting Graeber in full:
The most remarkable pattern is the emergence, in almost the 
exact times and places where one also sees the early spread 
of coinage, of what were to become modern world reli-
gions: prophetic Judaism, Christianity, Buddhism, Jainism, 
Confucianism, Taoism, and eventually, Islam. While the pre-
cise links are yet to be fully explored, in certain ways, these 
religions appear to have arisen in direct reaction to the logic 
of the market. To put the matter somewhat crudely: if one rel-
egates a certain social space simply to the selfish acquisition 
of material things, it is almost inevitable that soon someone 
else will come to set aside another domain in which to preach 
that, from the perspective of ultimate values, material things 
are unimportant, and selfishness – or even the self – illusory. 
(2012: 13–14)
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We find support for this approximation in the On the Genealogy of 
Morality, where Nietzsche finds that there is no evidence of the reactive 
creditor nor the guilt-ridden, culpable, self-flagellating subject before the 
arrival of money, but plenty to show that money heralds ‘the most fun-
damentally constitutive creation of them all, an eternal indebtedness to 
an omnipresent God to whom everything is owed: a God who sacrifices 
himself for the guilt of human beings (can you believe that?).’ And when 
debts were finite ‘guilt’ was not a property of human emotion. Only, with 
the creation of God and money do we find guilt emerging as a manifes-
tation of suffering, a suffering that is an absolutely interminable conse-
quence of a debt that can never be repaid.
The effects of relinquishing the world of finite, payable debts were 
many and deep. Humans lost touch with their nature, their beginnings 
and their ancestors: they turned against the womb from which they arose 
and ‘into whom from now on the principle of evil is inserted’ (Nietzsche 
1998: 62), and turned away from existence itself, which is thus felt to 
have little value. This turning away is in the first instance nihilism, and 
in the second, prompts the search for other states of being – particularly 
religious piety.
These shifts in the relations of credit and debt are first-order events in 
the development of a certain consciousness. The crucial point here is that 
with Nietzsche, Deleuze and Guattari, and Graeber, we have a material-
ist account of the development of thinking as such; and when we come 
to consider whether economic predicates are a priori or transcendental, 
we find, if sufficiently lengthy timescales are used, that historically, politi-
cally imposed precepts and narratives which suit the needs of the rulers 
over the ruled can be challenged. This includes what appears to be the 
most naturalized precept of them all: the neutral status of money.
There are, however, two problems with this view. Money is indeed 
all of the things described above. Money may have been forged out of 
calculation, it may have emerged with war and despotism, and it may, as 
Deleuze and Guattari contend, be ‘first and foremost a power of com-
mand.’ But money is also whatever we want it to be, because how some-
thing emerges is not the same as what it is. Money is a superlative tool for 
the calculation of obligations and debts; it makes the creation of markets 
possible and creates anonymity. It enables deterritorialization, freedom 
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from bonds, class and the exhilarating freedom of all things to shed limit-
ing meanings, purposes, uses or values. This is a tremendously productive 
development in human relations. To be able to borrow without sticky 
social or kinship obligations is an attribute of individual autonomy and 
existential capacity.
Money’s emergence does mean that there is a tendency for personal, 
finite (that is, dischargeable) compassionate indebtedness, the binding 
among people borne out of mutual reliance, to give way to alienated and 
commodified relations, but the opposite is also the case; money can also 
be used to express love and compassion, to appease and facilitate human 
relations and forge the social bond.
Unquestionably, money creates hierarchies, changes the nature of 
obligation, monetizes relations and changes the value of everything, par-
ticularly subjective, social and ecological relations. But this type of think-
ing must not shelter ressentiment towards the innovations, entrepreneurial 
risks and expansion that capitalism affords. Money also creates new alli-
ances, new soma, affects, desires and thoughts; polyplurient life is facili-
tated through money as pure flow. Capitalism forces us to be free, and 
this is an axiom, but, without question, millions of people find content-
ment through the opportunities, freedom and security that capitalism 
and the inherent ease of money affords. However, as Goodchild (2010: 
33) points out, a specific historical process has taken place, from money 
as universal equivalent and exchange value to money as speculative capi-
tal, until ‘finally money replaces itself as a differential, reflexive flow.’
Money has so many dimensions it is little wonder that no definitive 
theory of it exists. Such rhetorical statements as ‘in capitalism the debt 
becomes infinite because one is submitted to a law and a system, but this 
law does not demand a particular body so much as empty and formal 
submission’ (Colebrook 2006: 130) need to be balanced by the fact that 
the deterritorialization facilitated by exchange enables the transcendence 
of all bodies including God, the despot, the nation state, Oedipus, and 
class. Money is both capture and release: the deepest diastolic and sys-
tolic movements of the psyche and the bowels are manifested in the flows 
of the financial markets. The desolate capitalist system is also creative, 
innovative and facilitative of human needs and multiple layers of expres-
sion and joy. It is nothing short of arrogant to dismiss the hard creative 
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work and self-determination of millions of economic actors that sustains 
the system as we know it, not least because deterritorialization is not a 
facet of capitalism, but a life force that finds its expression in the exchange 
of equivalences, open systems and flexible forms of social organization 
facilitated by the market. This is at some remove from Nietzschean and 
Graeber-inspired accounts of money as despotic imposition and alienat-
ing abstraction.
For Nietzsche, to become a dependable man is a form of self-slavery, 
but we must concede that without dependable men who honor their 
debts society breaks down and chaos ensues. It is exactly this type of 
ethical demand to take responsibility for one’s own debt that has been 
exploited by the financial sector. Debt to the homeowner means self-
respect, personal responsibility and security. For the financier, it is merely 
an asset to be packaged, collateralized, securitized: an asymmetry of obli-
gation that works only in the banks’ favor. Venn captures the unequal 
relationship between debtor and creditor turned predatory and punitive:
[A] historical shift [in] a chain of signifiers … has gradually 
come to link debt to fallenness through the idea of sin and 
its metonymies, such as wilful inadequacy, laziness, dysfunc-
tional behaviour, underdevelopment, inferiority, and so on. 
It is a worldview (and an imaginary) which in the minds of 
policymakers authorises the criminalisation of indebtedness. 
(Venn, forthcoming)
Can this to-ing and fro-ing between what has the appearance of libera-
tion/emancipation and repression/iniquity be resolved by returning to 
Deleuze’s Marxist account of the development of capital and labor?
First we should review how Deleuze and Guattari set out the relation-
ship between the emergence of labor-power and money in the develop-
ment of capitalist production in Anti-Oedipus (2002: 226/228). Most 
importantly, abstract labor was not premised upon the production of 
capital, and an asymmetry of the relations between debtor and creditor 
precedes historically that of production and wage labor. Indeed, abstract 
labor existed independently of money and commodities and effected a 
decoding of flows in and of itself. However, it required the appearance 
of a double-sided monetary system of general equivalence and capital 
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accumulation for the force of abstract labor to be fully unleashed. Money, 
having emerged semi-independently, imposed upon abstract labor the 
characteristic of exchange, and money became a value in its own right.
Once detached from the body and the socius, money enters into rela-
tions with itself and becomes the supreme value of society, assuming the 
capacity to concretize once again that which it abstracted into the plane 
of equivalence. This is a circular motion: as monetary equivalences liber-
ate values from needs, money becomes its own force and money begets 
money. Money then determines the concrete processes, taking on the 
appearance of prime cause. Here Deleuze and Guattari (2000: 227) 
follow Marx:
Value in process, money in process, and, as such, capital … 
value … suddenly presents itself as an independent sub-
stance, endowed with a motion of its own, in which money 
and commodities are mere forms which it assumes and casts 
off in turn. Nay more: instead of simply representing the rela-
tions of commodities, it enters now, so to say, into relations 
with itself. It differentiates itself as original value from itself as 
surplus value. (Marx 1887: 106)
This force, as capital, is then used to enforce a system for the mainte-
nance of profit, but over time it effects this less through the extraction of 
surplus value than by rent or tribute and through command of the flows 
of life and production. Deleuze and Guattari expand Marx’s thoughts 
in many ways: for them, control of the flow is power in and of itself, a 
type of omnipotence that can far exceed the satiations of acquisition 
and excess.8 Through controlling investment, capital determines both 
what is done (investment in environmentally destructive industries, 
the endless production of rubbish) and what is not done (ethical care, 
stewardship of resources, genuine democracy, equal distribution of the 
common wealth).
We can see this model most clearly in the endemic criminality and 
amorality of the financial sector which demonstrates how capitalism 
under neoliberalism – after asset striping, off-shoring and wage reduction 
– ran out of assets to exploit and came to feed off itself. An avaricious 
and rapacious tendency unleashed the capitalist war machine against life. 
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It is much more than a coincidence that the New York Stock Exchange 
topped 15,000 for the first time ever just as it was announced that the 
atmosphere had absorbed 400 ppm CO2. Such is the ruin that the only 
recourse open to it appears to be a return to much more savage social 
formations as increasingly ‘modern capitalist and socialist states take on 
the characteristic features of the primordial despotic state’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2000: 220). Think of drone strikes, the prison –industrial com-
plex and direct tribute in the form of quantitative easing. It is more than 
a note in passing to comment that for Deleuze and Guattari history is not 
teleological, as primitive, despotic and civilized capitalist machines coex-
ist in contemporary society.
The world as represented by capitalism is therefore seen through the 
wrong lens. Instead of a world of production, wealth, values, and social 
relations, the world as represented increasingly manifests the exclusive 
requirements of the monetary system, the first requirement of which is 
the production of more money. Labor processes and general production 
that were once the heartbeat of society are now used to produce only cap-
ital. The deployment of this quotation from Marx in Anti-Oedipus illus-
trates why Deleuze and Guattari refer to themselves as Marxists: ‘Capital 
is dead labour that vampire-like, only lives by sucking living labour, and 
lives the more, the more labour it sucks’ (Marx 1887: 160).
However, and this is the real matter at hand, such is the nature of 
money that any discussion of its historical development and the amor-
phousness of its form bears yet further contradistinction in a seemingly 
endless movement between adversative conjunctions such as ‘also,’ 
‘but’ and ‘however’ that is logically unavoidable. This is not a problem 
because the defining feature of any Deleuzian analysis is its capacity to 
take into account the contradictions inherent in any issue. Deleuze, 
across his entire corpus, whether on painting or cinema, philosophy or 
science, develops systems that create dynamic relations between what 
other systems would treat as irreconcilable contradictions, paradoxes 
or dialectics. Hence, we live under the axiomatics of capitalism, yet life 
retains its vitalism; the society of control regulates social relations, yet 
across A Thousand Plateaus unexpected speeds and slowness traverse the 
machinic, human and organic, in expressions of social life composed of 
melodic refrains.
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Thus, the free market is a powerful liberatory, schizoanalytic, force. 
Despite Nietzsche’s protestations, money does create an equality of rela-
tions where none previously existed. And here we might add another 
corrective to Nietzsche. Certain thought processes may indeed have 
been instantiated by exchange, and unquestionably psychic structures 
and social realities are imprinted by violence, but thinking is an infinitely 
more varied and dynamic process that involves the senses, memory, 
imagination, recognition and misrecognition, as well as the sensible and 
insensible flows and limits of this world. There is certainly no norm or 
model that reifies experience into a stable and unchanging form.
Money also allows for temporal equivalence. What incalculable free-
dom is this to be released from the shackles of time, as money enables 
unprecedented investment that creates new temporal dynamics? 
Consider the Channel Tunnel.
Money is at once a deterritorialization, which allows relations to 
extend beyond immediate exchange or barter, thereby extending a ten-
dency of life to create or produce for what is not present; but it is also a 
reterritorialization, which introduces equivalence, sameness and a quan-
tity of value through time, an attempt to contain and master the disequi-
librium of time (Colebrook 2006: 86).
The system of equivalences and the power to make the dissimilar 
comparable is freedom. As across time so also in space, a process cap-
tured by Philip Goodchild with his usual perspicacity:
money is … a quantum flow, facilitating an exchange of goods 
and services between heterogeneous cities, where interests, 
values, and codes lack a common measure. Money retains 
value and facilitates communication where the coding breaks 
down, where one encounters indeterminacies and intervals. It 
bridges the chaos. (2010: 29–30)
As well as being flow, money is also a thing. You can use it, it has direct 
objectivity. However, this very objectivity accounts for the perpetuation 
of an irrational system because it places an ‘objective’ value on things, 
which invokes a sense of trust and a semblance of objectivity (a loaf of 
bread is worth more than a slice). Money extends the illusion that we all 
participate in the system as equals: the money earned by the wage earner 
Savage Money 255
is the same as that amassed by the billionaires. But the stability provided 
by the idea that money is a determinate quantity entered on bank state-
ments and balance sheets is based only on faith, as are the distortions, 
specious premises, bogus methodologies and mathematical tautologies 
of the dismal science known as economics. Economic ‘rationality’ only 
makes sense within a system that is irrational and is divorced from other 
measures that would include rudimentary values for life.
Everything is rational in capitalism, except capital or capitalism itself. 
The stock market is certainly rational; one can understand it, study it, the 
capitalists know how to use it, and yet it is completely delirious; it’s mad 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2001: 215).
The other ‘objective’ part to this system is the sense that money is the 
fabric of life that we all have equal access to. It is approachable: it exists 
right there in front of you, not actually outside of you but as part of your 
very constitution; your processes are exactly the processes you have 
inherited. Hence:
this principle of convertibility – which is enough … to ensure 
that the desire of the most disadvantaged creature will invest 
with all its strength, irrespective of any economic understand-
ing or lack of it, the capitalist social field as a whole. Flows, 
who doesn’t desire flows, and relationships between flows, 
and breaks in flows? (Deleuze and Guattari 2000: 229)
Accordingly, an appearance is given of a medium of exchange that is fair, 
and able to provide a quantitative determination of all things as a price; 
yet in and of itself, it is neutral. Moreover, we can position ourselves 
wherever we wish in relation to it, and should take responsibility for 
our autonomous choices. Yet the effects of the price mechanism are also 
pernicious, it creates an illusion of a primary equivalence at the heart of 
society, and inurs us to a fundamental disequilibrium, as Shaviro (2011: 
8) observes: ‘The “price system” continually forces us into debt. And 
thereby it confines, restricts, and channels our behavior far more rigidly, 
and effectively, than any compulsion based upon mere brute force would 
be able to do.’
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Neoliberalism as Infinite Debt
Possibly second only to Graeber’s best-selling work in terms of impact 
in political activist circles is Lazzarato’s The Making of the Indebted Man 
which is essentially an application of the ‘prophetic’ (Kerslake 2009) 
Anti-Oedipus to contemporary neoliberal society. However, there are 
distinct problems with this account, the resolving of which will allow 
sharper distinctions be drawn regarding the relationship between control 
societies and debt. Lazzarato presents a litany of effects of the concretiza-
tion of the paradigm of debt in neoliberalism, including increased immis-
eration, the takeover of the common wealth, and the commandeering of 
public, social and psychic space. Lazzarato takes the Deleuzeo-Guattarian 
conceptual apparatus further by arguing that our expectations of what 
might be socially possible and the extent to which we can imagine the 
future have been effectively colonized by debt. For him, the archetype 
of social relations, and its violent substrata, is being concretized in real 
historical conditions. He attempts neither a critique nor an analysis, but 
aims to show, in an ardent call to arms, how the warnings of Anti-Oedipus 
have been realized.
Debt-based subjection takes all the forms discussed hitherto, it is as 
material as it is existential, as it suffuses our minds, sensibilities, languages 
and psyches. Infinite debt is the primary social bond and is now the mate-
rial and subjective condition of our lives. To paraphrase Lazzarato: the 
subject of debt is in an existential condition, at once responsible for his 
own fate, and for the debt of the banks, society, the sovereign state and by 
extension the whole world.
For Lazzarato, this is at once a return to the logic of capitalism’s 
originative form, the extraction of rent or tribute, and a new stage in its 
development whereby debt acts as a ‘capture,’ ‘predation,’ and ‘extraction’ 
machine on the whole of society, as an instrument for macro-economic 
prescription and management, and as a mechanism for income redistri-
bution and a return to its originative form as tribute. For example, Mattera 
et al (2012) have tracked how 19 states have passed laws that allow 2,700 
large corporations (every brand name company you know – Goldman 
Sachs, General Electric, Proctor and Gamble) to keep the state income 
taxes paid by the workers at their factories in those states. Put another 
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way, 2,700 companies get to pocket the money paid by their employees 
in tax. Five-and-a-half billion dollars has been diverted from workers’ 
paychecks in this way. US pipeline companies are exempt from corpo-
rate income tax but they are allowed to include the tax on the rates they 
charge customers. Energy customers are thus paying a tax that does not 
exist and this increases the ultimate return to the owners of these pipe-
lines by as much as 75%. Recent research shows that in the UK welfare 
support functions as a ‘failure to pay a living wage subsidy’ to the employ-
ers of 5.5 million workers, and private sector housing benefit serves as a 
direct transfer of public funds to property owners and banks. This shift 
from profit to rent is also noted by Lofgren (2012), who writes that the 
super rich ‘aim to create a “tollbooth” economy, whereby more and more 
of our highways, bridges, libraries, parks, and beaches are possessed by 
private oligarchs who will extract a toll from the rest of us.’
All of the accounts discussed above confront us with the same ques-
tion: are we dealing with an anthropological invariant or a historically 
specific assemblage of forces? The answer is that the disequilibrium 
inherent to relations of exchange, which came to be expressed in money, 
is the originative paradigm of the social, and that the debt paradigm has 
displaced or superseded other forms of capitalist development (cognitive 
capital, financial capital, and so on). The neoliberal form is a specific form 
of debt relation in which this paradigm of ‘capture, predation and extrac-
tion forms the very basis of social life. The creditor–debtor relationship 
constitutes specific relations of power that entail specific forms of pro-
duction and control of subjectivity – a particular form of homo economi-
cus the “indebted man”’ (Lazzarato 2012: 77–8). Thus, in neoliberalism, 
the creditor–debtor relationship encompasses all other relations: capital/
labor, business/customer, workers/consumers. Everyone is a debtor, 
accountable and guilty before capital. Capital has become the Great 
Creditor, the Universal Creditor.
The question arises as to the relationship between an abstraction, 
a seemingly amorphous ubiquitous indebtedness, and specific mate-
rial acts such as the invention of new financial products, new computer 
algorithms, and the pre-crash wave of deregulation. The question often 
directed to Deleuze’s articulation of the society of control (and to his 
wider politics) similarly concerns the relationship between the indefinite 
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and the specific. In answer we should note that a significant feature of the 
Deleuzean and Guattarian political landscape is their tendency to avoid 
giving specific examples of (and indexes to) even their most productive 
and worthwhile political concepts – capitalist axiomatics, schizoanalysis, 
the war machine – requiring the reader to experiment with them each 
time they are used. To prevent ossification concepts must remain mobile, 
work in multiple circumstances and be brought into relations with other 
concepts in the manner of creating new understandings and potentials 
for political thought, and have an inherent resistance to subsumption and 
cliché. Most importantly, though, is that a level of abstraction must oper-
ate as a necessary counter-force and weapon: ‘we must rise to this level of 
abstraction and deterritorialisation if we want to avoid being swept away 
or crushed by the Great Creditor’ (Lazzarato 2011: 161).
Exchange Money, Credit Money
Accepting, indeed welcoming, all the paradoxes inherent to this state-
ment: Deleuze and Guattari’s identification of a profound dualism at the 
heart of money is the rock bottom of all of the matters at hand. For them 
we cannot underestimate:
the extreme importance in the capitalist system of the dualism 
… between the formation of means of payment and the struc-
ture of financing, between the management of money and 
the financing of capitalist accumulation, between exchange 
money and credit money (2000: 229).
Credit money and exchange money are tendencies; the multiple interac-
tions between the two use the same coin, and banks facilitate both financ-
ing and payment transactions with one continually flowing into the other. 
Even so, the fundamental difference between the two is of inestimable 
importance. ‘There is a profound dissimulation of the dualism of these 
two forms of money, payment and financing – the two aspects of banking 
practice’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2000: 229). In this sense, it is decidedly 
not the same coin that is counted as credit on the balance sheet and in the 
pocket of the wage earner. Credit money is where the flow of exchange is 
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arrested, where values are assigned, and divinations of purpose, rent and 
ownership are made according to the axiomatics of capitalism.
On the one hand, exchange money has no value in and of itself: it is 
‘an impotent sign of exchange value,’ it could be a theatre token, a shell 
or a notch. On the other hand, credit money traverses a particular circuit 
where it assumes, then loses, its value as an instrument of exchange and 
where the conditions of flux imply conditions of reflex, giving the infinite 
debt its capitalist form. It is here that Deleuze and Guattari predict the 
impact of credit money: ‘bank credit effects a demonetisation or dema-
terialization of money, and is based on the circulation of drafts instead 
of the circulation of money’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2000: 229). ‘Drafts’ 
here correspond only in part to the 97% bank-issued money identified by 
Positive Money; in reality they include the trillions of dollars conjured 
up by the shadow banking system. In short: the ‘capitalist field of imma-
nence’ is sustained by the circulation of credit money (Kerslake 2009), 
and through credit ‘the archetype of violence and savagery is forcibly 
built into the nature of money, and money is a precondition for existence 
in any part of the globe’ (Shaviro 2011). This credit-and-exchange-money 
binary solves a residual problem with the Marxist theory of money.
It is unfortunate that Marxist economists too often dwell on the mode 
of production, and on the theory of money as the general equivalent as 
found in the first section of Capital, without attaching enough impor-
tance to banking practice, to financial operations, and the specific circula-
tion of credit money (Deleuze and Guattari 2000: 230).
At this stage of the argument, it should be clear that trying to estab-
lish the essence or truth of money, trying to pinpoint its role and func-
tion, should give way to the problem of forces. What counts is less the 
essential nature of money than what it does. Capitalism is sustained by 
the great paradoxes between its dynamism and destructiveness; inven-
tion and despotism, freedom and servitude, the implacability of its axi-
oms and demand to constantly revolutionize them, these can be under-
stood in terms of this essential dualism and how the irrepressible creative 
charge and rhizomic flow of capital is essentially underpinned by credit 
money, or more importantly, how exchange money comes into existence 
as credit money:
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[Deleuze] underscores the impossibility of considering a 
market economy in itself, since the latter derives from and is 
always subordinate to the money economy and to the debt 
economy, which distribute power, subjection, and domina-
tion. … The asymmetry of power, the differentials of power 
expressed in debt-money, hold for every society – primi-
tive society, ancient society, feudal society, and capitalism. 
(Lazzarato 2012: 37–8)
At this point we can return to the earlier semi-orthodox economic the-
ories of Positive Money, their fellow travellers, Steven Keen, Margrit 
Kennedy and the longer tail represented by the likes of Frederick Soddy, 
Irving Fisher et al. We can see more clearly now what Deleuze and 
Guattari mean when they say that ‘the circulation of money – is the means 
of rendering the debt infinite.’ Money is not issued, as it should be, like oil 
to smooth the system of trade, investment and exchange. Instead it is 
deployed as an opportunity to charge rent and to sustain the entire sys-
tem of the production and circulation of commodities. Financial institu-
tions and banks ‘create a debt spontaneously to themselves’ that releases 
‘a flow possessing a power of mutation’ determining the planning of 
investment in technology and labor (Deleuze and Guattari 2000: 237).
It is essential to retain all the subtleties and nuances outlined above; 
capitalism is sustained by a virtuous circle of customer demand, free-
dom of choice, and an astonishingly productive power underpinned by 
the invisible hand of the inescapable market. Exchange is liberatory but 
only within the conditions set by the market that have to be accepted. 
Capitalism’s first principle is the encouragement and release of flows that 
lead in unexpected directions and the constant revolutionizing of the 
instruments and relations of production, yet it must also limit and block 
these lines of flight.
The value of trading and the market and cannot be denied – it is the 
circularly system of libidinal and social production – but here we are 
discussing a very distorted market. Its lines of flight, rhizomic poten-
tial and accumulative charge are blocked by its own axioms and credit 
money. As Graeber has recently pointed out, the policies of the G20, G8, 
International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization and the World 
Bank have singularly failed to foster wellbeing for the world’s population; 
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where success is to be found where their policies have been ignored, yet 
all the while they have magnificently convinced the world that capital-
ism – and not just capitalism, but exactly the financialized, semi-feudal 
capitalism we happen to have right now – is the only viable economic 
system (Graeber 2013). Thus banks not only have the capacity to control 
investment and interest, most importantly they control the relationship 
between credit and exchange money that becomes the principal feature 
of the capitalist mode of production itself.
This is Deleuze’s first axiomatic of capitalism – that it must be pre-
sented as common sense, irrefragable and transcendental in its imma-
nence; that it insists there is no other way of controlling the schiz/flow, 
credit money/exchange money, credit/debt whilst concealing its chronic 
wastefulness and iniquity and the inherent power relations: therein; and 
that it inhibits human creativity largely through the issuance of money.
Through the system of debts, money imposes an immense 
and irresistible system of social control on individuals, cor-
porations, and governments, each of whom are threatened by 
economic failure if they refuse their obligations to the money 
system. (Kerslake 2009)
In this way, neoliberalism is the control society – we are controlled by and 
submit to its values as it insists that alternatives to its immanence are 
crushed. Kerslake is right, Anti-Oedipus was prophetic:
There is always a monotheism on the horizon of despotism: 
the debt becomes a debt of existence, a debt of the existence 
of the subjects themselves. A time will come when the credi-
tor has not yet lent while the debtor never quits repaying. 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2000: 197)
Here we can recognize the phenomenological struggle of the mind to 
take in the colossal sums of bank credit, the quadrillions produced by 
the financial services industry as assets, securities and virtual credit, that 
exist alongside the flows and intimacies of everyday life facilitated by 
exchange money. Whilst they may be expressed in the same coin their 
functions are so dissimilar as to make it impossible to conceive of them as 
the same thing. Today, consumption, production and the production of 
subjectivity are geared to provide the surplus value needed to give these 
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inestimable virtual sums some ‘objective’ attachment to the ‘real’ world: 
an attachment that was stretched beyond breaking point in the crash of 
2008. Indeed, far from a purely cash driven nexus we find that primi-
tive, industrial, Fordist and post-Fordist forms of capital are required to 
produce leverageable assets in order that finance capital can continue to 
reproduce itself. Indeed, exchange (as the swapping of debts and prom-
ises creating a form of sociality and mutuality) far from being an antidote 
to credit is now, as a new form of feudal capitalism emerges, a kind of cap-
ture as all flows are permitted as long as they are quantified and circulated 
through the system of exchange.
How this dynamic process provides the historical material origins for 
systems that are in equal measure cognitive and social (the philosophical 
holy grail) is outlined perceptively by Goodchild in his paper ‘Philosophy 
as a Way of Life: Deleuze on Thinking and Money,’ where he argues that 
the exchange/credit money differential, the flow of the one into the 
other, is absolutely fundamental to the structure of human thought:
Exchange money and credit money, segmented line and 
quantum flow: this unique self differentiation and re-conjuga-
tion is the schiz-flow that structures the capitalist social field, 
generating all the dualisms of Capitalism and Schizophrenia – 
representation or production, molar or molecular, striated or 
smooth, State or war-machine, neurosis or psychosis, exten-
sive or intensive multiplicities, being or becoming, organiza-
tion or consistency, transcendence or immanence – in each 
case, we are informed that it is not an exclusive disjunction 
or a value judgment, but that one term is continually passing 
into the other. Capitalism, a purely machinic process of seg-
mentation, can only function alongside such intensifications 
of experience. (Goodchild 2010: 30 and 35)
To conclude, we have at hand a way of thinking that captures the intense 
contradictions that are inherent to the nature of money and how these 
contradictions subtend the oppositions and disjunctions inherent to the 
development of thought and social relations.
Although he does not use such combinative terms, Matthew Tiessen’s 
statement could possible be laid atop of a Positive Money working paper:
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Today’s money has become the primary agent of capital accu-
mulation and an aggressive catalyst of dispossession that, in 
order to feed itself, uses enormous leverage to parasitically 
prey on life and energy in general, insatiably consuming emer-
gent, biological and processual forms of life and matter in 
order to feed that which both keeps it alive and expanding: 
debt. (Tiessen 2012)
In the meeting of Positive Money, and Deleuze and Guattari there is no 
need to posit contradictions between philosophical and anthropological 
speculations and the objective political policies and programs of political 
economy. Controlling the bank’s issuance of money is a specific weapon, 
perhaps the most urgently needed of our age. A range of currencies serv-
ing different purposes is also needed. Such a range already exists.9 The 
coexistence of a range of currencies with a state-issued currency may 
be the first of a series of experiments wherein the philosophical work of 
Deleuze and Guattari might find practical concrete application. As would 
a combination of reforms that piece-by-piece may gain the consistency 
of a counter-aggregate sufficient to cause the capitalist abstract machine 
to lose its potency. Like much of the Occupy movement worldwide, the 
OccupyLSX Economics Working Group (EWG), of which the author is 
a member, is discussing a range of specific policy initiatives and reforms 
to the monetary system. The three main foci of these discussions for the 
EWG in London are thus: reform of the issuance of money; reform of 
the structure of land ownership and rent; and reform of wage structures 
along the lines of guaranteeing a minimum income to all citizens regard-
less of status or employment. It is striking how much of this chimes with 
Deleuze’s description of the three main decodings that came together to 
create the capitalist system:
These decodings of all kinds consisted in the decoding of land 
flows, under the form of the constitution of large private prop-
erties, the decoding of monetary flows, under the form of the 
development of merchant fortunes, the decoding of a flow of 
workers under the form of expropriation, of the deterritoriali-
sation of serfs and peasant landholders. (Deleuze 1971)
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Finally, what must be borne in mind, as the Occupy Economics Working 
Group and Positive Money do, is that credit is not an evil in and of itself, 
credit is a fact of life, and we measure people and ourselves by our capac-
ity to repay debts. Credit is a requisite of non-simultaneous exchange, 
provided the charge behind the industrial revolution, and is the way in 
which production can be released from the shackles of time and space. 
The problem then is not credit or debt per se but who issues it and who 
controls it to what end. In this respect we have at hand a potential consil-
ience between the highest level of philosophy – which is philosophy at 
its most concrete – and concrete proposals that in aggregate can create a 
revolution against what is now being commonly called despotic or feudal 
capitalism without tearing down society and creating chaos.
The modern banking system manufactures money out of 
nothing. The process is perhaps the most astounding piece of 
sleight of hand that was ever invented. Banking was conceived 
in inequity and born in sin …. Bankers own the earth. Take 
it away from them but leave them the power to create money, 
and, with a flick of a pen, they will create enough money to buy 
it back again. Take this great power away from them and all 
great fortunes like mine will disappear, for then this would be a 
better and happier world to live in. But, if you want to continue 
to be the slaves of bankers and pay the cost of your own slavery, 
then let bankers continue to create money and control credit.
Sir Josiah Stam, Director of the Bank of England 1927
Works Cited
Benes, Jaromir and Michael, Kumhof. 2012. The Chicago Plan Revisited. IMF Working 
Paper, WP/12/202. International Monetary Fund.
Coghlan, Andy and Debora Mackenzie. 2011. ‘Revealed – The Capitalist Network 
that Runs the World’. New Scientist 2835. Accessed May 8, 2015 from: http://
www.newscientist.com/article/mg21228354.500-revealed--the-capitalist-
network-that-runs-the-world.html#.UidCblNvk0w
Colebrook, Claire. 2006. Deleuze: A Guide for the Perplexed. London: Continuum.
Savage Money 265
 Deleuze, Gilles. 1971. ‘Cours Vincennes 16/11/1971 (Deleuze / Anti-Oedipe et 
Mille Plateaux)’. Trans. Daniel W Smith. Accessed May 8 19, 2015 from: http://
www.webdeleuze.com/php/texte.php?cle=116&groupe=anti+oedipe+et+mille+
plateaux&langue=2
Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari. 1987. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia. Trans. by Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press.
Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari. 1994. What Is Philosophy?. Trans by Hugh 
Tomlinson and Graham Burchell. New York: Columbia.
Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari. 2000. Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. 
Trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R Lane. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press.
Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari. 2001. ‘Capitalism: A Very Special Delirium’. 
In Hatred of Capitalism. Ed. Chris Kraus and Sylvére Lotringer. New York: 
Semiotext(e): 215–21.
Boyle, David. 2002. The Money Changers: Currency Reform from Aristotle to E-Cash. 
London: Routledge.
Ferguson, Charles H. 2012. Predator Nation: Corporate Criminals, Political Corruption, 
and the Hijacking of America. New York: Crown Business.
Galbraith, John Kenneth. 1975. Money, Whence It Came, Where It Went. Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin.
Goodchild, Philip. 2010. ‘Philosophy as a Way of Life: Deleuze on Thinking and 
Money’. SubStance 39 (1): 24–37.
Goodchild, Philip. 2013. ‘Exposing Mammon: Devotion to Money in a Market 
Society’. Dialog 52 (1): 47–57.
Graeber David. 2012. The History Of Debt: Slavery, Money, and the Crucial Role of 
Violence. Accessed September 28, 2013 from: http://www.pubtheo.com/page.
asp?PID=1745
Graeber, David. ‘A Practical Utopian’s Guide to the Coming Collapse’. The Baffler 22: 
53–8.
Holland, EW. 1999. Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus: Introduction to 
Schizoanalysis. London: Routledge.
Jackson, Ross. 2012. Occupy World Street. Cambridge: Green Books.
Keen, Steve. 2012. ‘Instability in Financial Markets: Sources and Remedies’. New 
Economic Thinking’s Paradigm Lost Conference (April 14). Berlin. Accessed May 6, 
2015 from: at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=js9WBi_ztvg
266 Andrew Conio
Kerslake, Christian. 2009. ‘Deleuze and the Meanings of Immanence’. ‘After 68’ 
Conference ( June 16). Maastricht: Jan van Eyck Academy. 
Lazzarato, Maurizio. 2011. The Making of the Indebted Man: An Essay on the Neoliberal 
Condition. Trans. by Joshua David Jordan. New York: Semiotext(e).
Lazzarato, Maurizio. 2012. Deleuze and Guattari: A Short History of Debt. Los Angeles: 
Semiotext(e).
Lofgren, Mike. 2012. ‘Revolt of the Rich: Our Financial Elites are the New 
Secessionists’. The American Conservative (August 27). Accessed February 28, 2013 
from: http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/revolt-of-the-rich/
Marx, Karl. 1973. Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy. Trans. N 
Nicolaus. New York: Penguin.
Marx, Karl. 1887.Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, vol. 1. Ed. Friedrich Engels. 
Trans. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
Mattera, Philip and Kasia Tarczynska, et al. 2012. Paying Taxes to the Boss. 
Washington: Good Jobs First. Accessed September 19, 2013 from: http://www.
goodjobsfirst.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf/taxestotheboss.pdf
Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1988. On the Genealogy of Morality. Trans. Maudemarie Clark 
and Alan J Swensen. Indianapolis: Hackett.
Ryan-Collins, Josh, and CAE Goodhart. 2012. Where Does Money Come From?: 
A Guide to the UK Monetary and Banking System. London: New Economics 
Foundation.
Paul Fisher (Executive Director Bank of England). 2013. Speaking on the BBC Radio 
4 programme What is Money?. Cited in Dyson, Ben. 2013. Reforming the Monetary 
System. Positive Money. Accessed 8 May, 2015 from: http://www.positivemoney.
org/our-proposals/video-reforming-the-monetary-system/
Read, Jason. 2008. ‘The Age of Cynicism’. In Deleuze and Politics. Ed. Ian Buchanan 
and Nicholas Thoburn. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Rowbotham, Michael. 2011. ‘The Significance of Monetary Reform: The Disaster 
of Debt Based Economics’. Paper presented to The Committee on Monetary and 
Economic Reform (April 13). London: House of Parliament. Accessed May 8, 
2015 from: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XcCbGGlX8as
Steven Shaviro. 2011. ‘The Bitter Necessity of Debt: Neoliberal Finance and the 
Society of Control’. Concentric: Literacy & Cultural Studies 37 (1): 73–82.
Tiessen, Mathew. 2012. ‘Infinite Debt and the Mechanics of Dispossession’. In 
Revisiting Normativity with Deleuze. Ed. Rosi Braidotti and Patricia Pisters. 
London: Bloomsbury.
Savage Money 267
Venn, Couze. Forthcoming. Protocols for a Post-Capitalist World. Cited with 
permission.
Vogl Josef. 2012. ‘Sovereignty Effects’. INET Conference (April 12). Berlin.  Accessed 
July 19, 2013 from: http://ineteconomics.org/sites/inet.civicactions.net/files/
Vogl%20Paper.pdf
Notes
1. I am grateful to the Occupy London Economics Working Group for 
the opportunity to discuss this paper on more than one occasion. I am 
particularly grateful to Clive Menzies, Dave Dewhirst and Tim Flitcroft for 
their comments.
2. Over 600,000 YouTube views of their video ‘97% Owned’ (as of March 4, 
2014); 30,000 visits per month to http://www.positivemoney.org
3. Including Prof. Herman Edward Daly; Dr Martin Harrison Martin Harrison 
(formerly Chief Investment Strategist with Deutsche Asset Management); 
Prof. Joseph Huber; Paul Moore (one of the UK’s leading specialists in risk 
management, regulatory affairs and corporate governance in the financial 
sector with twenty-seven years experience of UK and other regulatory 
regimes); James Robertson (British-born political and economic thinker and 
activist, publisher of 14 books); Gordon Styles; and Prof. Richard Werner; 
in addition to advisors (who wish to remain anonymous) at the Bank of 
England, RBS and Lloyds Banking Group, the International Monetary Fund, 
and the BBC.
4. Mortgage, company, government, student and credit card debt is a massive 
dead weight on economy activity.
5. For Irving Fisher this refers to 200BC–500AD, for Graeber 800BC–600AD.
6. Deleuze and Guattari identify three different social machines: The primitive 
territorial machine of savage society; the imperial despotic machine of 
barbarian society; and the capitalist immanent machine of civilized society. 
7. For Graeber, 2000BC–800AD.
8. A recent study of financial power by researchers at the Swiss Federal Institute 
of Technology shows how this structurally embedded form of power works 
in practice. Analysing the degree of connectivity amongst networks of 
transnational companies, the findings reveal a web of ownership linking the 
largest transnational corporations (TNCs), whereby a ‘super-entity’ formed 
through interlocking ownerships involving just 147 of them controls 40% 
of the entire network of 43,060 TNCs. Most of this ‘tightly knit’ entity were 
financial institutions, and the connections include shared ownership in 
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each other. The map of power also uncovers a wider set consisting of a core 
group of 1,318 companies which controlled 60% of global revenues (Coghlan 
and Mackenzie 2011). This concentration is the result of both preferential 
connectiveness motivated by existing power relations (players gravitate 
towards the most powerful groups, networks or individuals) and ‘naturally’ 
occurring structures relating to systems characterized by complexity. 
 So, the architecture of the network of power – showing the characteristics 
associated with small-world networks – together with the kind of business 
companies do, and the shared assumptions about the economy that unite 
decision-makers into a coherent hub, combine to establish the ‘super-entity’ 
determining the fate of the global economy. It means a small elite – the 
1%? – wields enormous power which can by-pass democratic control and 
regulations.
9. In the form of: time banks; air miles (United Airlines in the USA used to 
pay their entire worldwide PR account in frequent flyer points); electronic 
barter currencies (Trade Dollars Northwest) and international currency 
(universal); herocards in Minneapolis, Local Economic Trading Schemes; 
and, loyalty cards (Boots loyalty card has space on it for various different 
loyalty currencies). 
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